Skip to main content

Full text of "Global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction : hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, first session"

See other formats


\ 




Part I 
S. Hrg. 104-422 



GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION 



Y 4.G 74/9: S, HRG. 104-422/ 
PT.l 

Global ProliferatioB of Weapons of... 




HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

PERMANENT 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON 
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 



PART I 



OCTOBER 31 AND NOVEMBER 1, 1995 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs 



I ^«^P: 



documents ] 




JUh 



1^98 



Part I 
S. Hrg. 104-422 



GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

PERiVIANENT 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON 
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 



PART I 



OCTOBER 31 AND NOVEMBER 1, 1995 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs 




U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
20-875 cc WASHINGTON : 1996 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 

Superintendent of DocumenLs. Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 

ISBN 0-16-052543-8 



COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman 
WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware JOHN GLENN, Ohio 

WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine SAM NUNN, Georgia ^ 

FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi DAVID PRYOR, Arkansas 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

BOB SMITH, New Hampshire DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

HANK BROWN, Colorado BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

Albert L. McDermott, Staff Director 

Leonard Weiss, Minority Staff Director 

Michal Sue Prosser, Chief Clerk 



PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 

WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware, Chairman 
TED STEVENS, Alaska SAM NUNN, Georgia 

WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine JOHN GLENN, Ohio 

FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi DAVID PRYOR, Arkansas 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

BOB SMITH, New Hampshire DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

HANK BROWN, Colorado BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

Harry Damelin, Chief Counsel 

Daniel S. Gelber, Chief Counsel to the Minority 

Carla J. Martin, Chief Clerk 

John F. Sopko, Deputy Chief Counsel to the Minority 

Alan Edelman, Counsel to the Minority 

(II) 



CONTENTS 



Opening statements: p 

Senator Stevens I -^X 

Senator Nunn ."^!!!!!!!!!!."!! 4' 150 

Senator Cohen 7' 1^9 

Senator Glenn ""3ZZZZZZZ"Z'""'Z 9 

Senator Lugar [ex officio] in ie;o 

Prepared statement: ' 

Senator Roth 2 

Senator Akaka o 

WITNESSES 
October 31, 1995 

John F. Sopko, Deputy Chief Counsel to the Minority, accompanied by Alan 
Edelman, Counsel to the Minority, Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga- 

LIOIIS , 1C 

^^ A £^ 9'^°"' ^^"^°^ ^*^^^' ^™^ Control and Proliferation Analysis Center 

lAisC, Inc ' •./^q 

LTC Edward M Eitzen, Jr., M.D., M.P.H., Chief, Preventive Medicine Depart- 
ment, Medical Division, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 

-L'lSG^SGS IIO 

James iV Genovese, Chief, Chemical/Biological Counterterrorism Team Edge- 
wood Research Development and Engineering Center, U.S. Army Chemical 
and Biological Defense Command II9 

Yumiko Hiraoka, Aum Shinrikyo Nun and Sect Leader, New York City Chap- 
ter, accompanied by Jeremiah Gutman, Esq . 135 

November 1, 1995 

Amy E. Smithson, Senior Associate, Henry L. Stimson Center 153 

Dr_ Vil S.Mirzayanov former Chief, Counterintelligence Department, State 
Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology, Moscow, Russia 166 

Milton Leitenberg Senior Fellow, Center for International and Security Stud- 
ies, University of Maryland ^ J7Q 

Michael Moodie, President, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute 1 186 

Dr^ Gordon C. Oehler, Director, Nonproliferation Center, Central Intelligence 

/agency 210 

Connie J. Fenchel Director, Strategic Investigations Division, Office of Oper- 
ations, Office of Investigations, U.S. Customs Service 225 

John P. O'Neill, Special Supervisory Agent, Chief, Counterterrorism Section 

a ederal Bureau of Investigation . 236 

°Pu'brHfalSsef^"e°:: '■'■''■■ °'"='"' °«""= °' ^'""'^''^ Preparedness. 

Z4o 



(III) 



IV 

Page 

Alphabetical List of Witnesses 

Eitzen, Lt. Col. Edward M. Jr.: 

Testimony 112 

Prepared Statement 115 

Fenchel, Connie J.: 

Testimony 225 

Prepared Statement 229 

Genovese, James A.: ^ 

Testimony 119 

Prepared Statement 122 

Hiraoka, Yumiko: 

Testimony 135 

Holmes, H. Allen: 

Testimony 243 

Prepared Statement 245 

Leitenberg, Milton: 

Testimony 170 

Prepared Statement 177, 285 

Mirzayanov, Vil S.: 

Testimony 166 

Moodie, Michael: 

Testimony 186 

Prepared Statement 190 

O'Neill, John P.: 

Testimony 236 

Prepared Statement 240 

Oehler, Gordon C: 

Testimony 210 

Prepared Statement 214 

Olson, Kyle B.: 

Testimony 103 

Prepared Statement 109 

Smithson, Amy E.: 

Testimony 153 

Prepared Statement 156 

Sopko, John F.: 

Testimony 15 

Prepared Staff Statement 47 

Young, Frank E.: 

Testimony 248 

Prepared Statement 251 



APPENDIX 
Exhibit List 

1. a. The Henry L. Stimson Center News Advisory dated October 2 1995 

accompanying The Henry L. Stimson Center Report No. 17, dated 
October 1995, entitled "Chemical Weapons Disarmament In Russia: 
Problems and Prospects" 368 

b.The Henry L. Stimson Center News Advisory dated November 1, 
1995 accompanying The Henry L. Stimson Center Report No. is' 
dated October 1995, entitled "The U.S. Senate and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention: The Price of Inaction" 445 

2. a. Study, "The Conversion of Biological Warfare Research and Develop- 

ment Facilities to Peaceful Uses," by Milton Leitenberg, published 

by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1994 * 

b. Commentary, "The Biological Weapons Program of the Former So- 
viet Union," by Milton Leitenberg, published by The International 
Association of Biological Standardization, 1993 * 

3. a. Report, 'The Weapons Proliferation Threat" prepared by Non- 

proliferation Center, Central Intelligence Agency, March 1995 482 

b. Report, "The Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat," prepared 
by Nonprohferation Center, Central Intelligence Agency, 1995 501 

4. Statement for the Record of Stanley A. Weiss, Chairman, American 

Premier, Inc. and Business Executives for National Security * 

5. a. Certificate of Incorporation of Aum USA Company, Limited 546 

b. Charities Registration Statement of Aum USA Co., Ltd 553 

c. Documents concerning International Tesla Society, Inc. provided bv 
Aum USA Co., Ltd _ 555 

d.Aum document entitled "Beyond Life and Death" 558 

e. Purported transcript of video message by Shoko Asahara, taped 

for NHK-TV, March 24, 1995, provided by Aum 562 

f Miscellaneous documents subpoenaed from Yumiko Hiraoka Aum 

Shinrikyo Nun and Sect Leader, New York City Chapter '. * 

^ ^- Study, "Chemical And Biological Terrorism: The Threat According 
fo The Open Literature," prepared by the Canadian Security Intel- 
ligence Service, June 1995 * 

b. August 1995 issue of Commentary, a publication of the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service, "The Threat of Chemical Biological 
Terrorism" " * 

7. United Nations Security Council Report dated October 11 1995 "Re- 

port of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation 
ol the Special Commission's plan for the ongoing monitoring and 
verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C 
of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)" 563 

8. "Investigation Report On Noxious Gas Toxication of Matsumoto City " 

prepared by Matsumoto City Region Comprehensive Medical Coun- 
cil, March 1995 (English and Japanese versions) * 

9. Report "The Matsumoto Incident: Sarin Poisoning In A Japanese 

Residential Community," by Kyle B. Olson, Chemical and Biological 
Arms Control Institute g03 



(V) 



VI 

Page 

10. a. Foreign Broadcast Information Service JPRS Report, "Terrorism — 

Special Edition: 20 March Poison Gas Attack in Tokyo Subway," 

dated April 2, 1995 * 

b. Foreign Broadcast Information Service JPRS Report, "Terrorism — 
Special Edition: 20 March Poison Gas Attack in Tokyo Subway; 
1-13 April Reportage," dated April 26, 1995 * 

11. Miscellaneous translations by the Congressional Research Service of 

Japanese documents prepared at the request of Permanent Sub- 
committee on Investigations * 

12. SEALED EXHIBIT: September 1995 Japanese National Police report * 

13. a. SEALED EXHIBIT: Letter from the Embassy of Australia, dated 

October 24, 1995, to Senator Sam Nunn, Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations, transmitting a report entitled "The Australian 
Investigation of the Aum Shinrikyo Sect" prepared by the Aus- 
tralian Federal Police * 

b. Redacted copy: Letter from the Embassy of Australia, dated October 
24, 1995, to Senator Sam Nunn, Permanent Subcommittee on Inves- 
tigations, transmitting a report entitled "The Australian Investiga- 
tion of the Aum Shinrikyo Sect" prepared by the Australian Federal 
Police 608 

14. a. SEALED EXHIBIT: "The Australian Investigation of the Aum 

Shinrikyo Sect," report prepared by the Australian Federal Police 

for the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations * 

b. Redacted copy: "The Australian Investigation of the Aum Shinrikyo 
Sect," report prepared by the Australian Federal Police for the Sen- 
ate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 619 

15. SEALED EXHIBIT: "Overview of Aum Shinrikyo Investigation in Aus- 

tralia," prepared by Austrahan Federal Police, June 27, 1995 * 

16. a. SEALED EXHIBIT: Video produced by The Australian Federal Po- 

lice regarding Operation Seaking * 

b. Video produced by The Australian Federal Police regarding Oper- 
ation Seaking * 

17. SEALED EXHIBIT: Document received from U.S. Naval Criminal In- 

vestigative Service, re: Aum Shinrikyo * 

18. SEALED EXHIBIT: Documents received from Federal Aviation Ad- 

ministration, re: Aum Shinrikyo * 

19. Materials received from Biosym Technologies, San Diego, California, 

re: Aum Shinrikyo 658 

20. Materials received from Tripos, Inc., St. Louis, Missouri, re: Aum 

Shinrikyo 682 

21. Materials received from Rothco of Smithtown, New York, re: Aum 

Shinrikyo 691 

22. Materials received from International Tesla Society, Inc., re: Aum 

Shinrikyo 722 

23. "Ten Myths About The Chemical Weapons Convention" by loanna 

Iliopulos, Business Executive for National Security, September 1995 * 

24. Miscellaneous materials downloaded from Internet, re: Aum Shinrikyo 

cult, terrorism, and weapon designs * 

25. Supreme Initiation: An Empirical Spiritual Science for the Supreme 

Truth, by Shoko Asahara, published by AUM USA Co., Ltd., 1988 * 

26. Declaring Myself the Christ: Disclosing the True Meanings of Jesus 

Christ's Gospel, by Shoko Asahara, published by Aum Publishing 

Co, Ltd., 1992 * 

27. Vajrayana Sacca, Volume Nos. 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10, published by Aum 

Shinrikyo * 

28. Report, "Antisemitism in Japan: Its History and Current Implica- 

tions," by David G. Goodman, 1995 * 



VII 

Page 

29. Background Paper 'Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass De- 

struction," prepared by the Office of Technology Assessment, United 
States Congress, dated December 1993 * 

30. Booklet, "Deterrence and Defense in an NBC Environment: Implica- 

tions for U.S. Military Strategy and Operations," prepared by B. 
Joseph and J. Reichart, Center for Counter Proliferation Research, 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense Univer- 
sity * 

31. Tokyo Journal article entitled "Death In The Air: The Attack of Nazi 

Nerve Gas," April 1995 * 

32. Video, Toyko Nerve Gas story, March 20, 1995, Eyewitness News * 

33. Video, deposition of Philip Rupani before the Permanent Subcommit- 

tee on Investigations, October 17, 1995 * 

34. a. SEALED EXHIBIT: Video, deposition of Yumiko Hiraoka before 

the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, October 18, 1995 * 

b. Audio cassette, deposition of Yumiko Hiraoka before the Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, October 18, 1995 * 

35. Video of Aum Shinrikyo's activities in Australia shown at Permanent 

Subcommittee on Investigations' hearing on October 31, 1995 * 

36. Video, Japanese TV out-takes, re: Aum Shinrikyo facility * 

37. Report, "Terrorism Studies Program — Preventing Super-Terrorism: Bi- 

ological, Chemical, Nuclear, Report of a Study Group Meeting," 
The George Washington University, August 12, 1995 * 

38. Letter from Embassy of Japan, dated October 26, 1995, to John Sopko, 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations: re: photographs of Aum 
Shinrikyo members * 

39. Sinki, November 20, 1992, Volume 68, re: Japanese article discussing 

Asahara and other 40 members of Aum Shinrikyo cult invited to 
Zaire for purpose of medical and nutritional aid * 

40. Letter to Dan Gelber, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 

dated October 15, 1995, from Jeremiah S. Gutman, attorney for 
Yumiko Hiraoka, regarding Yumiko Hiraoka's appearance before 
the Subcommittee * 

41. Three media reports submitted for the record by Senator William 

Cohen: Asahi News Services, January 4, 1995, "Mystery Gas Chokes 
Yamanashi Villages"; The Daily Yomiuri, January 8, 1995, "Cult 
Sues TBS Over Report"; Sunday Times (London), March 19, 1995, 
"Did Terrorists Kill With Deadly Nerve Gas Test?" * 

42. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations' charts: 

a. "Aum Shinrikyo Activities in Russia" * 

b. Photos of interior of Aum Shinrikyo facilities * 

43. November/December 1995 letters between Senator Carl Levin, Mem- 

ber of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, and Dr. Gor- 
don Oehler, Director, Nonproliferation Center, Central Intelligence 
Agency, regarding Chemical Weapons Convention * 



May be found in the files of the Subcommittee. 



GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION 



TUESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1995 

U.S. Senate, 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 

Washington, DC. 

The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations met, pursuant to 
notice, at 9:36 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Build- 
ing, Hon. Ted Stevens presiding. 

Present: Senators Stevens, Nunn, Cohen, Glenn, Dorgan, and 
Akaka. Also present: Senator Lugar. 

Staff present: Daniel S. Gelber, Chief Counsel to the Minority; 
John Sopko, Deputy Chief Counsel to the Minority; Alan Edelman, 
Counsel to the Minority; Mark Webster, Investigator to the Minor- 
ity; Mary Robertson, Assistant Chief Clerk to the Minority; Richard 
Kennan (Detailee, U.S. Customs); Renee Pruneau-Novakoff 
(Detailee, CIA); Harold Damelin, Chief Counsel and Staff Director; 
Eric Thorson, Chief Investigator; Michael Bopp, Counsel; Stephen 
H. Levin, Counsel; Ariadne Allen, Investigator; Jack Cobb, Coun- 
sel; Christopher Greer, Investigator; Susanne Horner, Librarian; 
Mary Ailes, Staff Assistant; Carla J. Martin, Chief Clerk; Ken 
Myers (Senator Lugar); Dan Bob (Senator Roth); John Roots (Sen- 
ator Stevens); Jim Bodner (Senator Cohen); Al McDermott (Govern- 
mental Affairs Committee); Christine Ciccione (Governmental Af- 
fairs Committee); Matt Sikes (Senator Nunn); Rick Valentine (Sen- 
ator Smith); Nina Bang-Jensen (Senator Lieberman); Debra Wada 
(Senator Akaka); Len Weiss (Governmental Affairs Committee); 
Randy Rydell (Cxovernmental Affairs Committee); and Tom Griffith 
(Senate Legal Counsel). 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STEVENS 

Senator Stevens. My apologies for being late. All the tour people 
are in from Alaska, and 25 people for me is like 5,000 people for 
you, Sam. 

Let me thank all of you for being here. The Subcommittee is 
going to continue a series of hearings on the serious and growing 
worldwide threat that is posed by the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, which encompass chemical, biological, and nu- 
clear weapons, and weapons material. These hearings today and to- 
morrow will focus specifically on the risks resulting from the pro- 
liferation of chemical and biological weapons by examining as a 
case study the sarin gas attack on a Tokyo subway station by the 
Japanese cult known as Aum Shinrikyo. 

(1) 



Senator Roth is unable to be here today. He is the Chair of the 
Permanent Subcommittee. We will put Senator Roth's statement in 
the record at the beginning of this hearing. 

[The prepared statements of Senator Roth and Senator Akaka 
follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR. 

A new era in the use of weapons of mass destruction is upon us. Consider that 
the same substances used in certain detergents, ceramics and even pen ink are key 
ingredients to lethal chemical weapons. Consider also that deadly biological agents 
may be extracted from seemingly-innocuous plants, may be produced in the labora- 
tory in almost unlimited quantities, and may be ordered from private suppliers for 
ostensible research purposes. With these facts in mind, understand that madness 
has recognized the deadly simplicity and availability of chemical and biological 
weapons, and is reaching to these agents as its newest method. 

This Subcommittee has a longstanding history of investigating and exposing the 
problem of weapons proliferation. The record we have created chronicles the spread 
of chemical and biological weapons throughout the world, the threat to domestic and 
global security posed by the conventional arms bazaar, and the black market for nu- 
clear materials. Today we turn reluctant eyes to another page from this somber 
compendium 

The chapter we now examine is perhaps the most chilling. It describes the hor- 
rible potential of chemical and biological weapons that we first examined back in 
1989. Today, after a religious cult in Japan known as the "Aum Shinrikyo" cruelly 
and barbarously unleashed this horrible potential on innocents, we must revisit this 
subject. What was once science fiction is now reality. 

This hearing focuses on the Aum Shinrikyo as an example of what can happen 
when madness finds a method. The madness, in this case, began with a man named 
Shoko Asahara, a disaffected yoga instructor who formed a religious cult in the mid- 
1980s and named it Shinrikyo, or "supreme truth" in Sanskrit. The cult was devoted 
to Siva, the Hindu god of destruction and reproduction, and predicted Armageddon 
in 1997. It attracted up to sixty-five thousand members worldwide, including an es- 
timated ten thousand followers in Japan, more than thirty thousand in Russia, and 
numerous others around the rest of the world, including in the United States. 

In the late 1980s, the Aum secured protected status as a religious corporation and 
began amassing large quantities of cash, land and other assets through questionable 
means. Asahara organized the cult by establishing a ministerial cabinet patterned 
after the Japanese government. 

Its finances and structure in place, the Aum turned its attention to finding a 
method through which it could carry out Asahara's mad ambitions. The Aum is al- 
leged to have engaged in a bewildering number of sinister activities, which can be 
divided into three categories. The first consists of the Aum's elaborate, malicious 
preparations. These included a uranium-mining and chemical-testing expedition to 
the Australian outback where Aum scientists experimented with sarin on sheep; an 
attempt by the cult's office in New York to purchase a highly sophisticated laser 
device capable of measuring plutonium; the construction of factories to manufacture 
chemical, biological, and conventional weapons; and the development of a microwave 
device the size of a refrigerator to dispose of bodies, and a laser cannon for use 
against the Tokyo police. 

The second category is comprised of attempts to murder innocent civilians and 
government officials. In addition to other attempts, the Aum spread anthrax bac- 
teria from the top of a Tokyo building; deployed briefcases containing small fans in- 
tended to spread chemical and biological agents in covert fashion; and, in a Tokyo 
subway restroom, set on fire two plastic bags of chemicals, which, had they not been 
found quickly and extinguished, would have combined to produce a cloud of deadly 
hydrogen cyanide gas. 

The third category is comprised of actual killings allegedly committed by the Aum. 
Among these are the grisly tale of a remodeled two-ton truck spraying sarin in a 
residential area of Matsumoto resulting in seven deaths and five hundred injured; 
the March 20, 1995 Tokyo subway gassing resulting in twelve deaths and five thou- 
sand injured; and the murder of both cult "enemies" and disobedient followers by 
lethal injection. 

Perhaps the most obvious lesson we can learn from the Aum is this: Chemical and 
biological weapons can be produced and deployed by organized, well-funded and sci- 
entifically-knowledgeable groups. A related concern is that, if a group cannot 
produce chemical or biological weapons itself, it may find them for sale. 



The conditions for the creation of a chemical and biological weapons black market 
appear to exist already. The Department of Defense reports that dozens of countries 
have some biological and/or chemical systems capabilities. Russia alone has an esti- 
mated stockpile of forty thousand metric tons of chemical weapons protected by se- 
curity systems described as "rudimentary." A recent article in the Washington Times 
notes that a former Soviet military office is under investigation for aiding in the 
shipment of nearly a ton of chemical substances to unidentified Middle East buyers 
in 1993. 

This summer, Iraq admitted to having developed a large biological weapons pro- 
gram. More recently, Iraqi officials have been accused of withholding information 
from a United Nations group monitoring the disposal of these weapons. 

Here in the United States, I think we have been surprised to find ourselves more 
than simply spectators to these troubling events. Earlier this year, two men in Min- 
neapolis were convicted of possessing ricin, a biological toxin twice as lethal as the 
deadliest cobra venom. Also this year, a Columbus, Ohio man allegedly obtained 
three vials of bubonic plague bacteria from a private supplier of biological cultures. 
And with sadness, we remember the tragedy in Oklahoma City, where agricultural 
fertilizer was mixed with fuel oil to create an explosion our nation will never forget. 

We must squarely address the face of terrorism by working diligently to prevent 
the unlawful diversion and production of chemical and biological weapons. Globally, 
it may be time to refine our arms controls conventions to better counter the threats 
posed by terrorist organizations. Domestically, the Senate has passed an anti-terror- 
ism measure designed to help law enforcement agencies thwart terrorist attempts 
and to stiffen the penalties on such reprehensible activities. The idea is to bolster 
both prevention and deterrence, and it is a good one. This measure should become 
law. 

Terrorist groups like the Aum Shinrikyo rely upon anonymity and surprise in 
order to accomplish their objectives. I believe that through hearings such as this we 
help raise awareness of terrorism, its objectives, and its methods. Our message is 
not just to beware, but to be aware of terrorist methods in order to halt these orga- 
nizations before they act. 

I commend the distinguished ranking member. Senator Nunn, and his staff for 
their efforts to bring these problems to the public's attention. For years, my col- 
leagues. Senators Nunn and Lugar, have warned of weapons of mass destruction 
with clarion voice, and their efforts deserve our praise. 

I also thank the Japanese and Tokyo governments for their cooperation with the 
Subcommittee. They have done our country a great service in helping to shed light 
on the Aum Shinrikyo and its perverse pursuits. 

Before closing, I want to point out a fundamental challenge groups like the Aum 
present to Japan, the United States and the rest of the democratic world. The chal- 
lenge is to strike a balance between security and associational and religious free- 
doms. We must pursue domestic security with care, so that we do not sacrifice free- 
doms central to democracy. 



PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA 

Mr. Chairman, today's hearing focuses on a profound threat to world peace — the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The use of chemical, biological and nu- 
clear weapons and the procurement of materials to manufacture these weapons, par- 
ticularly by terrorist organizations, pose a significant threat to our national security, 
as well as to peace efforts around the world. 

One only has to look at the Middle East to see that delicate efforts to bring peace 
to the region are being threatened by fringe terrorist groups. The Japanese cult, 
Aum Shinrikyo, is another example of the potential threat that the United States 
and our allies face. The bombing of the World Trade Center and the Oklahoma Fed- 
eral Building and the derailing of an Amtrack train in Arizona show only to clearly 
the threats we face here in the United States. Today's hearing will show that Amer- 
icans are not immune to the growing threat posed by the proliferation of chemical, 
biological and nuclear weapons. The time has come for us to confront this issue and 
to determine a course of action to respond to this rising specter of danger. 

The ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention would be the first step to 
ensure that future generations of Americans are safeguarded from the horrors of 
chemical weapons. It can also serve as a model for other arms control and verifica- 
tion treaties. 

Senator Stevens, I am pleased to be here today, and I commend Senator Nunn 
and Senator Roth for their leadership in this area. I look forward to learning more 
about the threat from weapons of mass destruction to our country and the world. 



Senator Stevens. On March 20 of this year, the world was 
stunned by the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway station that 
killed 12 people and injured over 5,000. I think there is no question 
that these weapons are menacing because countries or individuals 
seeking mass destruction capability find them relatively cheap to 
produce and do not demand the elaborate technical infi'astructure 
needed to make nuclear weapons. 

These hearings raise very timely and important questions, both 
for the world community and for our Nation. We have seen all too 
clearly that we are not immune fi"om terrorist acts. This investiga- 
tion has been conducted by the Subcommittee's minority staff, and 
I commend the Subcommittee's ranking minority member, Senator 
Nunn, and his staff for the outstanding work they have done on 
this important investigation. 

Senator Lugar, I am please very much to have you here. While 
not a Member of this Subcommittee, we also commend you for the 
fine work you have done in this area. You have a long-standing 
commitment to this important issue, and I appreciate the attend- 
ance of the witnesses who have agreed to come before the Sub- 
committee. Let me yield now to Senator Nunn. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR NUNN 

Senator NuNN. Thank you very much. Chairman Stevens. 

Today we begin a series of hearings to examine the global pro- 
liferation of weapons of mass destruction. As we stand at the 
threshold of the 21st century, there is perhaps no greater threat to 
this Nation and, indeed, to the world's national security than the 
illicit spread of these awesome and awful devices. 

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet Communism 
eliminated what many considered to be the gravest threat to our 
world stability and security, that is, the threat of an all-out con- 
frontation and even war between the two superpowers. We have 
moved fi"om an era of high risk but also high stability to a climate 
of much lower risk but also much less stability. In many ways, the 
world is a far more unstable place today than it was a decade ago. 
Ethnic, religious, racial, and political conflicts have led to an in- 
creasing level of violence and terrorism around the globe. It seems 
no place is immune today — not the marketplaces of Sarajevo, not 
the buses of Tel Aviv, not the subways of Paris, not the office build- 
ings of New York or Oklahoma City. Zealotry in the name of a 
cause has created individuals and groups who are increasingly will- 
ing to do the unthinkable. Unfortunately, the ability to obtain 
weapons of mass destruction and carry out the unthinkable is in- 
creasingly coming within their grasp. 

While the fall of the Soviet Union has certainly diminished the 
risk of a major war between the United States and a would-be 
challenger, it has also created new risks which could have a very 
severe impact on the United States. Never before has an empire 
collapsed leaving some 30,000 nuclear weapons, hundreds of tons 
of fissile material, at least 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, ad- 
vanced biological weapons, huge stores of sophisticated conven- 
tional weapons, and literally thousands of scientists with the 
knowledge to make all of these very sophisticated weapons. As the 
remnants of that empire struggle to achieve democratic reforms 



and build a free-market economy, the challenge facing the Rus- 
sians, and the entire world, is to ensure that the former Soviet 
Union does not become a vast supermarket for the most deadly in- 
struments known to man. Unfortunately, there are already many 
prospective customers. 

At the same time, the inexorable advance of science and commu- 
nications has made the technology of these instruments available 
to an ever-widening' audience. The ingredients for sarin and other 
chemical weapons are easily accessible today over the Internet, as 
is information about biological weapons and even instructions as to 
how to make a nuclear device. The scenario of a terrorist group ei- 
ther obtaining or manufacturing and using a weapon of mass de- 
struction is no longer the stuff of science fiction or even adventure 
movies. It is a reality which has come to pass and one which, if we 
do not take appropriate measures, will increasingly threaten us in 
the future. 

Indeed, it is just that reality which has led to today's hearing. 
In an event that was little noticed at the time outside of Japan, 7 
people died and over 500 were treated at hospitals when a mysteri- 
ous vapor seeped into the open windows of an apartment complex 
in the city of Matsumoto on June 27, 1994. While some experts ul- 
timately concluded that the vapor was the deadly nerve gas sarin, 
no group ever claimed credit for the incident and no arrests were 
made. As a result, the world paid little attention to the Matsumoto 
City incident. 

The world was forced to pay attention, however, on the morning 
of March 20, 1995. On that day, at the height of the morning rush 
hour, several members of a religious cult which preached Armaged- 
don between the United States and Japan unleashed a sarin gas 
attack on the innocent civilian riders of the Tokyo subway system. 
The attack specifically targeted a central station in the heart of the 
city which served the major government agencies of the Japanese 
Government. 

Twelve persons were killed and over 5,000 were injured. If the 
cult had crafted a more efficient delivery system prior to their at- 
tack, the death toll could have easily soared into the tens of thou- 
sands. Nevertheless, the relatively low death toll fi-om this attack 
is a credit to the excellent work of the Japanese emergency re- 
sponse and health authorities. As a result of the investigation 
which followed the Tokyo attack, Japanese authorities were able to 
develop evidence that this cult had also carried out the earlier at- 
tack which I alluded to in Matsumoto City. 

The cult, known as the Aum Shinrikyo, thus gained the distinc- 
tion of becoming the first group, other than a nation during war- 
time, to use chemical weapons on a major scale. I believe this at- 
tack signals the world has entered into a new era. Because of these 
concerns, I directed the Subcommittee minority staff to examine 
the activities of the Aum and to report back to the Subcommittee 
and to the Senate on the lessons to be learned from this group. 
Their report is deeply disturbing. 

For example, this was a group which, in furtherance of its reli- 
gious and political goals, sought to acquire and planned to use 
some of the deadliest weapons known to man. 



The Aum had built its own chemical manufacturing plant in 
which it produced such chemical agents as sarin and VX gas. They 
had also built a plant to develop biological weapons and may have 
developed such agents as botulin toxin and anthrax. 

With over $1 billion in assets, money was no object for this 
group. They were willing to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars 
at a time on pieces of equipment to aid in their weaponization pro- 
gram. They were even willing to consider the cost of buying a nu- 
clear weapon. 

The Aum's reach stretched literally around the world as they 
sought to fulfill the prophecies of their leader. The Aum had made 
extensive contacts in Russia in an effort to obtain military training, 
equipment, and weapons, including laser weapons and even nu- 
clear weapons. They had traveled to Australia to mine uranium 
and to carry out tests with chemical agents. They even had mem- 
bers working here in the United States attempting to obtain ad- 
vanced technology and equipment to help them carry out weapons 
production. 

As we will hear today, the Aum's office in the United States was 
accessing and attempting to purchase sophisticated computer pro- 
grams and equipment with potential military applications. 

Despite all this activity, and despite the fact that the group's 
doomsday philosophy was primarily against the United States, the 
Aum was virtually unknown to U.S. intelligence or law enforce- 
ment prior to the March 20 subway attack. In an age when we 
have witnessed two major terrorist attacks on targets in the United 
States, anything other than constant vigilance in this area could 
have catastrophic consequences. Yet preventing groups such as the 
Aum ft^om arising in the future and obtaining similar destructive 
capabilities is an extremely complex problem. It is not one that will 
be solved in 1 or 2 years. It is not one that will yield to simple solu- 
tions. It is a problem which will have to be fought on many fi'onts: 

We must develop a real awareness of the proliferation threat 
among the public and, in particular, among the business and sci- 
entific communities which are the source of much of the precursor 
technology and materials which are vital to these groups. 

We must also beef up our human intelligence, and that means 
we must develop better coordination between intelligence and law 
enforcement, not only in this country but also around the world. 

We must develop a global strategy, one which includes the coun- 
tries of the former Soviet Union and, in particular, Russia to im- 
prove our capabilities worldwide to track and trace nuclear, chemi- 
cal, and biological material. This means we must concentrate on re- 
search and development efforts to greatly improve our capabilities 
to detail, trace, and track weapons of mass destruction. 

We must enhance export control regimes worldwide and develop 
better technologies for better border control. 

We must also make maximum use of arms control agreements 
such as START II and of international treaties and conventions 
such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Con- 
vention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. And that gets 
right here at home in the Senate. 

We must have a global coordinated effort against international 
organized crime and terrorism. 



We must intensify our cooperative efforts with the countries of 
the former Soviet Union to help them destroy their excess weapons 
and materials, improve their accounting and storage for those they 
do maintain, and constructive economic alternatives for their sci- 
entists who will otherwise inevitably be tempted to sell their 
knowledge to Libya, North Korea, or groups around the world such 
as the Aum. 

On this last point, we will hear tomorrow from a number of ex- 
perts who will discuss the controls on chemical and biological weap- 
ons in the former Soviet Union, including a former Soviet chemical 
weapons scientist who will express his concerns on this issue. 

It is my hope that the Subcommittee's hearings today and tomor- 
row, Mr. Chairman, will help to focus attention on these issues. 
The activities of the Aum should serve as a warning to us all. This 
is a lesson we will ignore at our own peril. 

Before I conclude, I would like to thank the Government of 
Japan for the assistance they have provided to the Subcommittee 
in connection with this investigation. On relatively short notice 
they arranged for the Subcommittee staff to travel to Tokyo and 
provided them with a series of highly informative briefings from a 
number of key agencies and ministries. They have been candid and 
forthcoming in their discussions with our Subcommittee, and they 
have been very gracious in responding to the Subcommittee's re- 
quests. The United States and Japan have forged a valuable part- 
nership over the years, and the cooperation the Japanese Govern- 
ment has exhibited in this matter proves the worth of that partner- 
ship again. 

I would like to note the assistance of the Australian Government 
in this matter as well. They, too, have been gracious in providing 
the Subcommittee with important information and documents 
which were an invaluable aid to this investigation. I would also ac- 
knowledge the assistance of Russian authorities in this matter. 

I would also, Mr. Chairman, thank you and thank Senator Roth 
and the entire majority staff for their cooperation and support in 
connection with this hearing. Last, but certainly not least, I would 
like to join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming our good friend. Sen- 
ator Dick Lugar, who has worked diligently on these issues with 
me and with others over the years, and certainly he is an expert 
in this area and has taken the lead on many of these areas legisla- 
tively. Senator Lugar, we are delighted to have you. 

Senator Cohen, it is good to be with you, as usual, in your dili- 
gent work on this Subcommittee, so I look forward, Mr. Chairman, 
to hearing from the staff and from our witnesses this morning. 

Senator Stevens. Senator Cohen, do you have an opening state- 
ment? 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COHEN 

Senator Cohen. I do, Mr. Chairman. I will try and make it as 
brief as possible. 

For years, the threat of terrorists acquiring and using nuclear, 
biological, chemical or other weapons of mass destruction has been 
the realm of fiction, speculated upon by authors ranging from 
Larry Collins to Stephen King (as well as a less well-known author 
from Bangor, Maine). 



8 

In March, however, the world was shocked by the news that a 
hitherto unknown rehgious cult in Japan had unleashed a nerve 
gas attack in the Tokyo subway system. As one of our witnesses 
will tell us this morning, we would not have been shocked had we 
been paying attention, for this same cult had staged an even more 
sophisticated — although, fortunately, less deadly — nerve gas attack 
last year in Japan. 

What really is shocking is that this cult had established a global 
network of individuals engaged in the acquisition of advanced tech- 
nology, the acquisition of weapons, the testing of weapons, the rais- 
ing of funds, and possibly the planning of attacks outside Japan — 
this and the fact that this network operated beneath the gaze of 
the U.S. intelligence and under the nose of Japanese law enforce- 
ment. 

With the leader of the Aum now in the dock in Tokyo, some 
might be inclined to view the case as a bizarre bit of history or at 
most, as one Japanese publication put it: Japan's answer to the 
O.J. trial. But the past is prelude, and having ignored the implica- 
tions of the 1994 gas attack in Japan, we will have only ourselves 
to blame if we are caught off guard next time. 

Countries that we know to be sponsors of international terrorism, 
such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria, have devoted considerable re- 
sources to developing and producing biological and chemical weap- 
ons. It does not require much imagination to envision that those 
who hire terrorists to blow up jumbo jets might also enlist them 
to poison our population. 

And, as the Aum case demonstrates, even small but dedicated 
groups can develop the means to unleash death on an unsuspecting 
society. As the witnesses today will testify, the Aum not only devel- 
oped the ability to produce and deliver chemical weapons, it also 
had begun taking steps to develop biological weapons and had nu- 
clear ambitions, as well. 

Our witnesses will also testify to the fact that there are no easy 
solutions. The very nature of our free and open society makes us 
America, the vulnerable. 

To cite one example, the Senate's consideration of the Anti-Ter- 
rorism Bill last spring highlighted the delicate balance that must 
be struck in a free society between protecting our civil liberties and 
protecting our citizens lives. While some point to the Branch 
Davidian case as an example of excessive use of force by the state, 
our witnesses today will testify that the Aum case demonstrates 
excessiveness at the other end of the spectrum. The unfettered 
freedom given religious groups by the Japanese Government appar- 
ently contributed directly to thousamds of innocent casualties that 
resulted from the Aum's nerve gas attacks last year and this 
spring. 

While the Japanese and American legal and social contexts are 
very different, the Aum case holds lessons for us as we continue 
the always ongoing quest for how best to "insure the domestic tran- 
quillity" and "secure the blessings of liberty." 

One lesson is that if prevention fails, then proper preparation 
can minimize the consequences of an attack. I believe that during 
the coming 2 days of hearings, one message we will hear repeatedly 
is that the United States can be much better prepared than we cur- 



rently are and that much of what needs to be done involves not bil- 
Hons for new technology but better coordination among Federal 
agencies and between Federal and local officials. 

During consideration of the Anti-Terrorism Bill, the Senate 
adopted an amendment drafted by Senator Nunn and others re- 
garding use of the Armed Forces to respond to chemical weapons 
and biological weapons attacks. 

Attached to it was an amendment I drafted requiring the Execu- 
tive Branch to improve the coordination among the many Federal 
agencies that have a role in countering the chemical weapons and 
biological weapons threat. It also required improvements in civilian 
agencies' capabilities so that they do not become totally and perma- 
nently reliant on the military. 

The military has a contribution to make in addressing these 
threats, but it should play a supporting role and not the leading 
role in domestic law enforcement activities. 

I hope the coming 2 days will give us an opportunity to explore 
these and other issues related to this critical issue. 

Senator Nunn, I commend you for launching, back when you 
were chairman, these investigations into the threat posed by weap- 
ons of mass destruction. I look forward to working with you and 
other Members of the Senate to define measures to better protect 
the American people from this threat, based in part on the testi- 
mony we will receive today and tomorrow. 

Senator Stevens. Senator Glenn? 

OPENmG STATEMENT OF SENATOR GLENN 

Senator Glenn. Thank you. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman, I, too, 
want to compliment you and all those who have been involved with 
having this hearing. Over 6 years ago, the Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs and the Permanent Subcommittee on Inves- 
tigations (PSI), jointly held a series of hearings that were called 
"Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons." Out of that 
came a 746-page print that I believe still remains one of the best 
available references for those who are interested in doing back- 
ground work in this area, one of the best reference works that we 
have in leading up to the current consideration of these areas. 

I think this is much more likely to be a problem for us and other 
nations around the world by far than ICBM concerns, because this 
is so much easier to do. 

In those hearings, just to demonstrate this very briefly, back in 
those days when we had the other hearings we had the testimony 
of David Goldberg who was a chemical weapons analyst, Depart- 
ment of the Army, and I asked him at that hearing about how com- 
mon the knowledge was about how to produce these things. And he 
said you can go to any first-year organic chemistry book and at 
least get the basic chemistry for the production of some of these 
agents. It is very easy. And Judge Webster, who was the head of 
CIA at that time, I asked him about what size area would be need- 
ed to set up a plant to produce this, and I asked him compared 
with this room or a factory or a warehouse and whatever, and 
Judge Webster's testimony was, when he referred to this room, he 
said this is large enough to produce a small factory, and that is 



10 

probably about as far as I should go in being specific about it. But 
the process is not that involved. That was Judge Webster. 

So you could set up a factory, a small factory, in a place the size 
of this room. So it is no wonder we have trouble keeping up with 
where these things are all over the world, so I think it is one of 
our toughest problems. I am glad to see us following through on 
this, and I think we need a lot more attention on this thing. 

I don't know that we can solve this problem. It is so easy to 
transport this stuff. It is not like ICBMs. You can take this stuff 
and go through detectors at airports and all sorts of things. And 
yet biological weapons are as vulnerable — I mean, they are as de- 
structive as nuclear weapons except they just take a little bit more 
time as they produce their toxins and so on. It takes a little more 
time, but with a small cache of these things, you can kill as many 
people as a nuclear weapon would kill in just a few seconds. So it 
is one of our biggest problems. 

I think our first thing to do is to get the chemical weapons con- 
vention taken care of. I would like to see that get approved. At 
least that puts the stamp of disapproval of most of the industri- 
alized world on these things so we then can work forward fi*om 
that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Stevens. Senator Lugar, do you have a comment this 
morning? 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LUGAR 

Senator LUGAR. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for your 
welcome, and Senator Roth and Senator Nunn for their invitation 
to join the Committee and to work jointly with the European Af- 
fairs Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee on these 
problems. 

Conventional wisdom holds that, of many extraordinary changes 
in the world since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the one that is likely 
to have the most profound consequences for American national se- 
curity involves the expiration of Communism, and, with it, the ex- 
pansion of the Soviet adversary. However, assessed in terms of di- 
rect consequences for American security, the disappearance of So- 
viet Communism is rivaled and perhaps exceeded, in my view, by 
the collapse of the totalitarian command and control society, espe- 
cially the command and control of the superpower arsenal of weap- 
ons of mass destruction and weapons-usable materials. 

As a consequence of the collapse of this command and control so- 
ciety, the vast potential supermarket of nuclear, chemical, and bio- 
logical weapons and weapons-usable materials is becoming increas- 
ingly accessible. Absent a determined program of action that is as 
focused, serious, and vigorous as America's Cold War strategy, it 
is my view that Americans have every reason to anticipate acts of 
nuclear, chemical, or biological terrorism against American targets 
before this decade is out. 

The single most important truth about the security environment 
in which we now live is that Russia is convulsed by a genuine on- 
going revolutionary transformation of the state, the economy, the 
military, and the society. But unlike prior revolutions, history has 
chosen to store in the midst of this current Russian revolution a 



11 

superpower arsenal of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
and materials. 

For seven decades, the bad news was that a totalitarian Com- 
munist government imprisoned its entire society. But one of the 
few benign results of that totalitarian system was unquestioned 
control of dangerous weapons-usable materials, including weapons 
of mass destruction. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union 
and the death of Communism, powerful forces are now tearing 
apart the fabric of command and control in that economy, govern- 
ment, and state. Among these forces, the most powerful is the 
deepest yearning for individual freedom which, under conditions of 
disintegrating authority, is often indistinguishable from license and 
anarchy which help to breed conditions of lawlessness in which 
nothing can be secure from loss, theft, or sale. 

The human beings and systems designed by a totalitarian state 
to manage the Soviet Union's arsenal of weapons of mass destruc- 
tion are not unaffected by these developments. Over the past 3 or 
4 years, trickles of weapons-usable materials have begun showing 
up in the West. The current trickle forewarns of an impending flow 
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons materials and perhaps 
even of weapons themselves. 

With the loosening of controls over the safety and security of 
weapons-grade material that has accompanied this disintegration 
of the Soviet Union, the question arises: Has the likelihood of a 
weapon of mass destruction exploding in U.S. territory gone up or 
down? It is my view the risk has increased. 

While the probability of large-scale nuclear, chemical, or biologi- 
cal exchange has mercifully decreased, the probability that one, 
two, or a dozen weapons of mass destruction detonating in Russia, 
or Europe, or the Middle East, or even the United States, has in- 
creased. Because this threat comes in a form so unfamiliar, indeed 
so radically different from prior experience, and because the instru- 
ments and policy to address it are so unlike the "business" that the 
White House and the national security establishment have pursued 
for decades, the American political leadership, the Congress, and 
the American people have great difficulty awakening to this fact. 

These are precisely the kinds of challenges that my colleague, 
Sam Nunn, has been willing to address during his tenure in the 
Senate, and I have been pleased to join with him in tackling such 
issues during the past few years. 

On August 22 and 23, Senator Nunn and I initiated this series 
of hearings. Those initial hearings were held under the auspices of 
the European Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee. 
We called the hearings to sound a wake-up call about this most di- 
rect threat to U.S. national security interests to date and for the 
foreseeable future. The defining danger of proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction is not so much Iran's purchase of civilian nu- 
clear reactors fi'om Russia that may assist Iranian nuclear ambi- 
tions a decade hence. Rather, it is the threat today and tomorrow 
that Iran and other aspiring proliferants will purchase weapons of 
mass destruction or weapons-usable material from some fragment 
of the Russian custodial system. 

The second purpose of those hearings was to begin to define in 
some detail the shape of this new and barely recognizable threat. 



12 

American policy has long recognized the risk posed by additional 
states acquiring weapons of mass destruction, but traditional non- 
proliferation is not the leading edge of the problem. Nor is the 
main problem one of accelerating "denuclearization" and reduction 
of chemical and biological weapons by the dismantling of ready 
weapons, although this is vitually important. Rather, today the de- 
fining danger is that of the loss of control of tens or hundreds of 
pounds of weapons-usable materials, such as uranium, plutonium, 
and sarin, or, indeed, of numbers of actual weapons themselves. 

Although we were treated during the August hearings to some 
graphic descriptions of lax security at Russian nuclear facilities, 
the security at Russian nuclear facilities is considered generally 
better than the security at Russian chemical weapons storage sites. 
Indeed, many Russian scientists believe that Russia's chemical ar- 
senal presents a far more exposed and appealing target for poten- 
tial thieves and terrorists than the nuclear sites. 

The third purpose of the initial hearings was to begin to outline 
a strategy and an agenda for action that would galvanize the Presi- 
dent and the American people to adopt policy priorities and the 
requisite resources commensurate with the vital national interests 
the U.S. has in the fate of the former Soviet arsenal. To date, the 
United States response to this threat has not even begun to ap- 
proximate the U.S. stakes in the matter. 

Although there are a vast number of small U.S. programs which 
Senator Nunn and I have sponsored, and which the Senators here 
today have supported, that are designed to deal with many dif- 
ferent weapons issues in the former Soviet Union, these programs 
cumulatively address only at the margins the need to reduce the 
near- term leakage threat of materials and weapons. A new level of 
commitment, effort, and resources is required if the United States 
is to guard itself against this new threat. 

Difficult as it is, identifying a new challenge is the easier part 
of the problem. Summoning the political leadership, the political 
will and resources, and the support of the American people is hard- 
er still. Despite the threat of loose weapons of mass destruction 
and weapons-usable materials, will the political leadership of the 
country, including the Congress, step up to the plate? Do any new 
initiatives, however vital to the national interests of the United 
States, have much prospect of getting a serious hearing in the cli- 
mate of massive deficits, deep budget cuts, and shrinking leader- 
ship and imagination? 

Why is the Senate not debating the chemical weapons convention 
now, negotiated by the Bush administration, submitted by the Clin- 
ton administration, to determine how this multilateral vehicle can 
assist the United States in meeting the kind of threat and terror 
visited on Tokyo's subway system? 

Or will this new threat be given the priority it deserves only on 
the morning after the first act of nuclear, chemical, or biological 
terrorism takes place on American soil? What will we wish we had 
done? What will the administration do then? What will the Con- 
gress and the American people demand then? 

These hearings today and tomorrow are designed to force us to 
pause, reflect, prioritize, and summon political leadership and the 
support of the American people to address this new security threat 



13 

to our country. I am pleased to have an opportunity once again to 
work with my colleague, Sam Nunn, and his colleagues on this 
Subcommittee, and I commend them and the Permanent Investiga- 
tions Subcommittee for continuing this probe into a new and 
present danger to the United States. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The media release from Senator Lugar follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LUGAR 

LUGAR WARNS OF PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

Senator Calls Weapons Proliferation "Greatest Threat to Our National 

Security" 

WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Richard Lugar today issued the following statement 
at hearings of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on "Global 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:" 

"Conventional wisdom holds that of the many extraordinary changes in the world 
since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the one that is likely to have the most profound 
consequences for American national security involves the expiration of Communism 
and, with it, the expansionist Soviet adversary that served as the fixed point for 
U.S. security policy. 

"However, assessed in terms of direct consequences for American national security, 
the disappearance of Soviet communism is rivaled and perhaps exceeded, in my view, 
by the collapse of the Soviet totalitarian command and control society, especially the 
command and control of the superpower arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and 
weapons-usable materials. As a consequence of the collapse of this command and 
control society, a vast potential supermarket of nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons and weapons-usable materials is becoming increasingly accessible. 

"Absent a determined program of action that is as focused, serious, and vigorous 
as America's Cold War strategy, it is my view that Americans have every reason to 
anticipate acts of nuclear, chemical, or biological terrorism against American targets 
before this decade is out. 

"The single most important truth about the security environment in which we 
now live is that Russia is convulsed by a genuine, ongoing revolutionary trans- 
formation of the state, the economy, the military and the society. But unlike prior 
revolutions, history has chosen to store in the midst of this current Russian revolu- 
tion a superpower arsenal of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and mate- 
rials. 

"For seven decades, the bad news was that a totalitarian Communist government 
imprisoned its entire society. But one of the few benign results of that totalitarian 
system was unquestioned control of dangerous weapons-usable materials, including 
weapons of mass destruction. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the 
death of communism, powerful forces are now tearing apart the fabric of command 
and control in the economy, the government, and the state. Among these forces, the 
most powerful is the deepest yearning for individual freedom which, under condi- 
tions of disintegrating authority, is often indistinguishable from license and anarchy 
which helps to breed conditions of lawlessness in which nothing can be secure from 
loss, theft, or sale. 

"The human beings and systems designed by a totalitarian state to manage the 
Soviet Union's arsenals of weapons of mass destruction are not unaffected by these 
developments. Over the past three or four years, trickles of weapons- usable materials 
have begun showing up in the West. The current trickle forewarns of an impending 
flow of nuclear, chemical, and biological-weapons materials and perhaps even of 
weapons themselves. 

"With the loosening of controls over the safety and security of weapons-grade ma- 
terials that has accompanied the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the question 
arises: Has the likelihood of a weapon of mass destruction exploding on U.S. territory 
gone up or down? It is my view that such a risk has increased. While the probability 
of a large-scale nuclear, chemical, or biological exchange has mercifully decreased, 
the probability that one, or two, or a dozen weapons of mass destruction detonating 
in Russia, or Europe, or the Middle East, or even the United States has increased. 

"However, because this new threat comes in a form so unfamiliar, indeed so radi- 
cally different from prior experience, and because the instruments and policies to 
address it are so unlike the 'business' that our White House and national security 



14 

establishments have pursued for decades, the American political leadership, the 
Congress and the American people have great difficulty in awakening to this fact. 
But these are precisely the kinds of challenges that my colleague, Sam Nunn, has 
been willing to address during his tenure in the Senate, and I have been pleased 
to join with him in tackling such issues over the past few years. 

"On August 22 and 23, Senator Nunn and I initiated this series of hearings. Those 
initial hearings were held under the auspices of the European Subcommittee of the 
Foreign Relations Committee. We called those hearings to sound a wake-up call 
about this most direct threat to U.S. interests today and for the foreseeable future. 
The defining danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not so much 
Iran's purchase of civilian nuclear reactors from Russia that may assist Iranian nu- 
clear ambitions a decade hence. Rather, it is the threat today and tomorrow that 
Iran and other aspiring proliferants will purchase weapons of mass destruction or 
weapons-usable materials from some fragment of the Russian custodial system. 

"The second purpose of those hearings was to begin to define in some detail the 
shape of this new and barely recognizable threat. American policy has long recog- 
nized the risks posed by additional states acquiring weapons of mass destruction, 
but traditional non-proliferation is not the leading edge of this problem. Nor is the 
main problem one of accelerating 'denuclearization' and reducing the threat of chem- 
ical and biological weapons by dismantling thousands of ready weapons, although 
this is vitally important. Rather today, the defining danger of weapons of mass de- 
struction is that of the loss of control of tens, or hundreds of pounds of weapons- 
usable materials such as uranium, plutonium, and sarin, or indeed, of numbers of 
actual weapons themselves. Although we were treated during the August hearings 
to some graphic descriptions of lax security at Russian nuclear facilities, security 
at nuclear facilities is considered generally better than the security at Russian 
chemical weapons storage sites. Indeed, many Russian scientists believe that Rus- 
sia's chemical arsenal presents a far more exposed and appealing target for poten- 
tial thieves or attackers than the nuclear sites. 

"The third purpose of those initial hearings was to begin to outline a strategy and 
agenda for action that will galvanize the President and the American people to 
adopt the policy priorities and the requisite resources commensurate with the vital 
national interests the U.S. has in the fate of the former Soviet arsenal. To date, the 
U.S.'s response to this new threat of nuclear, chemical and biological leakage has not 
even begun to approximate U.S. stakes in the matter. Although there are a vast num- 
ber of small U.S. programs that Senator Nunn and I have sponsored that are de- 
signed to deal with many different weapons issues in the former Soviet Union, these 
programs cumulatively address only at the margins the need to reduce the near- 
term leakage threat of materials and weapons of mass destruction to the United 
States. A new level of commitment, effort, and resources is required if the United 
States is to guard itself against this new threat. 

"Difficult as it is, identifying a new challenge is the easier part of the problem. 
Summoning the political leadership, the political will and resources, and the support 
of the American people to act is harder still. Despite the threat of loose weapons of 
mass destruction and weapons-usable materials, will the political leadership of this 
country, including this Congress, step up to the plate? Do any new initiatives, how- 
ever vital to the national interests of the United States, have much prospect of get- 
ting a serious hearing in the climate of massive deficits, deep budget cuts, and 
shrinking leadership and imagination? Why is the Senate not debating the Chemical 
Weapons Convention — negotiated by the Bush Administration and submitted by the 
Clinton Administration — to determine how this multilateral vehicle can assist the 
U.S. in meeting the kind of threat and terror visited on Tokyo's subway system? 

"Or will this new threat be given the priority it deserves only on the morning after 
the first act of nuclear, chemical, or biological terrorism takes place on American 
soil? What will we wish we had done? What will the Administration do then? What 
will the Congress and the American people demand then? 

"These hearings today and tomorrow are designed to force us to pause, reflect, 
prioritize, and to summon political leadership and the support of the American peo- 
ple now to address this new security threat to our country. 

"I am so pleased to have the opportunity once again to work with my friend and 
partner, Sam Nunn, and to commend him and the Permanent Investigations Sub- 
committee for continuing to probe into this new and present danger to the United 
States." 

Senator STEVENS. I am the new Chairman here, and under the 
circumstances that this investigation has been conducted primarily 
by the minority staff under the direction of Senator Nunn, I beheve 



15 

it is only proper that he should Chair these hearings. So I turn the 
Chair over to him. 

Senator NUNN [presiding]. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 
We, as you know, swear in all the witnesses before our Subcommit- 
tee, so I will ask both of our witnesses, John Sopko, who is the 
Deputy Chief Counsel, and staff counsel, Alan Edelman — and I be- 
lieve Rick Kennan is not going to testify, but our two witnesses, 
John and Alan, will testify, so I would ask both of you to hold up 
your right hand and take the oath. Do you swear the testimony you 
will give before the Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Sopko. I do. . 

Mr. Edelman. I do. 

Senator NUNN. Thank you. I would ask you to go ahead and pro- 
ceed with your statements, and I understand. Rick, you are not 
going to be testifjdng this morning. Right? 

Mr. Kennan. That is correct. 

Senator NuNN. We thank you for your help. John? 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. SOPKO, DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL TO 
THE MINORITY, ACCOMPANIED BY ALAN EDELMAN, COUN- 
SEL TO THE MINORITY, PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON IN- 
VESTIGATIONS 

Mr. Sopko. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Sub- 
committee, as you noted, this week the Subcommittee begins the 
first in a series of hearings concerning the global proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction by looking at the case study of the 
Aum Shinrikyo's activities in Japan and elsewhere. 

As noted by Senator Glenn, 6 years ago in 1989, this Subcommit- 
tee, in conjunction with the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 
held 4 days of hearings on the spread of chemical and biological 
weapons. At those hearings, the specter of terrorist groups using 
chemical or biological weapons was only hypothetical. As we all 
know from recent events in the United States, the destructive in- 
tentions of fanatical groups and individuals has become an actual- 
ity in Oklahoma, New York City, and in Arizona. And, just 7 
months ago, on March 20, we witnessed the first major use of 
chemical weapons by terrorists with the sarin gas attack in the 
Tokyo subway system. 

Commentators throughout the world now agree that these events 
are of major international significance. The proverbial genie has 
been released from its bottle. In a quantum leap, terrorists respon- 
sible for the American and Japanese events have planted ideas and 
provided roadmaps for others to attack American domestic targets 
as well as to use such weapons against innocent civilian popu- 
lations worldwide. 

In the course of the last 5 months, the minority staff conducted 
hundreds of interviews of both government and private individuals. 
The staff received both classified and unclassified briefings from al- 
most every major U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agency as 
well as many elements of our military and civilian agencies. The 
staff was also briefed by numerous foreign agencies, including offi- 
cials of the Japanese, German, Russian, Ukrainian, and Australian 
governments. In addition, 2 months ago the staff traveled to Japan, 



16 

Russia, Ukraine, and Germany to obtain firsthand information con- 
cerning the activities of the Aum cult. 

The staffs investigation of the activities of the Aum Shinrikyo 
found evidence to suggest that the Aum cult was a clear danger to 
not only the Japanese Government but also to the security inter- 
ests of the United States and that this danger, although lessened 
significantly by recent actions of the Japanese authorities, is still 
present. 

Although the findings may initially sound farfetched and almost 
science fictional, the actions of the Aum and the facts corroborated 
from multiple sources by the staff create a terrifying picture of a 
deadly mixture of the religious zealotry of groups such as the 
Branch Davidians, the anti-government agenda of the U.S. militia 
movements, and the technical know-how of a Dr. Strangelove. 

The staff found, for instance, that: The cult was extremely large 
with approximately 40,000 to 60,000 members; the cult was ex- 
tremely wealthy with more than $1 billion in assets; the cult was 
actively recruiting scientists and technical experts in Japan, Rus- 
sia, and elsewhere; that the cult was planning and apparently had 
the means to directly assault the leadership of the Government of 
Japan; that the cult had produced chemical weapons, including 
toxic agents such as sarin, VX, phosgene and sodium cyanide; that 
the cult was also in the process of developing biological weapons, 
including anthrax, botulism and "Q" fever; that the cult attempted 
to assassinate the chief law enforcement officer for Japan as well 
as the Governor of Tokyo; that the cult had successfully infiltrated 
various levels of Japanese Government and industry, including ele- 
ments of Japan's law enforcement and military community; that 
the cult regularly used murder and kidnapping to silence its en- 
emies in Japan; and that the cult acquired conventional arma- 
ments and attempted to acquire weapons of mass destruction and 
their technologies from the former Soviet Union. 

The cult leadership was ruthless, cunning, and fully willing to 
utilize any and all means, including the killing of hundreds of 
thousands of innocent citizens, to carry out its avowed purpose of 
plunging both the United States and Japan into a war of Armaged- 
don. As noted in the opening statements of various Senators, the 
cult, its activities, and intentions were not fully appreciated by U.S. 
law enforcement and intelligence services until after the Tokyo gas- 
sing incident on March 20, 1995. 

In a large sense, the Aum incident is a remarkable yet frighten- 
ing case study of the threat modern terrorism poses to all indus- 
trial nations. It serves as a harsh wake-up call for the United 
States which until recently was rather complacent about the threat 
of terrorism. 

Much is still not known about all of their interests and activities, 
especially here in the United States and Russia. Most of the trials 
in Japan have just started. To the staffs knowledge, none of the 
defendants have been debriefed by U.S. officials. Despite this, 
much can be learned from what the staff was able to uncover in 
its short 5-month inquiry. 

The following will be a brief summary of what we know about 
the Aum and its activities around the world. 



17 



In August of 1989, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government granted 
the Aum official religious corporation status, which was just taken 
away, we believe, yesterday by the Japanese authorities. This law 
provided the Aum various privileges including massive tax breaks 
and de facto immunity from official oversight and prosecution The 
staff was repeatedly told, especially on its Japanese trip, that this 
was a significant event in the development of the Aum's deadly ac- 
tivities. Although the police could investigate a religious group for 
criminal acts, the staff was told by Japanese cult experts and gov- 
ernment officials that in practice this would be difficult if not im- 
possible to do because of the law and the government's reluctance 
to do such investigations. 

With its registration as a legally recognized rehgion, the Aum's 
activities and character dramatically changed. Its net worth grew 
from less than 430 million yen, approximately $4.3 million when 
recognized in 1989 to more than 100 billion yen, or approximately 
U bilhon, by the time of this year's Tokyo incident. Likewise the 
membership rose dramatically after legahzation. From merely a 
score of members in 1984, it grew by its own account to 10 000 
members in 1992 and over 50,000 worldwide in 1995. From one of- 
fice in Japan in 1984, it expanded to over 30 branches in over 6 
countries. We have prepared a chart, which shows some of the 
worldwide activities and locations of the Aum sect.i 

The staff learned that starting in 1989 the cult also became more 
aggressive and dangerous. With its dramatic growth, the staff 
tound evidence of increased complaints from parents and family 
members of Aum recruits alleging kidnappings and other physical 
assaults. 

Another event that the staff learned was important in the chang- 
ing character of the Aum cult concerned their brief foray into poli- 
tics. The year after they became a registered religion, Asahara an- 
nounced to his members that the Aum was to run a slate of can- 
didates in the Japanese Diet in February of 1990. Asahara and 24 

"^^T .on^/*^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^® ^^^ ^^^ *he parhament and all lost 

1 he 1990 election defeat was the final turning point for the direc- 
tion the Aum would eventually take. After their defeat, the Aum 
gave up all legal pretensions and turned away from normal inter- 
action with the larger Japanese society. From then on, the rhetoric 
01 Armageddon and paranoia became incessant. Cult experts in 
Japan told the staff that in hindsight it appears that from 1990 on- 
ward, the die apparently was cast for a violent confi-ontation with 
the people of Japan. 

It was a core element of the Aum religion that salvation would 
^i^f-v.^^T^!^ ^A *^^®^^, of Armageddon to those who adopted the Aum 
taith. The Aum foretold salvation for those Aum members who at- 
tained a higher state through the teachings of Asahara, the Su- 
preme Master. Asahara also preached salvation even to those mem- 
bers who perished in the predicted Armageddon since they were as- 
sured a special status in their reincarnated state 
cr.L ^^^\ Asaliara published a major religious treatise on Arma- 
geddon called "The Destruction of the World." In it, Asahara appar- 

1 See Appendix F of Staff Statement. 



18 

ently described a worldwide calamity based upon a war between 
Japan and the United States that would start sometime in 1997. 

In 1993, Asahara again publicly reiterated his predictions of Ar- 
mageddon. In a book entitled "Shivering Predictions by Shoko 
Asahara," he stated that, "From now until the year 2000, a series 
of violent phenomena filled with fear that are too difficult to de- 
scribe will occur. Japan will turn into waste land as a result of a 
nuclear weapons' attack. This will occur from 1996 through Janu- 
ary 1998. An alliance centering on the United States will attack 
Japan. In large cities in Japan, only one-tenth of the population 
will be able to survive." 

He later wrote that, "A Third World War will break out. I stake 
my religious future on this prediction. I am sure it will occur." 

Although most of Asahara's prophecies predicted this Armaged- 
don in 1997 or 1998, documents recently seized by Japanese au- 
thorities from Aum facilities indicate that sometime starting in 
1994 the date for this cataclysmic event was moved up specifically 
to November of 1995. The staff was told by Japanese Government 
sources that they were concerned from their analysis of the cult 
teachings that the Aum may have "decided to speed things up" by 
instigating the predicted war between Japan and the United States 
in November of 1995. 

This November prediction is especially troubling as it coincides 
with the planned visit of President Clinton and 17 other world 
leaders who are scheduled to gather in Osaka, Japan, for the an- 
nual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting. It is scheduled 
now for November 16-19. The staff has not discovered any credible 
link between these two events. We have no credible evidence that 
the Aum planned an attack directly at the APEC gathering. How- 
ever, the timing of the two events raises some concern. 

It is a vexing task to quantify the level of threat a group such 
as the Aum presents to United States security. As this report indi- 
cates, the Aum was highly dangerous and extensively erratic and 
unpredictable, obtaining much of their direction from the "proph- 
ecies" and ramblings of a charismatic madman. However, it is clear 
that a core belief of the Aum was that the United States was their 
enemy and that a war with the United States was a central compo- 
nent of their prediction of Armageddon. Although no specific threat 
against President Clinton has been documented, the staff has 
learned that both the United States Secret Service and the Japa- 
nese Government take such a threat seriously and have taken se- 
curity precautions. 

In the course of our inquiry, it also became clear that the Aum 
included among the followers many highly trained graduates in the 
sciences and technological fields from some of Japan's leading uni- 
versities. They included members with degrees in fields such as 
medicine, biochemistry, architecture, biology, and genetic engineer- 
ing. A distinctive feature of this cult was that many were young in- 
tellectuals in their 20's and 30's who had dropped out of Japanese 
society. 

Among some of Japan's best and brightest who joined the cult in- 
cluded a former researcher of the Japanese National Space Devel- 
opment Agency, an expert on chemical weapons who majored in or- 
ganic physics at Tsukuba University, a researcher who studied ele- 



19 

mentary particles, a reporter with a major Japanese newspaper, a 
physicist from Osaka University, a cardiac speciahst, and an or- 
ganic chemist, to name a few. In the longer version of the staff 
statement, which is over 100 pages, we detail some of the members 
and the actual description of their backgrounds. 

Senator Nunn. Without objection, your entire statement will be 
put in the record, and I understand it has been given out. Is that 
correct, the complete statement? 

Mr. SOPKO. That is my understanding. Senator. 

The staff also confirmed that they recruited from the military, 
the police, and certain key technological industries and faculties to 
further their mihtarization and intelligence functions. 

For example, the staff learned that the Aum had a strategy to 
recruit officers of the Japanese Self Defense Force and to use them 
as "combat troops" for the cult as well as to assist them in training 
other Aum members and in providing intelligence on Japanese 
Government activities. 

The Aum obtained the list of hundreds of Japanese Defense 
Force members and tried to recruit them. The list was recovered 
during the arrest of an Aum follower. This strategy placed a high 
priority on recruiting members of the First Airborne Brigade and 
other highly trained divisions of the Japanese military. The staff 
discovered evidence that to carry out this recruitment drive the 
Aum even wiretapped the house of the First Airborne Brigade's 
commander to spy on his private life. 

Some of these Japanese Defense Force recruits individually or in 
cooperation with other Aum members: Assisted in the burglary of 
the Metropolitan Pohce Department office to steal driver's license 
data; assisted in the break-in of the Hiroshima factory of 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in an attempt to steal technical docu- 
ments on weapons such as tanks and artillery; assisted in a 
hrebombing attack on the Aum headquarters in Tokyo in an at- 
tempt to inspire pubHc sympathy for the Aum; and provided mili- 
tary training to other Aum members. 

These Japanese Defense Force members also passed secret infor- 
mation to the Aum concerning the Metropolitan Police's planned 
raid on the Aum facilities. This raid was supposed to occur on 
March 20, 1995, but was postponed because of the Tokyo subway 
gassing that occurred on that date. The staff learned that these of- 
ficers alerted the Aum of the anticipated raid, and as a result the 
Aum initiated their deadly subway assault to try to thwart that 
raid. 

Unlike other religions, the Aum was organized into ministries 
and departments that attempted to mirror the Japanese Govern- 
I?u^r 1 -^j ^^^ prepared a chart, which will be made an ex- 
hibit, that identifies all of the most important ministries. Some of 
the members of the inner circle who were heads of these ministries 
included Hideo Murai, the former Minister of Science and Tech- 
nolo^. His was a key ministry which reportedly had over 300 
members including a number of skilled scientists. Murai himself 
was assassinated after the Tokyo event, apparently by Japanese or- 
ganized crime figures. 

We have also Hsted Kiyohide Hayakawa, age 45, who was the 
Minister of Construction. He was one of Asahara's chief advisors 



20 

and considered the mastermind of the sect's growth and miUtariza- 
tion. He supervised the operations in the United States, Russia, 
and Austraha, among other things. 

Yoshihiro Inoue, age 25, the IntelUgence Minister, was respon- 
sible for gathering intelhgence on government counter measures. 
He was imphcated in the major burglaries of the defense contrac- 
tors as well as the infiltration of the Japanese Defense Forces. He 
has also been implicated in the letter bomb attack on Tokyo Gov- 
ernor Aoshima. 

We have also listed Tomomitsu Niimi, 31, who is the Minister of 
Home Affairs for the Aum. This ministry was responsible for main- 
taining control and discipline over the membership. It was involved 
in most of the kidnappings and torture of dissident and runaway 
members. 

Also listed is Ikuo Hayashi, 48, the Treatment Minister. He was 
a key player in developing the sarin for the Tokyo attacks. 

Also listed is Seiichi Endo, age 34, the Health and Welfare Min- 
ister. Mr. Endo and his ministry were responsible for the chemical 
and biological weapons research and development. Endo has appar- 
ently confessed to his involvement in the sarin attacks and that 
Asahara had closely directed his research and development. 

As I previously mentioned, the Aum was very wealthy. Japanese 
Government estimates place its assets at over 100 billion yen, or 
approximately $1 billion. They also list 16 separate pieces of prop- 
erty in 11 different prefectures belonging to the Aum. They also 
note that the cult possessed a large amount of liquid assets includ- 
ing a large helicopter, boats, gold bars, and cash. 

The Aum amassed this fortune in a number of ways. Not only 
did they require their followers to turn over all of their earthly pos- 
sessions, they also came up with a number of ingenious and out- 
landish money-making schemes from running noodle shops, operat- 
ing a publishing house, and other legitimate businesses, all the 
way to extortion and selling their spiritual leader's blood and bath 
water. 

We have before you, Senator, some of the various books that they 
published, actually very high quality publishing. They also pub- 
lished comic books, as well as other documents. Here are some 
Asahara tee shirts that they sold even after the Tokyo gas attack. 
It turned out that the successor to Asahara, who has been subse- 
quently arrested, name Joyu, had become a teen idol to many 
youngsters in Japan, even after the Tokyo event. So you could go 
to their stores and buy this stuff, as well as cookies and other food 
products. 

We have also prepared a chart here (appendix B) which we have 
sourced to the Japan Times, which is purportedly based upon docu- 
ments that they had obtained listing some of the items that the 
Aum would sell. They ranged from headgear designed to syn- 
chronize one's brain waves to that of Asahara that would cost you 
approximately $10,000 a month, to a 200-cc bottle of water fi-om 
Asahara's bath for $20. A significant amount was probably raised 
from these activities, although the exact total is not known. 

As we mentioned, the Aum was also actively engaged in the 
preparation for both a conventional and unconventional attack 
upon the Japanese Government and its people. Much evidence of 



21 

the Aum's militarization comes from former Aum members who 
have confessed to Japanese authorities. These confessions have 
been corroborated by weapons parts, equipment, and records seized 
by Japanese pohce, including the notebooks of Construction Min- 
ister Hayakawa and the computer files found at the sect's offices. 

The Aum apparently had planned to illegally manufacture as 
many as 1,000 AK-47's and cartridges before the police raids. The 
staff learned that the Aum had been manufacturing parts for these 
guns with the aid of computer-controlled machine tools at the 
Aum's complex. ' 

It also appears that the Aum was interested in developing laser 
weapons. The staff" has learned from Japanese Grovernment sources 
that notations found in Hayakawa's handwritten notebook indicate 
the cult was actively seeking information on the development of 
such weapons. 

The cult also attempted to steal technology from NEC's laser 
beam laboratory in November of 1994. At the end of December 
1994, Aum followers were arrested for burglarizing Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries Research Center in Hiroshima. They apparently 
broke into that facility on a number of occasions in an effort to 
steal documents and data on laser beam technology. 

The Aum's cult was also aggressively involved in chemical and 
biological weapons production. Although the extent of their success 
is not fully known to this date, the staff found evidence that they 
successfully produced nerve agents such as sarin, tabun, soman, 
and VX, and biological agents such as botulism and anthrax, and 
controlled substances such as LSD. 

Just last week, on October 20, Japanese prosecutors revealed the 
full extent of Asahara's plot to use deadly sarin gas. At the initial 
arraignment against four cult members, the prosecutor publicly 
charged that the four, under the direction of Asahara, planned to 
produce 70 tons of sarin within 40 days of completion of the sarin 
production facility at Satyam No. 7. The prosecutors added that 20 
kilograms of one batch was used in the June 1994 Matsumoto at- 
tack which killed 7 people. 

It appears that starting in the spring of 1993, the Aum utilized 
its own chemical company to start acquiring the chemical agents 
and other materials necessary for full-scale production. Sarin re- 
search and production was conducted under the direction of 
Masami Tsuchiya, head of the cult's chemical team, and Seiichi 
Endo, the cult's Health and Welfare Minister. Production occurred 
at a facility in the Aum compound site in Kamikuishiki called 
Satyam No. 7. We have blown up photographs, aerial photographs 
taken of Satyam No. 7 and some of those buildings which we are 
showing right now.i 

Reports from Japanese officials indicate that the sarin production 
facility was extremely sophisticated. It was almost all fabricated by 
the Aum members themselves who utilized their other companies 
as sources for material and technical expertise. According to pros- 
ecution sources, the cult produced 30 kilograms of sarin from their 
computerized chemical plant sometime in 1994 before an accident 
caused them to shut down operations. It is believed that the sarin 



1 See Exhibit No. 11. 



22 

for the June 27, 1994, Matsumoto incident was made at this facil- 
ity before the accident. 

We also have a chart showing the interior design of Satyam No. 
7. We were told by almost every official we spoke to that it was 
a highly sophisticated chemical plant. (See appendix G.) 

These are photographs. Senator, purportedly taken by a news re- 
porter who snuck into the Satyam plant prior to the police closing 
it down, and he took a number of these photographs showing the 
interior of the building. We were denied access to the facility, so 
we could not corroborate whether these photographs accurately de- 
pict that facility. 1 

As previously noted, the Aum also tried to develop other chemi- 
cal weapons such as soman, tabun, and VX. The staff confirmed 
from official documents that the Aum produced VX on at least four 
separate occasions, although full-scale production never occurred. 

The staff confirmed from official documents that Mr. Niimi and 
others were involved in at least two VX attacks. They include the 
attack on a Mr. Hamaguchi with VX on December 12, 1994, while 
he was walking on an Osaka street. Hamaguchi died 10 days later 
on December 22. And if I can emphasize that although sarin is ex- 
tremely deadly, as the witnesses in the next panel will discuss, VX 
is an even more deadly gas. And the fact that they were at least 
developing small quantities of VX is very significant for an under- 
standing about how technically skilled and capable this group was. 

The police detected a by-product of VX in Mr. Hamaguchi's blood 
serum confirming the presence of VX after his death. In another in- 
cident, Niimi attacked a Mr. Nagaoka, the head of the "Association 
of the Victims of Aum Shinrikyo" with VX gas in January of 1995. 
He fortunately survived but was in a coma for several weeks per 
a staff conversation we had with his son. 

Ominously, there have been police reports cited in the Japanese 
press that sodium cyanide, linked to cult members, was found in 
late September 1995 in Japan. Police claim to have found as much 
as 8.5 kilograms of sodium cyanide in the apparent hideout of an 
Aum fugitive. The sources have said that this amount of sodium cy- 
anide could kill approximately 70,000 people. 

Materials seized at the Aum facilities and other evidence con- 
firms that the Aum had embarked upon an intense research and 
development program for the production of biological weapons. 
Judging from this evidence, Japanese authorities believe the Aum 
succeeded in producing botulism toxin. The same Japanese authori- 
ties are less certain but have serious concern that the Aum had 
also produced anthrax bacillus. I will not describe both of those two 
agents, but the next panel will go into great detail about the 
lethality and medical consequences of both of those agents. Again, 
it goes to the importance of this cult as a case study because of 
their technical capabilities. 

The staff has confirmed that Seiichi Endo, Health and Welfare 
Minister for the cult, confessed that he had been working on devel- 
oping biological weapons and was close to finalizing this effort be- 
fore the Tokyo incident. He claims to have embarked upon this 
work at the specific instructions of Asahara, the leader. Other Aum 



» See Exhibit No. lie. 



23 

followers have also confessed to their involvement in the biological 
program. 

Probably the most chilling of all the reports coming out of Japan, 
Senators, were those that the Aum had actually attempted to use 
bacteria warfare. 

The staff has learned that a number of devices were found by the 
police in Tokyo that authorities believe may have been intended to 
disperse anthrax. Three attache cases were discovered on March 
15, 1995, 5 days before the Tokyo gas attack. We do not have a 
blown-up depiction of this chart, but this does appear as an appen- 
dix to the staff statement, and it shows the device as well as the 
containers. There were batteries in there and fans. 

When the devices were found, none of the liquid was found. This 
later becomes important, as Mr. Edelman will tell you, because the 
Aum specifically was here in the United States purchasing large 
quantities of camcorder batteries, large quantities of serum bottles, 
and large quantities of small fans. We don't know specifically if 
this was used for bacterial dispersal or for chemical dispersal. We 
have had experts tell us it could have been utilized for either. 
Again, the witnesses in the next panel will discuss in some detail 
the significance of dispersal of either anthrax or chemical agents. 

Mr. Chairman, in light of the length of this statement, I won't 
go into more detail about many of the other crimes and criminal 
activities committed by the cult. But, in the days following the sub- 
way attack, I think public scrutiny was on just the sarin attack by 
this cult. But, the staff has found upon closer scrutiny of the Aum's 
activities that there is a common character — excuse me, a common 
thread of criminality leading back to almost the date it was legally 
chartered. It includes murder, attempted murder, kidnapping, and 
burglaries. We have prepared a chart that shows their various 
criminal activities in Japan that we were able to corroborate. A 
more detailed description is found in the staff statement. 

Senators, late in the evening of June 27, 1994, a substance later 
identified as sarin seeped through the open windows of apartments 
and houses in the Kaichi Heights neighborhood near the old heart 
of the city of Matsumoto. Seven people eventually died and over 
500 were injured and taken to hospitals. It was not until the police 
arrests subsequent to the next year's Tokyo incident that 
uncontrovertible evidence was developed linking the Aum to 
Matsumoto. The staff has confirmed that Japanese police have con- 
fessions from a number of Aum followers implicating the Aum in 
this gas attack. The Science and Technology Minister for the Aum, 
Hideo Murai, as well as his successor, Masami Tsuchiya, have been 
implicated. 

Tsuchiya, in a confession, has provided the police a motive for 
this sarin gas attack. The sarin was released within 30 feet of the 
dormitory where three judges were staying. These were three 
judges who were hearing a court case involving the Aum. Tsuchiya 
has told the police that he and his cohort proceeded to the parking 
lot next to the judges' dormitory and sprayed sarin out of a nozzle 
device attached to a truck specifically outfitted for that purpose. An 
electric heater was used to heat the liquid into a gaseous state for 
dispersal by an electrically powered fan. The gassing lasted for ap- 



24 

proximately 10 minutes, releasing a gas that was carried on a 
southeasterly wind into the targeted residence. 

Matsumoto proved to them, the cult, that they could effectively 
deliver sarin. The police have recovered portions of the truck and 
the special fittings used in the Matsumoto attack. 

Apparently the truck and its device were taken apart soon after 
the Matsumoto incident so it was not available to be used the fol- 
lowing year in Tokyo. This would later have ramifications for the 
citizens of Tokyo. When it came time for the Aum to strike again, 
it has been surmised that they lacked their only tested delivery 
system. Its absence may have played a major role in the Aum's 
choice of the target and method of delivery, and that is the sub- 
ways of Tokyo. 

On the morning of March 20, 1995, the Aum attempted to mur- 
der tens of thousands of innocent people in order to create unimagi- 
nable disorder and chaos. Unlike the earlier Matsumoto incident in 
which the Aum targeted a specific group of people, the Tokyo sub- 
way attack involved the indiscriminate use of the chemical nerve 
agent sarin on an enormous civilian population. Had the chemical 
mixture and delivery system been slightly different, the resulting 
tragedy would have been unprecedented, if not beyond comprehen- 
sion. 

The Aum's plan was to place approximately 11 small containers 
of sarin on 5 trains running on 3 different lines of the Tokyo sub- 
way system. That subway system has over 5 million riders daily. 
The selected trains were scheduled to arrive at the central 
Kasumigaseki station within 4 minutes of each other at the height 
of morning rush hour, between 8:00 and 8:10 a.m. The containers, 
which were made out of nylon polyethylene and wrapped in news- 
paper, were placed on baggage racks or left on the floor and punc- 
tured by Aum members to release their deadly cargoes of sarin. 

As planned, most of the stricken trains converged at the height 
of rush hour and disgorged their sick and frightened passengers. 

We would like to show a still photo of some of the events on that 
tragic day, but we also have prepared a brief 45-second clip from 
a tape provided to us by the Australian federal police. This longer 
version of the tape describes the activities of the Australian police 
in Australia in investigating the Aum, and we ask that it may be 
made an exhibit. But we have a smaller portion of that tape which 
was used by the Australian police as a training tape. 

The Chairman. Without objection, it will be made a part of the 
record and appropriately numbered. ^ 

Mr. SOPKO. Just to give a brief feel for what occurred that morn- 
ing and after the incident, if we could play that please. 

[Videotape played.] 

Mr. SoPKO. This event, Senator, succeeded in killing 12 and in- 
juring 5,000. Some have argued, Senator, that this shows it was 
not a successful event since it only killed that number, although 
Aum's plan was also to create massive terror on the streets of 
Tokyo. Not only did it succeed in killing these people and injuring 
these people, it succeeded, even to this day, in affecting the psyche 



1 See Exhibit No. 16b. 



25 

of Japanese citizens as well as the psychology of people around the 
world. 

It succeeded in causing panic and chaos in the station and 
throughout Tokyo as commuters and subway workers alike col- 
lapsed in severe fits of coughing, choking, and vomiting. It was 
only a fortunate mistake by the Aum in the preparation of the spe- 
cial batch of sarin used that day and the inferior dissemination sys- 
tem used to deploy it that limited the number of casualties. 

Senator, we have reviewed a number of reports describing men, 
women, and children in panic, coughing uncontrollably, collapsing 
in heaps. On one platform, over 30 passengers collapsed after being 
overcome with fumes that were strong enough to be smelled one 
floor above. Subway workers and other emergency workers who 
first arrived on the scene quickly became victims themselves. 

The Tokyo attack was first viewed as the long-prophesied attack 
on the Government of Japan by the Aum. However, the Japanese 
Government now believes that the gas attack was meant merely as 
a diversionary feint in anticipation of a planned government raid. 
The staff has learned that the police have evidence that the Aum 
leadership planned the Tokyo attack after they discovered that the 
police were going to raid their facilities in search for a kidnaped 
notary public. 

From March 23 through September 4, 19957'tHe police have con- 
ducted over 500 raids on approximately 300 locations, arresting al- 
most 400 Aum members and charging them in 240 separate cases. 
Many of those charged have started to appear for trials, including 
Asahara who was scheduled to start trial on Thursday, October 26. 
He fired his attorney the day before the trial started. 

Despite this aggressive response from the Japanese authorities, 
criminal activities of the Aum did not come to an end with the 
Tokyo incident or the arrests. 

For example, on March 30, 1995, only 10 days after the sarin 
subway attack, the Commissioner General of the National Police 
Agency was shot and seriously wounded by an unknown assailant 
who has now been linked to the Aum. 

On April 19, 1995, in what appears to have been a copycat at- 
tack, more than 500 people were sickened and taken to hospitals 
complaining of stinging eyes, sore throats, nausea, and dizziness 
after inhaling a mysterious gas released at different places around 
the Yokohama station. 

On April 23, 1995, 1 month after the subway incident, Murai, the 
Aum's Science and Technology Minister, was stabbed to death. 

On May 5, 1995, the Aum struck again by attacking Shinjuku 
station, one of the busiest in Tokyo, with another chemical weapon. 
In this case, the Aum used sodium cyanide placed in public rest- 
rooms. This did not succeed, but chemical experts have estimated 
the amount of gas that would have been released would have been 
sufficient to kill between 10,000 to 20,000 people. 

On May 16, the data that Asahara was arrested, the Aum sent 
a letter bomb to the Governor of Metropolitan Tokyo which ex- 
ploded in the hands of his secretary, blowing off the fingers of his 
left hand. 

And as late as July 4, 1995, another gas attack was attempted 
in Tokyo by the Aum, again involving hydrogen cyanide. 



26 

The threat still remains that other devices may be employed in 
the future, especially during some of the more important trials. The 
staff has been advised that not all of the chemicals produced by the 
Aum have been accounted for, nor have all the more fanatical 
members been arrested. As an example, as late as September dur- 
ing the staffs fact-finding trip, the entire city of Tokyo was fes- 
tooned with wanted posters for some of the Aum members. 

Until all of the fanatical members, their weapons of mass de- 
struction, and their assets are accounted for, there is still some jus- 
tification for the Japanese and the Americans to be concerned. 

Mr. Edelman will now proceed and describe in detail the over- 
seas operations of the Aum, including their activities here in the 
United States. 

Mr. Edelman. One reason why we in the United States should 
be concerned about the Aum is because of the truly global nature 
of this cult. In this section we will examine the Aum's activities in 
7 different countries on 4 different continents, including Russia and 
the United States. 

Through a number of private and governmental sources, includ- 
ing Aum documents, the staff has confirmed that the Aum began 
its activities in Russia in 1991, and the organization there quickly 
grew to become the Aum's largest organization in the world. The 
first followers registered in Moscow in 1991, and in June 1992, the 
Russian Ministry of Justice registered the cult as an official reli- 
gious organization. 

There have been many allegations in the Japanese and Russian 
press about Aum activities in Russia. The staff attempted, but was 
unable, to confirm many of these allegations while in Moscow in- 
vestigating this issue. Moreover, the staff has learned that U.S. 
Government officials themselves have been unable to confirm or 
deny many of the allegations. We will therefore attempt to differen- 
tiate between what we know and what the press reports. 

Following the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway, two Russian 
Duma committees began investigations on their own of the Aum — 
the Committee on Religious Matters and the Committee on Secu- 
rity Matters. 

The Russian Duma has reported that the Aum had 11 branches 
outside of Moscow and at least 7 inside Moscow. Some of the other 
Aum headquarters in Russia were located in St. Petersburg, 
Kazan, Perm, Vorkuta, Tyumen, Samara, Vladivostok, Elista, and 
Vladikavkaz. 

On the chart, 1 which is up right now, you can see the location 
of many of the Aum's centers. Those are the cities marked in red. 
We have also put on this map the location of many of Russian's 
strategic facilities, particularly missile assembly plants, chemical 
and biological production facilities. You will notice that many of the 
Aum's centers were located near these important strategic facilities 
of Russia — we believe that that was no accident. 

According to Russian press reports, the Aum was very specific in 
targeting its recruiting in Russia. The sect asked prospective mem- 
bers to choose the subjects among 24 fields they wanted to pursue 



' See Exhibit No. 42a. 



27 

in the future. Physics, chemistry, and biology were reportedly the 
top three areas listed. 

Based upon official Japanese documents and numerous press re- 
ports and staff interviews, the staff has confirmed that in 1992 the 
Aum bought radio time from one of the largest radio stations in 
Russia, the state-run Mayak Radio. They obtained a 3-year con- 
tract at a cost of $800,000 per year, according to a Russian press 
report. The staff has confirmed that the Aum broadcast an hour- 
long program on a daily basis over this station. These broadcasts 
were also relayed via an Aum radio tower located in Vladivostok 
which broadcast those reports to Japan every evening. Aum pro- 
grams were also televised on Russia's 2x2 television station. 

Even before the Tokyo sarin gas attack, the Aum had become 
controversial in Russia. According to Russian press reports, at the 
end of 1992 parents of cult members, led by a Russian Orthodox 
priest who claims to have deprogrammed up to 50 Aum members, 
initiated a civil lawsuit against the sect. On July 15, 1994, Russia's 
Ministry of Justice annulled the registration of the Russian branch 
of the Aum on technicalities having to do with their registration 
procedure. A few weeks later, however, the organization was re- 
registered by the Moscow Department of Justice as "Moscow's Aum 
Religious Association." 

Following the subway attack, the activities against the Aum in 
Russia intensified. By mid-April of 1995, President Boris Yeltsin 
publicly ordered Russia's Prosecutor General, the Federal Security 
Service, and the Commission for Religious Organizations in the 
Russian Government to thoroughly investigate the Aum. In re- 
sponse to this edict, Russian press reports indicate that the Rus- 
sian court that had been hearing the parents' lawsuit banned all 
of the Aum's activities in Russia. The court charged that the Aum 
was harming Russia's young people and criticized Mayak Radio 
and the Russian television station for allowing Aum propaganda on 
its airwaves. The Aum was ordered to pay 20 billion rubles, the 
equivalent of $4 million, to the defendants, and it lost its registra- 
tion in Russia as an official religion. The group was also banned 
from further television and radio broadcasting. Despite these ac- 
tions, an Aum official in Moscow said, "Aum will not cease to exist 
in Russia. We shall continue to exist in other forms, but we shall 
prevail by all means." 

The Russian press stated that July 1995, Russian authorities 
began arresting Aum members. In early July, Russian authorities 
detained the leader of the Tatarstan branch of the Aum. On July 
21, 1995, Russian law enforcement officials arrested one of the 
leaders of the Moscow branch of the sect, Outi Toshiyatsu, who is 
a Japanese citizen. Russian authorities charged Toshiyatsu with 
organizing groups that infringe on citizens' rights and with causing 
material damage by cheating or breaching confidence. There has 
been no trial yet of this individual in Russia. 

It is clear that the Aum was interested in the technology and 
weapons that are available in Russia. The major proponent of the 
sect's expansion into Russia was the Aum's Construction Minister 
Kiyohide Hayakawa. He was also the mastermind of the Aum's at- 
tempts to arm itself, according to Japanese officials and cult docu- 
ments. 



28 

In total, Hayakawa visited Russia 21 times from 1992 to 1995, 
spending a total of 180 days there. The staff believes that Haya- 
kawa played a key role in obtaining technology and weapons from 
Russia. Hayakawa helped to purchase a Soviet-made MI-17 heli- 
copter and invited Russian engineers to Japan to help train sect 
members to maintain the helicopter, this according to official Japa- 
nese documents. 

The staff has confirmed that the helicopter passed through Japa- 
nese customs in 1994 via Azerbaijan Air and that the Aum subse- 
quently inquired about certification for a larger MI-26 helicopter 
and the requirements to fly such a helicopter to Japan from Russia. 

Japanese police sources also allege that Hayakawa brought pistol 
models to Japan from Russia in the spring of 1994 in order to at- 
tempt to produce those pistols in Japan. These sources also claim 
that documents seized from Hayakawa upon his arrest included 
blueprints for the Soviet Kalashnikov assault rifle. 

There have been many allegations that Aum members may have 
received military training in Russia. 

Official Japanese documents and press reports state that a tour- 
ist brochure printed by a company known as Devenir Millionaire, 
an Aum-affiliated travel company located in Tokyo, described a 
tour of Russia that included shooting exercises at Russian military 
facilities. The brochure claimed that the exercises would be per- 
formed under the supervision of former Spetznaz members of the 
Russian armed forces. 

Press reports claim also that Aum Defense Ministry leader Kibe 
and Secret Unit member Furukawa underwent comprehensive pilot 
training in Russia. The Aum paid Russian instructors at Moscow's 
"Airfield Number 3" $15,000 each for a rigorous training course. 
Furukawa was in charge of planning military training in Russia 
under a special Russian unit. As indicated elsewhere in this state- 
ment, the staff has also confirmed that Kibe received helicopter 
training in the United States, in South Florida in late 1993. 

Russian Defense Ministry officials have denied that any training 
took place at their official facilities. In contrast, though, the staff 
found Russian and Japanese press reports which provided the fol- 
lowing information: 

Russian military sources told Japanese reporters that Asahara 
had inspected a military base near Moscow in the summer of 1993, 
although they again denied that training took place at that time. 
Together with a number of followers, Asahara met military officials 
there for talks, and inspected the grounds. 

The chief of staff of the Far Eastern Military District of Russia 
has publicly denied rumors that Aum members were trained as pi- 
lots at his base but admitted that there are many private firms and 
air companies with helicopters at their disposal. 

In addition to obtaining conventional arms and training in Rus- 
sia, the Aum apparently saw the country as a source for more ex- 
otic weapons. At the time of his arrest, Hayakawa had information 
on him about a gas laser weapon. His documents referred to the 
name of a Russian city where "there is a weapons market" and 
noted the distance of that city from Moscow. 

Hayakawa's documents also indicated that the sect was inter- 
ested in obtaining a space-launch rocket, this again according to 



29 

Japanese press. According to these accounts, Japanese officials said 
that the documents include a reference to a Russian proton rocket 
and reference its prices and the need to build a base in Japan. 

The Aum's interests apparently extended to even the most dev- 
astating of weapons. There are references in the documents seized 
from Hayakawa as to the purchase of nuclear weapons. The docu- 
ments contain the question: "How much is a nuclear warhead?" 
The documents then go on to list several prices. It is unclear to the 
staff whether thd references in these notebooks are reflections of 
actual discussions or negotiations or merely the musings of Min- 
ister Hayakawa. 

Much has been written in the press about the relationship be- 
tween the Aum and officials of the Russian Government. Most of 
these allegations have been denied in whole or in part by the offi- 
cials in question, and little has actually been confirmed by either 
U.S. or Japanese Government officials. 

The following, however, has been reported by both Russian and 
Japanese press sources: That Asahara led a delegation of 300 Aum 
members to Russia in March 1992. During that trip, Asahara pur- 
portedly met with Parliament Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy 
and former Russian Parliament Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov. 

It has also been reported that Russian Parliamentarian Vitally 
Savitsky, the chairman of the Duma's Religious Affairs Committee, 
told his fellow parliamentarians, "his committee seriously sus- 
pected that the Aum Shinrikyo had been assisted in its penetration 
into Russia by Russian intelligence services." 

It has been reported that the premier nuclear research facility in 
Russia, the Kurchatov Institute, had Aum followers among the em- 
ployees. 

During 1992 to 1993, Aum leaders reportedly visited Russia and 
approached Russian science officials seeking laser and nuclear 
technologies, and Shoko Asmara reportedly met with Nikolay 
Basov while in Moscow in 1992. Mr. Basov is the 1964 Nobel Prize 
winner for his research on the principle of laser technology. 

It has also been reported that the Secretary of the Russian Secu- 
rity Council, Oleg Lobov, met with the Aum and may have received 
large sums of money from the Aum. 

A Russian known to be a secretary of Lobov's sent facsimiles to 
Hayakawa in Japan, and Hayakawa reportedly visited Lobov dur- 
ing his visits to Russia throughout the 1992-95 time period. 

Lobov reportedly met with Aum officials on his own without in- 
forming the Russian embassy or asking its advice. Sources say that 
this February 1992 meeting was agreed to without the participa- 
tion of the Russian Foreign Ministry or intelligence services prior 
to Lobov's trip to Japan. No leading embassy staffers were present 
at that meeting. 

All of the officials have denied the allegations that they helped 
the Aum. The staff, however, has discovered photographs that ap- 
peared in Aum publications purporting to show Rutskoy, 
Khasbulatov, Basov, and Lobov meeting with Aum leader Asahara. 

The staff has also reviewed official Japanese documents which do 
corroborate limited aspects of the above reports. These documents 
state that in December 1991 a Russian business person visited 
Russia with Hayakawa, then the cult's administration director, and 



30 

met with Lobov, the President of the Russian-Japan College, the 
present Russian Secretary of the Security Council, Mr. Muravjbv, 
the Secretary General, and Mr. Khushchov, the chairman of the 
Board of Trustees. 

In February 1992, Mr. Lobov was invited to Japan by Nissho- 
Iwai Company, Ltd., and met with Asahara. 

In March 1992, after chartering an Aeroflot aircraft, a delegation 
of 300 cult members headed by Asahara visited Russia and met 
with Rutskoy, Khasbulatov, and Lobov. 

Again, these last few items are items which have been confirmed 
through official Japanese documents. 

In addition, the staff has been able to confirm, through its own 
visit to Russia and a visit to the Kurchatov Institute, that an em- 
ployee of the institution was and still is a member of the Aum. 

The Aum's most intriguing presence may have been in Australia. 
The staff has confirmed that the Aum was in Australia fi-om April 
1993 to October 1994. From documents provided to the staff by the 
Australian Federal Police, the staff determined that the cult pur- 
chased a 500,000-acre sheep ranch in Banjawarn, Australia, lo- 
cated approximately 375 miles northeast of Perth, Western Aus- 
tralia's state capital. In order to purchase this farm, the cult 
formed a front company named Clarity Investments, and another 
company, Maha Posya AustraUa, Ltd., in 1993. 

The Australian Federal Pohce gave the staif documents confirm- 
ing that in April 1993 three members of Aum Shinrikyo arrived in 
Perth fi-om Tokyo. The three included Construction Minister Haya- 
kawa, who was also the person instrumental in setting up the 
Aum's operations in Russia, and Intelligence Minister Yoshihiro 
Inoue. The two hired an Australian citizen of Japanese heritage 
who was a real estate agent based in Perth, and with her viewed 
remote farming properties in Western Australia. 

Ultimately, the group decided on the property in Banjawarn Sta- 
tion, an area where there is a known uranium deposit. In April 
1993, Hayakawa allegedly offered to purchase this property for 
cash; however, the offer was refused by the owner. Following this 
refusal, the Aum formed its two fi-ont companies, and through 
these companies managed to purchase the property for approxi- 
mately $400,000. The Aum subsequently purchased eight mining 
leases in September 1993 for approximately $4,700 each. 

Shortly after purchasing the property, Hayakawa met with a 
consulting geologist. During that meeting he told the geologist that 
the Aum wished to obtain a ship and inquired what price they 
could expect to pay. Hayakawa also mentioned at the meeting that 
the Aum wanted to export uranium ore from Banjawarn Station in 
44-gallon drums. 

Shortly thereafter, Hayakawa and another Aum member by the 
name of Maki engaged an Australian travel agent to make arrange- 
ments for six 4-wheel-drive vehicles and a chartered aircraft. The 
staff has confirmed that shortly thereafter cult leader Shoko 
Asahara arrived in Perth with 24 followers from Japan. The Aum 
traveled with chemicals and mining equipment on which they paid 
over $20,000 in excess baggage fees. According to the Australian 
police report, among the baggage was a mechanical ditch digger. 



31 

picks, petrol generators, gas masks, respirators, and shovels. A cus- 
toms duty of over $15,000 was paid to import these items. 

Because of the large amount of excess baggage being brought in 
by the group, Australian Customs searched the entire group. This 
search revealed 4 liters of concentrated hydrochloric acid, including 
some in containers marked as hand soap. Among the other chemi- 
cals that Australian Customs officials found were ammonium chlo- 
ride, sodium sulphate, perchloric acid, and ammonium water. All of 
these chemicals and some of the laboratory equipment were seized 
by the Australian authorities. 

Having lost their chemicals to the authorities, the Aum members 
used their real estate agent and their geologist — both of whom 
were Australian citizens — to obtain new chemicals from chemical 
wholesalers. These chemicals were obtained either in the name of 
Maha Posya or in the name of the real estate agent's company. 

The Aum also tried to hire earth-moving equipment from a min- 
ing operation at an adjoining station. The mine operators refused 
to lend their equipment without a mine worker to operate it, a de- 
mand which the Aum refused. A backhoe ultimately was hired by 
the Aum without an operator from a rental company for 3 days, 
from September 16-18, 1993. Digging and evidence of earth-moving 
equipment has been found on the property. 

The Aum also established a laboratory on the Banjawarn Station 
property which was stocked with computers and various digital and 
laboratory equipment. Witnesses told Australian Federal Police 
that the laboratory contained laptop computers, digital equipment, 
glass tubing, glass evaporators, beakers, bunsen burners, and ce- 
ramic grinding and mixing bowls. 

Shortly after the sarin gas attack in Matsumoto in June 1994, 
the Banjawarn Station property was offered for sale. Mr. Maki 
handled the details of the sale and seemed very anxious that the 
sale proceed quickly. The property was sold in late July 1994 for 
$237,000, almost $165,000 less than what the Aum had paid for it 
only a year earlier. 

The Aum's activity on the property is partially known and, to 
some degree, still a mystery. Various police sources indicate that 
Hayakawa was interested in extracting uranium from Australia for 
the development of weapons. Documents seized from Hayakawa in- 
clude some 10 pages written during a 1993 visit to Australia which 
refer to the whereabouts of properties of uranium in Australia, in- 
cluding one reference praising the quality of the uranium in the 
state of South Australia. 

It appears, however, that the Aum was interested in more than 
just mining on the Banjawarn property. The chairwoman of the ab- 
original community living near the Banjawarn Station said that 
she and other aborigines saw about 5 people wearing full-length 
suits and helmets on the remote site in late August of 1993. The 
suited sect members were standing by a twin-engine airplane and 
others were in the plane. 

In March 1995, shortly after the Tokyo subway attack, the Aus- 
tralian police were invited to the sheep station by its new owners 
who had found papers with Japanese writing and various chemi- 
cals on the property. The chemicals that the police found could 
have been used for mineral processing or to make an irritant gas. 



32 

The current owners of the property have stated that the Japa- 
nese occupants had a number of gas masks in their possession but 
that they took them when they left. One gas mask was left behind 
and seized by Australian police. Paper dusk masks were also lo- 
cated in a plastic bag bearing Japanese writing. 

The staff has confirmed that the Aum conducted experiments 
with sarin on sheep at its Banjawarn Station property. The Aus- 
tralian Justice Minister said that members of the Aum tested sarin 
in Australia before the Tokyo attack. He said that tests on wool 
and soil samples taken from the Banjawarn Station had confirmed 
traces of the chemical. The Justice Minister stated that sarin resi- 
due had also been found in and near a group of about 29 dead 
sheep that were located on the property. Specifically, traces of the 
acid that results when sarin breaks down was found in the soil and 
in the wool of the sheep. 

In addition, authorities found a document written in Japanese 
and titled "Banjawarn Station." This document suggested the sect 
may have been experimenting on the sheep. The document con- 
tained notations for classifying dead or injured sheep by using 
unique Japanese markings. 

In addition to its activities in Russia and in Australia, the Aum 
also had a presence here in the United States. The Aum officially 
came to the United States in late 1987 when it incorporated an of- 
fice in New York City under the name Aum USA Ltd., a not-for- 
profit corporation. Although the office purported to promote the 
cult's book sales and recruitment of followers, the staffs review of 
documents and records and interviews of the manager of the office 
establish that the office was also acting as a purchasing agent for 
the cult as it attempted to obtain high technology equipment, com- 
puter software and hardware, and other items from the IJnited 
States. 

According to corporate records, the New York City office was ini- 
tially organized by Fumihiro Joyu, an individual who took over for 
Mr. Asahara after he was arrested. Mr. Joyu is himself now under 
arrest in Japan. 

The articles of incorporation were amended in 1988, and at that 
time Mr. Asahara himself appeared as a director of the corporation. 
The company was a tax-exempt organization and registered as a 
charity in New York. 

In the early 1990's, according to corporate documents, Yumiko 
Hiraoka became the primary manager of the Aum's office and all 
office-related documents thereafter were in her name. Later this 
morning, Ms. Hiraoka will testify before the Subcommittee. 

Despite a claim of aggressive recruitment by Hiraoka, the cult 
maintained an active membership of less than a few dozen devotees 
in the New York area. 

The staffs investigation, though, reflects that the cult's New 
York office was actively involved in the procurement and attempted 
procurement of high technology items with possible military use. 
Though most of the documents at the Aum's headquarters were 
taken by the cult after the Tokyo incident, entries in the Aum's 
ledgers reflect various payments to technology and laser compa- 
nies. The cult utilized various corporate entities to facilitate these 



33 

transactions, including its primary alter ego, Aum USA Company, 
and the company Maha Posya. 

In August 1993, the cult attempted to obtain a Mark IVxp inter- 
ferometer from the Zygo Corporation in Middlefield, CT. This de- 
vice is a laser measuring system primarily used for measuring lens 
systems, optical components, and flat and spherical surfaces. It is 
a dual commercial/military use item and has numerous applica- 
tions, including the possible measuring of plutonium spheres. The 
U.S. Commerce Department prohibits the export of this machine to 
certain countries, including Libya, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba. 
The machine, though, is not prohibited for export to Japan. 

In August of 1993, representatives of Zygo received contacts from 
the Aum, including telefaxes from Hiraoka. On August 23, Zygo is- 
sued a price quotation for the system of over $102,000. Addition- 
ally, the Aum requested a vibration isolation table from Zygo 
which, with modest reconfiguration, could also be used to measure 
spherical surfaces such as plutonium. Neither of these purchases, 
however, was ever consummated. 

In 1994, the Aum did complete two sales transactions with 
Lydall Technical Paper of Rochester, NH. These transactions, 
which totaled approximately $32,000, were for HEPA media, which 
is an air filtration media. The staff would note that this media is 
used in so-called clean rooms and that the Aum itself constructed 
clean rooms at their compounds in Tokyo to facilitate their han- 
dling and production of sarin and other chemical and biological 
weapons. 

In January 1995, the Aum purchased molecular modeling soft- 
ware from a company known as Cache Scientific of Beaverton, OR. 
This shipment cost approximately $2,900 and consisted of basic 
software, including a manual and computer diskettes. 

In a similar effort, the Aum contacted Biosym Technologies, In- 
corporated, a molecular design software company located in San 
Diego. During February and March of 1995, Aum members nego- 
tiated with Biosym for the purchase of a sophisticated computer 
hardware system and over 20 different software programs. This 
hardware was purchased for $47,000. 

Following the Tokyo attack, the computer hardware was re- 
turned to Biosym, but the disk drive containing the software was 
missing. Allegedly, this disk drive was taken to Japan. The drive 
ultimately was returned to Biosym by the Aum, but it is unknown 
at this time whether the sect was able to download the information 
that the drive contained. 

In March 1995, Mr. Hiramatsu contacted sales and technical rep- 
resentatives of Hobart Laser Products. This company manufactures 
extremely sophisticated lasers for industrial and scientific applica- 
tions including cutting and welding. According to the company, for 
approximately 2 weeks leading up to March 18, 1995, the Aum ne- 
gotiated for the purchase of a 3-Ialowatt laser welder with installa- 
tion support. This system costs approximately $450,000. 

From discussions with Hiramatsu and Murai, the operating pa- 
rameter set forth by Murai allowed Hobart to draw the following 
technical conclusions: 

One, that the Aum wanted the laser to be operable from within 
a glove box, a sealed-room environment outside of which the opera- 



,^ 34 

tor could manipulate the equipment through the usage of thick 
gloves. Experts have advised the staff that this is particularly use- 
ful if biological toxins, aerobic or contact poisons, or nuclear emis- 
sions are of concern. 

Also, Murai indicated the laser would be used to weld aluminum 
oxide. The welding was to be of canisters, and perhaps canisters 
within canisters. 

Of primary concern to Hiramatsu and Murai was the rapid deliv- 
ery of this expensive laser. Hobart representatives were told that 
it was required immediately and that cash was available. 

When the company informed the Aum members, however, that 
this was custom-made equipment and that it would take some 
months to provide to the Aum, the cult quickly cut off discussions 
on March 18, 1995, which was just 2 days prior to the Tokyo at- 
tack. 

Also in March of 1995, Mr. Hiramatsu contacted Tripos, Incor- 
porated of St. Louis, Missouri. This company specializes in molecu- 
lar design software that is used by highly trained physicists and 
chemists to develop new therapeutic drugs in the pre-clinical de- 
sign phase. It can also be used to research and develop biological 
toxins. 

Beginning in June of 1994, the Aum established a relationship 
with a purchasing agent on the West Coast to assist it in obtaining 
military technology and hardware. The company. International 
Computers and Peripherals, was a U.S. business in California 
formed to export computer parts to Japan. The partners in the ven- 
ture, Phillip Rupani, Cameron Hader, and Kevin Singh, sought 
Japanese companies as potential clients. 

Through telefax, telephone, and personal contacts, ICP developed 
a business relationship with Hiramatsu and Tsuyoshi Maki and 
began to obtain computer parts presumably for the Aum's computer 
stores in Japan. However, near the end of 1994, Hiramatsu began 
to make requests for other items from ICP. Initially, he wanted to 
obtain thousands of serum bottles, hundreds of mechanical fans, 
and equal amounts of camcorder batteries. As Mr. Sopko indicated 
earlier, these are precisely the types of items which were utilized 
to make the deployment devices used in the attache cases which 
were found in the Tokyo subway system. 

Later, Hiramatsu began to inquire about obtaining laser equip- 
ment, survival equipment, and similar items. At one point, 
Hiramatsu asked whether ICP knew how to obtain arms, a plane, 
and container ships. Hiramatsu told Rupani that the arms were for 
a customer in the Middle East. The staff has deposed Mr. Rupani, 
one of the partners in this company, and with your permission, we 
would like to play a very short 2- or 3-minute excerpt from that 
deposition in which he discusses his contacts with the Aum. 
[Videotape played.] 

Mr. Edelman. That was just a brief excerpt of a longer deposi- 
tion of Mr. Rupani, and we would request that the complete video 
deposition be made an exhibit to the record. ^ 

Senator NUNN. Without objection, it will be made part of the 
record and appropriately numbered. 



iSee Exhibit No. 33. 



35 

Mr. Edelman. In January of 1995, the staff has learned that Mr. 
Maki and Mr. Hiramatsu began to seek mihtary equipment from 
sources in the United States. During that month, Mr. Maki at- 
tended a Winter Market Show at the Reno Convention Center in 
Nevada at which time he made contact with a representative of 
Rothco Company, a firm in Smithtown, NY. Mr. Maki inquired 
about obtaining survival equipment through Rothco and expressed 
an interest in obtaining gas masks. 

A week after this meeting, Rothco received a request wherein 
Mr. Maki requested various items, including 200 military-style 
knives and various types of gas masks. Rothco ultimately shipped 
two gas masks to the Aum in Japan as samples, a Russian mask 
and an Israeli mask. Following that shipment, Rothco received a 
request for 400 of the Israeli gas masks with filters, and the com- 
pany's account was credited with over $3,000 in pa5Tnent for those 
gas masks. It was requested, however, that Rothco send the gas 
masks not directly to Japan, but to ICP, Mr. Rupani's company in 
California, ' and that that company would act as a freight 
consolidator. 

Two days after the Tokyo attack, sources from Japan contacted 
ICP and told the company representative that they should stop 
selling to Maha Posya because they were involved with the Aum 
and were killing people in Japan. At that time, Mr. Rupani recalled 
the Maha Posya shipment from the freight forwarder and returned 
it to ICP in California. Mr. Rupani opened the shipment and dis- 
covered that it did include the gas masks in it. 

As we saw on the large chart of the Aum's world activities, the 
Aum was in numerous countries aside from Russia and the United 
States. They had an oftice in Germany. They had businesses in Tai- 
wan. They even had a tea plantation which they ran in Sri Lanka. 
So this was truly an organization whose tentacles reached around 
the globe. 

The threat posed by the Aum today is unknown. It still has sub- 
stantial assets, thousands of devotees, and authorities are unsure 
whether its weapons and weapons potential has been completely 
neutralized. Furthermore, the anti-Western rhetoric and the Arma- 
geddon prophecies that fueled the tragic and near-cataclysmic inci- 
dents in Tokyo and elsewhere are still evident. 

The cult's rise and its efforts to obtain and deploy weapons of 
mass destruction raise numerous policy issues, however, that ex- 
tend well beyond the specific threat posed by Shoko Asahara and 
his disciples of the Aum Shinrikyo. The Aum was merely one exam- 
ple, a case study, of what may be the most dominate and emerging 
threat to our national security today. 

That concludes our formal statement, Mr. Chairman. We do have 
a number of exhibits in a bulky form which we would request be 
made part of the record. ^ 

Senator NuNN. Without objection, they will be part of the record. 

I would like to thank you, Mr. Edelman, Mr. Sopko, and also 
Rick Kennan, Mark Webster, Scott Newton, Renee Pruneau- 
Novakoff, and on the majority side, Harry Damelin, Mike Bopp, 
and Steve Levin for a very, very thorough job. I don't have a lot 



' The exhibits appear in the Appendix beginning on page 368. 



36 

of questions. We have other panels, and we have a third witness 
today that you have alluded to. But if you could summarize, distin- 
guishing between what t5T)e of weapons they actually had and had 
developed and those weapons that they were working on, could you 
summarize that for us, the weapons they actually possessed that 
we know about and the weapons that they were working on that 
they never did actually deploy? 

Mr. SOPKO. Well, from the chemical and biological point of view. 
Senator, we know they had and deployed sarin and VX. Those are 
the primary ones. They were working on botulism and anthrax. 
There is some debate — and we haven't confirmed it — that they 
could have had both of those, but I don't believe they intentionally 
deployed it. There may have been accidental deployment. 

They also had a Russian helicopter that they were attempting to 
put a dispersal device on. They had drone aircraft that they were 

going to put a dispersal device on. They had 

Senator NUNN. Drone aircraft, unpiloted small aircraft that could 

carry chemical or biological 

Mr. SoPKO. That is correct, Senator. It has a tank in it, and then 
it is used to spray. They also had AK-47's and were building more 
AK-47's. We know they had some Russian-made pistols that they 
obtained. 

Now, they were trjdng to obtain laser weapon technology. They 
were also trying to obtain some other military technology like 
tanks and other hardware, but they weren't able to do it. 

Senator Nunn. We have no evidence they actually had laser 
weapons at this stage? 
Mr. SoPKO. No, Senator. 

Senator NuNN. No evidence that they had gained access to any 
nuclear device at this stage? 

Mr. SoPKO. No, Senator, although they were looking for nuclear 
material and nuclear scientists to help them. 

Senator NUNN. Do we have evidence of how much uranium min- 
ing they did in Australia, if any? 

Mr. Edelman. There is evidence that they did some excavation 
in Australia. It has not been confirmed whether they actually took 
any uranium ore out of Australia, and it is not clear the total 
amount of ore, if any, which they may have been able to extract 
fi*om the ground. 

Senator NuNN. So we don't know that. 

Mr. Edelman. We don't know what, if anything, they took from 
Australia. 

Senator NuNN. In summarizing, what weapons do we know that 
they actually got or weapons material or sophisticated equipment 
actually had delivered to Japan fi-om the United States as opposed 
to what they were trying to get? What do we know about in terms 
of what actually got through to Japan? 

Mr. Edelman. In terms of actual weapons, I don't believe we 
have any evidence that there were actual weapons that they ob- 
tained from the U.S. and sent to Japan. They did obtain some tech- 
nology which they could have utilized in making their weapons, in 
particular in making chemical or biological agents. 



37 

Senator NuNN. But most of what they were trying to get in this 
country, though, was intercepted after they became known follow- 
ing the March attack, was it not? 

Mr. Edelman. There was at least one instance where material 
was intercepted by law enforcement authorities. In other instances, 
the deals which the Aum was trying to arrange with various com- 
panies fell through, either because of price or for other reasons. 
The companies may have started to become suspicious of why these 
people wanted the items. 

Senator NUNN. But most of the records were taken out of their 
offices before we had a chance to examine them, were they not? 

Mr. Edelman. That is correct. From our interviews with the 
manager of the New York office, we were told that within a month 
after the subway attack, the key cult members from Tokyo came 
to New York, went through all of the files there, and took a box 
full of documents, which primarily contained all of the records of 
their business transactions here in the U.S. 

Senator NUNN. How did you discover the companies you have 
listed here? You listed a number of American companies that they 
had tried to procure various materials and technology from. How 
did you find those companies? 

Mr. Edelman. There were still some records left in the New York 
office, including some accounting records which made references to 
various companies. Our staff then followed through on those 
names, contacted the companies, interviewed principals from those 
companies, and through that method obtained somewhat of a pic- 
ture of what the Aum's activities were. 

Senator NuNN. But there could be a lot of other companies that 
were in the records that you did not see. Is that right? 

Mr. Edelman. It is very possible that there were many more 
companies that we do not know about that the Aum may have been 
dealing with here in the U.S. 

Senator NuNN. So we really don't know how much may have 
been delivered to Japan from the United States? 

Mr. Edelman. No. We don't know how many companies they 
may have contacted, how many different devices they may have ob- 
tained, and how much they may have been able to get to Japan. 

Senator Nunn. Do we know whether any of the companies that 
we do know about violated any of our export laws? 

Mr. Edelman. There was the one shipment when the sample of 
two gas masks were sent to the Aum in Japan. That shipment 
would appear to have violated export restrictions. We will have 
representatives fi-om the U.S. Customs Service testifying tomorrow. 
They could better address that. But from what we have been told, 
shipment of gas masks would require some sort of license or au- 
thorization, and that apparently was not obtained in this instance. 

Some of the other items which the Aum was seeking to acquire 
were in one sense or another restricted, but the group never 
reached the stage of actually trying to get them out of the country 
for those restrictions to 

Senator NuNN. Are there any indications that the Aum actually 
used biological weapons? 

Mr. Edelman. There are a couple of reports. I think Mr. Sopko 
alluded to one report of perhaps an accidental release of biological 



38 

toxins at the Tokyo headquarters. There has been another report 
in the Japanese press which recites facts concerning a device which 
was used by members of the Aum, a truck or a car with which they 
purportedly drove around the Imperial Palace in Japan with a de- 
vice that sprayed botulinum toxin. According to these press reports, 
Mr. Asahara, Mr. Hayakawa, and Mr. Joyn were all present in that 
vehicle as it circled the Imperial Palace, and this took place in the 
summer of 1993 

Senator NuNN. But no damage was done? 

Mr. Edelman. According to the reports, there was no damage 
done because the toxin itself loses its toxicity once it hits the air 
and sunlight and daylight, so that there was never any damage. 

We have not been able to independently confirm the veracity of 
these allegations, however. 

Senator NUNN. In the course of your investigation, you have 
talked to a lot of our own law enforcement agencies, intelligence 
agencies, emergency preparedness agencies. Secret Service and so 
forth. What is your judgment about how prepared the United 
States is in terms of our law enforcement agencies in particular to 
handle a similar type threat in this country? 

Mr. SOPKO. Senator, the verdict is out on that, unfortunately. We 
do know that there are contingency plans to handle that type of 
threat and to handle that type of incident. Those will be discussed 
tomorrow by the government witnesses. 

We have some concerns about the ability of the U.S. Government 
and its many agencies to respond to such an incident. We have 
some concerns about the intelligence and law enforcement coordi- 
nation to respond to that incident. It is good, but it could be better. 

We have some concerns about our medical capabilities to respond 
to that incident. 

Senator Nunn. The Japanese were pretty well prepared medi- 
cally. Is that right? 

Mr. SoPKO. They were pretty well prepared, and I don't believe 
we would have been as good as they were if an incident like that 
had happened. Now, that isn't to condemn our response, but the 
Japanese, you have to realize, had an inkling something was going 
to happen. They also have a different society and a different struc- 
ture in responding to these type events. They also have a long his- 
tory of disasters there like the earthquakes in which they have a 
response team prepared. 

Now, sometimes they don't work as well as they would want to, 
but they seem to have had their medical response, their health care 
and public service response to the incident put together quite well. 
That probably causes more concern than even the law enforcement 
and intelligence capabilities as when you look at our response from 
the medical point of view here in the United States. 

Senator NuNN. Wouldn't you have to have certain treatment 
available for a chemical attack near the scene in order to be able 
to cope with it? 

Mr. SoPKO. That is correct, Senator, and you have to educate the 
health care providers to be on the lookout for these type of inci- 
dents, especially a biological attack. Again, our next panel will dis- 
cuss that in more detail, and Dr. Young from the Public Health 
Service will also discuss our medical response capabilities. 



39 

Senator NuNN. After looking at what happened in Japan, what 
is your judgment about whether such an event could happen in the 
United States and the likelihood of it in the next few years? 

Mr. SOPKO. Senator, all of the experts we talked to said it is real- 
ly not a question of if but just rather when an event will occur here 
in the United States. 

Senator NuNN. Most likely chemical, biological, nuclear? What is 
most likely? 

Mr. SoPKO. Senator, probably most likely either chemical or bio- 
logical, not nuclear, just because of the difficulty of putting to- 
gether a nuclear device versus a chemical and biological device, 
which you can put together. I mean, Senator, we even found mate- 
rial on the Internet which, in a matter of seconds, one of our staff- 
ers just pulled this off the Internet. It is called the "Killer Cults: 
Wake Up and Smell the Poison." It describes how to make a sarin 
weapon, describes how to make biological weapons. And that was 
only in a matter of minutes we pulled this up. That is the unfortu- 
nate thing. There is so much material out there already in the pub- 
lic domain. 

Senator NUNN. If you listed three or four things that we need 
most to make priorities in terms of being prepared to prevent this 
kind of occurrence but to deal with it if it ever occurred, what 
would they be? 

Mr. SoPKO. Well, intelligence is the key. Senator, and devoting 
more resources to our intelligence efforts and then also cooperation 
between our intelligence community and the worldwide intelligence 
community because a terrorist event of the future is going to be 
international in scope. So, international cooperation of intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies is a second key priority. 

The third would be to devote more resources and training to the 
response to an incident. That is where I think the staff — and I 
think Mr. Edelman will agree with me — feel the most concern. Are 
we able to get highly trained fire crews and emergency crews out 
there to an incident like this and not have them become the victims 
themselves? I think those three areas would be probably the three 
areas I would recommend. 

Senator NuNN. At this point in time do we have law enforcement 
that is equipped with chemical capabilities in dealing with this, gas 
masks, etc.? 

Mr. SoPKO. Senator, we do have those capabilities. Whether they 
are adequate or not can best be answered probably by the upcom- 
ing witnesses. 

Senator NuNN. Mainly in our military, though, isn't it? 

Mr. SOPKO. Yes, Senator. Our military is very well prepared for 
that. They are up to speed on that. It is the question — and they can 
support a civilian response to that. But the question is. Will the 
military be there if an incident happens in some subway? It is 
going to be some local fire department or local EMS crew that is 
going to show up first. It is going to be a doctor or a series of doc- 
tors in emergency rooms who are going to notice people coming in 
with some type of illness first. And those are the people who have 
to be educated and trained and equipped for this type of incident. 

Senator Nunn. Thank you. Senator Cohen? 

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 



40 

You mentioned that there were Aum devotees in Russia. Are 
there any, to our knowledge, in the United States? 

Mr. Edelman. From our interviews with the manager of the 
Aum's New York office, the number appears to be Hmited. Al- 
though some of the authorities that we spoke with claimed that 
there could be as many as 200 Aum members here in the U.S., we 
have not found evidence to support that, and we believe that the 
figures that we were given by the Aum's New York manager her- 
self of perhaps a few dozen is probably closer to accurate. 

Senator COHEN. Well, you mentioned that the timetable for this 
conflict that has been preached by Hayakawa was accelerated to 
November 1995. We also may recall that following the bombing in 
Oklahoma, word was spread by some of the groups in this country 
that the U.S. Government was, in fact, responsible for the gas at- 
tack in Tokyo. 

Now, was that due to Aum members spreading that? Was that 
due to local militia groups contributing to that particular view of 
the U.S. Government's activities? How do you attribute that story? 

Mr. Edelman. The Aum has continuously accused the United 
States of carrying out or seeking to carry out chemical and biologi- 
cal warfare against it. There were times prior to the Tokyo attack 
when foul odors were detected around their compound, 
Kamikuishiki near Mt. Fuji, where people were found gagging and 
coughing. The Aum in response to that claimed that their facilities 
had been attacked by the U.S. military and that they themselves 
had been sprayed by the U.S. military with chemical agents. 

Senator COHEN. The question I am asking is whether or not the 
Aum followers, to the extent they exist in the United States, were 
responsible for planting that notion with some of the militia groups 
in the United States who in turn started to circulate literature that 
the United States was responsible for that. 

Mr. Edelman. I don't think we have evidence of direct contacts 
between the Aum in the U.S. and U.S. militia groups. We were told 
by the New York manager that after the Tokyo attack, she received 
a call from the hierarchy in Japan and was given instructions as 
to how to deal with the media in the U.S. if they should call and 
ask about this attack on the Tokyo subway system. And as well, 
the Aum representatives in other countries were given a statement 
by Asahara to give to the media disclaiming the Aum's responsibil- 
ity for this. 

Mr. SOPKO. Senator, if I can add, we do know that the Aum went 
out and tried to hire U.S. experts after the Tokyo incident to go 
back to Japan and appear on TV and to give news reports saying 
that this could not have been an Aum-related incident but was, 
rather, a military incident by either the Japanese or U.S. military. 
So we know they attempted — we actually have the toll records of 
some of the calls made to U.S. officials — not officials, but U.S. aca- 
demics. Now, no one took that offer, but they were attempting to 
do that to manipulate them, at least the Japanese media. 

Senator COHEN. You indicated that we will hear during the 
course of these hearings some testimony perhaps that there may 
have been some kind of intelligence failure on our part. The ques- 
tion I had is: Between June 1994 when the Matsumoto incident oc- 
curred and December 1994, was the U.S. Government told by the 



41 

Japanese Government that sarin was involved, or was it told that 
it was simply an industrial accident? 

Mr. SOPKO. Senator, in an open setting, I am not going to be able 
to answer that question. 

Senator CoHEN. All right. We will wait for a closed setting. 

Mr. SoPKO. Yes. I would like to answer, and we can give you a 
briefing, and I think our intelligence authorities can— but I believe 
I am in an area which I don't think I can answer. 

Senator CoHEN. Will you also be prepared to brief the Committee 
on what cable traffic, if any, came from our Embassy in Japan con- 
cerning this? Even though this is an issue that was not followed 
closely in the United States, it was followed very closely by the 
Japanese press. And I would be interested in having the staff re- 
veal, to the extent you have any knowledge about what kind of 
cable traffic came back from our Embassy and what the assessment 
was by our Embassy in Tokyo. 

^xT^l^ ^^^^^- We would be more than happy to do that, Senator 
We do have some unclassified cables that we can also provide so 
we do know there was some reporting on the incident. 

Senator, one thing I can say is that fi-om our discussions with 
every major U.S. law enforcement and inteUigence agency, they all 
to a man, and woman, said the Aum was not on their radar screens 
until Tokyo. Then all of a sudden it was on our radar. We got that 
from everyone we talked to. 

Senator Cohen. I am not drawing a parallel, necessarily, but you 
may recall when they had the anthrax disaster in Sverdlovsk, the 
boviet Government at that time claimed it was simply an accident 
a case of tainted meat. We learned years later that it was quite to 
the contrary. So I would be interested in finding out whether or not 
there was any initial reaction this may have simply been an indus- 
trial accident as opposed to an identification of sarin being in- 
volved. ^ 

Senator NUNN. Are you speaking of the first attack, the 
Matsumoto attack? 

Senator Cohen. Yes, Matsumoto, the first attack. 

Another question Senator Nunn has raised concerns how do we 
detect. Our biggest problem, it seems to me, is not necessarily de- 
tection, but It still presents a problem. If, as Senator Glenn in his 
opening remarks pointed out, you could have a facility the size of 
this room producing these toxins, then it is going to be very hard 

•1® T^u ^^^^ worldwide. We ran into this problem some years ago 
with Libya, in Rabat. You may recall that the Libyans at that time 
Claimed it was simply a pharmaceutical facility, which raised seri- 
ous questions in our minds since you would be hard pressed to ius- 
tity why you have surface-to-air missile sites all around a pharma- 
ceutical production facility. But, nonetheless, we were well aware 
ot what was being produced at that plant. There may be more in 
production today, even. 

We can point to all of the other countries who are high on our 
list ot terronst-sponsoring nations, so we know that there may be 
a large number of countries developing both chemical weapons and 
biological weapons, and I would point out that even though we 
have agreements with Russia and others, they seem to be in viola- 
tion ot those agreements even as we speak. So assuming we get 



42 

treaties that are ratified, we still have the problem — I am sure 
Senator Lugar will confirm — of monitoring compliance with those 
treaties, which is going to be no easy task, particulariy since we 
are dealing with something that you can manufacture easily. In 
fact you could even buy by mail order for about $35 in this country, 
some of the toxins we are talking about. 

So it is a question of how do we detect worldwide what is going 
on, and then how do we detect at home what is going on. And as- 
suming you can detect it, then you have the question in dealing 
with it here at home of how do you resolve the conflicts between 
our civil liberties and the need for order. 

Mr. Chairman, I recall back in the late 1970's attending a con- 
ference in Germany that addressed the threat of international ter- 
rorism. An industrialist by the name of Schleyer had just been as- 
sassinated and found in the trunk of his Mercedes. And at this con- 
ference in Germany, which was my first trip, I was rather sur- 
prised with the level of security. Helmut Schmidt and Henry Kis- 
singer were in attendance, among many other people. And the 
hotel was surrounded by armored personnel carriers, and every po- 
lice officer was armed with a submachine gun. And I wondered at 
that time would that level of security ever have to be necessary in 
the United States, and would it be tolerated in the United States. 
And that is something that has troubled me over the years in 
terms of what level of security we will insist upon as we try to 
wrestle with the threat, the ever increasing and looming threat of 
international terrorism. 

I don't know how we resolve that. We talk about law and order. 
My own intuition tells me at some point in time we will reverse 
it and talk about order and law, because I think people will de- 
mand that we protect them, that we preserve their lives, and have 
to reconcile the balance in favor of the preservation of life over that 
of civil liberties. But that is precisely the threat that international 
terrorism or domestic terrorism poses for all of us, and it is not one 
with which we have yet come to grips, Mr. Chairman. 

So we need more intelligence, and we will get more intelligence. 
We need more cooperation between ourselves and other nations 
such as Russia and otlier countries that they may be supporting, 
directly or indirectly. We need to have better protective devices, but 
as we look back now at the threat of nuclear war back in the late 
1940's and early 1950's when we were taught to duck under our 
tables, to hide from the blast and not look out the windows at the 
light, and we look back now with some astonishment that we could 
have been so naive that that was going to protect us. Similarly, we 
now face the prospect that we may in each house have to have a 
gas mask, that we may have to have protective devices in our base- 
ment in order to respond adequately to the kinds of attacks which 
I believe are more probable than not. They are more probable be- 
cause of our lack of agent detection systems. They are more prob- 
able because of our lack of vaccines and protective equipment, and 
the ease with which these toxins can, in fact, be dispersed in our 
society. 

So we are going to face a different type of threat and the notion 
that somehow we all have to have protective devices or the govern- 



43 

ment will have to have an adequate supply of these kinds of de- 
vices raises the specter of another dimension. 
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Edelman. If I could, Senator Cohen, your point about detec- 
tion IS particularly difficult in a case of a group like the Aum be- 
cause as you pointed out, with the Libya case you could have 'sur- 
veillance satellites that find those missile sites around the facility 
But in the case of the Aum, how does one know that a building 
that a religious group says is a Buddhist temple is not, in fact a 
chemical weapons plant? ' 

Senator COHEN. For a very small amount of money, about $35 
you can actually purchase botulinum toxin by mail order Of 
course, it can be extremely lethal. If you take 10 pounds of tula- 
remia, you can destroy human life within 100 square kilometers 
compared to 50,000 pounds of chemical weapons to achieve the 
same effect. You can— well, I won't go into it in open session how 
many ways there are in which to disperse this, but I think that 
this is an extremely important subject matter, Mr. Chairman You 
have been working at it a long time, and I think it is long overdue 
that we raise the nature of the threat, the degree of cooperation we 
are going to have to have. And notwithstanding treaties, I guess 
my major point is this: We have treaties and we have agreements 
with some of our major partners in peace. They are still violating 
to this day— they are violating their word and their commitment 
both in chemical weapons and especially in biological weapons So 
we have to call attention to that, in open session if possible in 
closed session if necessary. ' 

Senator NUNN. Senator Cohen, you make very, very good points 
here. Senator Lugar asked the question in his opening remarks 
about what will we ask ourselves about what we should have done 
alter we have the first one of these chemical attacks. And I think 
that is the question we need to pose now. 

I think it is imperative that we draw a balance between civil lib- 
erties and protecting the lives of our people before something like 
this happens, not wait until after it happens. And then you always 
have overreaction. I think it is indicative during the Cold War 
when most of us in the national security field reahzed that the 
President of the United States might have to respond to a nuclear 
attack immediately without time for Congress to even consider or 
debate the matter of declaration of war, that in effect, de facto, the 
President of the United States was ceded authority to respond with 
massive retaliation to a nuclear attack against the United States 
with no meeting of Congress, no debate, nothing. 

When we get to lesser contingencies, we have the big debate, as 
we will appropriately do in the case of Bosnia, and as we appro- 
priately did in the case of the Persian Gulf. So the authority that 
will be ceded to the executive branch and in turn to law enforce- 
ment and intelhgence will depend on whether we get in ft-ont of 
tms question and prevent it or whether we wait until it happens 
m which case the demand for a whole lot more authority, notwith- 
standing cml liberties concerns, will be there. If you ever have a 

£ u"i'''!l^"^u^/'' *^^ U^^*^^ S^^t^s where thousands of people are 
killed, the whole nature of the civil liberties debate will change 
overnight, as we all know. ^ 



44 

It is indicative also that we have an anti-terrorism bill that 
passed the Senate. We worked out our concerns very carefully and, 
I think, drew a pretty careful balance about what the military 
could do and when it could operate after the Attorney General, 
after the Secretary of Defense. That bill is stuck in the House. But 
if we had one chemical attack, what the militia is now saying- 
some of the mihtia— about ceding of authority to the mihtary would 
disappear overnight. Within 2 days that bill giving authority to the 
U.S. military to come in in emergency situations would pass. Now, 
we don't want to give too much authority to the United States mili- 
tary, but we are woefully ill prepared now in our law enforcement 
community to deal with these kinds of attacks. 

So under very careful circumstances, we have to have the ability 
of our military to go in when there is this kind of attack with their 
equipment, their special technologies, and assist law enforcement, 
not take over but assist. 

But I think the question of what we do in terms of this balance 
will determine an awful lot, but I think it is imperative we get out 
in front of the situation and strike the right balance rather than 
waiting for it to happen and then greatly overreact at the expense 
of our constitutional protections. So that is what this hearing is all 
about. 

I might also say, Senator Cohen, I share your view that we have 
major challenges in verification and implementation of either 
chemical and certainly the biological which has been on the books 
now since 1972. Those are going to be continuing. We will have tes- 
timony, I think, as we go through this hearing today and tomorrow 
that will indicate that all of those implementation and verification 
problems will be easier with the treaties than without them, and 
that those are major challenges, as Senator Lugar well knows, that 
exist now. And the absence of the treaties doesn't in any way facih- 
tate either verification or implementation whereby the actual ratifi- 
cation of those will make what is, by definition, an almost impos- 
sible job more achievable than is the present case. 

In my view, this set of hearings and those that Senator Lugar 
has conducted already and those that he will conduct and those 
that you and I have worked together on in the past, Senator 
Cohen, indicate the national security area and arena that we are 
going to be dealing with for the next 10 to 20 years. This is the 
number one challenge. It is not Russia invading Poland or Czecho- 
slovakia. It is the question of what comes out of the former Soviet 
Union in terms of military threat that could be spread all over the 
world. That is the challenge that we face at this point. 

Senator COHEN. Could I add just one footnote to all of this? We 
keep reading in our press about whether or not we have enough 
of a mission for the Central Intelligence Agency and whether or not 
it ought to engage in economic espionage. There is plenty for our 
intelligence agencies to do. With regard to the notion that we are 
now living in a more peaceful world, I think Senator Nunn has 
clearly pointed out that while there is less of a nuclear threat to 
the United States, but the nature of the threat has changed dra- 
matically, and it is even more dangerous in many other respects. 
We have quite a mission for the CIA and all of our intelligence 
community to perform. 



45 

Senator NuNN. Senator Lugar? 

T fK^^^lT.t'^?'^- ^ ^^^ J""^* ""^^ question. You have testified— and 
1 thought that It was a very important point— that the Aum group 
was really not on the radar screens of our intelligence and defense 
officials, until the Tokyo attack, despite the loss of life and other 
activities earlier on. 

tinn^Jf "!? "^ 9 n'^^'^ii*' Japanese authorities, what was their percep- 
l]Z .T • ^'iu^^y appreciate that the intent of the organiza- 

tion was the overthrow of the Japanese Government? 

thPr"" Th^C^'t  ^^^^*«^' I. don't believe they fully appreciated it ei- 
ther. They knew about it. They had concerns about this group as 

ofhpr w-r '^'''^^'lu ^""^ ^' y^^ "^^ probably hear from some of the 
other witnesses, they were reluctant to move for the same reason 

tt\\rprXt'e7bfs^rte'« "^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^ ^^''^^^^ -^-^-^^- 

It dfd'n't'^Tl.*^^^ '^/''^ hoping it would just go away, we were told. 
It didn t. They had an indication that the Aum was starting to de- 
velop some type of chemical capability. I don't believe from our 
interviews that they knew how far it had gone until the sarin was 
released in Matsumoto and then in Tokyo They probably had no 
mdication at all or very little inkling about the biologicaf capabU^ 
ity, and only once they went into the site and actually opened the 
rn^ I?. «Al°^*^^ buildings and then quickly shut it diTthey dfs^ 
cover that there was a major bio lab and major bio research fadhty 

I think that probably summarizes it. They knew something was 
going on, but they c^dn't fuUy appreciate it. And iTon't blli^ve 
they fully appreciated the international scope of this organization 

Senator LuGAR. Poor to the Matsumoto incident or the Tokyo at^ 
tack, was there evidence of cooperation between intelligence au- 
.?r.''V^ ^7 of the other countries you have referencfd for !n- 
Sr wo^r ^T^l^' T^""" Australia, from the United States? In 
mpnt H™ ' the Japanese, m trying to evaluate their predica- 

ment, have any assistance from other nations'? 

forth  I t'hlnk hff ^*'''"' .*K ^""^ "^^^ ''^^ ^^^^^ discussion back and 
torth, 1 think, between the various countries on this group Japan 

Now^r "^^^ ^ P?^*"^ *^"^^' ^^^^d it wholly as dStic ^ 

wasTpeakin^^ FZ A ^l^?"" "^l^ ^^""^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ Mr. Edelman 
was speaking, the Austrahans became concerned about who this 

fellow Asahara was and why was he in Australia with all this S 

cess baggage They did contact the Japanese-now,^is would have 

thorif^'r.^H*'TK^"'i.P""-'^">^«- ^^^y^^^ ^«^t^^t the Japanese au! 
other pe^^^^^^ ^ background on who Asahara was and some of the 

•.Z"" i^^f ^''^^''*' ^^^^ "^^^ ^" «f the international cooperation we 

sia^s^or tL^p'^^*^^^' r*^^J *^^ J^P^^^«« contacted the R^s 
sians nor the Russians contacted the Japanese or anv— the U S or 

M %'^' P''^" *^*^" ^^^y« i'^^id^^t about this^oup. ''' 

and th^ T^n^^- ^"'* *^ ^^^' *^^ ^«^tact betwein the Australians 
and the Japanese was more on the lines of pohce-to-police or police- 

iSrg&^tuTe'"^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^"^^ ^^^ -* appear To W?n 

«.^lT*°'"^^^^'^- ^^^^^ United States were facing a similar predic- 
ament and we were receiving similar amounts of information from 



46 

Australian police and export control authorities, to what extent 
would this register on our radar screen? In other words, when 
would it finally reach a point where the President of the United 
States, the CIA or the Secretary of Defense would recognize that 
there was a threat out there? If it didn't reach our radar screens 
until Tokyo, obviously either the Japanese didn't tell us or we 
didn't get the message in an appropriate form. 

Mr. SOPKO. In this type of setting, Senator, that would probably 
be a useful question to ask, and that is the appearance we have. 
One of the things that is crucial is basically the analysis, getting 
the information to some group or organization that can analyze it, 
and it has got to be an all-sources center. Somewhere in our gov- 
ernment or internationally somebody should be collecting, whether 
it is law enforcement, whether it is intelligence, whether it is pub- 
lic record information— which, surprisingly, in the course of our in- 
vestigation we have been getting better information, better sources 
in many areas fi-om just public sources, you know, the academics 
or the institutions out there. 

But only when all of that information comes in somewhere and 
somebody can then see a connection between an organized crime 
case in Tokyo and a murder in Russia or the movement of— or cus- 
toms documents that showed a movement of some sarin by-product 
will they understand what the significance of it is. And that is why 
when we are talking about greater cooperation, it has got to be not 
just among law enforcement but law enforcement with the intel- 
Ugence community and it has got to be international in scope. 

Senator LUGAR. One of the points of this hearing is to serve as 
a data base for all we have collected to date on the subject, as well 
as to try to think through some institutional means of translating 
the work of the hearing into policy. The witnesses we have heard 
have done this collection fi-om all sources, and by their analysis we 
finally begin to see a pattern. But I don't believe this has been oc- 
curring regularly, and this reinforces the utility of these hearings. 

Senator NuNN. Thank you. Senator Lugar. 

I believe we have about a 2-minute wind-up here with the Aus- 
traUan video relating to both the uranium mining and the sheep 
gassing. It will take about 2 minutes, if you all could play that, and 
then we will call our next panel. 

Alan, if you could tell us what is going on, I beheve there is no 
sound, it is just video. ,,• • . 

Mr. Edelman. This is Mr. Hayakawa, the Construction Minister. 
He was one of the first to come to Australia with Mr. Inoue, who 
is their intelligence and action squad director. This is the actual 
Banjawarn Station property. You can see it is in a very remote 

area. ,. j u 

This is the AustraUan real estate agent they utilized to purchase 

the property, which is in Western AustraHa in the Outback. 

Subsequently, Mr. Hayakawa came back with Mr. Maki, who is 

pictured here, and they stayed on the property. 

These are some of the buildings on the property. You can see one 

was labeled as a laboratory. This is the inside of that laboratory. 

You can see there how remote the area of Austraha was where 

they were present. They had to use 4-wheel-drive vehicles to get 

around. No neighbors around basically for miles and miles. 



47 

This is some of the excavation that the Aum members were doing 
on that property, and many beheve it was a search for uranium de- 
posits. These are some of the other buildings on the property. 

After the Tokyo attack, the AustraUan authorities were alerted 
by the new owners of the property. They sent a team out to 
Banjawarn Station where they inspected the property, took sam- 
ples of the soil. They also found on the property the pile of sheep 
carcasses. They as well found chemicals, equipment, evidence of 
digging. That is the pile of the sheep carcasses. Not a very pleasant 
sight. But they took samples from that which were then analyzed 
at Australian Federal laboratories, and the result of that analysis 
was they determined that there was a presence of sarin there 

Senator NUNN. OK. Thank you both, and all the staff from both 
the majority and minority who were working on this. You have 
done an excellent job. 

[The prepared statement of the staff follows:! 

STAFF STATEMENT 

GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION A CASE 

STUDY ON THE AUM SHINRIKYO 

I. Introduction 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this week the Subcommittee 
begms the first m a series of hearings concerning the global proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction: Chemical, biological and nuclear. These weapons may be the 
most serious threat to our Nation's national security in hght of growing evidence 
that some terrorist groups and rogue states have already acquired and others are 
actively seeking such weapons for their arsenals. 

Six years ago in 1989 this Subcommittee, in conjunction with the Committee on 
Government Affairs, held four days of hearings on the spread of chemical and bio- 

Ih^'h.fH^ r^°i^^" Tl ^ff^^P^^""^' ^ ^ ^^^* ^^^°t' sP^^'-ed by revelations from 
the battle fields of the Middle East where both the Iranians and Iraqis used chemi- 
cal weapons. At those hearings we learned not only of the devastating effects of 
these weapons, but also of the rapid rate at which these weapons have begun to 
proliterate throughout the world. 

At those hearings, the specter of terrorist groups using chemical or biological 
weapons was only hypothetical. Although there had been sporadic reporting of fuch 
f^3 ■T''^ some mterest in these devices, up to that time there had been no 
S th. til'' r^ 1Q«^T°"^* group actually deploying such weapons. Additionally, 
fhp ?Tn,>Tcf .°"'" 1989 hearmgs the idea of a major terrorist attack occurring in 
fintv I 11 was also more hypothetical than real. Combined efforts of our Na- 

oft"^'? ^^t"? and law enforcement communities had thwarted such groups from 
attempting what was then viewed as the "unthinkable " 

inVhP f?n!Jp?fc ^"'^Jv!'^^ "'i^^^^ 'j°^ ^^^^- ^ ^^ ^" '^^^ fr°m recent events 
in the United States the destructive intentions of fanatical individuals and groups 

rnn. Z""^ an actuality m Oklahoma and New York City. Reports from Eastern Eu- 
rope document police seizures of kilogram quantities of weapons grade uranium 
And JUS seven months ago, on March 20th, we witnessed the first major use^f 
whi^hT Ii'^hT ""^^^ terrorists with the gassing attack of the Tokyo subw'ay system 
which killed 12 and injured over 5,000 innocent passengers 

int:^!!lT"^f "'■^ throughout the world now agree that these events are of major 
international significance. The proverbial genie has been released from its bottle In 
nl^ntoH T 'e^P- terrorists responsible for the American and Japanese events have 
tZ^U T ^""^ ^"T^^^ roadmaps for others to attack American domestic targets 
Rr,^! Vt «• "se such weapons against innocent civilian populations worldwide As 
Bruce Hoffman of the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at 
St. Andrews University in Scotland recently stated: violence at 

"We've definitely crossed a threshold. This is the cutting edge of high-tech 

neonTil"^ ^°' ^heyeVOOO and beyond. It's the nightmare%cenario E 
people have quietly talked about for years coming true." 



48 

It is in this context that Senator Nunn last year directed the Minority Staff of 
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations to initiate an investigation into the 
prohferation of weapons of mass destruction including chemical, biological, and nu- 
clear. His request was a natural progression from the work done by the Staff in 
1994 relating to the meteoric growth of organized criminal activity in the former So- 
viet Union. That inquiry raised the specter of criminal involvement in the thefl and 
distribution of fissile material from the Former Soviet Union. It culminated in the 
first congressional hearing that brought together the heads of law enforcement 
agencies combating organized crime in Russia, Germany, and the United States to 
testify about their common problems and concerns. (See: International Organized 
Crime And Its Impact On the United States, May 25, 1994, S. Hrg. 103-899). 

The Staff initially began its investigation by focusing on the possibility of diver- 
sion of nuclear materials from the Former Soviet Union. A hearing on issues related 
to this problem is planned for later in the year. However, recent events from Japan 
overtook the investigation and, last June, Senator Nunn redirected the Staff to focus 
upon the ongoing activities of the Aum Shinrikyo as a case study of what can hap- 
pen when a fanatical group with financial resources obtains sophisticated technical 
abilities and decides to utilize weapons of mass destruction in furthering its goals. 

In the course of the last five months, the Minority Staff conducted hundreds of 
interviews of both government and private individuals. The Staff received both clas- 
sified and unclassified briefings from almost every major United States law enforce- 
ment and intelligence agency as well as many elements of our military and civiliaii 
agencies. The Staff" was also briefed by numerous foreign agencies including officials 
of the Japanese, German, Russian, Ukrainian and Australian governments. In addi- 
tion, two months ago, the Staff traveled to Japan, Russia, Ukraine and Germany 
to obtain first hand information concerning the activities of the Aum cult. In the 
United States, the Staff conducted numerous interviews in New York and other re- 
gions, reviewed subpoenaed records from the cult's New York office, and examined 
documents from corporations which had business relations with the cult or its cor- 
porate entities. , , „ ^ n ^u jo*. 

The Minority Staff" investigation was greatly assisted by Senator Koth and Ste- 
phen Levin, Michael Bopp and Ian Brzezinski of his staff". In addition, the Sub- 
committee Staff" appreciates the cooperation and assistance provided by the various 
agencies of the United States and foreign governments contacted in the course ol 
this inquiry. The Staff" would like to especially acknowledge the assistance of the 
United States Customs Service and Central Intelligence Agency for providing 
detailees to the Subcommittee to assist in this complicated investigation. 

II: Preliminary Findings and Questions 

The Staffs investigation of the activities of the Aum Shinrikyo found evidence to 
suggest that the Aum cult was a clear danger to not only the Japanese government 
but also to the security interests of the United States and that this danger, although 
lessened significantly by the actions of Japanese authorities, is still present. 

Although the findings may initially sound farfetched and nearly science fictional, 
the actions of the Aum and the facts corroborated from multiple sources by the Staff 
create a terrifying picture of a deadly mixture of the religious zealotry of groups 
such as the Branch Davidians, the anti-government agenda of the U.S. militia move- 
ments and the technical know-how of a Doctor Strangelove. The Staff found that: 

• The cult was extremely large with approximately 40,000 to 60,000 members 
worldwide including a membership estimated to be three times larger in Russia 
than in Japan. 

• The cult was extremely wealthy with more than $1 billion in assets. 

• The cult actively recruited scientists and technical experts in Japan, Russia and 
elsewhere in order to develop weapons of mass destruction. 

• The cult was planning and apparently had the means to directly assault the 
leadership of the government of Japan. 

• The cult had produced chemical weapons, including toxic chemical agents such 
as Sarin, VX, phosgene and sodium cyanide and had successfully deployed sarin 
on at least two occasions against large groups of innocent civilians. 

• The cult was also in the process of developing biological weapons, including an- 
thrax, botulism and "Q" fever and may have actually attempted at least one un- 
successful deployment of a biological weapon on the innocent populace of Tokyo. 

• The cult attempted to assassinate the chief law enforcement officer for Japan 
as well as the Governor for the prefecture of Tokyo. 

• The cult had successfully infiltrated various levels of the Japanese government 
and industry including elements of its law enforcement and military. 

• The cult regularly used murder and kidnapping to silence its enemies in Japan. 



49 



• The cult acquired conventional armaments and attempted to acquire weapons 
ol mass destruction and their technologies from the former Soviet Union to uti- 
lize in their planned attack on the Japanese and United States governments 
Ihe cult was also actively engaged in acquiring sensitive technologies in the 
United States to also assist it in weaponization— the full extent of which is still 
not lully known. 

• The cult leadership was ruthless, cunning and fully willing to utilize any and 
all means, including the killing of hundreds of thousands of innocent citizens 
^"J^r'If "A ^"^T^" purpose of plunging the United States and Japan into 
m Ja an ^™^^^^^°" ^""""^ ^^ich the cult would arise as the supreme power 

• The activities of the cult were and continue to be of a security concern to the 
Secret Service for the protection of the President of the United States 

• if 'f ^7^' '^ activities, and intentions were not fully appreciated by United 
states law enforcement and intelligence services until after the Tokyo gassine 
incident on March 20, 1995. As one senior U.S. law enforcement official sGted- 

they weren t on our radar screen." 

thi^f^rit'f^^ ^7^^' f^^ ^"™ incident is a remarkable yet frightening case study of 
nfHiffi u ™°^f"' ^"""s™ poses to all industrialized nations. It raises a series 
nlvf fl n "i^^^^^T.s ^bo"t domestic and international preparedness as we enter the 
r^in . J^ serves as a harsh wake-up call for the United States which until 

recently was rather complacent about the threat of terrorism. Some of the issues 
these hearings are meant to raise include: 

• How was this Doomsday Cult able to recruit some of the best and brightest of 
university trained scientists in Japan and elsewhere and what are the implica- 
tions for other Western industrialized nations? impuca 

• How could a purported pacifist religious group accumulate such technology and 
weaponry in a relatively short period of time without raising the attention of 
Western intelhgence and law enforcement agencies'? 'ii-tenuon ox 

' orlnteYligence?"^^"^ ^ °'" ^"PP^""^^"^ ^^ °**'^'" ^o"P«' whether political, criminal 

• What did U.S law enforcement and intelligence agencies know about the capa- 
bilities and intentions of this group before the Tokyo incidenf? 

• Could such an event happen here? 

' Ll°; ^^A^^^Fv^l^''^J°'' ^""^^ ^° occurrence from an intelligence, law enforce- 
ment and public health perspective? cmuii-e 

In an attempt to answer these questions, the Staff has prepared the following 
summary of the Aum's activities. Much is still not known aboSt all of their interlsL 
especially here in the United States and in Russia. Most of the trials i^apan have 
not been completed and the evidence presented in those trials has not been widely 
disseminated outside of Japan. To the Staffs knowledge, none of the defendant 

thTstaffwiabL't^^ "■^- '""f '" °^^P^^^ ^^^^' ™"^h^- be leLned from thai 
ine atari was able to uncover in its inquiry 

n..llHnl!ff°^^^'^'^^°?^'^' ^^^ ^'^^ ^^^ corroborated the following account with 
multiple foreign and domestic sources including government agencies current and 

tances 'the sTff t''' outside experts and su^oenaed docuSs In manyTn 
stances the Staff has obtained first hand accounts and original documentarv evi 
dence from government and private sources. Due to the senStiv ty anf uS queness 
rp.?p??h°^ '^' "^^"7'^^ ''^H'l^'^ by ^be Staff, we have withheld or othem?se con 
are esDecLnv'i'n.v'°T °^?" "^^'""^^- ^^ose documents used by the Staff wS 
tee aS arfa^vanfht''fn ^T'^m^^"^™^^"*^^''^^ ^« ^^^^^^ exhibits of the Subcommit- 
tee and are available for the Members and their staff to review. 

III. Background of the Cult 
A. The Early Years 

1. The Master Asahara: Humble Beginnings 

40^v^ear'^old leS^'h^r ^^^"P''^^^ Truth) was founded in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, a 
4U year old legally blind former yoga teacher. Asahara was born on March 2 1955 
dren W ^^^"°!?^'" Yatsushiro, Japan. He was the fourth son of seven chil 
rn^f;; h! °^^^^ ^^ ^'^ '■ ^'" [^'"ily ^a« P««^. his father being a tatami (mat) 
SJ^fft ? was educated m ocal schools for the blind because of inflntile glaucoma 
f?.tw J^«°^\a^the age of SIX and lived in a school dormitory from then unt^" gr^d: 
for thi R?i^H^f^ h'^°^'- ^^' graduating from the Kumamoto Prefectura sfhool 
for the Bhnd, Asahara moved to Tokyo wliere he unsuccessfully sought em-ollment 



50 

in Tokyo University. He apparently graduated from a junior college in March 1975, 
and later received some informal training as an acupuncturist. 

Little more is known of his early years. He apparently married a local college stu- 
dent in 1977 and has six children with his wife, Kazuko. Although his followers 
claim that before founding his cult he traveled widely in the East in the pursuit 
of religious training, the Staff was unable to confirm this. The Staff did corroborate 
that Asahara apparently worked in acupuncture for some time and also operated 
a pharmacy in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Police reports indicate he was ar- 
rested on suspicion of violating Japanese pharmaceutical laws in 1982 for selling 
unregulated medicines. The Staff was unable to determine the disposition of this ar- 
rest but was advised that he was never jailed for the offense. However, as a result, 
his pharmacy went into bankruptcy shortly after his arrest. 

In 1977 Asahara began the study of yoga and in 1984 he formed a company called 
the Aum Shinsen-no kai which was a yoga school and publishing house. From var- 
ious Aum publications it appears that around 1986 he changed his own name to 
Shoko Asahara and, in 1987, the name of his yoga group to the Aum Shinnkyo— 
a Sanscrit derivative literally meaning "teaching the universal or supreme truth. 

2. Religious Recognition: A Turning Point 

In August, 1989, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government granted the Aum official re- 
ligious corporation status. This law provided the Aum various privileges including 
massive tax breaks and de facto immunity from official oversight and prosecution. 
The Staff was repeatedly told that this was a significant event in the development 
of the Aum's deadly activities. Under the Japanese Religious Corporation Law, after 
a group is recognized, authorities are not permitted to investigate its "religious ac- 
tivities or doctrine." This is broadly interpreted to cover almost everything the reli- 
gious group does, including what would normally be viewed as "for profit" corporate 
activities. Although the police could investigate a religious group for criminal acts, 
the Staff was told by Japanese cult experts and government officials that in practice 
this would be difficult if not impossible to do because of the law and the govern- 
ment's reluctance to investigate religions. , . j • ^ ^■ 

Ironically, the United States is partially responsible for the broad interpretation 
given to the Religious Corporation Law. The law was enacted in 1947 as a reaction 
to excesses against religious groups by the former Japanese Imperial government. 
With strong American influence in post-war Japan, this law was enacted to protect 
religious beliefs from government interference. Since its enactment approximately 
200 000 religious groups have been recognized. Their membership actually exceeds 
the ' population of Japan by almost 70 million due to multiple memberships. Al- 
though the vast majority of these religious sects are law abiding and well respected, 
the Staff was told that there is effectively no government oversight^ over the ^activi- 
ties of any of these groups even though some operate tax exempt "for profit busi- 
nesses and a few control their own political parties. 

The Staff learned the Aum made their recognition as a religious group a high pri- 
ority They embarked upon an aggressive lobbying campaign which included picket- 
ing the offices of the agency that was to make the decision. One Aum expert who 
had been following their activities for some time called their efforts "scandalous 
and totally out of character with other religious groups. Public sources have alleged 
that to ensure their registration, the Aum also aggressively lobbied local politicians 
to put pressure on the Tokyo government officials to approve their application. 

The Staff was told that this quirk in Japanese law was a significant factor in the 
development of the Aum cult. With its registration as a legally recognized religion, 
the Aum's activities and character dramatically changed. Its net worth grew from 
less than 430 million yen (approximately $4.3 million) when recognized in 1989 to 
more than 100 billion yen ($1 billion) by the time of the Tokyo incident six years 
later. Likewise, its membership rose dramatically after legalization. From merely a 
score of members in 1984 it grew, by its own accounts, to 10,000 members in 1992 
and about 50,000 woridwide in 1995. And, from one office in Japan in 1984 it ex- 
panded to over 30 branches in over six countries. . 

Starting in 1989 the cult also became more aggressive and dangerous. With its 
dramatic growth, the Staff found evidence of increased complaints from parents and 
family members of Aum recruits alleging kidnappings and other physical assaults 
by the cult. A number of anti-Aum groups were started at about this time by family 
members of cultists. . 

Those that formed these groups complained that they themselves became victims 
of assaults and harassment. For example, as we will describe in a later section, the 
first Aum murders occurred within months of the sect being granted religious status 
when in November of 1989 cult members kidnaped and murdered a prominent Yo- 



51 ; 

kohama lawyer, Tsutsumi Sakamoto, his wife and their one year old son Prior to 
Thf ^?f^^'"^"''f •.;^/'u ^.^^^J?°\" ^^^ represented many of these anti-Aum groups. 
«n!.nnr.if fY.f^ R! '^^^ "^'^^ their Drotective religious status in place, the cult felt 
so confident that they were immune from government interference that they decided 
to silence Sakamoto. After successfully doing so, the lack of any government re- 
sponse, we were told, apparently emboldened the Cult to commit even more horribL 
"^^^:.f^^"f}^''^^''^''J^^'\^F^''r^T^^ enemies in Japan. As we now know, this 
A^^t 4nn^A "^ "°* 'f ^- ^•"''f ^J"^ ^''^y" incident, the Japanese police have arrested 
about 400 Aum members, including most of their hierarchy. 

3. Political Failure: Another Turning Point 
A.^°*^,f ^"^"^ ^^f\u^^ Staff learned was important in the changing aspect of the 

t^S.TrJlT'T^i^^'' ^"^^ ^°'"^J '""t P°"^^^^- '^^^ y^^' ^«^«'- they became a reg 
TZft ^f^g'0".'Asahara announced to his members that the Aum was going to run 
a slate of candidates in the Japanese Diet election in February 1990. Asahira and 
24 other members of his inner circle ran for parliament under the banner of the 
Aum s own party— the Shinrito. i^dimei oi me 

..Jfi^ ^h? Yl^ .1° u ^y ^"T^*" ^""^ members that Asahara was personally very 
confident that both he and the other Shinrito candidates would win their election? 
However, all lost badly. Asahara himself only received a mere 1 700 votes out ofTD 

foM the S Iff ?h;,?A "h""' Ti- ^'. "^' '' his humihation, fo^er Aum mlmbSs 
told the Staff that Asahara did not even get all the votes of his own followers who 
numbered well m excess of the 1,500 votes he obtained 

It is almost universally held that the 1990 election defeat was the final turnine 
point for the direction the Aum would eventually take. Although they had already 
A^r'fv'^ crimes including murder before the 1990 election, after their defeat the 
the^i^Ir "iLTr. legal pretensions and turned away from normal interaction with 
the larger Japanese society. From then on the rhetoric of Armageddon and paranoia 
fhat frnm"fQQ<r'- ^"^^ %T'J^ ^" Japan told the Staff that in hindsight it^appears 
fhf ni. 7 S °°'^^'^' ^¥ ^'? apparently was cast for a violent confrontation with 
the people and government of Japan. i-^liuh wiui 

B. The Cult's Beliefs 

1. East Meets West: A Levitating Terrorist 

The Aum Shinrikyo is grounded in Buddhism but with a strone mixture of as 
FrPni^.^?""" ^^ Western mystic beliefs including the works of the mhCentu^ 
^'^'^^^^^^^1'''°^^^' Nostradamus. The religion preaches that there are a numbS 
f "J^P c""^- ^-7^1^^^ consciousness that a member can reach through the teachinS 
of the Spirit of Truth, His Holiness the Master Shoko Asahara." Aum litera ufe 
claims that only one person, Shoko Asahara, has attained the highestTvel of con 
Sember'ofth^ A^'"" If '^^A^'' '^ Nirvana. The Staff inter^ewed one former 

^lu^tLiJ^^^^^^^ [hrSttTfS fp^eSo^drs^a1k?l -{j; 

tioI"\^ wlf^a^llSin'L" r^ f ^- ''"'"?^' °^ '■^'^^°"" ^'^^« surrounding "reincarna- 
'w;„t f^ i! ^'^^^^ ^fhf^^ '^ extrasensory experiences including clairvoyance 
seeing through waUs" and "levitation." Asahara claimed to frequently levitate and 
th^LsTmehts^aTnear^'tn^h^ photo^aphic evidence the Staff r^evlew^Toncernrng 
JKf r./hi fK^P 1 ? l"* be crude forgenes. Even to the untrained eye they show 

SamXe t^t^comeSf™^ "^^ ^^^^^^^^ '^^^^"^^ ^ ^ ^-- -'^ - ^ 

2. Aum Armageddon: Shiva Meets Sarin 

god^lwva^'%h%^wL*''Jit ^l ^"tliorities that the cult was fixated with the Hindu 
Solaininfr in n^rtr 'T'^»'=^"t since "Shiva" is the "god of destruction" thereby 
maeeddon " Afthnnlh ^r * "^^"""^ °^i^^ ?^* ^"^ '^^ particular emphasis on "Ar- 
?on^' or the 'tnS nT^hl '?^"-P* is widely known in Westorn religions, "Armaged- 

Xions noDuTar ?n T.L H '' "°^ •? "°'"'"^^ *^"^* °^ Buddhism or other Eastern 
re gions popular in Japan. However, it was a core element of the Aum religion with 

alr'kTahS ?o"r3 f 1 ^' '"^ °f Armageddon to those who adopted The lim 
er stafe th?nn/h !£. , K^ for those Aum members who have attained a high- 
er state through the teachings of the "Supreme Master"— Asahara Asahara also 
^^a^^f '^^^^'^^^ «^«" to those of his members who perished^n tSe p^ediSed il 

/he Stoff w?.'t.7Hr'""T^''"'""^ ^ '^^''^^ ^^^"^ ^" tLir reincamatefstate 
U.m^  . "^ °^ Japanese government officials that in 1989 Asahara oub- 

lished a major religious treatise on Armageddon called The Destruction of the World 
In It Asahara apparently described a world-wide calamity b^sed upon a purported 



52 

war between Japan and the United States which would start sometime in 1997. 
Asahara based his predictions on "The Prophecies of Nostradamus, the Revela- 
tions of St. John" from the New Testament, Buddhist scriptures, and other personal 

"^^AgaiJr^n 1993, Asahara publicly reiterated his predictions of Armageddon. In a 
book entitled Shivering Predictions by Shoko Asahara, Asahara stated that: 

"From now until the year 2000, a series of violent phenomena filled with 
fear that are too difficult to describe will occur. Japan will turn into waste 
land as a result of a nuclear weapons' attack. This will occur from 199b 
through January 1998. An alliance centering on the United States will at- 
tack Japan. In large cities in Japan, only one-tenth of the population will 
be able to survive. Nine out of ten people will die." 
Later that year in another book published by the Aum in Julv, entitled Second 
Set of Predictions by Shoko Asahara, he provided further revelations concerning 
these wars. He claimed that a Third World War would soon break out. He wrote 
that : 

"I am certain that in 1997, Armageddon will break out By 'break out' I 
mean that war will erupt and that it will not end soon. Violent battles wi 
continue for a couple of years. During that time, the world population will 
shrink markedly. . . . 

"A Third World War will break out. I stake my religious future on this pre- 
diction. I am sure it will occur." 
Within days after the subway attack in March 1995, Asahara in a video message 
wherein he denied complicity in the incident, further explained the perceived role 
of his cult in Armageddon: 

"We act on the basis of prophecies. In 1997 and 1998 most of Japan's large 
cities will suffer major damage in a war between the U. S and Japan, inen 
the Japanese economy will collapse. Japanese assets will be lost, reyiying 
the nation after this collapse is one goal of ours . . . salvation activities. 

3. Armageddon in 1995: A Threat to the United States? 

Although most of Asahara's prophecies predicted the Armageddon in 1997 or 
1998 documents recently seized by the Japanese police from Aum facilities indicate 
that sometime starting in 1994 the date for this cataclysmic event was moved up 
to November of 1995. The Staff was told by Japanese government sources that they 
were concerned from analyzing cult teachings that the Aum may have decided to 
speed things up" by instigating the predicted war between Japan and the United 
States in November, 1995. ^ , ^ , . .,, „ ... 

The new November timetable for Armageddon appears to have coincided with 
public statements by Asahara that he and his people were already the victims ot 
gas attacks by Japanese and U.S. military aircraft. In a public sermon delivered by 
Asahara at his Tokyo headquarters on April 27, 1994, he claimed that: 

"With the poison gas attacks that have continued since 1988 we are 
sprayed by helicopters and other aircraft wherever we go. . . . The use ot 
poison gases such as sarin were clearly indicated. The hour of my death has 
been foretold. The gas phenomenon has already happened. Perhaps the nu- 
clear bomb will come next." (Emphasis Added) 
The date of this speech is significant since it predates by two nionths the June 
27th sarin gas attack in Matsumoto, Japan. This event which left 7 dead and oyer 
500 iniured will be discussed in greater detail later in the Staff" statement. Although 
the Aum has always publicly denied any involvement in any gas attacks, evidence 
developed after the Tokyo incident from arrested cult members clearly implicates 
the cult in the Matsumoto incident. Juxtaposed, the prediction of the new Armaged- 
don in November with the discussion of sarin, leaves a clear impression that the 
Aum may have been planning a gas attack in November 1995 p^^^iHont 

The November prediction is troubling as it coincides with the fact that President 
Clinton and 17 other world leaders are scheduled to gather »" Osaka Japan for the 
annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting on November 16-19. Ihe 
Staff has not discovered a link between these two events. We have no credible evi- 
dence that the Aum planned an attack directed at the APEC gathering. The timing 
of the two events, however, raises some concern. v u -. 

Just two weeks ago, the Japanese press reported that the Japanese police have 
launched one of their nation's largest security details to protect the November Ib- 
19 Asia-Pacific conference. The articles specifically note that the police are guarding 



53 



against a possible nerve gas attack similar to the sarin attack in Tokyo. They claim 
that the Osaka police have stocked up on gas masks and chemical protection suits 
m order to guard against any such attack. Takaji Kunimatsu, the Commissioner 
General of tfie Japanese National Police Agency, is also quoted as ordering aU of 
his police commanders to be on "full alert', saying: ^ 

"Particularly after the subway incident, it has become extremely difficult to 
predict who would do what. ..." 

Kunimatsu is also said to have called on all senior police chiefs to step up their in- 
vestigations of the Aum sect since "the truth of the sect remains unclear " 

Concern that the Aum mav have sought out United States targets is fueled by 
the rampant anti-American rhetoric historically used by the cult. As early as 1993 
ii^^Z^^rT^ the United States of planning the attack on Japan that would fort 
bhfm?r/thp W^^f^f'^'^^"- Th%Sylt« literature also disparaged'^the United States, 
thlcuH .1.L for causing the rampant materialism ani internationalism that 

r!Ll,Z\ fl^ ^^^ ^°°}S^ ^^^ '^^^^^^ problems with Japan. The cult has re- 

peatedly accused the United States of masterminding and of carrying out a series 
of chemical attacks on it. These accusations go back to early 1994 and the cult nrn 
atTals' '"'" "'^"° '"^ '°"'''^ Slaughterecf Lambs that Xgedly documents th^ese 

The anti-American rhetoric became more personalized in January, 1995 when the 
cults monthly organ, Vajrayana Sacca printed a series of anti-ASt^rican and ant^ 
Japanese government articles The Stafi^obtained one article called Will Clinton Be 
Assassinated? In which the cult wrote: '-^""c.u at: 

"Clinton will be without doubt a one-term president. At best, he will not 

^^.t^^t f ^ i^"""^^' *' wo^ld not be strange if he were assassinated, 
making it appear like an accident." 

That same pubhcation also contains an article raising the specter of planned ter- 
rorist assassinations of various Japanese officials. A number of prominent Tpanese 
3S?! '- InXd.H^''"^ n "blackhearted aristocrats who had solcf th"ir sout Tthe 
tlVL i?.^^"^^^ ^«^« Daisaku Ikeda, the Honorary Chairman of Sokagakkai, a Jap- 
anese religious group; Yukio Aoshima, the Governor of Tokyo; and Ichiro Ozawa the 
Secretary General of the New Frontier Party of Japan. OzaWa was esDedaHv'sin 
gled out and P aced at the head of the list as 'the^king of Sl^ess" for hi^^close 
tha't PriliH^/n.^rTf States. The Staff was told by a n^umber of jlpaiese sources 
that President Chnton was also named on another similar Hst prepared by the cult 
but to date we have not been able to find this document and hst ' 

On MalTs ?35^ 'nn t^ ^"'^^ ^ ^^'t ^l^"^ ? ^^^ °^ potential assassination targets. 
Un May 16, 1995, on the evening of Asahara's arrest, Tokyo Governor Aoshima who 

Xltho^frif.""^*^ mentioned on the January list, was the recipient of a maU bomb 

diJSeVo^utlfdrtSVKfnoI^LS.^^ ''-' ' '^"'^'^^ °^^'^^^^ -^- ^^^ b«-^ 
Unconfirmed press reports assert that the cult was targeting the United States 
Japanese Pubhc Television (NHK) issued a story in mid-jSne, 1995 that it had ob- 
hT.f ^f^^A^u °^^?.^ «>°fession of the cult's chief physician, IkurH^yashi in whkh 
he admitted the cult was planning, as early as November of 1994, to mai' packages 
of sarin to unnamed locations in the United States. It quoted HayaThi as sS 
ofhe Uni?i^"rr P^'^^ °^ '^^ ^^1*' Yoshihiro Inoue, lanted Haylshi to trSTe! 
catld that^he nlan w^J^'"'"^" the parcels for further delivery. The broadcast indi- 
cated that the plan was never carried out but that Inoue still planned to use sarin 
gas in America^ Both Hayashi and Inoue have been charged aloS with others fS 
murder for the March 20th Tokyo subway attack ^ ^ ^'^ 

nfJlLT^^J-^^^^^ ^^^^ the cult's Intelligence Ministry Chief Inoue kept a number 

cont™ n/tiTe'lum "Sf.^^^^r "^^^^ ^-^ j".^^^ dow? random thoughts and p^ans 
concerning the Aum. These notes were seized by the poUce. Allegedly Inoue wrote 

?n.T"/ P m" ^°^^^'■y r^"* «°"^« '^"d of indiscriminate terrorism in major US cTes 
i?nl ffi^^T^°'^- ^^^ ^"°"^^ ^"^^ks were to be similar to the^okyo sarin gas 
sing. Although some portions of these notes have been corroborated those soedfic 

K'ro\nese"m;Hi'^? ""'TJ^^."'^? \^^^ ^° ^^^ °«t been confir'med.'llC^^^ 
scribe^the New virk nW '?if ^ t^^ police have possession of these sections that de- 
them ^ ' ^^' ^ ^''^' ^^^ b^^° "°able to obtain access to 

senWlfuf^sfiHtl^A^^'iv*^^ ^^^. ^Z^^ ''^*^".^^* ^ ^""P ^"^h as the Aum pre- 
sents to U.b. security. As this report indicates, the Aum was highly dangerous and 

V^X'ct^s"'aTd'rarbin".T''^?^'^^' °.'^^'°^.°^ '""S' °^ their^dirUlon'Tom the 
>^i;i<- f lu A '^ambhng of a charismatic madman. However, it is clear that a core 
belief of the Aum was that the United States was an enemy" of the Aum and that 



54 

a war with the United States was a central component of their prediction of Arma- 
geddon. Although no specific threat against President Clinton has been documented, 
the Staff has learned that both the United States Secret Service and the Japanese 
government take such a threat seriously and have taken security precautions. 

4. Aum's Other Enemy: The Jews 

The Aum was also virulently anti-Semitic. As an example, in a 95-page publica- 
tion issued two months before the Tokyo incident, the Aum attacked the Jews as 
the "hidden enemy." This special edition of the Vajrayana Sacca was entitled Man- 
ual of Fear and began with a declaration of war on the Jewish people: 

"On behalf of the earth's 5.5 billion people, Vajrayana Sacca hereby for- 
mally declares war on the 'world shadow government' that murders untold 
numbers of people and, while hiding behind sonorous phrases and high 
sounding principles, plans to brainwash and control the rest. Japanese 
awake! The enemy's plot has long since torn our lives to shreds." 

The tract quotes liberally from a number of anti-Semitic writings and blames the 
Jewish people, for among other things, the mass murders in Cambodia by the 
Khmer Rouge, the massacres by Serbs and Croatians in Bosnia, and the tribal war- 
fare in Rwanda. It claims that the Jews are planning similar massacres in other 
areas of the world in order to carry out a sinister plot to reduce the world's popu- 
lation by three billion people by the year 2,000. The Aum also has linked the Jews 
to its other enemies within Japanese society— the "black aristocracy" of Japanese 
"internationalists" including a number of current and former Japanese politicians 

Although the Staff found no evidence of specific attacks upon Jews or Jewish cul- 
tural, religious, business or political institutions, this may have been more the sim- 
ple result of the absence of such targets in Japan. On the other hand, the Aum did 
target for its rhetoric those it called "Jewish Japanese." These people were not Jew- 
ish but rather cosmopolitan Japanese, government officials and members of the 
business establishment in Tokyo who in the Aum's view exemplified the internation- 
alism and materialism that the Aum hated. Eventually, these "Jewish Japanese" be- 
came the victims of the Aum's indiscriminate Matsumoto and Tokyo sarin attacks. 

IV. The Operation of the Aum 

A. Membership and Recruitment: Large and Highly Technical 

The cult claimed a membership as high as 65,000, the large majority of whom 
30,000-50,000, were in Russia. These numbers have not been pubhcly corroborated 
by the Japanese government although most of the officials and Aum experts the 
Staff interviewed placed the worldwide membership in the 40,000 to 60,000 range. 
Despite the recent spate of publicity surrounding the criminal acts of the cult and 
the arrest of approximately 400 Aum activists by Japanese authorities, there has 
not been a dramatic loss in membership in Japan. Since declared illegal by Russian 
authorities, Aum membership in Russia has declined drastically. The Staff has pre- 
pared a list of the most important cult members, attached as Appendix A. 

In the course of our inquiry, it became clear that the Aum included among its fol- 
lowers many highly-trained graduates in the sciences and technological fields from 
some of Japan's leading universities. They included members with degrees in fields 
such as medicine, biochemistry, architecture, biology, and genetic engineering. A 
distinctive feature of this cult was that many were young intellectuals in their 20 s 
and 30's who had dropped out of Japanese society to join this doomsday cult. 

Among some of Japan's "best and brightest" who joined the cult included a former 
researcher of the National Space Development Agency of Japan, an expert on chemi- 
cal weapons who majored in organic physics at Tsukuba University, a researcher 
who studied elementary particles, a reporter with a major Japanese newspaper, a 
physicist from Osaka University, a cardiac specialist, and an organic chemist, to 

name a few. - , . , 

The Japan Times recently released a detailed description of a number oi the key 
members of the Aum hierarchy which offers an excellent view of the expertise of 
this cult. It reported the following: 

Hideo Murai, (36) (deceased)— Minister of Science and Technology— After 
graduating from the physics department of Osaka University he entered 
graduate school specializing in physics and started working for Kobe Steel 
Ltd's research and development department. 

Kiyohide Hayakawa (45)— Minister of Construction— Held a master's de- 
gree in architecture from Osaka University. 



55 



Fumihiro Joyu (32)— Public Relations Minister— Graduate of Waseda 

.ir^'^l^'^^i masters degree in artificial intelligence. Was an engineer 

at the National Space Development Agency before joining cult ^"^ineer 

Yoshinobu Aoyama (35}-^ustice Minister— Son of a wealthy family in 
Osaka. Graduate of Kyoto University Law School and younges^t peS o 
pass national bar exam. t^<^iouii tu 

Masami Tsuchiya (30)-Chief Scientist-Held a master's degree in or- 

ff hid'hp^H ' '^' ^'■^"iT'^r^^ University. Reportedly joined the cSlt because 
It had better research facilities than his university. 

Not all of the Aum members had such backgrounds. A number of the members 
IZl ^T^ ^.^ff""^^^^ fi'J ^™"' r'^""^ backgrounds. Many were young aSl rebel 
her. hid h "^^^ r°'1,^^ ^"^^ ^°T^/ ""^^ members that these woJking^lass mem- 
bers had been specifically recruited for work details to help in the construction of 
the various Aura factories and also for the Aura's militaiy forces. Neverthekss the 

s^ty baikPunds "' '''" '"'' ""^°"'^ °' '^^ ^"'"'^ '^'^^"^ ^^^ coLge or univer! 

rrw -^ '^i^'lu'' to understand the Aura's attraction to such an educated audience 
This IS s 111 the sulyect of much debate in Japan and has been the subject of niraer: 
ous articles and editorials m the Japanese media numer 

Regardless of the reasons for their success, the Aum was extremely successful in 
Its recruitment drives. They were very aggressive in their recrSnt^chvSes and 
even had an entire division called the New Followers Agency to perS Ihis task 
Beyond rudinientary techniques such as leafleting and street cornerToselytizi^g 
the Aura used a diverse blend of recruiting raethods. They used their classes on 
S',c.W^^' ^'^^'"^ ^"^ meditation on carapuses to recStTheralso recruited 
allv tfpv hro' H""T!^r' ^«™P"ter stores, book stores and noodle Jhops Addk on- 
used f and other Sh^.^'' :ff f^g^^^ •JfP^" through their Russian radio station and 
used It and other radio and television shows in Moscow to recruit in Russia 

cessfu" not^onlv frj.^'Pf fvf T*^'^^^ ^^ '^^ ^^^F"' ^^^^^^^ ^^at the Aura was suc- 
cesslul not only for all of the above reasons but a so because of their use of osvche 

dehc and raind-altering drugs in the recruitraent process. The sSfffound^stroS 

evidence to support the contention that the Aura used these sub?tances abnl w^th 

M«nv b^^nwashing techniques including sleep deprivation a^d soTation thlrlpy 

Many ex-Aura members have been quoted publicly admitting to the use of these tac: 

is ^hatTth?tL°f of°SrS"l ^^^d,^f ^ °f the strength of their recruitraent efforts 
IS mat at the tirae of the Staff visit to Japan, five months afler the Tokvo subwav 
attack and subsequent to the arrest of most of the Aum leadership the Aum wis 
Idh^rf f ""^ recruiting new followers. In fact, Fumihiro Joyu,' who replaced 
Asahara as spokesperson for the Aum, became a "teen idol" for thousands of r^n« 
Kft' n^t^'^/'j^'^f r^° f^""^^ ^'« l««ks- All of this occurred dSpSi?he fact that 
'^rf^^^;^Ll'^Z '"^"^'^^^ '^' ^^^° ^"^P^-^^^ - murderl^k^Ttetpt^Ji^ 

ZZf}^^ ^ ^'"''^ 't^™ -^^ *^^i^i°g °ther Aum members a^d in ToviLeinte 
ceSin^h'e's^SS' ^^'"^*^^^- ''°^^"^'^' ^^^ ^"^ ^PP^^^ toKTefn'sul 

JD^F m?mhSl^'.nf ^'^^ ?f /^^' strategy, the Aum obtained the hsts of hundreds of 
^f L A /n^""^ ^mt"^ t° '■^^"^^t <^hera. The list was recovered durin? the arrest 
tL^FifstlSrErT^adf '^'^^KP^^^^'.f ^^^^ P"^"^^ on recruiting Members ff 
evfdeice thSt^c^^n,V^w °'^^' ^l^^^^ ^"^^^"^^ divisions. The Stiff discovered 
houseofthpFi^f A^^ out this recruitment drive the Aura even wiretapped the 
nouse ot the First Airborne Brigade's coraraander to spy on his private life 

and sSd'that the'S^"'' interviewed by the Staff conTraeSthTsrecrukraent drive 
rh.Hint fin f ^'^^ ^^[^ approximately 100 Defense Force merabers recruited in 

and rn?L Jffp mTm'h^r"- ^^' '^?^ ^^ P"'^"^^^^ ^^^''''^ ^^^^ onl? 20?ncurabent 
ev4/ncTr^;^?h^^ ^^t^o-^H there appears to be 

J^re^^^^^^^^^ 



56 

Minister of the Aum. These individuals either individually or in cooperation with 
other Aum members : 

• Assisted in the November 27, 1994 burglary of a Metropolitan Police Depart- 
ment office to steal driver's license data; 

• Assisted in the break-in of the Hiroshima factory of Mitsubishi Heavy Indus- 
^ tries on December 28, 1994, in an attempt to steal technical documents on 

weapons such as tanks and artillery; 

• Assisted in a firebombing attack on the Aum headquarters in Tokyo on March 
18, 1995, in an attempt to inspire public sympathy for the Aum just before the 
Tokyo subway gas attack. 

• Provided military training to other Aum members. 

Additionally, the Staff has reviewed documents that indicate that JDF members 
also passed secret information to the Aum concerning the Metropolitan Police's 
planned raid on the Aum's facilities. This raid was supposed to occur on March 20th 
but was postponed because of the Tokyo subway gassing that occurred on that date. 
The Staff learned that these officers alerted the Aum of the anticipated raid and 
as a result the Aum initiated their deadly subway assault. 

The Japanese Defense Forces were not the only victims of successful Aum pene- 
tration. The Staff discovered that the Aum recruited a number of police officers 
along with other low-ranking government bureaucrats. Former Aum members told 
the Staff that the Aum was actively attempting to recruit police officers. They re- 
membered at least two active duty police officers being Aum members— one a Ser- 
geant and the other an Assistant Inspector. The Staff was also told by former Aum 
members that the Aum wanted to recruit employees in the Prime Ministers per- 
sonal office and in particular those employees who had access to statistical informa- 
tion concerning the Japanese government and economy. The Staff has no informa- 
tion indicating how successful the Aum was in the later attempts. 

In addition, the cult actively recruited individuals in the Japanese business sector. 
Although not as well documented as other areas of activity, the Aum apparently tar- 
geted those industries that had technology or know-how that it needed for weapons 
production. There is some evidence that they successfully penetrated a number of 
Japanese defense contractors including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. and 
Nippon Electronics Co. Ltd. 

Japanese press reported that one of Mitsubishi's employees was arrested tor as- 
sisting an Aum member who was an active duty Japanese Defense Force member 
in the theft of Mitsubishi research data. Mitsubishi publicly acknowledged the ar- 
rest of their employee, Hideo Nakamoto (38) and the theft of materials. However, 
they denied that this technical data was defense related. 

In November, 1994, followers of the Cult were arrested on suspicion of breaking 
into the offices of Nippon Electronics Co., Ltd. (NEC). The purpose of the intrusion 
was to obtain information on laser technology from NEC's laser beams laboratory 
in Sagamihara, Kanagawa prefecture. When the police arrested Masanobu Iwao, 
who is alleged to have worked for the Aum's Intelligence Ministry, they discovered 
sketches and maps of the interior layouts of facilities at six major electronic firms. 
Also included in the materials seized were the names of dozens of Aum members 
who worked for major electronic and chemical companies in Japan. Police suspect 
that the internal diagrams of the firms were provided by Aum sympathizers/mem- 
bers from the various firms. Police were led to suspect Iwao of the NEC burglary 
when they found his portable personal computer and floppy disks at the scene of 
the crime. 
B. Structure of the Aum: A Government In Waiting 

The founder of the Aum, Shoko Asahara, occupies the top position of the Aum as 
its "Supreme Leader." Under him, the followers are classed into seven ranks of en- 
lightenment. All owe complete allegiance to him. 

Unlike other religions, the Aum was organized into Ministries and Departments 
that attempted to mirror the Japanese government. For example, under Asahara, 
the Cult had 24 identifiable organizations comparable to the Japanese government 
with similar functions and responsibilities. Thus, the Aum had ministries of defense, 
health and welfare, science and technology, heavy industry, education, etc. As with 
the Emperor of Japan, Asahara also had a "household agency" which provided secu- 
rity and medical care for his family. In addition, Asahara had a "secretariat" headed 
by his 11 year old daughter, Reika Matsumoto, whose duties are unknown. 

The Staff has prepared a chart which will be made an exhibit that identifies all 
of the most important ministries. Although the cult had more members in Russia 
than in Japan, all of the highest positions in the cult were held by Japanese citi- 
zens. 



57 

These ministers along with the head of Asahara's "household agency" were part 
of the inner circle of advisors to Asahara. Unlike the tens of thousands of Aum 
members who are believed to have been innocent devotees of the Aum this inner 
circle knew the true nature of the cult. Most have been arrested for helping to plan 
and carry out the Aum's known atrocities. Some of the members of this inner circle 
and their respective ministries are as follows: 

• Hideo Murai— Former Minister of Science and Technology.— This was a key 
ministry which reportedly had over 300 members including a number of skilled 
scientists. It was responsible for the cult's scientific experiments and was the 
critical ministry for the production of the sarin nerve gas. Murai was probably 
the primary go-between to Japanese organized crime for the production of ille- 
§o ^n^PrY^^^^ '^ Speculated to be the major reason for his murder on April 
Z6, 1995. He was succeeded by Masami Tsuchiya, age 30, who was subsequently 
arrested for murder and attempted murder for the Tokyo subway incident 
Tsuchiya is reported to have confessed that he led the group's sarin production 

• Kiyohide Hayakawa (45)— Minister of Construction.— He was one of Asahara's 
chief advisors and considered the mastermind of the sect's growth and mili- 
tarization. He was in charge of acquiring land, building all sect facilities and 
acquiring all of the technology and military hardware. He supervised the oper- 
ations in the United States, Australia and Russia. He has been arrested for in- 
volvement in the Tokyo incident. He has also been recently indicted for the 
1989 murder of Yokohama lawyer, Tsutsumi Sakamoto, and his family 

• Yoshihiro Inoue (25)— Intelligence Minister.— He was responsible for gathering 
intelligence on government counter measures against the cult as well as acquir- 
ing scientific and other technical materials. He has been implicated in most of 
the major burglaries of defense contractors as well as for the infiltration of the 
Japanese Defense Forces. He was arrested on May 15th for his involvement in 
lokyo incident. He was recently implicated in the letter bomb attack on Tokvo 
liovernor Aoshima. 

• Tomomitsu Niimi (31)— Minister of Home Affairs.— This ministry was respon- 
sible tor maintaining control and discipline over the membership It was in- 
volved in most of the kidnappings and torture of dissident and runaway mem- 
bers. Niimi has been indicted for murder in regards to the Tokyo incident as 
well as the 1989 murder of the Yokohoma attorney and his family. He has also 
been publicly quoted as having confessed to the use of VX and sarin gas against 
tormer Aum members and critics. 

• Ikuo Hayashi (48)— Treatment Minister.— He was a key player in developing the 
sarin tor the Tokyo attacks. As a trained physician he was called upon to ad- 
minister drugs to recalcitrant Aum members and played a role in distributing 
the sarin in the subway cars. He and his wife traveled to the United States to 
collect documents on the use of sarin. He has been charged with murder in re- 
gard to the Tokyo incident. 

• Seichi Endo (34)— Health and Welfare Minister.— This minister and his ministry 
were responsible for the chemical and biological weapons research and develop- 
ment program. Endo worked closely with Masami Tsuchiya, head of the sect's 
Chemical team and the successor to Hideo Murai, Science and Technology Min- 
ister, who was assassinated on April 23, 1995. Endo has confessed to his in- 
volvement in the sarin attacks and that Asahara had closely directed his re- 
search and development. Endo has been indicted for murder. 

C. Financial Operations: Over $1 Billion 

"^^m^Tn^^^ ^^"^ wealthy. Japanese government estimates place its assets at 
over 100 bilhon yen or approximately $1 Million. They also list 16 separate pieces 
ot property in 11 different prefectures belonging to the Aum. They also note that 
the cult possessed a large amount of liquid assets including a large helicopter, boats 
gold bars and cash. Reportedly, the police recovered 700 million yen ($7 million) 
^"'fu A ^ ^^^'"^ of gold ingots in iust one of the buildings they raided 
.u ■'^^ „ ™ amassed this fortune by a number of means. Not only did they require 
their followers to turn over all of their earthly possessions, they also came up with 
a number of ingenious and outlandish money-making schemes from running noodle 
shops and other legitimate businesses to extortion and selling their spiritual leader's 
blood and bath water. 

According to the Aum's teachings, the only way to survive the Armageddon was 
to strictly follow the Aums teachings and in particular, to renounce the world and 
all of Its worldly possessions. This tied directly into another tenet of the Aum that 
demanded all members who wished to reach a higher state of consciousness to give 
all ot their assets, including other family members' assets, to the cult. A majority 



58 

of the Japanese members are believed to have innocently turned over most of their 
assets to the cult. This would run from a person's telephone credit card worth a few 
dollars to one's Tokyo residence worth millions. No one knows for sure ho\y much 
money was raised in this fashion but it is imagined to have been staggering in light 
of the vehement protests that were raised by thousands of relatives of Aum mem- 
bers. ,• A 

The Aum raised millions by also selling religious training and paraphernalia. A 
list of some of the items offered for sale is attached to the Staff statement as Appen- 
dix B. They ranged from headgear designed to synchronize one's brain waves to that 
of Asahara for $10,000/month to a 200cc bottle of water from Asahara's bath for $20. 
A significant amount was probably raised from these activities, although the total 
is not known. 

The cult also raised funds in a perverse use of the Japanese Religious Corpora- 
tions law to extort money. Because the law gives so much protection to religious 
groups, the Aum along with other legitimate religions could establish offices/church- 
es ahnost anywhere. The Staff was told by former Aum members and government 
sources that they would use this legal guarantee to extort money from townspeople 
by threatening to come into their community. Apparently the Aum collected $9.2 
million from one community on condition that it leave town. 

The Aum also had legitimate businesses throughout the world that produced in- 
come for the cult. For example, in Taiwan it had an import/export agent. In Sri 
Lanka it maintained a tea plantation. The Aum was also involved in several dif- 
ferent businesses in Japan. The cult's corporate affiliates ranged from the Maha 
Posya computer retailer to chains of "bento" (boxed lunch) shops and cheap Chinese 
noodle restaurants, a fitness club, a telephone dating club, and, unbelievably, a 
baby-sitting firm. 

In July 1995 Japan press reports, citing police sources, said that the Aum paid 
over $400 million to companies in foreign countries over the past three years. The 
Japanese press reports that most of the amount, about $300 million, was paid to 
a Taiwanese company from a Japanese computer company run by the cult as the 
price for computers and computer parts purchased by the Aum. These press reports 
allege the Aum remitted some $1 million to accounts of a Russian company at banks 
in the Netherlands, Finland, and other European countries as broadcasting fees. 
The Aum also paid some $400,000 to an Australian company as fees for buying a 
farm and medicines, and nearly $100 million to other computer related companies 
in the United States and other countries, according to officials contacted by the 
Staff 

The amount of money earned by these enterprises is not known at this time. How- 
ever, the size of their operations reflects a wealthy sect with extensive resources. 
The Staff has prepared an Appendix (Appendix C) which lists those properties and 
companies that we were able to document. 

Another source of income for the cult may have come from illegal drug manufac- 
turing. As will be explained in a later section, there appears to be credible evidence 
to suggest that the Aum was using its chemical expertise to manufacture stimulants 
and other illegal drugs for the Japanese underworld. Japanese government sources 
have concluded that the Aum produced and sold illegal drugs including stimulants 
and LSD. Whether or not they were also manufacturing these drugs for the Yakuza 
or mafia is still not fully proven but materials reviewed by the Staff seem to indi- 
cate a strong circumstantial tie between these two groups for the sale of drugs. 

Despite these sources of income, some commentators have raised questions about 
whether the Aum was also obtaining funding from some other outside group, either 
foreign or domestic. Until more evidence is made public from the trials or records 
seized by the Japanese police, it is impossible to respond to these allegations. 

D. Militarization of the Aum: Preparing For War With The West 

The Aum was actively engaged in the preparations for both a conventional and 
unconventional attack upon the Japanese government and its people. This section 
will discuss the Aum's ambitious yet basically unsuccessful preparation for conven- 
tional warfare; the next section will detail the more successful and more frightening 
chemical, biological and nuclear preparation by the Aum to initiate Armageddon. 

Much evidence of the Aum's militarization comes from former Aum members who 
have confessed to Japanese authorities the specifics of the Aum's militarization pro- 
gram. These confessions have been corroborated by weapons parts, equipment and 
records seized by Japanese police including the notebooks of Construction Minister 
Hayakawa and computer files found at the sect's offices. 

The Staff learned that on April 6, 1995, a large number of components analogous 
to AK-74 submachine gun parts along with blueprints for their manufacture were 
found in a car owned by an Aum member. The AK-74 is the modern day version 



59 

of the World War II era Soviet AK-47 assault rifle. Later, completed machine guns, 
additional parts, used rocket launchers and other military paraphernalia were found 
by Japanese police at the main Aum facility in Kamikuishiki. This is the same loca- 
tion where the sarin gas and biological facilities were located. The seized machine 
guns and parts resemble Russian-made AK-74s. 

The Aum had apparently planned to illegally manufacture as many as 1,000 AK- 
74s and cartridges before the police raids. The Staff learned that the Aum had been 
manufacturing parts for these guns with the aid of computer-controlled machine 
tools at the Aum complex at the foot of Mt. Fuji since July 1994. Apparently Aum 
Intelligence Minister Inoue ordered the destruction of the weapons and lathes after 
the police raid on March 22nd. He had also instructed that they all be dumped into 
the reservoir located at Kusaki Dam in Gunma Prefecture. The Staff has learned 
that police searches of the area confirmed this information. Subsequent public state- 
ments by police authorities allege that over 100 Aum members were involved in the 
production of AK-74s. 

It also appears that the Aum was interested in developing laser weapons. The 
Staff has learned from Japanese government sources that notations found in the 
Aum's Construction Minister Hayakawa's handwritten notebooks indicate that the 
cult was actively seeking information on the development of such weapons. These 
sources also indicate that apparently a number of Aum members traveled to Moscow 
to interview a Dr. Nikolay Basov, a purported Nobel Laureate and authority on this 
subject. The Staff has obtained Aum brochures with photographs purporting to show 
Dr. Basov with Asahara. In addition, as previously mentioned, the cult also at- 
tempted to steal technology from NEC's laser beam laboratory in Sagamihara in No- 
vemher of 1994. At the end of December, 1994, other Aum followers were arrested 
on suspicion of burglary at the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Research Center in Hir- 
oshima prefecture. They apparently broke into the facility on a number of occasions 
in an effort to steal documents and data on laser beam research. 

An official Japanese document reviewed by the Staff, confirms these events and 
also indicates that in March, 1995, documents on laser technology, including blue- 
prints for a laser gun were confiscated from one of the Aum members. Documents 
relating to laser technology were also found buried in the grounds near the cult's 
facilities in Fujinomiya, Yamanashi prefecture. Additionally, as set forth in section 
VI(C), infra, of this Staff Statement, the Aum's U.S. operatives were actively seek- 
ing laser technology. 

Those same Hayakawa notebooks also include references to nuclear weapons and 
seismological weapons. As will be discussed in more detail in a later section on Aum 
activities in the United States and Russia, the Aum actively sought nuclear weap- 
ons technologies wherever they could find it. The Staff learned that data regarding 
nuclear weapons research was found on a number of laser discs seized during a po- 
lice raid on March 23, 1995, from an Aum member. 

There also appears to be evidence that the Aum sent a party of its members to 
the former Yugoslavia to research the work of Nikola Tesla, the discoverer of alter- 
nating current who experimented with the theory of seismic weapons before he died 
in 1943. Apparently these Aum members traveled from February to April, 1995 to 
the Tesla Museum in Belgrade to review Tesla's thesis and other research papers 
concerning "Tesla weapon systems" that focus on wave amplification. Their efforts 
in both Yugoslavia and in the United States to obtain such weaponry is discussed 
in section VI(D), infra. 

The Aum was also interested in military training for its followers. The Staff 
learned from former Aum members that weapons and other military training was 
provided at an Aum training camp in Japan. Approximately 200 Aum members 
went for training in groups of 50 members. The training was provided by 3 brothers 
who were current active duty Japanese Defense Force members. These former Aum 
members also recalled seeing at least 50 AK-74s that were used for the training. 
They also said that the reason given to the Aum members for the training was that 
the Aum was going to produce a war movie and that the Aum members were being 
trained in order to realistically act in the movie. 

These same former Aum members also recalled an incident where one of their 
friends brought back two Tokarev pistols from Russia. While in Moscow, Construc- 
tion Minister Hayakawa had given the weapons with 16 rounds of ammunition to 
their friend, also in Moscow, with specific instructions to deliver them personally to 
Asahara. They never learned the purpose of the guns and their friend reportedly 
was startled when Asahara opened up the sealed package containing the guns in 
his presence. 

The Staff has confirmed that "shooting tours" in Russia had been arranged by the 
Aum for some of its members as part of its efforts to provide military training. One 
such tour was scheduled for September 21-30, 1994. This trip was arranged through 



60 

a travel agency which is a front company for the cult called "Devenir Millionaire', 
located in Kandanishiki-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo. As mentioned in section VI(C), 
infra, the cult also obtained helicopter training in Opa Locka, Florida. 

According to the brochure distributed by the firm mentioned above, their training 
included shooting practice for automatic rifles at a Russian military base on the out- 
skirts of Moscow. It also notes that former Spetznaz members, a specialized Russian 
military unit, would be providing the training. Although the Staff was told that 
some high officials of the cult did receive Spetznaz training in Russia, we could not 
confirm if this particular tour ever was carried out. 

Finally, a number of private and government sources have confirmed that the 
Aum had constructed ana utilized a microwave incinerator to actually burn out bod- 
ies of enemies of the cult or cult members who perished during training or through 
other cult activities. Apparently the Aum would place bodies into the device, com- 
prised of a stainless steel drum connected to an industrial microwave, for three days 
and then soak the ashes into nitrate which would dissolve the calcium remains. A 
Japanese government document indicates that nearly two dozen bodies were dis- 
posed of in this manner. 

E. Aum's CBW Program: Gas, Bugs, Drugs and Thugs 

The Aum cult was aggressively involved in chemical and biological weapons pro- 
duction. Although, the extent of their success is not fully known to this date, the 
Staff found evidence that they successfully produced nerve agents such as Sarin, 
Tabun, Soman and VX, biological agents such as botulism and anthrax and con- 
trolled substances such as LSD. 

Their operations involved chemical and biological research, development and pro- 
duction on a scale not previously identified with a sub-national terrorist group. They 
created a relatively sophisticated chemical and biological research facility without 
attracting the attention of either Japanese or foreign governments. In the course of 
these operations, they not only produced potential weapons but also illegal drugs 
for their own use and for sale to others. 

The cult's motivation for the production of chemical and biological weapons is in- 
extricably linked to its Armageddon prophesy. As previously mentioned, Asahara 
foretold Armageddon in 1997 and then moved the date to 1995. The cult had as a 
basic belief that there would be a major war between Japan and the United States 
that would involve weapons of mass destruction. Based upon our investigation, in- 
cluding discussions with Aum members and review of Aum propaganda, the cult de- 
veloped these weapons in order to either be prepared for this cataclysm or to insti- 
gate it by pre-emptive strike against their Japanese and Western enemies. 

1. Chemical Weapons 

Just last week, on October 20th, Japanese prosecutors revealed the full extent of 
Asahara 's plot to use deadly sarin gas to effectuate his version of Armageddon. At 
the initial arraignment against four cult members charged with conspiracy to com- 
mit murder, the prosecutor publicly charged that the four, under the direction of 
Asahara, planned to produce 70 tons of sarin within 40 days of completion of the 
sarin production facility, Satyam No. 7. The prosecutors told the court that the de- 
fendants made sarin gas on three separate occasions in November and December 

1993. They also produced another 30 kilograms of the deadly substance in February 

1994. The prosecutors added that 20 kilograms of this batch was used in the June 
1994 Matsumoto attack which killed 7 people. 

The cult gas squad was to spray the sarin via a helicopter the Aum had pur- 
chased. In furtherance of this conspiracy, the prosecutors charged the cult with the 
purchase of the Soviet-made helicopter. If the plot succeeded, Asahara had promised 
to promote the cult members involved to senior positions in the Aum hierarchy, the 
prosecutors revealed. The four defendants charged have admitted to the police their 
involvement in building the sarin plant but deny they knew its purpose. 

It is clear that around 1992 the Aum began to research poisonous gasses includ- 
ing sarin and other nerve agents such as tabun and soman. From confessions and 
other information, the Japanese police now surmise that the Aum chose sarin be- 
cause of its relative ease of production and the fact that the precursors for it were 
readily available. 

The Aum elevated their efforts to develop and deploy sarin to near mystical 
heights. In speeches Asahara repeatedly refers to sarin. The Staff obtained and 
translated documents found at an Aum facility that included a December 30, 1994 
manual on how to make sarin. The publisher of the manual was listed as 
Matsumoto Arnrin (the author's pun on the Matsumoto sarin incident). Within the 
manual, which includes chemical configurations for sarin, is a song entitled "Song 
of Sarin, the Magician" whose lyrics include: 



61 

"It came from Nazi Germany, 

A little dangerous chemical weapon, Sarin — , Sarin — , 

If you inhale the mysterious vapor. 

You will fall with bloody vomit from your mouth. 

Sarin — , Sarin — , Sarin — , the chemical weapon." 

"Song of Sarin, the Brave" 

"In the peaceful night of Matsumoto City 

People can be killed, even with our own hands. 

The place is full of dead bodies all over, 

There! Inhale Sarin, Sarin, 

Prepare Sarin! Prepare Sarin! 

Immediately poisonous gas weapons will fill the place. 

Spray! Spray! Sarin, the Brnve, Sarin." 

Also referred to in tjje manual was a reference to "Uncle Fester" as an American 
who would relate the know-hew to produce sarin. Uncle Fester, the Staff has 
learned from U.S. experts on chemical weapons, is a popular underground pseudo- 
nym for individual(s) who publish information on producing terrorist devices. The 
Staffs brief search of the Internet discovered innumerable ways to obtain such in- 
formation. 

As the song indicates, sarin is a deadly nerve agent first synthesized in the 
1930's. Other nerve agents with similar characteristics to sarin (GB) considered by 
the Aum are tabun (GA), soman (GF) and VX. They are all liquids not gases. They 
can all be absorbed through the skin, are volatile and, at high temperatures or when 
aerosolized by an explosion or other method, can be inhaled. 

Standard medical textbooks describe sarin as a colorless, odorless liquid that is 
500 times more toxic than cyanide gas. Only half a milligram of sarin can kill a 
person. As a "nerve agent", sarin belongs to a group of compounds that inhibit the 
enzyme acetylcholinesterase which breaks down acetylcholine at the junction be- 
tween nerve endings. This leads to an increase in secretions from the nose, eyes, 
mouth, airways and intestines, twitching, weakness, paralysis and eventually death. 

The initial effect of a small droplet on the skin may be unnoticed local sweating. 
The first systemic effects — nausea, vomiting and abdominal cramps, followed by a 
feeling of uneasiness and sometimes muscle twitching — may not begin until as long 
as 18 hours after exposure. A large exposure to liquid tabun, sarin and soman, or 
even a small amount of VX, within one to thirty minutes may cause sudden uncon- 
sciousness, convulsions and, within minutes, paralysis and apnea (asph5rxiation). 

Exposure to a small amount of vapor within seconds causes excessive constriction 
of the pupil of the eye, ocular pain, tunnel vision and dim or blurred vision. 
Bronchoconstriction and increased bronchial secretions cause symptoms varying 
from mild discomfort to difficult or labored breathing. With a large exposure, one 
or two breaths may lead to loss of consciousness within seconds, followed by convul- 
sions and, within minutes, paralysis and apnea (asphjrxiation). 

Atropine, which was used by our troops in the Persian Gulf war, is an antidote 
for Sarin and other nerve agents. Atropine blocks the action of excess acetylcholine 
thereby stopping the deadly build up that results in the increased secretions. 

Starting in the Spring of 1993, the Aum utilized its own chemical company to 
start acquiring the chemical agents and other materials necessary for full scale pro- 
duction. Sarin research and production was conducted under the direction of 
Masami Tsuchiya, head of the cult's chemical team and Seiichi Endo, the cult's 
Health and Welfare Minister. Production occurred at a facility in the Aum 
compound site in Kamikuishiki called Satyam No. 7. 

Reports from Japanese officials indicate that the sarin production facility was ex- 
tremely sophisticated. It was almost all fabricated by the Aum members themselves 
who utilized their other companies as sources for material and technical expertise. 
According to prosecution sources, the cult produced 30 kilograms of sarin from their 
computerized chemical plant sometime in early 1994 before an accident caused them 
to shut down operations. It is believed that the sarin for the June 27, 1994 
Matsumoto incident was made at this facility before the accident. 

Apparently the sarin actually used for the Tokyo incident was made on a smaller 
scale at a laboratory inside the Aum compound on March 19, 1995, the day before 
the Tokyo subway incident. Unconfirmed reports indicate that there may be some 
sarin missing from the cult's stockpiles. One such report indicates that Aum mem- 
bers may have buried sarin at undisclosed locations. 

As previously noted, the Aum also tried to develop other chemical weapons such 
as soman, tabun and VX. The Staff confirmed from official documents that the Aum 
produced VX on at least four separate occasions in the same facility used to produce 



62 

the Sarin compound. They were developed under the direction of Masami Tsuchiya 
for experimental purposes but full scale production never occurred. 

There is credible evidence that the Aum did deploy small quantities of VX, one 
of the deadliest nerve agents known, on at least two occasions. Confessions from a 
number of Aum members implicate Tomomitsu Niimi, currently under arrest, for 
deploying this weapon on a number of enemies of the Aum. Japanese authorities 
have been quoted in the press as saying that Niimi has confessed to this crime. 

The Staff confirmed from official documents that Niimi and others were involved 
in at least two attacks. They include the attack on Tadahiro Hamaguchi with VX 
on December 12, 1994, while he was walking on an Osaka street. Hamaguchi died 
ten days later on December 22nd. The police detected "mono-ethyl-methyl phos- 
phoric acid", a by-product produced only from VX, in Hamaguchi's blood serum on 
July 22, 1995, confirming the presence of VX. In another incident, Niimi attacked 
Hiroyuki Nagaoka, 57, the head of the "Association of the Victims of Aum 
Shinrikyo" with VX gas in January, 1995. He fortunately survived but was in a 
coma for several weeks per a Staff conversation with his son. It was dispensed by 
spraying it from a hyperdermic syringe into the face of the victim. Nagaoka's son 
told us that his father survived because his assailants missed his face. 

The Japanese police believe that there may have been a third incident of VX de- 
ployment although they have not identified the victim or other circumstances in any 
detail. The Staff has learned from government sources that the incident involves an 
83 year old Tokyo man who collapsed in his house in December, 1994 from what 
is alleged to have been an Aum sponsored VX attack. The man never reported the 
incident to the police or authorities. 

From a Japanese government document the Staff has learned that after the 
Nagaoka incident, the Aum retained some excess VX. This material had not been 
found by the police in the initial series of raids. It is believed that this VX may be 
in the possession of one or more Aum members who were still at large at the time 
of the preparation of this Staff statement. 

Ominously, there have been police reports cited in the Japanese press that sodium 
cyanide, linked to cult members, was found in late September 1995, in Japan. Police 
found as much as 8.5 kilograms of the sodium cyanide in the apparent hideout of 
an Aum fugitive, according to Japanese police sources. The sources said that the 
amount of sodium cyanide found in 17 bottles could kill approximately 70,000 peo- 
ple. The cyanide was found by hikers in September around a tent strewn with 
camping gear in a mountainous area of Japan where cult member, Satoru Hiratu, 
a member of the intelligence ministry, is believed to have hidden between mid-May 
and early September. Sodium cyanide was found in devices designed to generate 
highly toxic cyanide gas that were found in subway station in Tokyo in May and 
July. Hirata is on the wanted list for alleged involvement in the death of a Tokyo 
public notary official. 

In the days following the subway attack in March, Asahara video-taped a reply 
to allegations of their chemical weapon build-up. In his rambling statement, a tran- 
script of which was obtained by the Staff, he implicitly confirms the cult's possession 
of the chemicals, but seems to claim they are for other purposes. Throughout the 
statement he emphasizes his Armageddon theories and claims that half of his 1700 
monks and nuns have been sprayed with Q-fever. 

2. Biological Weapons 

Materials seized at the Aum facilities and other evidence confirms that the Aum 
had embarked upon an intense research and development program for the produc- 
tion of biological weapons. Judging from this evidence, Japanese authorities believe 
the Aum succeeded in producing botulism toxin. The same Japanese authorities are 
less certain but have serious concern that the Aum had also produced anthrax bacil- 
lus. 

Both botulism toxin and anthrax are viewed by experts as serious weapons of 
mass destruction. In a 1993 report of the Office of Technology Assessment, it is 
noted that botulism toxin is a poison made by a bacterium, Clostridium botulinum. 
It is one of the most poisonous substances known to man. The fatal dose of botulin 
toxin by injection or inhalation is about 1 nanogram (a billionth of a gram) per kilo- 
gram of weight. This would equate to about 70 nanograms of botulin toxin to kill 
the average adult male. The toxin is also relatively fast-acting, producing death be- 
tween 1 to 3 days in 80% of the victims. (See: Technologies Underlying Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, Office of Technology Assessment, 1993) 

Anthrax is the name given for a severe illness caused by the bacterium Bacillus 
anthraxis. It is considered one of the prototypical biological-warfare agents. In na- 
ture, anthrax is primarily a disease of cattle and sheep but can also infect humans. 
It can survive for long periods of time in the soil in a dormant state. Aft;er infection, 



63 

it reverts to an active phase in which it multiplies rapidly in the host body and se- 
cretes deadly toxins. (Ibid.) 

After inhalation into the lungs, anthrax spores travel to the lymph nodes of the 
chest, where they become active, multiplying and releasing three proteins that func- 
tion as a potent toxin. This toxin results in uncontrollable hemorrhaging and fatal 
tissue damage. In addition to its lethality anthrax has other characteristics that 
make it an attractive BW agent including the ease of production. (Ibid.) 

The Staff has confirmed that Seiichi Endo, Health and Welfare Minister for the 
cult, confessed that he had been working on developing biological weapons and was 
close to finalizing this effort before the Tokyo incident. He claims to have embarked 
upon this work under the specific directions of Asahara. Other Aum followers have 
also confessed to their involvement in the biological program at the cult's 
Kamikuishiki compound. 

In the compound, the police have found large amounts of equipment that is indis- 
pensable for cultivating bacteria and viruses. Also uncovered were large amounts of 
peptone," a substance used to cultivate bacteria, as well as quantities of books and 
materials on the production of botulism, cholera and dysentery. The amount of pep- 
tone seized was phenomenal. Apparently there were 100-200 metal drums of pep- 
tone seized at the Aum facilities, each having a capacity of 18 liters. By comparison, 
university research classes are said to typically use only about one liter of peptone 
per year. Thus, the Aum were expecting to propagate a huge quantity of bacteria. 

Subsequent discoveries by the police were equally disturbing. It appears from offi- 
cial Japanese government material reviewed by the Staff that the police determined 
that Seichi Endo had produced an antibody for botulinus and was constructing a 
four-story concrete facility for further development of biological weapons at another 
Aum site in Naganohara. That facility was to be equipped with a so-called "clean 
room" with specialized ventilation systems and a sealed room for protecting cul- 
tivated bacteria from leaking. 

The Staff has been told by a number of credible sources that the actual building 
used for the production of bacterial agents has yet to be fully searched by Japanese 
authorities. All of the materials recovered so far have been from ancillary buildings 
located on the Kamikuishiki site, not from the actual production facility. These 
sources have warned us that up to the date of the Staffs visit to Japan in late Au- 
gust, Japanese authorities had merely sealed this building after a cursory inspection 
from its doorway. These sources contend that the police have not gone into it be- 
cause of concerns over its unknown contents. At a later date when more information 
has been gleaned from informants and records the police intend to launch a thor- 
ough review of material and cultures included in the building. 

Probably the most chilling of all the reports coming out of Japan were those that 
the Aum had actually attempted to use bacteria warfare. The Staff has learned that 
a number of devices were found by the police in Tokyo that authorities believe may 
have been intended to disperse anthrax. Three attache cases were discovered on 
March 15, 1995, five days before the Tokyo gas attack, at the Kasumigaseki subway 
station in Tokyo. Each contained a small tank to hold an unknown liquid, a small 
motorized fan and a vent and battery. Unfortunately, none of the liquids were recov- 
ered for analysis. Experts have told the Staff that these devices were crude dissemi- 
nation devices for bacterial or chemical agents. Additionally, the Staff has learned 
from a number of government sources that the cult had obtained at least two radio 
controlled drone aircrafts whose likely use was also to distribute biological weapons. 

In addition, the Staff has recovered documents from the Aum's attempts to pur- 
chase material here in the United States that may be relevant to their biological 
program. As discussed in greater detail in Section VI(C), infra, the Aum wanted to 
obtain hundreds of camcorder batteries and small fans as well as thousands of small 
serum bottles. All are similar to the components used in the attache cases. 

The Staff has also learned that the police suspect that the Aum dispersed anthrax 
bacilli at their Tokyo headquarters. This belief is based upon a confession by one 
of the former Aum members. The event occurred in June, 1993 and coincided with 
complaints from neighbors of a foul odor. The police report that the Aum's Tokyo 
headquarters building seemed to have been equipped for bacteria production. 

Equally disturbing have been a number of press reports in late May of 1995 con- 
cerning the Aum's interest in the Ebola virus. The Staff has confirmed that mem- 
bers of the Aum sent a purported medical mission to Zaire in 1992 to assist in the 
treatment of Ebola victims. The press reports allege that in actuality the Aum was 
attempting to find a sample of the Ebola strain to take back to Japan for culturing 
purposes. This is entirely believable in light of their confirmed and aggressive bio- 
logical weapons program. 

In support of these claims, the Staff was told that in a December, 1994 broadcast 
from Moscow, the Aum's Health and Welfare Minister, Seichi Endo discussed the 



64 

use of Ebola as a potential biological warfare agent. Apparently a copy of this 
speech was transcribed by the cult and printed in Japanese in one of their publica- 
tions. The Staff has to date been unable to find which of the many hundreds of doc- 
uments published by the Aum contained this speech. However, the Staff has con- 
firmed from Aum documents that in October of 1992 Asahara and 40 followers trav- 
eled to Zaire for "mediral assistance" to that country. 

3. Illegal Drug Production 

The Japanese police strongly suspect that the Aum was using its chemical weap- 
ons development program to also produce illegal drugs, including stimulants and 
LSD. The police also believe that the Aum had an arrangement to sell their drugs 
to Japanese organized crime, the Yakuza. The police also have credible evidence to 
believe that some of the drug production was being used by the Aum leadership on 
its membership and new recruits for thought-control purposes. 

In support of these charges, the Japanese police report they have found a note- 
book of one of the Aum leaders detailing the production process for illegal stimu- 
lants. The police allegedly discovered a number of precursors for the production of 
stimulants. The police have also determined that a number of senior Aum members 
attempted to sell large quantities of drugs to various Japanese organized crime 
groups. Information garnered by the police indicated that the Aum drugs were not 
popular because they were, in the words of one police informant, "garbage." 

The police allegedly have obtained confessions from a number of Aum members 
that discuss the use of drugs in the initiation rites of the Aum. A number of these 
members described hallucinating after being given unknown substances. Traces of 
LSD and other illegal drugs have reportedly been found in blood samples of a num- 
ber of Aum members. In addition at least 10 grams of LSD powder was confiscated 
from the cult's Satyam No. 2 building. 

The Staff has learned that Masami Tsuchiya, head of the Aum's chemical team, 
has confessed to the police that he produced LSD for the cult. The police report that 
Tsuchiya admitted to systematically producing LSD and other drugs for use on Aum 
members and for sale. Apparently implicated in this scheme was former Construc- 
tion Minister Hayakawa whose hand-written notes list the chemicals needed to 
manufacture LSD. 

V. Crimes of the Cult 

A. Murder And Mayhem: Precursors To Gas 

In the days following the subway gas attack on March 20, 1995, as suspicion fell 
on the Aum, most people outside of Japan learned for the first time of this rather 
obscure Japanese religious sect. To most, their criminal actions of March 20th were 
out of character for a religious group. Yet, a closer review of the Aum's history show 
that this group's character had a common thread of criminality leading back to al- 
most the date it was legally chartered. They include murder, attempted murder, 
kidnappings and burglaries. These incidents, most of which only became known to 
the outside world in the aft;ermath of the Tokyo attack, have led many to conclude 
that Japanese authorities should not have been surprised by either the subway at- 
tack or its perpetrators. 

This section of the Staff statement will briefly chronicle the most serious of the 
criminal acts of the Aum cult leading up to the tragedy in the Tokyo subway. Their 
recitation provides an accurate portrait of this group's criminality. It also serves as 
a reminder of the consequences of government inaction. A number of Japanese Aum 
experts interviewed by the Staff charged that their own government's inability or 
unwillingness over the years to investigate the Aum led to the cult's delusion of in- 
vincibility. They noted that the cult regularly snatched former members and en- 
emies off the street without any police interference. This immunity just emboldened 
the Aum to more outrageous conduct in their opinions. 

The following is a partial chronological list of criminal activities of the Aum cult 
leading up to the Tokyo gassing attack of March 20, 1995. 

A longer, more detailed chronology of major events in the history of the Aum cult 
is attached as Appendix D: 

Name Title 

1989 Parents and family members of Aum recruits complain to law enforcement offi- 
cers that the Aum was kidnapping and physically assaulting recruits and family 
members of recruits. 



65 

Name Title 

Nov. 1989 Mr. Sakamoto, a lawyer representing anti-Aum groups, and his wife and one- 
year-old son are kidnapped and murdered. After the Tokyo attack, Aum mem- 
bers confess to the crime and the families' remains are found. 

Oct. 1990 Aum members found guilty in Japanese court of violating the Utilization of Land 

Planning Act. 

Oct. 1992 Aum "medical mission" sent to Zaire to obtain a sample of the deadly Ebola 

virus. 

1993 Aum begins research into and production of chemical agents. 

June 1993 Noxious fumes from a building believed to be affiliated with the sect cause ap- 
proximately 100 people to complain in the Koto ward of Tokyo. Following the 
sarin gas attack in Tokyo, Aum members told Japanese officials that the Aum 
dispersed anthrax bacilli at their Tokyo headquarters at this time. 

Sept. 1993 Two Aum members plead guilty to carrying dangerous chemicals on an airplane 

in Perth, Australia. 

June 1994 Sarin gas attack in l^atsumoto, 7 people died and over 200 injured. The sect pur- 
chases and smuggles an MIL-17 helicopter from Russia to Japan. 

July 1994 Cult begins manufacturing AK-74s. A hazardous odor smelled near the premises 

of Aum in Yamanashi prefecture. 

Sept. 1994 Miyazaki Prefecture police accepted a complaint and charged the cult with plun- 
dering an inn owner of his receipts. 

Nov. 1994 Aum members broke into the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department in order to 

steal driver's license data. Followers were arrested on suspicion of breaking 
into the offices of Nippon Electronics Co. The purpose was to obtain informa- 
tion on laser technology. 

Dec. 1994 Aum members broke into the Hiroshima Factory of the Mitsubishi Heavy Indus- 
tries in order to steal technical documents on weapons such as tanks and artil- 
lery. 
Aum members killed Tadahiro Hamaguchi by spraying him with VX while he was 

walking on an Osaka street. 
Aum may have attacked an 83-year-old man with VX gas. 

Jan. 1995 Tomomitsu Niimi alleged to have sprayed VX gas at Hiroyuki Nagaoka, head of 

the Association of the Victims of Aum Shinrikyo. Nagaoka survived but is in a 
coma. 

Feb. 1995 A village office administrator was kidnapped. Killed by drug injection. Body 

burned in microwave incinerator located in underground room in Satyam No. 2. 
PAum follower, Kotaro Ochida, a pharmacist, is hanged in the Aum facilities. 
His body is bumed in microwave incinerator. Eight other bodies were burned in 
the incinerator. 

Mar. 1995 Prior to the 20 March sarin gas attack: 

Aum members assisted in a firebombing attack on the Aum headquarters in 
Tokyo in an attempt to inspire public sympathy for the Aum just before the 
Tokyo subway gas attack. 
Three pieces of luggage containing sprayers were placed in the Kasumigaseki 

subway station. 
An Osaka University student was injured, captured and confined by Aum mem- 
bers. 
Six former Aum members were confined by Aum members, police found them 
during raids on Aum facilities following the sarin gas attack. 

B. Matsumoto: A Dry Run For Tokyo 

On March 20, 1995, to the pubhc at large, a new form of terrorism was unleashed 
with the Aum's release of its deadly sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system. Yet the 
events leading up to that incident confirm that the Aum had used sarin to kill be- 
fore in Matsumoto, a small industrial and resort city of several hundred thousand 
people 100 miles west of Tokyo. 

Late in the evening of June 27, 1994, a substance later identified as sarin seeped 
through the open windows of apartments and houses in the Kaichi Heights neigh- 
borhood near the old heart of the city. Seven people eventually died and over 500 
people were injured including a number still in comas. 

Suspicion initially fell on a former chemical salesman at whose residence various 
chemicals were found. He was believed to have accidentally released the gas while 
mixing a home-made batch of herbicide for his garden. This later turned out to be 
physically impossible since none of the compounds found in his house could have 
caused the toxic results of the incident. In addition, traces of sarin were found near 
where witnesses had seen individuals in a vehicle releasing some type of gas. 



66 

This and other evidence led a number of non-government experts to suspect ter- 
rorist involvement in the Matsumoto affair. Kyle Olson, in January 1995, provided 
the most accurate analysis of Matsumoto, viewing the event as the handiwork of un- 
named terrorists. He opined that it was merely a dry run and that the next sarin 
attack would be in the Tokyo subway system. Other commentators noted the inter- 
est of the Aum in sarin and clearly hinted that the Aum may have been behind the 
Matsumoto incident. 

It was not until after the police arrests subsequent to the Tokyo incident that 
uncontrovertible evidence was developed linking the Aum to Matsumoto. The Staff 
has confirmed that the Japanese police have confessions from a number of Aum fol- 
lowers implicating the Aum to this gas attack. Masami Tsuchiya, head of the cult's 
chemical squad, has admitted he developed the sarin used for the attack and that 
Hideo Murai, the deceased Science and Technology Minister for the Aum, and six 
other senior cult members were involved. 

Tsuchiya also has provided the police a motive for this incident. He has indicated 
that the Aum attack was linked to a court case then being heard in Matsumoto. 
The Aum was then defending itself against fraud charges brought by various land 
owners in Matsumoto. On May 10th, the trial had concluded and the verdict was 
scheduled to be released on July 19, 1994. The Aum decided to target the three 
judges hearing the case in order to prevent them from returning a decision against 
the Aum. 

The sarin was released within 30 feet of the dormitory where the three judges 
were staying. All three judges fell ill as a result of the attack and the decision was 
delayed as planned by the Aum. As of the Staff trip to Tokyo, the Matsumoto court 
has still not reconvened to release its decision. 

Tsuchiya has also told the police that initially they had planned to attack the 
judges while they were working in the Matsumoto branch of the Nagano District 
Court. Only after arriving there did they learn that the judges had left the court- 
house and returned to their residences. They then proceeded to the parking lot next 
to the judges dormitory and sprayed the sarin out of a nozzle device attached to a 
truck specially outfitted for that purpose. Apparently an electric heater was used 
to heat the liquid into a gaseous state for dispersal by an electrically powered fan. 
The gassing lasted for approximately 10 minutes releasing a gas that was carried 
on a southeasterly wind into the targeted residences. 

Tsuchiya also confirmed that the Aum used Matsumoto as a test run. The cult 
had never before tried the sarin gas on a large scale dispersal. Matsumoto proved 
to them that they could effectively deliver it. The police have recovered portions of 
the truck and the special fittings used in the Matsumoto attack. 

Apparently the truck and its device were taken apart soon after the Matsumoto 
incident so it was not available to be used the following year in Tokyo. It has been 
suggested that the Aum quickly destroyed this device when an accidental spill of 
sarin at their Kamikuishiki facility looked like it was going to attract police atten- 
tion. On July 9th, two weeks after Matsumoto, the dairy farming region near the 
Aum compound was swept by a strong and strange odor that allegedly killed vegeta- 
tion near the Aum compound. Police were called to the scene but were denied access 
to the sect's compound. Although the police did not pursue the matter any further, 
the Aum apparently was concerned that they might discover the Matsumoto vehicles 
and therefore destroyed the evidence. 

This would later have ramifications to the citizens of Tokyo. When it came time 
for the Aum to strike again, it has been surmised that they lacked their only tested 
delivery system. Its absence may have played a major role in the Aum's choice of 
target and method of delivery. 

C. Tokyo: A Nightmare In The Morning 

On the morning of March 20, 1995, the Aum attempted to murder tens of thou- 
sands of innocent people in order to create unimaginable disorder and chaos. Unlike 
the earlier Matsumoto incident in which the Aum targeted a specific group of peo- 
ple, the Tokyo subway attack involved the indiscriminate use of the chemical nerve 
agent sarin on an enormous civilian population. Had the chemical mixture and de- 
livery system been slightly different, the resulting tragedy would be unprecedented, 
if not beyond comprehension. 

The Aum's plan was to place approximately eleven small containers of sarin on 
five trains running on three major lines of the Tokyo subway system (Marunouchi, 
Chiyoda and Hibiya). The subway system has over 5 million riders daily. The se- 
lected trains were scheduled to arrive at the central Kasumigaseki station within 
four minutes of each other at the height of the morning rush hour between 8:00 and 
8:10 a.m. The containers, which were made out of nylon polyethylene and wrapped 



67 

in newspaper, were placed on baggage racks or left on the floor and punctured by 
Aum members to release their deadly cargoes of sarin. 

The station towards which the cars were converging, Kasumigaseki, is one of the 
largest where a number of subway lines converge. It is also at the heart of Tokyo's 
government district. Within walking distance is the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Fi- 
nance, Tax Administrator, Labor, Health & Welfare, as well as both the Tokyo Po- 
lice and the National Police Agency (the equivalent of the FBI). Many of the riders 
who use the Kasumigaseki station are employees and officials of those agencies. 

As planned, most of the stricken trains converged at the height of rush hour and 
disgorged their sick and frightened passengers. The Aum's plan succeeded in killing 
twelve and injuring 5,500 people. It also succeeded in causing panic and chaos in 
the station and throughout Tokyo as commuters and subway workers alike collapsed 
into severe fits of coughing, choking and vomiting. It was only a fortunate mistake 
by the Aum in the preparation of the special batch of sarin used that day and the 
inferior dissemination system used to deploy it that limited the number of casual- 
ties. If not for these mistakes, the Staff has been told bj' chemical weapons experts, 
tens of thousands could have easily been killed in this busy subway system that 
moves over five million passengers a day. 

Despite the poor quality of the sarin and its inadequate delivery system, the scene 
under the streets of Tokyo that morning was terrifying. Reports reviewed by the 
Staff describe men, women and children in panic, coughing uncontrollably, vomiting 
and collapsing in heaps. On one of the platforms over 30 passengers collapsed after 
being overcome with fumes that were strong enough to be smelled one floor above 
at the ticket counters. Subway workers and other emergency workers who first ar- 
rived on the scene quickly became victims themselves. 

One first hand account reviewed by the staff was from one of the two Americans 
injured in the event. This civilian U.S. employee stated that the first indication he 
had of a problem was when he changed trains at Kasumigaseki station and noted 
a peculiar odor. He waited for a train for approximately 20 minutes without realiz- 
ing what was going on, in part because he spoke little if any Japanese. During this 
time he began to experience troubled breathing, headache, and pain in his chest and 
throat. He explained that the harder he tried to breathe the more his chest hurt. 
By the time he was taken to the hospital he had lost most eye-hand coordination 
and voluntary control over his bodily functions. He soon lost consciousness and had 
to be revived at the hospital. Fortunately, he survived and has fully recovered. 

The Tokyo attack was first widely viewed as the long-prophesied attack by the 
Aum on the Japanese government. Because all of the trains targeted were scheduled 
to arrive at Kasumigaseki station, it was believed that the attack was targeted on 
the numerous government bureaucrats working there. 

However, the Japanese government now believes that the gas attack was meant 
merely to be a diversionary feint in anticipation of a planned government raid 
against the Aum. The Staff has learned that the police have evidence that the Aum 
leadership planned the Tokyo attack after they discovered that the police were going 
to raid their facilities in search for a kidnaped notary public. (It later was discov- 
ered that the Aum had killed this individual.) They, including Asahara, the Aum's 
Construction Minister Hayakawa, the Aum's Home Affairs Minister Niimi, and the 
Aum's late Science & Technology Minister, Murai, reasoned that the sarin attack 
would disrupt the police investigation, delay the searches and give them additional 
time to flee or destroy incriminating evidence. 

The Staff learned that the police have evidence that showing after Asahara ap- 
proved the sarin attack, Murai was given the task of carrying it out. He, in turn, 
met with Ikuo Hayashi, the Aum's Treatment Minister, Tomomasa Nakagawa, an 
Aum doctor, and Seiichi Endo, the Aum's Health and Welfare Minister, to decide 
upon the specific plan of attack. They decided to use the bags of sarin placed on 
the specific trains. 

Specific assignments were given out. Ikuo Hayashi was assigned to place the 
sarin bags on the Chiyoda line; Torn Toyoda and Yasuo Hayashi the Hibiya line; 
and, Masato Yokoyama and Kenichi Hirose the Marunouchi line. Five others were 
selected as lookouts and drivers — Tonomitsu Niimi, Shigeo Sugimoto, Kouichi 
Kitamura, Katsuya Takahashi and Kiyotaka Sotozaki. Yoshihiro Inoue, the Aum's 
Intelligence Minister, was assigned to be field supervisor for the operation. 

The various teams carried out their missions and then returned to a special hide- 
out in Tokyo where they each were given an injection of an antidote for sarin. They 
then changed their clothes and burned those they had worn as well as the umbrellas 
used to pierce the sarin packages. When they reported their successful operation to 
Asahara, he is reported to have commented "how nice it is that their souls were re- 
moved by Shiva." 



68 

Within days of the Tokyo subway attack, the law enforcement community and the 
pubhc-at-Iarge scrutinized the Aum as the group responsible for the tragedy. Among 
the documents obtained at the cult's New York office, the Staff found scraps of 
paper that when pieced together appear to be an English translation of Asahara's 
March 24th defense of the cult that was publicly disseminated. In the statement 
Asahara claims he has been sprayed with poisonous gas along with hundreds of his 
disciples. He further attempts to explain away the tremendous stockpiles of chemi- 
cal weapon precursors that were discovered by Japanese authorities days earlier. 
Specifically, he claims the chemicals were for legitimate manufacturing purposes. 

The Staff has asked chemical experts to review Asahara's March 24th explanation 
to assess the scientific veracity of his claims. The experts advised the Staff that 
Asahara's claims are "not believable" based upon Asahara's asserted usage of the 
chemicals. Furthermore, the experts confirm that the various chemicals all have 
general or specific applications in the development of chemical weapons such as 
sarin and cyanide gas. 

D. Post Tokyo: The Terror Continues 

From March 23, 1995 through September 4, 1995, the police have conducted over 
500 raids on approximately 300 locations, confiscating 66,000 items of evidence in 
their investigation of the Aum. The number of Aum followers arrested have reached 
398 in 240 separate cases. Those arrested and or indicted have included almost the 
entire hierarchy of the cult. They have been charged with a variety of offenses rang- 
ing from murder, conspiracy, kidnapping, assault, kidnapping, obstruction of justice, 
harboring, and theft, to petty traffic and licensing offenses. Many of those charged 
have started to appear for trials, including Asahara who was scheduled to start trial 
on Thursday, October 26th. He fired his attorney the day before the trial. 

Despite this aggressive response from the Japanese authorities, criminal activities 
of the Aum did not come to an end. As a matter of some concern, a number of sig- 
nificant events have occurred since the Tokyo subway incident involving the Aum. 

For example, on March 30, 1995, only ten days after the sarin subway attack, 
Takaji Kunimatsu, the Commissioner General of the National Police Agency, was 
shot by a lone gunman. Japanese government material, obtained by the Staff, reveal 
this shooting occurred in front of his residence as he was leaving for work. He was 
seriously wounded by three shots from what police believe was a U.S. made Colt 
38 caliber revolver. The would-be assassin fired four time from a distance of ap- 
proximately 60 feet away. He then fled from the scene on a bicycle. 

Although the assailant is still at-large, the Aum has been implicated in the crime 
by a police investigation that resulted last month with the police arresting Mitsuo 
Sunaoshi who belonged to the Aum's Construction Ministry. 

On April 15, 1995, the entire country was put on alert over rumors that Asahara 
had predicted something terrible was going to happen on that date. Although noth- 
ing occurred, over 20,000 additional police were deployed in full riot gear, bullet- 
proof vests and gas masks throughout Tokyo. Many stores shut down out of concern 
over a potential gas attack. Scores of people stayed away from work or avoided the 
subway system. 

Four days later, on April 19, 1995, in what appears to be a copy cat attack, more 
than 500 people were sickened and taken to hospitals complaining of stinging eyes, 
sore throats, nausea, coughs and dizziness after inhaling a mysterious gas released 
in three different places around Japanese Railway's Yokohama Station. Most were 
released that day from the hospital and no serious injuries or deaths occurred. The 
Police originally claimed evidence of phosgene but later retracted that statement 
and indicated they could not identify the substance. The police have arrested a non- 
Aum. 

Then, on April 23, 1995, one month afler the subway incident, Hideo Murai, the 
Aum's Science and Technology Minister, was stabbed repeatedly while in front of 
the Aum headquarters. He later died from his wounds. His assailant, Hiroyuki Jo, 
was immediately arrested for this daring attack that occurred in front of hundreds 
of police and press cameramen. 

Weeks later, a member of Japanese organized crime, Kenji Kamimine, was ar- 
rested in regards to this murder. The police suspect that the murder of Murai had 
been ordered by either organized crime or Asahara in order to prevent him from 
revealing their relationship. The case continues to be investigated. 

On May 5, 1995, the Aum struck again by attacking Shinjuku Station, one of busi- 
est in Tokyo, with another chemical weapon. In this case, the Aum used sodium cya- 
nide placed in a public restroom. The chemical device was a rather simple binary 
weapon consisting of two plastic bags, one containing 2 liters of powdered sodium 
cyanide and the other containing about 1.5 liters of diluted sulfuric acid. When dis- 
covered, the bags were ablaze. Had they broken open a chemical reaction would 



69 

have occurred producing deadly hydrogen cyanide gas. Chemical experts have esti- 
mated that the amount of gas that would have been released would have been suffi- 
cient to kill between 10,000 and 20,000 people. 

On May 16, 1995, Asahara was finally arrested. That evening, the Aum again 
struck. A letter bomb mailed to the Governor of Metropolitan Tokyo exploded in the 
hands of his secretary, blowing off the fingers of his left hand. Five members of the 
Aum, including its Intelligence Chief Inoue, were indicted for producing and posting 
the explosive on May 11th. 

As late as July 4, 1995, another gas attack was averted in Tokyo. Again, this in- 
volved hydrogen cyanide and a rest room. In this case 4 devices were found in rest 
rooms at the Kayaba-cho, Tokyo and Ginza subway stations and the Japanese Rail- 
way suburban Shinjuku station. The devices were different than the ones used on 
May 5th but all used the similar principal of mixing two separate bags containing 
sulfuric acid and sodium cyanide. None of the devices worked. 

The threat still reni'ains that other devices may be employed in the future espe- 
cially during some of the more important trials. The Staff has been advised that not 
all of the chemicals produced by the Aum have been accounted for, nor have all of 
the more fanatical members been arrested. As an example, up to at least early Sep- 
tember during the Staffs fact-finding trip, the entire city of Tokyo was festooned 
with wanted posters for some of the Aum members. In addition, the Aum still has 
substantial funds. Only a portion of its original $1 billion assets has been seized or 
frozen by authorities. 

Until all of the fanatical members, their weapons of mass destruction and their 
assets are accounted for, there is still some justification for the Japanese to be con- 
cerned. Additionally, until our government is satisfied that it knows all that it needs 
to know about the capabilities of the Aum, including its shopping list of high tech 
items, its intentions involving our Nation and its international links to other coun- 
tries, we in the United States are justified to be concerned. 

VI. Overseas Operations 

One reason why we in the United States should be concerned about the Aum is 
because of the truly global nature of the cult. In this section we will examine the 
Aum's activities in seven different countries on four different continents, including 
Russia and the United States. 

A. The Aum Shinrikyo in Russia 

1. The Organization 

Through a number of private and government sources, including Aum documents, 
the staff has confirmed that the Aum began its activities in Russia in 1991 and the 
organization there quickly grew to become the Aum's largest organization in the 
world. The first followers registered in Moscow in 1991 and, in June 1992, the Rus- 
sian Ministry of Justice registered the cult as an official religious organization. 

There are many allegations in the Japanese and Russian press about Aum activi- 
ties in Russia. The Staff was unable to confirm many of these allegations while in 
Moscow investigating this issue. Through briefings over the last several months, the 
Staff also learned that U.S. government officials have been unable to confirm or 
deny many of the allegations. 

Following the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway, two Russian Duma commit- 
tees began investigations of the Aum — the Committee on Religious Matters and the 
Committee on Security Matters. A report from the Security Committee states that 
the Aum's followers numbered 35,000, with up to 55,000 laymen visiting the sect's 
seminars sporadically. This contrasts sharply with the numbers in Japan which are 
18,000 and 35,000 respectively. The Security Committee report also states that the 
Russian sect had 5,500 full-time monks who lived in Aum accommodations, usually 
housing donated by Aum followers. Russian Aum officials, themselves, claim that 
over 300 people a day attended services in Moscow. The official Russian Duma in- 
vestigation into the Aum described the cult as a closed, centralized organization. 

The Russian Duma has reported that the Aum had eleven branches outside of 
Moscow and at least seven inside of Moscow. Some of the other Aum headquarters 
in Russia were located in St. Petersburg, Kazan, Perm, Vorkuta, Tyumen, Samara, 
Vladivostok, Elista, and Vladikavkaz. 

According to Russian press reports, the Aum was very specific in targeting its re- 
cruiting in Russia. The majority of the Russian Aum members were disaffected uni- 
versity students. According to a Russian press report that claims to have access to 
forms that prospective Aum members filled out, the sect asked prospective members 
to choose the subjects among 24 fields they wanted to pursue in the future. Physics, 
chemistry, and biology were reportedly the top three areas listed. 



70 

Based upon official Japanese documents and numerous press reports and Staff 
interviews, the Staff has confirmed that in 1992 the Aum bought radio time from 
one of the largest radio stations in Russia — the state-run Mayak Radio — under a 3- 
year contract. The contract cost $800,000 per year, according to a Russian press re- 
port. The Staff has confirmed that the Aum broadcast an hour long program on a 
daily basis. The broadcasts were also relayed via an Aum radio tower in Vladivostok 
to Japan every evening. The Staff was told by U. S. and Russian government 
sources that the Aum, also, either owned or leased a radio station in Vladivostok. 
Aum programs were also televised on Russia's "2X2" television station. 

A Russian press report claims that according to a sect document distributed to 
Russian followers, the Aum planned to form a company in Russia. The document 
states that Asahara was predicting an economic crisis in Russia that would lead to 
increased unemployment. The document asked Aum followers in Russia to quit their 
jobs and work for this company. The document said that Aum would train its Rus- 
sian followers in agriculture, medicine, science, and legal services. 

Japanese and Russian press reports claim that the Aum formed a security com- 
pany in Moscow in 1994. Japanese reporters obtained copies of the registration pa- 
pers for this company, called "Aum Protect." According to the address on the reg- 
istration documents, the firm was located in the same building as the Aum's Mos- 
cow headquarters and was established with initial reserves of 2.5 million rubles (ap- 
proximately $160,000). The Japanese press claims that this Aum company's staff of 
twelve had permits to bear arms fi-om Russian authorities and they had received 
special training in the Russian armed forces. According to former Russian Aum 
members, quoted in the Russia and Japanese press, "Aum Protect" was used to put 
physical pressure on sect members who wished to leave the cult. 

Even before the Tokyo sarin gas subway incident, the Aum had become controver- 
sial in Russia. According to Russian press reports, at the end of 1992, parents of 
cult members, lead by a Russian Orthodox priest who claims to have deprogrammed 
up to fifty Aum members, initiated a civil lawsuit against the sect. On July 15, 
1994, Russia's Ministry of Justice annulled the registration of the Russian branch 
of the Aum on technicalities having to do with the registration procedure, according 
to Russian press reports. A few weeks later, however, the organization was re-reg- 
istered by the Moscow Department of Justice as "Moscow's Aum Religious Associa- 
tion." Aum also registered a "Committee for the Defense of Freedom" at this time. 
It is this defense committee that fought the parents' group three year fight against 
the Aum, according to Russian and Japanese press reports. 

Following the subway attack, activities against the Aum in Russia intensified. By 
mid-April 1995, President Yeltsin pubUcly ordered Russia's Prosecutor General, the 
Federal Security Service, and the Commission for ReUgious Organizations in the 
Russian government to thoroughly investigate the Aum. In response to this edict, 
Russian press reports indicate that the Russian court that had been hearing the 
parents' lawsuit against the Aum banned all of the Aum's activities in Russia. The 
court charged that the Aum was harming Russia's young people and criticized 
Mayak Radio and the Russian television station for allowing Aum propaganda on 
its airwaves. The Aum was ordered to pay 20 billion rubles (4 million dollars) to 
the defendants and it lost its registration as an official religion. The group was also 
banned from further television and radio broadcasting. Despite these actions, an 
Aum official in Moscow said: 

". . . Aum will not cease to exist in Russia. We shall continue to exist in 
other forms, but we shall prevail by all means." 

According to Russian press reports, in June of 1995 the parent group that had 
originally initiated the court case against the Aum, charged that the Aum continued 
to operate underground. By July 1995, the Russian press stated that Russian au- 
thorities began arresting Aum members. In early July, Russian authorities detained 
the leader of the Tatarstan branch of the Aum. The leader there told Russian re- 
porters that his branch had 200 followers. On July 21, 1995, Russian law enforce- 
ment officials arrested one of the leaders of the Russian branch of the sect, Outi 
Toshiyatsu, who is a Japanese citizen. Russian authorities charged Toshiyatsu with 
organizing groups that infringe on citizens' rights and with causing material dam- 
age by cheating or breaching confidence. There has been no trial yet. 

The press as well as the parent's organization opposed to the Aum, have publicly 
criticized the inaction of Russian authorities in closing the Aum headquarters in 
Moscow following the court's decree. According to their allegations, only one of the 
Aum's seven centers was closed immediately. In that center, reporters claim that 
authorities found "powders and unpackaged tablets." Russian press reports claim 
that Russian officials did not move to close the remaining centers until at least a 



71 

week after the court order to close the Aum premises and that by then, those cen- 
ters were completely emptied, all their contents having been removed. 

2. Arming With Russian Weapons 

It is clear that the Aum was interested in the technology and weapons that are 
available in Russia. The major proponent of the sect's expansion into Russia was 
the Aum's Construction Minister Kiyohide Hayakawa. He was also the mastermind 
of the Aum's attempts to arm itself, according to Japanese officials and cult docu- 
ments. 

In total, Hayakawa visited Russia 21 times from 1992-1995, spending a total of 
180 days there. The first recorded visit took place from January 11-20, 1992. He 
visited three other times before mid-March of that year — presumably paving the 
way for Asahara's late March visit. From November 1993 to April 1994, Hayakawa 
visited Russia regularly between one and two times a month. Hayakawa was in 
Russia from March 17-22 of this year during the sarin attack in Tokyo. He said 
that he was there to learn about the judiciary system and to renew broadcasting 
contracts. 

The Staff believes that Hayakawa played a key role in obtaining technology and 
weapons from Russia. Hayakawa helped to purchase a Soviet-made MI-17 heli- 
copter and invited Russian engineers to Japan to help train sect members to main- 
tain the helicopter, according to official Japanese documents. 

According to a Japanese Diet member who was giving a report to the Japanese 
legislature, the helicopter was built in Tatarstan. The Japanese official states that 
Russian law enforcement authorities were conducting a probe into an alleged bribe 
of a former Russian parliamentarian in connection with the purchase of the heli- 
copter, according to the Japanese press. The Diet member said that the former Rus- 
sian parliamentarian allegedly helped expedite the acquisition through Azerbaijan 
and that the Russian lawmaker under investigation is from the Caucasus and has 
great influence in that region. 

The Staff has confirmed that the helicopter passed through Japanese Customs in 
1994 via Azerbaijan Air and that the Aum subsequently inquired about certification 
for a larger MI-26 helicopter and requirements to fly an MI-26 to Japan from Rus- 
sia. As indicated in section VI(C), infra, Aum members received helicopter training 
in the United States in late 1993. 

Japanese police sources also allege that Hayakawa brought pistol models to Japan 
from Russia in the Spring of 1994 in order to produce the pistols in Japan, according 
to press reports. These sources also claim that documents seized from Hayakawa 
upon his arrest included blueprints for the Soviet Kalashnikov assault rifle. 

There are many allegations that Aum members may have received military train- 
ing in Russia. 

• Official Japanese documents and press reports state that a tourist brochure 
printed by Devenir Millionaire, an Aum-affiliated travel company located in 
Tokyo, described a tour of Russia that included shooting exercises at Russian 
military facilities. The brochure claimed that the exercises were performed 
under the supervision of former Spetznaz members of the Russian armed forces. 

• Press reports claim that Aum Defense Ministry leader Kibe and Secret Unit 
member Masaq Furukawa underwent comprehensive pilot training in Russia. 
The Aum paid Russian instructors at Moscow's "Airfield Number 3" $15,000 
each for a rigorous training course. Furukawa was in charge of planning mili- 
tary training in Russia under a special Russian unit. As indicated elsewhere in 
this statement, the Staff has confirmed that Kibe did receive helicopter training 
in South Florida in late 1993. 

• Documents seized from Hayakawa contained the following schedule for military 
training: 

Regulation program — $2,800 to military 

1st Day — tank armored vehicle ride inside 

2nd Day — various guns, rocket cannon, machine gun 

3rd Day — rifle machine gun 

4th Day — rest 

• A senior Japanese police officer told the Japanese press that Hayakawa's docu- 
ments stated, "If expenses are paid, government will grant approval." 

Russian Defense Ministry officials have denied that any training took place at of- 
ficial facilities. In contrast, the Staff found the following Russian and Japanese 
press reports: 

• Russian military sources told Japanese reporters that Asahara inspected a mili- 
tary base near Moscow in the summer of 1993, but stated that no training took 



72 

place at that time. Together with a number of followers, he met military offi- 
cials there for talks, and inspected the grounds. The officials pointed out that 
not only Asahara and his followers but many other foreigners were also given 
access to the base. 

• A Russian diplomatic source told Russian reporters that, "for many the military 
is letting in outsiders regardless of whether they are visiting officially or on a 
private trip." 

• A staff member of the Interior Ministry also publicly claimed that the Ministry 
would not participate in such training but that militants of any rich organiza- 
tion could have used training bases of private security bodies. 

The Chief of Staff of the Far Eastern Military District of Russia has publicly de- 
nied rumors that Aum members were trained as pilots at his base but admitted that 
there are many private firms and air companies with helicopters at their disposal. 
The spokesman opined that one of these firms or a pilots' club may have trained 
the sect members. He noted that in 1993 the local press published a report concern- 
ing the death of a Japanese tourist in the crash of a helicopter belonging to a pri- 
vate company. 

In addition to obtaining conventional arms and training, the Aum apparently saw 
Russia as a source for more exotic, and far more deadly, weapons. At the time of 
his arrest, Hayakawa had information about a gas laser weapon. His documents re- 
ferred to the name of a Russian city where "there is a weapons market" and noted 
its distance from Moscow, according to Japanese press. 

Hayakawa's documents also indicated that the sect was interested in obtaining a 
space-launch rocket, according to the Japanese press. According to press accounts, 
Japanese officials said that the documents include a reference to a Russian Proton 
rocket and reference its prices and the need to build a base in Japan. The Proton 
rocket is capable of canying a satellite. The press has speculated that Russia's 
Khunichev Space Center, which is the designer and producer of the TOPOL rocket, 
had some sort of relationship with the Aum. Recently, however, the public relations 
office of the Center announced that the Center has never had any contact with the 
sect. 

The Aum's interests apparently extended to the most devastating of weapons. 
There are references in the documents seized fi-om Hayakawa to the desired pur- 
chase of nuclear weapons. The documents contain the question "how much is a nu- 
clear warhead?" and lists several prices. It is unclear whether the references are re- 
flections of actual discussions or negotiations. 

3. Allegations of Influence In Russia 

Much has been written in the press about the relationship between the Aum and 
officials of the Russian government. Most of these allegations have been denied, in 
whole or in part, by the officials in question. Little has actually been confirmed by 
U.S. or Japanese government officials. 

The following are some of the allegations made by Russian and Japanese press 
reports: 

• That Asahara led a delegation of 300 Aum members to Russia in March 1992. 
During that trip, Asahara met with Parliament Vice President Aleksandr 
Rutskoy and former Russian parliament speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov. 

• That Russian parliamentarian Vitally Savitsky, chairman of the Duma's Reli- 
gious Affairs Committee told fellow parliamentarians that, "his committee seri- 
ously suspected that Aum Shinrikyo had been assisted in its penetration into 
Russia by Russian intelligence services." 

• That the premier nuclear reseau-ch facility in Russia, the Kurchatov Institute, 
had Aum followers as employees. 

• That during 1992-93 Aum leaders visiting Russia approached Russian science 
officials to seek laser and nuclear technologies and that Shoko Asahara met 
Nikolay Basov while Asahara was in Moscow in 1992. Basov is a 1964 Nobel 
prize winner for his research on the principle of laser technology. 

• That Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Oleg Lobov, received anywhere 
from $500,000 to even $100 million from the Aum. This relationship started in 
December 1991 and continued through 1995. 

• That a Russian known to be a secretary of Lobov's sent facsimiles to Hayakawa 
in Japan and that Hayakawa visited Lobov during his visits to Russia through- 
out the 1992-1995 time period. 

• That no one from Moscow asked Russian Embassy officials to check out the 
Aum and that Lobov met with Aum officials on his own, without informing the 
Embassy or asking its advice. The sources said that the February 1992 meeting 
was agreed to without the participation of the Russian Foreign Ministry or in- 



73 

telligence services prior to Lobov's trip to Japan. No leading Embassy staffers 
were present at the meeting. 

All of the officials have denied allegations that they helped the Aum. The Staff 
has discovered photographs that appeared in Aum publications purporting to be 
Rutskoy, Khasbulatov, Basov, and Lobov with Aum leader Asahara. Furthermore, 
in a press statement quoted on page one of the March 30, 1995, Russian language 
edition of Mowcow Izvetsiya, Lobov admit to meeting with Aum officials but states 
that he was duped by them due to his "charitable nature" and neither the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor the Russian intelligence service warned him away 
from them. 

The Staff has reviewed an official Japanese document that corroborate limited as- 
pects of the above allegations. The document states: 

• In Fall 1991, Aum Shinrikyo gave a message promising aid to Russia, to a Rus- 
sian business person in Tokyo who had been asking many organizations for 
such aid. 

• In December 1991, this business person visited Russia with Hayakawa, then 
the cult's administration director, and met with Mr. Lobov, the President of 
Russian-Japan College, present Russian Secretary of Security Council, Mr. 
Muravjbv, the Secretary General, and Mr. Khushchov, the Chairman of the 
Board of Trustees. 

• In February 1992, Mr. Lobov was invited to Japan by Nissho-Iwai Co., Ltd, and 
met with Asahara. 

• In March 1992, by chartering an Aeroflot aircraft, a delegation of 300 cult fol- 
lowers headed by Asahara visited Russia and met with Rutskoy, Khasbulatov, 
and Lobov. 

In addition, the Staff has been able to confirm, through a visit to the Kurchatov 
Institute, that an employee of the Institute was, and still is, a member of the Aum. 
The nature of any of the relationships alleged above, if indeed a relationship existed, 
remains unconfirmed. 

4. The Aum In Other CIS States 

The Aum attempted to open offices in other states of the former Soviet Union. The 
Staff has confirmed that there are some Aum disciples in Kiev, Ukraine. They peti- 
tioned government officials in Kiev to recognize the Aum as an official religious 
group in September 1993. The Ukrainian government ignored the request. The re- 
quest included the names of ten Ukrainians from Kiev who claimed that they were 
Aum members. 

In December 1993, the Aum petitioned for recognition in Belarus. In Belarus, the 
capital city officials rejected the request to open an Aum branch and banned Aum 
from using radio facilities to air religious messages. 

B. The Aum Shinrikyo in Australia 

The Aum's most intriguing presence may be in Australia. The Staff has confirmed 
that the Aum was in Australia from April 1993 to October 1994. From documents 
provided to the Staff by the Australian Federal Police, the Staff determined the cult 
purchased a 500,000 acre sheep farm in Banjawarn, Australia located approximately 
375 miles northeast of Perth, Western Australia's state capital. In order to purchase 
this farm, the cult formed a front company named Clarity Investments, Ltd. in May 
1993 and another company, Maha Posya Australia, Ltd. in June 1993. Maha Posya 
was also used to import electrical equipment including transformers, static convert- 
ers, generators, co-axial cabling, batteries, meters and tools and protective equip- 
ment into Australia in September 1993. 

The Australian Federal Police gave the Staff documents confirming that in April 
1993, three members of Aum Shinrikyo arrived in Perth from Tokyo. The three in- 
cluded Construction Minister Kiyohide Hayakawa, who was also the person instru- 
mental in setting up the Aum's operations in Russia, and Intelligence Minister 
Yoshihiro Inoue. They hired an Australian citizen of Japanese heritage who was a 
real estate agent based in Perth, to view remote farming properties in Western Aus- 
tralia which were then for sale. They were evasive with the agent about their spe- 
cific requirements; however, it became apparent that they were looking for a remote 
area with arid conditions. The group indicated that they wanted to inspect prop- 
erties where they could conduct experiments of benefit to humankind. 

The group was flown to several properties in the period April 23-26. After landing 
at each station, they went off by themselves for some hours. While inspecting these 
properties, they conducted unknown experiments utilizing a laptop computer, at- 
tachments, and electrodes which were placed in the ground. Hayakawa and another 



74 

of the Aum leaders in the threesome may have also traveled to Tasmania and an 
area in South Australia where a large uranium deposit is located. 

Ultimately, the group decided on the property in Banjawarn, an area where there 
is a known uranium deposit. In April 1993, Hayakawa allegedly offered to purchase 
Banjawarn Station for cash; however, the offer was refused by the owner. Following 
this refusal, the Aum formed Clarity Investments and Maha Posya Australia. These 
companies were created for the claimed purpose of applying for mining and explo- 
ration leases. In June 1993, the Aum used Maha Posya as a front company to pur- 
chase Banjawarn Station for approximately $400,000. Asahara and Yasuko 
Shimada, an Australian citizen of Japanese descent and sect member were named 
as directors of each company. 

Hayakawa contacted a consulting geologist after learning that Banjawarn Station 
is a pastoral lease, meaning that other individuals could enter the property for the 
purpose of prospecting for minerals. Hayakawa did not want any unauthorized per- 
son to enter Banjawarn Station. It is unclear if he succeeded in having the lease 
changed; however, the Aum did purchase eight mining leases from the Western Aus- 
tralia Department of Minerals and Energy in September 1993 for approximately 
$4700 each. 

The Staff has confirmed that at about this same time Hayakawa and another cult 
member, Tsuyoshi Maki, applied for tourist visas at the Australian Embassy in 
Tokyo. Hayakawa and Maki arrived in Perth on September 3, 1993. Shortly after 
arriving in Australia, they met with their consulting geologist. During that meeting 
they told the geologist that they wished to obtain a ship and inquired of her what 
price they could expect to pay. They also mentioned at the meeting that they want- 
ed to export the uranium ore from Banjawarn Station in 44 gallon drums. 

During the following week, Hayakawa and Maki engaged an Australian travel 
agent to make arrangements for six four-wheel drive vehicles and a chartered air- 
craft. The Staff" has confirmed that at the end of that week cult leader Shoko 
Asahara arrived in Perth with 24 followers from Japan, including five females under 
the age of fifteen who were traveling without their parents. Also in the group were 
Hideo Murai, the sect's Science & Technology Minister; Niimi Tomomitsu, the Home 
Affairs Minister; and Inoue. The Aum group traveled with chemicals and mining 
equipment on which they paid over $20,000 in excess baggage fees. According to the 
Australian Federal Police report, among the baggage was a mechanical ditch digger, 
picks, petrol generators, gas masks, respirators, and shovels. A Customs duty of 
over $15,000 was paid to import these items. 

Because of the large amount of excess baggage being brought in by the group, 
Australian Customs searched the entire group. This search revealed four liters of 
concentrated hydrochloric acid, including some in containers marked as hand soap. 
Among the other chemicals that Australian customs officials found were ammonium 
chloride, sodium sulphate, perchloric acid, and ammonium water. All of the chemi- 
cals and some of the laboratory equipment were seized by Australian authorities. 

As a result of the search, two Aum members — Seichi Endo, a biochemist and Min- 
ister of Health & Welfare for the Aum; and Tomomasa Nakagawa, a medical — were 
charged with carrying dangerous goods on an aircraft. The two members subse- 
quently appeared in Australian court, pleaded guilty, and were fined about $1,750 
each. The two claimed that the acid was for gold mining. These same two individ- 
uals were later arrested by Japanese authorities in connection with the Tokyo sub- 
way attack. 

Australian authorities believe that the cult planned the logistics for transporting 
their goods to Banjawarn Station well in advance of the trip. They chartered three 
aircrafts and, having lost their chemicals to Australian authorities, the Aum used 
their real estate agent and their geologist, both of whom were Australian citizens, 
to obtain new chemicals for them from chemical wholesalers. These chemicals were 
obtained either in the name of Maha Posya or in the name of the real estate agent's 
company. All payments for the chemicals were made in cash. The Aum apparently 
went to great lengths to obtain these chemicals, including flying one of their mem- 
bers over 4,000 miles from Perth to Melbourne to obtain two 25 gram bottles of a 
chemical unavailable in Perth. The two bottles cost the Aum a total of $136 — in 
order to obtain them, the Aum spent over $800 in airfare. 

The Aum also tried to hire earthmoving equipment from a mining operation at 
an adjoining station. The mine operators refused to lend the equipment without a 
mine worker to operate it to which the Aum did not agree. A backhoe was hired 
by the Aum without an operator from a rental company for three days, September 
16-18, 1993. Digging and evidence of earthmoving equipment has been found on the 
property. 

The Aum also established a laboratory on the Banjawarn property which was 
stocked with computers and various digital and laboratory equipment. The door of 



75 

the laboratory was marked with Japanese characters and an Enghsh subtitle which 
read "Toyoda Laboratory." This may be a reference to a Toru Toyoda, a sect member 
who arrived in Australia with Asahara. Witnesses told Australian Federal Police 
that the laboratory contauned laptop computers, digital equipment, glass tubing, 
glass evaporators, beakers, bunsen burners, and ceramic grinding and mixing bowls. 
There were limestone or calcrete type rocks on the floor. Other equipment included 
a small laboratory-size rock crushing machine and two small generators. 

The Staff has confirmed from Australian authorities that most of the sect mem- 
bers who are Japanese citizens left Australia by 4 October 1994. In October 1993 
Asahara and four of the original group applied for tourist visas to return to Aus- 
tralia; however, acting on information provided by Australian Federal Police, the 
immigration department refused them visas, along with visas for twelve other Aum 
members. Asahara petitioned his visa denial with a letter to the Australian Federal 
Minister for Immigration. In the letter he said he was blind and needed the help 
of 2 aids. Also, because his life was under threat, he said he needed 17 bodyguards 
to accompany him on his trip to Australia. He said that his Tokyo headquarters had 
been sprayed with diluted harmful gas and that during trips to Russia he had re- 
ceived bomb threats. 

In late October 1993, two other Aum members did obtain visas. These two arrived 
in Perth on October 30, 1993 and stayed at Banjawarn Station until April 1994. 
While there, one of the Aum members petitioned the Western Australian Pastoral 
Board to de-stock Banjawarn station of its sheep. This petition was denied. Inspec- 
tions by Western Australian Pasostral Board members revealed that several wells 
were either fouled or not operating and the Board called for an Australian manager 
to be hired for the property or the lease would be revoked. 

The sect members did hire a manager. While at the property, the manager says 
that the two sect members maintained constant contact with their superiors in 
Japan, with instructions being received by fax or telephone. The manager did not 
witness any experiments or mineral exploration. The equipment and chemicals in- 
side the laboratory were removed about March or April 1994 to accommodate sheep- 
shearing teams. The Aum members insisted that either the sheep not be shorn or 
that they be shorn by others who would be flown in from Japan. Approximately 
2,000 sheep were subsequently sold to a slaughterhouse shortly after shearing. 

On April 28, 1994 these two cult members returned to Japan. They were replaced 
by an Aum member who is an Australian citizen and Tsuyoshi Maki, a Japanese 
citizen who had been part of the Aum's original advance team. 

Shortly after the sarin gas attack in Matsumoto in June 1994, Banjawarn Station 
was offered for sale by Maha Posya. Maki handled the details of the sale and 
seemed anxious that the sale proceed quickly. The property was sold in late July 
1994 for $237,000, almost $165,000 less than what the Aum had paid for it only 
a year earlier. 

The Aum's activity on the property is partially known and, to some degree, still 
a mystery. Various police sources indicate that Hayakawa was interested in extract- 
ing uranium from Australia for the development of nuclear weapons. Documents 
seized from Hayakawa include some ten pages written during Hayakawa's April- 
May 1993 visit to Australia which refer to the whereabouts of properties of uranium 
in Australia, including one reference praising the quality of the uranium in the 
state of South Australia. Australia is one of the world's leading exporters of ura- 
nium ore. 

It appears, however, that the Aum was interested in more than just mining on 
the Banjawarn property. The Chairwoman for the aboriginal community living near 
the sheep station, Phyllis Thomas, said that she and other Aborigines saw about 
five people wearing full-length suits and helmets on the remote site in late August 
1993. The suited sect members were standing by a twin engine airplane and others 
were in the plane. 

In March 1995, shortly after the Tokyo subway attack, the Australian police were 
invited to the sheep station by its new owners who had found papers with Japanese 
writing and various chemicals. The chemicals that police found could have been 
used for mineral processing or to make an irritant gas. They included perchloric 
acid, nitric acid, ferric chloride, ammonia solution, hydrochloric acid, chloroform, po- 
tassium dichromate, and other unidentified solutions. 

The Staff has confirmed that these chemicals are almost identical to the chemicals 
carried on board the aircraft by Asahara and his people when they flew to Perth 
in 1993. Only 2-3 liters of each chemical was found in an outhouse which bore a 
sign saying "Laboratory," while larger quantities were located in a portable build- 
ing. Although the Aum members had originally stated that the chemicals they 
sought to bring into Australia were for the purposes of gold mining, there was no 
evidence of gold mining having been carried out. 



76 

The current owners of the property have stated that the Japanese occupants had 
a number of gas masks in their possession but that they took them when they left. 
One gas mask was left behind and seized by Australian police. Paper dust masks 
were also located in a plastic bag bearing Japanese writing. 

The Staff has confirmed that the Aum conducted experiments with sarin on sheep 
at its property in Banjawarn. The Australian Justice Minister, Duncan Kerr said 
that members of the Aum tested sarin in Australia before the Tokyo subway attack. 
He said that tests on wool and soil samples taken from the Banjawarn station had 
confirmed traces of the chemical. Kerr said that sarin residue had been found in 
and near a group of about 29 dead sheep on the station. Specifically, traces of the 
acid that results when sarin breaks down was found in the soil and in the wool of 
the sheep found in the area. 

In addition, authorities found a docum.ent written in Japanese and titled 
"Banjawarn Station." This document suggested the sect may have been experiment- 
ing on sheep. The document contained notations for classifying dead or injured 
sheep by using unique Japanese markings. Australian Federal Police have also con- 
firmed that some of the sheep were killed with blunt force to the head. 

C. The Aum Shinrikyo in the United States ' 

The Aum Shinrikyo came to the United States officially in late 1987 when it in- 
corporated in New York City under the name Aum USA Company, Ltd., a not-for- 
profit corporation. Although the office purported to promote the cult's book sales and 
recruitment of followers, the Staffs review of records and documents, and interviews 
of the manager of the New York office, establish that the office was also acting as 
a purchasing agent for the cult as it attempted to obtain high technology equipment, 
computer software and hardware, and other items from the United States, much of 
which was intended to assist the cult's militarization program. Additionally, in the 
1990's the cult utilized a purchasing agent in California to facilitate acquisition of 
similar technology and hardware, and military equipment such as gas masks. 

The total extent of the Aum's efforts to obtain equipment and technology in the 
United States is not known. As indicated in this section, some of the items sought 
by the Aum were not delivered because U.S. company representatives were sus- 
picious of the Aum and its purported end-use of the product This is a good example 
of self- policing by the private sector and efforts to sensitize industry to their respon- 
sibility should be promoted. Other purchases appear to have been preempted only 
by the Aum's March 20th attack which gave notice to all of their criminal inten- 
tions. And, in certain instances, the Aum was simply able to access technology 
whose use is still unaccounted for. Although the Staff is aware that U.S. govern- 
ment agencies are investigating this activity, ultimately, we will never know how 
successful the Aum was in its efforts to militarize in the U.S. 

1. New York City Office 

According to corporate records, the New York City office was initially organized 
by Fumihiro Joyu, who claimed his address at 53 Crosby Street in New York. At 
various times it was staffed by different personnel including Yumiko Hiraoka, 
Yasua Hiramatsu, Masuru Jingo, Isao Yamamoto and others. From 1988 through 
the present the cult also maintained a small office at 8 East 48th Street, #2E; 242 
East 87 Apt 5d; 8 East 48th Street Apt. 4f 

The articles of incorporation were amended in 1988 and at that time Chisuo 
Matsumoto appeared as Director of the corporation. Chisuo Matsumoto is the lay 
name of Asahara. The articles established the Aum as a tax exempt organization. 
That same year, Joyu, as Treasurer/Director registered Aum USA as a charity in 
New York. In the section of the application requesting a description of the organiza- 
tion, Joyu wrote: 

"AUM U.S.A. Co. Ltd. is a non profit religious organization. The purposes 
for which the corporation is formed are to foster spiritual development 
through the study and practice of eastern philosophy and religion to encour- 
age means for extending awareness(sic), such as meditation, seminars, 
classes, workshops, to offer nutritional information and exercises which will 
further the development of spiritual well-being." 

In the early 1990's corporate documents of the Aum and tax records indicated that 
Yumiko Hiraoka became the primary manager of the Aum's New York office where 
all office related documents (bills, ledgers, accounts, tax records) were in her name. 

Hiraoka describes herself as a nun and sect leader of the New York branch of the 
cult. She indicated she is in her early 40's, although she is unable to be more exact 
as she measures her age in "monk" years. Based upon observations made by the 
Staff during interviews with her, she clearly is still a devotee of Asahara. 



77 

The Staff has reviewed the business records of the cult's New York office provided 
by Hiraoka pursuant to subpoena. It should be noted that the records provided may 
not reflect all of the cult's activities. According to Hiraoka, in late March 1995, with- 
in days after the subway attack in Tokyo, Hiramatsu appeared at the New York of- 
fice and took numerous records of the cult's transactions back to Japan. 

There is substantial documentation of efforts by Hiraoka and her staff to sell doz- 
ens of books published by the Aum such as Is Aum Shinrikyo Insane"?, The Secret 
Method to Develop Your Superhuman Power, The Doom's Day, and Curable High 
Blood Pressure. A review of the records provided, however, establishes that the cult 
in the years preceding the attack sold less than 100 books per year. During this 
same time period, despite a claim of aggressive recruitment by Hiraoka, the cult 
maintained an active membership of less than a few dozen devotees in the New 
York area. Some governmental sources estimate that the number was much higher, 
closer to 200. There is no evidence to support the higher number. There was also 
an Aum member in Colorado, according to Hiraoka, who was in regular contact with 
the New York office and translated Asahara's work into English. 

A review of the telephone records reflects very substantial telephone communica- 
tions both internationally to Japan and elsewhere including Canada, Germany, Rus- 
sia, United Kingdom, Taiiwan, Israel, Australia, Sri Lanka, Ghana and Nigeria, and 
domestically within the United States. As expected, there was substantial telephone 
activity in the days following the March 20, 1995 subway attack. 

Interestingly, in the days following the subway attack, the New York office of the 
cult recognized it had a substantial public relations problem. It transmitted the fol- 
lowing message to numerous "experts" or "would-be experts": 

"To Whom It May Concern: The Independent Research Committee for the Tokyo 
Subway Gas Attack urgently needs a group of impartial specialists from various 
fields. Please read the following guidelines and call (212) 421-3687 if interested 
in this investigation. We will greatly appreciate your cooperation." 

Telephone records also support substantial contacts with news media outlets. 

The Staffs investigation further reflects that the cult's New York office was ac- 
tively involved in the procurement and attempted procurement of high technology 
items with possible military use. Though most of the documents at the Aum's head- 
quarters were taken by the cult after the Tokyo incident, entries in the Aum's ledg- 
er reflect various payments to technology and laser companies. The cult utilized var- 
ious corporate entities to facilities these transactions including its primary alter ego, 
Aum USA Company Ltd., and the company Maha Posya. 

In documents received from Hiraoka the above entities claim the cult's New York 
offices as their corporate headquarters or their New York office. Both Aum USA and 
Maha Posya have Chisuo Matsumoto (a/k/a Asahara) as their director. Further, 
other directors and officers of these corporations are Aum members. Undoubtedly, 
based upon the above, it is clear that these corporations were alter egos of the cult 
itself wholly controlled by the cult and intended to conduct the cult's business. 

Through these companies and the efforts of its agents including Hiraoka, 
Hiramatsu and others, the Aum negotiated for purchase of various items. 

2. High Tech Acquisitions 

In August 1993, the cult attempted to obtain a Mark IVxp Interforometer from 
the Zygo Corporation in Middlefield, Connecticut. The Mark IVxp is a laser measur- 
ing system primarily used for measuring lens systems, optical components and flat 
and spherical surfaces. A dual commercial/military use item, the system has numer- 
ous applications including the measuring of plutonium. The U.S. Commerce Depart- 
ment prohibits the export of this machine to certain countries including Libya, Iran, 
North Korea and Cuba. 

In August of 1993, representatives of Zygo received contacts from the Aum, in- 
cluding telefaxes from Hiraoka. On August 23, Zygo issued a price quotation for the 
Mark IVxp system at $102,777.96. Additionally, the Aum requested a vibration iso- 
lation table which with modest reconfiguration can be used to measure spherical 
surfaces including plutonium used in nuclear weapons. 

Ultimately, the Aum did not receive the system. According to Zygo, the trans- 
action was never consummated because Zygo became suspicious of the transaction 
and contacted export licensing authorities. 

In 1994, the Aum completed two sales transactions with Lydall Technical Paper 
of Rochester, New Hampshire, totaling approximately $32,000, for HEPA media, 
which is an air filtration media. This media, which is roll goods, is utilized for air 
filtration in "clean rooms." The Staff would note that the Aum constructed "clean 
rooms" at their compounds in Tokyo in facilitate the handling and production of 
sarin and other chemical and biological weapons. 



78 

In January 1995, the Aum purchased molecular modeling software from Cache 
Scientific of Beaverton, Oregon. According to representatives with Cache, the entire 
contact with the Aum consisted of a telephone call requesting literature, a sales 
order and a shipment. The shipment cost approximately $2995.00. The software 
purchased was the most basic in their product line, consisting of a manual and com- 
puter diskettes. 

According to Cache representatives, their product enables a chemist to synthesize 
molecular experimentation on a computer screen instead of in a laboratory, which 
results in savings of time and money. He also stated that downloads from other 
databanks (i.e., Brookhaven's Protein Data Bank) could be ported into Cache pro- 
grams for analysis and data modeling. 

In a similar effort, Hiramatsu, on behalf of the Aum, contacted Biosym Tech- 
nologies, Incorporated, also a molecular design software company, located in San 
Diego. During February and March of 1995, Hiramatsu negotiated with Biosym for 
the purchase of a sophisticated computer hardware system and over twenty dif- 
ferent software programs. Hiramatsu purchased the hardware for $47,000 and 
agreed to a thirty day evaluation period for the software products. Additionally, 
Biosym uploaded approximately twenty samples (out of 200-300 available) from the 
Brookhaven Protein Data Bank. According to the company, they are a licensee of 
Brookhaven Laboratories and are authorized to distribute information from the data 
bank. 

Following the Tokyo gas attack, the computer hardware was returned to Biosym 
but the disk drive containing the software was missing. Allegedly, this disk drive 
was taken to Japan. The drive was later returned to Biosym by the Aum but it is 
unknown if the sect was able to download the information it contained. There were 
protections on the software to prevent such unauthorized removal. 

The software, as in the case with other company's products sought by the Aum, 
is used to model molecular structures during scientific and medical research. Ex- 
perts told the Staff that the Aum could use such advanced software to assist them 
in testing theoretical designs for toxins. It should be noted that this software is cov- 
ered by export restrictions to countries such as China. The fact that Japan is not 
among the countries included in such restrictions demonstrate that sub-national 
groups located in non-restricted countries, and who are engaged in development of 
sophisticated weapons, are not affected by export restrictions. 

In the weeks and days preceding the March 20, 1995, Tokyo subway attack, the 
Aum attempted to purchase a half million dollar laser system from the California 
manufacturing company, Hobart Laser Products of Livermore, California. 

In March, 1995, Hiramtsu, contacted sales and technical representatives of Ho- 
bart. Hobart manufactures extremely sophisticated lasers for industrial and sci- 
entific applications involving cutting and welding. According to the company, for ap- 
proximately two weeks leading up to March 18, 1995, the Aum negotiated for the 
purchase of a three kilowatt Laser Welder with installation support. The system 
costs approximately $450,000. 

The Hobbart personnel were confused by the Aum's intended end use for the ma- 
chine so they contacted Yasuo Murai, the Aum's Minister of Science & Technology 
in Japan. In their contact with Murai and in a subsequent meeting with Hobart rep- 
resentatives on March 8 in the United States, Hobart representatives attempted, to 
no avail, to determine the intended usage of the equipment. 

From the discussions with Hiramtsu and Murai, the operating parameter set forth 
by Murai, allowed Hobart to draw the following technical conclusions: 

• The Aum wanted the laser to be operable from within a glove box, a sealed 
room environment, outside of which the operator could manipulate the equip- 
ment through the usage of thick gloves. Experts have advised the staff" that this 
is particularly useful if biologic toxins, aerobic or contact poisons, or nuclear 
emissions are of concern. 

• Murai indicated the laser would be used to weld aluminum oxide (AIOx). The 
welding was to be of canisters, and perhaps canisters within canisters. AIOx is 
highly resistant to chemical corrosion, even more so than stainless steel, and 
the welder can operate with liquid nitrogen as a coolant. It is also extremely 
strong and can withstand high pressure. Aum had allegedly stockpiled large 
amounts of sheet AIOx for this purpose. 

• Of primary concern to Hiramatsu and Murai was the rapid delivery of this ex- 
pensive laser. Hobart representatives were told that it was required imme- 
diately and cash was available. This request was impossible: The laser is cus- 
tom built, after receipt of the order it would probably would take several weeks 
to months to complete and ship. Hobart told the Staff that there are also seri- 
ous export control requirements. 



79 

Hobart's representative also told the Staff that he learned that Hiramatsu was buy- 
ing up antiquated chip manufacturing equipment and stockpiling same in California 
for shipment to a front company in Silicon Valley. The Staff has been advised by 
various U.S. governmental sources that they theorize the cult intended to use this 
equipment to fill sham computer-manufacturing shops in Japan or Taiwan. These 
sources indicate that these companies would then be used to justify the importation 
and usage of chemicals such as arsenide, chlorides £ind fluorides, which can be ob- 
tained in the wafer and chip-etching business but are more realistically used by the 
Aum for the manufacture of toxic nerve and blood gases. 

In March of 1995, Yasuo Hiramatsu contacted Tripos, Incorporated of St Louis, 
Missouri. The company specializes in molecular design software. This software is 
used by highly trained physicists and chemists to develop new therapeutic drugs in 
the pre-clinical design phase. It can also be used to research and develop biological 
toxins. According to the company's Chief Executive Officer, people without extensive 
experience in this area would have difficulty in using and applying the software. 

According to Tripos sales personnel. Tripos was suspicious of Hiramatsu's motives 
regarding the purchase of their software from early on. Hiramatsu first contacted 
the New Jersey office of Tripos from California on March 3, 1995. During the course 
of their contacts with Hiramatsu, he consistently refused to provide detailed infor- 
mation on either the company (Aum) or the intended use for the software. 

Tripos installed all the available "modules" of their software on a computer 
workstation provided by the Aum. The software had keyword protection ancl was 
timed to expire thirty days after installation. Following the revelation that the Aum 
was suspected in the Tokyo gas attack. Tripos attempted to retrieve the software. 
The disk drive containing the software was intercepted by U.S. law enforcement per- 
sonnel in a shipment outward bound to Tokyo from California. While the software 
did have keyword protection, this could have easily been bypassed. The thirty day 
expiration protection could also be avoided by turning back the internal clock on the 
computer in which it is installed. The total worth of the software was over $507,000. 

The last contact Tripos had with Hiramatsu was on March 21, 1995, the day after 
the Tokyo gas attack. The CEO of Tripos told the Staff that the software could be 
used to determine if a scientific configuration was feasible but would only be the 
first step in development. He stated that biological toxins are relatively simple and 
the software was much more sophisticated than what would be needed to develop 
toxins. 

3. West Coast Activities 

Beginning in June 1994, the Aum established a relationship with a purchasing 
agent on the West Coast to assist it in obtaining military technology and hardware. 
The company, International Computers and Peripherals ("ICP") was a U.S. business 
in California formed to export computer parts to Japan. The partners in the ven- 
ture, Phillip Rupani, Cameron Hader and Kevin Singh (a/k/a Kevin Guneja), sought 
Japanese companies as potential clients. In June, 1994, the Aum, organized as 
Maha Posya, engaged ICP as an export agent. 

Through telefax, telephone, and personal contacts, ICP developed a business rela- 
tionship with Hiramtsu and Tsuyoshi Maki and began to obtain computer parts pre- 
sumably for the Aum's computer stores in Japan. The Staff has interviewed prin- 
cipals with ICP and reviewed their records. ICP estimates that their business with 
the Aum exceeded a few million dollars by the end of 1994. However, near the end 
of 1994, Hiramatsu began to make requests for other items. Initially, Hiramatsu 
wanted to obtain thousands of "serum" bottles, hundreds of mechanical fans and 
equal amounts of camcorder batteries. Later, Hiramtsu began to inquire about ob- 
taining laser equipment, survival equipment and similar items. At one point, 
Hiramatsu asked whether ICP knew how to obtain "arms," a plane, and "container 
ships." Hiramatsu told Rupani the arms were for a customer in the Middle East. 

ICP told Aum representatives they could not obtain these items but directed him 
to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 

In January 1995, the Staff has learned that Maki and Hiramatsu began to seek 
military equipment from sources in the United States. In late January 1995, Maki 
attended a Winter Market Show at the Reno Convention Center in Nevada at which 
time he made contact with a representative of Rothco, a company from Smithtown, 
NY. Maki inquired about survival equipment and expressed an interest in obtaining 
gas masks. 

A week after the January 1995 meeting, Rothco, through telefax received a re- 
quest from Devenir Millionaire, Inc., another Aum company, wherein Maki re- 
quested various items including 200 military style knives, and various types of gas 
masks. In February, Maki requested Rothco change the purchaser to Maha Posya 
Inc. because it would make it easier to clear Customs. 



80 

After receiving a $1,906.00 wire transfer to their account, Rothco sent samples of 
the requested items to Japan. In the shipment were a Russian and Japanese gas 
mask. Rothco shipped these items without applying for or obtaining a State Depart- 
ment license which is required. The following month, Rothco received a request for 
400 of the same gas masks with filters and its account in New York City was cred- 
ited with an additional $3,195.00. Maki, however, requested that Rothco send the 
gas masks to ICP of Freemont, California, who would act as a freight consolidator. 

ICP received the items after Hiramatsu indicated that the Atim wanted to consoli- 
date the items it had obtained in the United States. Various contain^^rs were for-  
warded to ICP, including boxes from Rothco. ICP, through a freight forwarder, start- 
ed the process of sending the items to Japan in March of 1995. 

On March 22, 1995, two days after the Tokyo attack, a source from Japan con- 
tacted ICP in California, and told company representatives that he should stop sell- 
ing to Maha Posya because they were killing people in Japan. At this time, Rupani 
recalled the Maha Posya shipment from the freight forwarder and returned it to ICP 
in Freemont, California. Rupani looked in the shipment and discovered it included 
the gas masks. 

4. Helicopter Training in Florida 

In 1993, two Japanese followers of the cult visited the United States to obtain 
pilot licenses for private helicopters. In October of 1993, members of the Aum came 
to Dade County, Florida and received flight lessons from Kimura, International, a 
private flight School in Opa Locka, Florida. The two were Aum Defense Agency Di- 
rector, Tetsuya Kibe, and Aum member Keiji Tanimura. They both had U.S. social 
security numbers and airman class 3 certificate numbers. They received a private 
pilot rating for rotor craft-helicopters on October 31, 1993. Soon after receipt of their 
licenses, the cult obtained the helicopter from Russia 

D. The Aum Shinrikyo in Other Countries 

In addition to its efforts to recruit members and obtain and test weapons and 
technology in Russia, the Aum also established a presence and/or undertook activi- 
ties in a number of other countries, including Germany, Taiwan, Sri Lanka and the 
former Yugoslavia. Some of these countries appear to have been used for recruit- 
ment purposes, while others appear to have been used for the establishment of pur- 
chasing companies or other businesses. In at least one country it appears the Aum 
attempted to obtain scientific information. 

1. Germany 

In January 1989, the Aum rented an 825 square foot office in Bonn, Germany for 
6,000 DeutscheMark per month. The office was ostensibly rented for administrative 
and cultural purposes. A woman named Yoko Shigimara-Haltod, a resident of Bonn, 
signed the lease and paid the monthly rent. Two telephone numbers are listed for 
the office in the name of Naruhito Noda; however, no one by that name is listed 
in the Bonn Population Office. 

In June 1991, the Aum sent a letter to the German Embassy in Tokyo requesting 
permission to send one of its members, Akira Wakatake, to reside in Germany for 
three years. According to the letter, Wakatake had been a member of the Aum since 
1986 and was a teacher of meditation techniques and yoga. The letter stated that 
the Aum would be responsible for any costs arising during Wakatake's stay in Ger- 
many, as well as for his personal conduct while in Germany. 

Wakatake entered Germany in February 1992. A sign on the Aum office there- 
after read "A. Wakatake Buddhismus und Yoga Center Aum." After several lan- 
guage courses at the Goethe Institute, Watatake was granted a trading license by 
Bonn city authorities in July 1993 which enabled him, in addition to his occupation 
as a teacher, to sell books and cassettes of the Aum. 

The Aum was not very successful in recruiting members in Germany. According 
to press statements made by Wakatake, ten German nationals — but no other Japa- 
nese — were members of the Bonn branch of the Aum. At least one member, a 
French national named Pauline Silbermann-Hashimoto who is married to a Japa- 
nese citizen, resided in Munich. It is unclear whether the Bonn office was used for 
anything other than recruitment efforts; however, on March 21, 1995, the day after 
the Tokyo subway attack, Shoko Asahara telephoned Wakatake in Bonn and dic- 
tated to him the text of a press communique to be given to the news agency, Agence 
France Presse (AFP) in Paris. 

The communique denied any involvement in the subway incident and accused the 
Japanese authorities of wanting to eradicate the Aum. Wakatake sent this commu- 
nique to Silbermann-Hashimoto, asking her to translate it into French and to send 
it to the AFP. The communique was received by the AFP via fax machine from Mu- 
nich on March 21, 1995. In addition, subpoenaed phone logs from Aum's New York 



81 

office show regular contact between Aum offices in New York and Bonn. German 
law enforcement authorities have no records of any illegal activities by either 
Wakatake for Silbermann-Hashimoto. 

2. Taiwan 

While the Aum's presence in Germany seemed to have been primarily for recruit- 
ment purposes, it's presence in Taiwan was more business-oriented. In June 1993, 
the Aum established a company in Taiwan by the name of Dai Hanei (Great Pros- 
perity) as a purchasing agent, ostensibly for the purchase of computer parts. Japa- 
nese press, citing police sources, have reported that from April 1993 to March 1995 
the Aum sent more than 2.5 billion yen ($25 million), through its Tokyo-based Maha 
Posya company, to Dai Hanei's bank account at the Taipei branch of a Tokyo foreign 
exchange bank. 

Under Japan's Foreign Exchange Control Law, transfers of sums in excess of 5 
million yen ($50,000) to an offshore account must be reported to the authorities. Ac- 
cording to the police sources, when Maha Posya sent more than 5 million yen at 
a time it reported the money as being used to buy computer parts. The sources con- 
firmed, however, that Maha Posya had bills for computer parts imports totaling only 
100 million yen ($1 million). The remaining 2.4 billion yen ($24 million) is appar- 
ently unaccounted for. 

The police sources reportedly quoted bank officials in Tokyo as saying that a high- 
ranking Aum member, who was an executive of Maha Posya and the cult's former 
Finance Minister, was the individual who made the remittances to Dai Hanei. The 
sources are also reported to have confirmed that Aum leader Shoko Asahara and 
the Maha Posya executive visited Taiwan frequently in 1993. 

3. Sri Lanka 

Relatively little is known about the Aum's activities in Sri Lanka. It reportedly 
owns considerable assets in Sri Lanka, including a tea plantation that the Aum 
began operating in 1992. The Staff has confirmed that the plantation is managed 
by an individual named Seizo Imoto and that it uses local citizens as employees. 
The Aum apparently has had several problems operating the plantation, though, in- 
cluding an inability to pay its employees. 

Following the attack on the Tokyo subway, a local organization of Buddhist monks 
petitioned the Sri Lankan President to confiscate the property of the cult and ban 
it from the country. Sri Lankan police did investigate the plantation, but nothing 
was found to indicate any connection between the plantation's operations and the 
sarin attack. 

4. The Former Yugoslavia 

At some point, the Aum became very interested in the ideas and inventions of 
Nikola Tesla, a scientist who experimented in the fields of atmospherics, 
electromagnetics, fluid d)Tiamics, and geodynamics in the early 1900's. According to 
an official of the International Tesla Society in the United States, a representative 
of the Aum in New York City, Yumiko Hiraoka, inquired into the Aum becoming 
a member of the Society. In January 1995, Hiraoka, the manager of the New York 
office, sought to obtain from the Society a number of books on the inventions of 
Tesla, his patents, and writings. 

When the Staff inquired as to why the Aum would be interested in Tesla's work, 
the official speculated that they may have sought information on Tesla's experi- 
ments with resonating frequencies. He stated that Tesla had experimented in creat- 
ing earthquakes and that Tesla was quoted as saying that with his technology he 
could "split the world" in two. He also noted that Tesla had developed a "ray" gun 
in the 1930's which was actually a particle beam accelerator. According to the offi- 
cial, this gun was reported to be able to shoot down an airplane at 200 miles. 

The official also told the Staff that upon Tesla's death the U.S. government had 
seized most of his papers and research notes. When members of the Society have 
requested information on Tesla's work under the Freedom of Information Act, much 
of the material has been "black penned" for national security reasons. 

It was for this reason that the Aum sent some of its members to the former Yugo- 
slavia. The Staff has confirmed that from February to April of this year, six mem- 
bers of the cult traveled to the Tesla Museum in Belgrade. There they studied 
Tesla's writings on something known as the Tesla Coil, a coil used for alternating 
current. The members also studied Tesla's work on high energy voltage trans- 
mission and on wave amplification, which Tesla asserted could be used to create 
seismological disturbances. 



82 

VII. Conclusions 

The threat posed by the Aum today is unknown. It still has substantial assets, 
thousands of devotees and authorities are unsure whether its weapons and weapons 
potential has been neutralized. Furthermore, the anti-Western rhetoric and Arma- 
geddon prophecies that fueled the tragic and near-cataclysmic incidents in Tokyo 
and elsewhere, are still evident. 

The cult's rise and its efforts to obtain and deploy weapons of mass destruction 
raises numerous policy issues, however, that extend well beyond the specific threat 
posed by Asahara and his disciples. The Aum was merely one example — a case 
study — of what may be the most dominant, emerging threat to our national security. 

The ease with which the cult accessed the vast international supermarket of 
weapons and weapons technology is extremely troubling. It is especially troubling 
in light of the current state of the economies and governments of the former Soviet 
Union. How much this cult acquired and how much more they could have obtained 
is still a mystery. How much the next group may be able to acquire is the question 
that also remains unanswered. 

Furthermore, despite the Aum's relatively overt and far flung activities, not a sin- 
gle U.S. enforcement or intelligence agency perceived them as dangerous, much less 
a threat to national security, prior to the March 20, 1995 Tokyo subway attack. 
More than a few representatives of these agencies indicated, as one candid 
counterterrorism officer admitted, "they simply were not on anybody's radar screen." 
How does a fanatic, intent on creating Armageddon, with relatively unlimited funds 
and a worldwide network of operatives, escape notice of western intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies outside of Japan? 

Our witnesses today and tomorrow, as well as at subsequent hearings, will put 
in context our national security needs and our government's capabilities. A number 
of questions and observations, based upon our inquiry today, may provide areas for 
further discussion and improvement: 

• Intelligence: U.S. intelligence agencies are apparently focusing heavily on offi- 
cial state proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Do they need to 
allocate increased resources to WMD terrorism? Do we need to enhance U.S. in- 
telligence agencies" expertise in biology, chemistry, and nuclear physics? Do we 
also need to increase their development and acquisition of new technologies to 
help the U.S. government detect and combat WMD? 

• Need to coordinate U.S. government agencies: In the future any CBW terrorist 
action is likely to involve foreign groups or activities. This means that intel- 
ligence organizations are likely to have information on such organizations and 
activities. In addition, law enforcement agencies with international presence 
like the U.S. Customs Service and FBI may also have information concerning 
these groups. Law enforcement and intelligence sources must have regular con- 
tact and interchange of ideas. Because the goal should be to prevent an attack 
before it even gets to the formative stages, law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies may not know what information the other needs or has. A critical need 
apparently exists for U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share 
information and coordinate activities in regard to WMD terrorism. Is there a 
need for creating a national clearinghouse or all sources intelligence/law en- 
forcement center to give U.S. government analysts access to all relevant terror- 
ist information from whatever source derived to analyze terrorist threats and 
assist prosecutions? Given the overlapping missions within our government, is 
there a need for a single, high-level Administration-wide coordinator? 

• Response Capabilities: During video footage of the Tokyo sarin gas attack, local 
police could be seen entering the subway without protective clothing next to 
military or other government officials encased in the most modern protective 
CBW uniforms. Apparently many of the would-be rescuers became some of the 
first casualties. Obviously, medical, rescue, fire and law enforcement personnel 
from the federal to the local level must be trained and equipped to handle a 
CBW incident. Likewise, hospitals and clinics must be prepared with proper 
supplies and antidotes to respond to a CBW event. Are procedures in place and 
adequate resources available for all U.S. government and private agencies to 
handle such events? In particular, are current funding levels for our Federal 
Emergency Management Agency adequate to successfully coordinate a national 
response to this threat? 

• Strengthen export controls: The trend recently in the U.S. has been toward liber- 
alizing export controls. Should policy makers revisit this policy and consider 
strengthening controls on some of the dual use items used for making WMD 
materials? 



83 



Promote Self-Policing: In the case study of the Aum, certain U.S. companies 
who were approached by the Aum and its corporate alter-egos, became sus- 
picious of the Aum's end-use of their products. Ultimately, certain transactions 
were not consumated. Conversely, other companies did not ask the right ques- 
tions or simply did not care. The U.S. business community has a duty to its con- 
sumers and our Nation to recognize dangers of many of its dual-use items and 
act responsibly. Although, to a great extent, the case study of the Aum appears 
to demonstrate some success with our joint government/industry educational 
program, can and should more be done in this area to improve corporate aware- 

T1QC!C?V 



ness ; 



• Ratification of CWC: Since the Subcommittee's last hearing on this issue in 
1989, the CWC has been under consideration. Would ratification of this treaty 
give the U.S. government increased leverage in halting the spread of chemical 
weapons? Would this be especially true if ratification were accompanied by pas- 
sage of a domestic law that instituted a national, computerized clearing house 
for dual-use chemicals and apparatus used to make chemicals, similar to export 
control mechanisms that track end-users and give the end-users" purpose for 
purchasing the item? 

• Open source information on WMD: Recipes and directions for making weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) are readily available in the open literature and now 
on the Internet. The U.S. government is considering declassifying additional in- 
formation about the U.S. biological weapons program. Does such open source lit- 
erature on WMD makes it easier for would-be terrorists and other governments 
to make these weapons? Is there a need to study how to control access to such 
information while still safeguarding our First Amendment guarantees? 

• Global cooperation: Few terrorists are now just domestic terrorists. Almost all 
are now international terrorists to some degree. Most travel and buy goods 
throughout the world. Are additional international agreements needed among 
at least the P-8 countries (G-7 plus Russia) to address this international aspect 
of terrorism? Is there a need for an agreement that would encourage that mem- 
ber countries share information involving WMD terrorism that may have inter- 
national implications? 

Appendix A 

AUM SHINRIKYO MEMBERS ^ 

Name Title 

AOYAMA, YOSHINOBU Aum Shinrikyo lawyer 

ASAHARA, SHOKO Aum Shinrikyo leader 

Asano, Shinya Aum member, former Japanese Self Defense Force member 

Chow, Tom Head of the Aum affiliate in Taiwan 

ENDO. SEJICHI Head of the Aum Health and Welfare Ministry and top biologist 

Fujinaga, Kozo Aum Science and Technology subordinate 

Furukawa, Masao Subordinate to Hayakawa-HDrganized shooting tour to a Russian mili- 
tary base 
Hara, Yoshihiro Aum member connected by the Japanese police to preparations for 

the Tokyo attack 

Hasegawa, Shigeyuki Runs two Aum affiliated chemical companies 

Hashimoto, Saturo Aum Home Affairs IVIinistry subordinate— sprayed Sarin related to the 

Tokyo attack 
Hatakeyama, Hironobu Aum member connected by the Japanese police to preparations for 

the Tokyo attack 

HAYAKAWA, KIYOHIDE Construction Ministry Head 

HAYASHI, IKUO Head of Aum's medical division, the Treatment Ministry 

Hayashi, Yasuo Aum member in the Science and Technology Ministry— connected by 

the Japanese police to the Tokyo attack 
Hiramatsu, Yasuo Upper management member of Aum who acted as purchasing agent 

for United States purchases 

Hiraoka, Yumiko Aum Nun and sect leader of Aum's New Yori< office 

Hirata, Masayuhi Aum doctor 

Hirose, Kenichii Indicted for participating in the Tokyo gas attack 

Horii, Takahisa Aum doctor 

Ikeda, Itsuro Aum member connected by the Japanese police to preparations for 

the Tokyo attack 

INDUE, YOSHIHIRO Head of Aum's Intelligence Agency and Action Squads 

Jo, Hiroyuhi The man who stabbed Murai 



84 

AUM SHINRIKYO MEMBERS^— Continued 
Name Title 

JOYU, FUMIHIRO Former Aum leader in Moscow— since March 1995, he has been the 

lead spokesman for Aum in Japan 

Kadokawa, Tomoki Science and Techology Ministry subordinate 

Katahira, Kenichiro Aum doctor 

KIBE, TETSUYA Aum's Defense Agency Chief 

Kikuchi, Naoko Aum Health and Welfare Ministry member related by the Japanese 

police to the Tokyo attack 

Kitamura, Koichi Aum Home Affairs subordinate related by the Japanese police to the 

Tokyo attack 

KobayashI, Katsuhiko Science and Techology Ministry subordinate, chemical team member, 

and secretary to a senior Aum member 

Maruyama, Michimaro Aum member connected to the Tokyo attack 

MATSUMOTO. CHIZUO Lay alias for Asahara 

Matsumoto, Takeshi Aum member suspected in the abduction of a Japanese notary official 

MATSUMOTO, TOMOKO ... Asahara's wife 

Mitsuka, Yoshihiro Aum member connected by the Japanese police to preparations for 

the Tokyo attack 

Moriwaki, Yoshiko Aum member connected by the Japanese police to preparations for 

the Tokyo attack 

MURAI, HIDEO Head of the Aum's Science and Technology Ministry 

NAKADA, KIYOHIDE An Aum senior sect member in the Home Affairs Ministry and Con- 
struction Ministry 

NAKAGAWA, TOMOMASA The Aum's Household Agency Director 

Nakamoto, Hideo Mitsubishi employee arrested for suspicion of helping an Aum and 

former Self Defense Force member steal company secrets 

Nakamura, Noburu Aum Home Affairs Ministry subordinate — sprayed Sarin related to the 

Tokyo attack 

Nakano, Katsuhiko Aum member arrested in connection with gun manufacturing 

NIIMI, TOMOMITSU Head of the Aum Home Affairs Ministry 

Ochida, Kotaro An Aum pharmacist — strangled by Yasuda 

Oikawa, Takayuki Aum member — arrested In connection with gun manufacturing 

Oka, Hideki Aum member connecetd by the Japanese police to preparations for 

the Tokyo attack 

Okada, Hiroyuki Aum member connected by the Japanese police to preparations for 

the Tokyo attack 

OuchI, Toshiyasu Defacto head of the Aum sect in Moscow since March 1995 

Sasaki, Kayoko Aum member connected by the Japanese police to preparations for 

the Tokyo attack 

Satoru, Hirata Aum Intelligence Agency member connected to the kidnapping of a 

Japanese notary official 

Shirai,Takahisa Aum member and former Japanese Self Defense Force member 

Sotozaki, Kiyotaka Aum member connected by the Japanese police to the Tokyo attack 

Sugimoto, Shigeo Aum Home Affairs Ministry member indicted for the Tokyo gas at- 
tack — alleged to have strangled another Aum member 

TakahashI, Katsuya Aum Intelligence Agency subordinate 

Takizawa, Kazuyoshi Aum scientist 

Tashita, Seiji Aum member connected by the Japanese police to the Tokyo attack 

Terajima, Keiji Aum Home Affairs Ministry subordinate — helped make Sarin 

Togashi, Wakashio Aum Science and Technology subordinate 

Tomita, Takashi Aum Home Affairs Ministry subordinate 

Tonosaki, Kiyotaka Aum member Indicted for Tokyo gas attack 

Toyoda, Toru Aum member Indicted for Tokyo gas attack 

TSUCHIYA, MASAMI Head of the Aum's Chemical Division of the Science and Technology 

Ministry and the top chemist 

Uchiyama, Rie Aum member — kidnapped her father 

Watabe, Kazumi Aum Science and Technology Ministry subordinate and engineer 

Yamagata, Akira Aum Home Affairs Ministry subordinate and former Japanese Self De- 
fense Force member— alleged to have used VX gas to kill rene- 
gade Aum members 

Yasuda, Hideaki Aum member who strangled Ochida 

Yokoyama, Masato Aum member indicted for Tokyo gas attack 

' This document was compiled and prepared by Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations' Staff using police 
records, news articles, and other open sources. ALL UPPER CASE INDICATES KEY AUM MEMBERS. 



85 



A P P E N I X 



The following is a list of the cost of "religious" 

training that Aum Shinnkyo followers and visitors 

are tod to undergo and items they were ordered 

to purchase. 

Training Courses 

A devotee has to pay V5.000 if he or she wants 

to change course midway through the training 

Initiation fees: VSO.OOO (for non-foltowers) 

Monthly membership fees: v3,000 

Yoga course for spiritual emancipation 
(Eachclass lasts tor three hours) 

Beginner course (10 classes): V30,000 

intemiedlate course (20 classes): V35,000 

Advanced course (20 classes): VBO.OOG 

Conespondence course 

1st section (60 days): V70,000 

2nd section (60 days): y70,000 

Late night seminar 

(six hours for each dass): VS.OOO 

Intensive ovemight seminar V7,000-V8,000 

Advanced course for the acquisition of super- 

natural power 

Compreliensive program for supernatural powers 

(for two sessbns a rrwnth): VI 5.000 

Initiation (one session): VIS.OOO 

Correspondence course: VI 5.000 

Supernatural power seminar V20,000 

Shaktipat 

A ritual which allegedly enables a member to 
gain spiritual energy through touching the 
forehand of another member with a higher 
sprtuaJ level. To receive Shaktipat training from 
cult gum Shoko Asahara. a devotee must have 
earlier gone through 60 units of training and 
made a donation of nwre than V50,000. 
To receive trairwig from one of Ashara's disciples 
wtx) have achiewed emancipation, a trainee has 
to have undergone 30 units of training and made 
a donation of more than v30,000. 



Intensive training In "Madness" 

An 1 1 -day course: 

Donations of more than 1^^20,00 

Bkx)d Initiation 

Ritual drinking of bkxxl that suppsedly came from 

Asahara: vi million 

Secret Inltlatton ~ 

Donations of more than VI million 

Special Initiation 

■■■■■■■..■.■■.■■■■ V300.000 or V500.000 course 

Bardo's Enlightenment 

Irrtravenous Injectnns of unknown content: 

V300,000 

TTEWS 

• TSI" telepathy headgear (a helmet with elec- 

tric wiring that supposedly synchronizes a tot- 
Lower's brain waves with those of Ashara): 
Vl milRon to rent per month 

• Videotapes on yoga and training: 

VSO.OOO - V400,000 

• Purusha (a small button with the sect's logo 
engraved upon it): VIOO.OOO 

• Miracle Pond (a 200cc bottle containing water 
from Asahara's bath: V20,000 

 Sandalwood rosary (set of two): V15.000 

• Vkleo tape of Aum seminars: V1 5,000 

• Purusha-shaped treasure box: V1 ,000 

Note: The menu and the prices are as of 1989. 
and were detailed in a cult pamphlet quoted by 
\t\e Sunday Mainichi news magazine and other 
sources. 



Reprinted from the Japan Times: Sd»cW WMMrt . TERROR In tht hMrt of JiOMV Th> Aum SWmtwo 
dOom»d«vcu> July 1995 



86 

Appendix C 

AUM SHINRIKYO FACILITIES 

Okamura Tekko Ishikawa Prefectre — cult took over Hydraulic cylinder factory, 60- 
70 cult members work there 

Tomizawa Yamanashi Prefecture — Aum Facility to produce firearms 

Matsumoto — Aum two story facility 

Tokyo Minami Aoyama — Aum HQ in Tokyo 

Tokyo— Aum Co. HQ 287 Setagaya Setakayu-ku 

NYC— Am Supreme Truth 8 East 48th St, NYC 

Shizuoka Prefect — Aum facility 

Yamanashi Prefect— Aum facility . 

Kamikuishiki Yamanshi Prefecture— Aum Training Center at the foot of Mt. Fuji 

Bonn — Aum sect activities 

Tokyo Nakano Ward — Aum affiliated hospital 

New York City Columbia College — Small Aum chapter 

Okinawa Prefecture — Aum facility 

Namino, Kumanoto Prefecture— Aum HQ before Kamikuishiki, evacuated 

Tomizawa.Yamanashi Prefecture— Aum facility. Police seized steel pipes resembling 
gun barrels. 

Vladivostok, Russia— Aum attempt to lease Mil-26 transport helicopter 

Ukraine — ^Alleged to have approached arms dealer to purchase two T-72s main bat- 
tle tanks 

Fujinomiya, Shizuoka Prefecture — Aum commune 

Zaire — Aum studied alleged ebola outbreak 

Naganohara, Gunma Prefecture — Aum facility 

Osaka, Cuo Ward — ^Aum facility 

Fujinomiya, Shizouka Prefecture — Aum facility 

Omiya, Saitama Prefecture — ^Aum Apartment 

AUM SHINRIKYO COMPANIES 

UNITED STATES 

A.U.M. Publishers, 8 East 48th Street, #2E, NY, NY 10017 (212) 421-3687 

A.U.M. Company Ltd., 8 East 48th Street, #2E, NY, NY 10017 (212) 421-3687 

Asahara, AUM USA Co., Ltd., 53 Crosby Street, NY, NY 

AUM Publishing, 8 East 48th Street, #2E, NY, NY 10017 (212) 421-3687 

Aum Inc, 8 East 48th Street, #2E, NY, NY 10017 (212) 421-3687 

Aum Supreme Truth, 8 East 48th Street, #2E, NY, NY 10017 (212) 421-3687 

Aum, 8 East 48th Street, #2E, NY, NY 10017 (212) 421-3687 

Yoga Center, 8 East 48th Street, #2E, NY, NY 10017 (212) 421-3687 

JAPAN 

Aum Hospital, Nakano Ward, Tokyo 

Aum's Computer Support Center, Sapporo City, Egi Building, 3-chome, Minami 
Nijo, Chuo-Ku, Sapporo City 

Aum's Computer Support Center, Osaka Nihonbashi Shop, Sanki Medical building, 
5-9-2 Nihonbashi, Naniwa-ku, Osaka 

Aum's Computer Support Center, Nagoya Shop, 3-31-12 Osu, Naka Ward, Nagoya 
City 

Aum's Computer Support Center, Akihabara Shop, 

Kokiso Building, 4-4-3 Sotokanda, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 

Aum's Computer Support Center, Minami Aoyama Center, Mahaspohsa Building, 7- 
5-22, Minami Aoyama, Minato-ku, Tokyo 

Bell Epoch 

Beck 

Cafeteria Unmei No Toki, Nishi Eifuku, 5-54-5 Eifuku, Suginami-ku, Tokyo 

Hasegawa Chemical Company 

Hikari Seimitsu Kogo, Fuji, Shizuoka Prefecture 

Imagawa Juban Yaki, Kameido, 5-29-21 Kameido, Koto-ku, Tokyo 

Mahapsya Inc of Japan, 7-5-12 Minami Ayoama, Minato-ku, Tokyo 

Oumo Shinrikyo 

Seiki Toitsu Tsusho Sangyo, aka: World Unified Trade and Industry World Unifica- 
tion Industry 

Shimomura Chemical Company 

Shinrito, 3-8-11 Miyamae, Suginami-ku, Tokyo 



87 



Umakarou Yausukarou Tei, Ekoda, 1-52-1 Kotake-cho, Merima-ku, Tokyo 
Umakarou Yasukarou Tei, Kichijoji, 4-25-7 Honcho, Kichijoji, Musashino City, 

Umakarou Yasukarou Tei, Kinshicho, Waise Building, 1-11-4 Taihei, Sumida-ku 
1 okyo ' 

Umakarou Yasukarou Tei, Maruta-cho, Kyoto, 10-5 Jurakumawari Higashi-cho 
Nakagyo-ku, Kyoto City 

AUSTRALIA 

Clarity Investments PTY, Ltd., c/o Murchia and Associates, Barristers and Solici- 
tors, 250 St. Georges Terrace, Perth, Australia 

'^oSnPcT^ ^"^t'^^ji^ PTY c/o Murchia and Associates, Barristers and Soliciters, 
250 St. Georges Terrace, Perth, Australia 



TAIWAN 



Dai Hanei (Great Prosperity) 
Maha Posya, Inc, Taipei 



Appendix D 
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS: THE AUM SHINRIKYO "DOOMSDAY CULT" 
Name Tj,le 

^^^ Asahara forms the Aum Shinsen-no kai Company, a book publisher 

and yoga training center. 

]^^^ The name of the organization is changed to Aum Shinrikyo. 

^^°' Aum USA Company Limited is incorporated in New York City. 

August 1989 Aum Shinrikyo is recognized as a religious corporation by the Tokyo 

Metropolitan Government. 
February 1990 25 Aum members, including Asahara, mn for the Lower House but 

none are elected. 

l^^"" Aum Shinrikyo begins religious activities in Moscow. 

October 1992 Aum "medical mission" sent to Zaire to obtain a sample of the deadly 

Ebola virus. 
June 1992 The Russian Ministry of Justice registers Aum Shinrikyo as an official 

religious organization. 
June 1993 The sect purchased a 500,000 acre sheep ranch in Western Aus- 
tralia. 
^^"® ^^^^ Noxious fumes from a building believed to be affiliated with the sect 

cause 100 people to complain in the Koto Ward of Tokyo 

f ^^MoSf  ^^^^ Asahara and up to 26 other sect members visit the ranch in Australia. 

^P"' '^^'* Aum members visit Australia to investigate the possibility of extracting 

uranium. 

June 1994 The sect purchased an MI-17 helicopter from Russia. 

June 27, 1994 7 die and over 500 are injured when the sect releases sarin gas in 

Matsumoto. 
July 1994 The sheep ranch in Australia is sold at a loss. 

"^"'y^^^"^ Residents repeatedly complain of peculiar odors from the sects 

Kamikuishiki complex. 
Sept. 1, 1994 231 people in seven towns in western Japan (Nara prefecture) suffer 

rash and eye irritations from unknown fumes. 
Dec. 12, 1994 Aum Home Affairs Ministry head Tomomitsu Niimi attacks a man with 

VX nen/e gas. The man dies ten days later. 
January 1995 Niimi attacks Hiroyuki Nagaoka. the leader of the Association of the 

Victims of Aum Shinrikyo, with VX gas but he survives. 
March 5, 1995 11 people hospitalized from strange fumes in the Keihin Kyuko train 

line in Yokohama. 

March 15, 1995 Three attache cases containing liquid, fans, vents, and batteries are 

M honiQQc discovered in the Kasumigaseki subway station in Tokyo. 

Marcn 20, 1995 12 die and 5,500 are injured from sarin gas released in five trains of 

the Tokyo subway system. 

A "^MQ^ili ^^^^ """^^ director of the National Police Agency is shot. 

Apn 1995 A Russian court bans all Aum Shinrikyo activities. 

Apnl 4, 1995 Odors are noticed from a suspected Aum hideout in Shinjuku Ward 

Tokyo. 
April 8, 1995 Ikuo Hayashi, the head of the Treatment Ministry is arrested. 



88 

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS: THE AUM SHINRIKYO "DOOMSDAY CULT"— 

Continued 

Name Title 

April 11, 1995 20 people complain of sore throats and a foul odor on the Keihin 

Kyuko line in Yokohama. 

April 12, 1995 Tomomitsu Niimi, head of the Home Affairs Ministry is arrested. 

April 19, 1995 500 people are hospitalized due to mysterious fumes in the Yoko- 
hama railway system. 

April 19, 1995 Kiyohide Hayakawa, the Aum Construction Minister, is arrested. 

April 21 ! 1995 27 people are overcome by fumes in a store near the Yokohama rail 

station. 

April 23, 1995 Hideo Mural, the Aum Shinrikyo Science and Technology Minister, is 

stabbed to death in front of Aum headquarters. 

April 26 1995 Seiichi Endo, the head of the Health and Welfare Ministry and 

Masami Tsuchiya, the head of the Chemical Division of the Science 
and Technology Ministry, are arrested. 

May 3, 1995 Yoshinobu Aoyama, the sect's law/yer is arrested. 

May 5! 1995 Two bags of poison gas are found in the men's restroom in the 

Shinjuku subway station in Tokyo. 

May 3, 1995 Traces of Sarin are found in samples, taken in March, from 24 dead 

sheep on the ranch previously used by the sect in Westem Aus- 
tralia. 

May 15, 1995 Yoshihiro Inoue, the Aum Intelligence Agency head is arrested. 

May 16, 1995 Shoko Asahara, Aum leader, is arrested. 

May 16! 1995 A parcel bomb explodes in the offices of Tokyo's Governor, wounding 

an aide. 

June 26, 1995 Asahara's wife, Tomoko Matsumoto, is arrested. 

July 4, 1995 Poison gas is found in the women's restroom on the Hibiya line, 

Kayaba-Cho subway station and in the men's restroom of the Japa- 
nese Railway Shinjuku station in Tokyo. 

October 6, 1995 Tokyo District Court holds hearings on the disbandment of Aum 

Shinrikyo. 

October 7, 1995 Fumihiro Joyu, the sect's spokesman is arrested. 

October 26, 1995 Asahara's trial continued to a date uncertain. 



89 



AUM SHINRIICYO JAPAN ACTIVITIES 



APPENDIX E 



S*to/ Japan 





North PteMc OcM/i 



^V ^B ^^^tT l^^Tf Ir^Sf 

v*^ y*^ *'^ 






^^ Gos Mojk purchose 
Ti^ Chemicot/Biologfcol Deployment 
A AUM Assah 

Weoporu Monufoctuf ing 



Defense Inhxmohoo TKeh 
(Rodtel K>el dolo) 



\ 






Defense Information Theh [Tank doto) 
Computer PurctKises 
Computer Software Purchases 
AUM Recruitment 



Jf Mt-l 7 Hekopter 
it^^ AUM Production Focility 



Chemicol Purchase 



90 



APPENDIX 



C/5 

H 







91 



WORLD MAP 



APPENDIX F 



COUNTRY 



ICON 



SIGNIFICANCE 



Australia 





li 



^ 



ADM purchased property in Australia in 1993 to 
utilize in the extraction of uranium. AUM carried out 
experiments with Sarin on sheep in Australia. Traces 
of chemicals used to make Sarin found in soil and 
wool of dead sheep. 



}r^» 



Germany 



'^oV^/ 




AUM tried to recruit people in Germany. 



Russia 



Russia 




AUM purchased broadcast time on Russian radio and 
television stations and owned radio transmitter tower 
in Vladivostok. 



Recruitment activities. 



92 



Russia, Moscow 




Two AUM members sent toairfield near Moscow to 
train as helicopter pilots. 



Russia 




Ml -17 helicopter dismantled and 
imported in June 1994 



Russia, Moscow 



Sri Lanka 



Taiwan 




AUM began religious activities in Moscow in 1991 . 



AUM owned and operated a tea plantation. 



AUM established purchasing agent in Taiwan and 
utilized it for purchases of computers and parts. 



USA, Bridgeport 




$400,000 machine manufactured to 

grind mirrors and lenses bought by AUM in 1 994. 



93 



USA, NYC, NY, 8 
8 East 48th Street. 



O r^J-'A 



Ne^ York 



USA Long Island 



USA, Fremont CA, 




AUM USA Company Ud. 

Incorporated as a nonprofit through 

which they buy US conoputers and other equipment. 



AUM purchased computers and 
software from various US sources. 



AUM downloaded Internet info on 
making toxin from the venom of the 
green mamba snake. 



Computer chips purchased manufacturing equipment 
purchased through a Fremont computer company. 



USA, St Louis, MO, 
San Deigo, CA 



USA, Las Vegas, 
Nevada 




AUM bought and returned software which couid have 
helped design new toxins. 



AUM member attended 

a sporting goods trade show and ordered gas masks 

and camping gear in January 1995. 



USA, Union City, CA 




Gas Masks prepared 

to be shipped to cult members in Japan through 

Fremont, CA. 



94 



USA, Florida 




AUM members received 
private helicopter training. 



Zaire, Africa 



b 



AUM funds medical mission to Zaire in 1 992 to assist 
in treatment of Ebola Virus victims. 



LOCATION 



Tokyo 



Tokyo 





95 


4 


JAPAN MAP 


ICON 


SIGNIFICANCE 


^ 


Sarin subway attacks 3/20/95 


^ 


Ikeda shot with sarin projectile 1 



Tokyo 



Akihabara 




ii 



Miimi shoots NPA Commissioner General Kunimatsu. 



Computer shop sales. 



Tokyo 



11 



Computer shop sales. 



Osaka 



fl 



Computer shop sales. 



Sopporo 



11 



Computer shop soles. 



96 



Tokyo 



ll 



Japan 



Computer shops/coffee shops and restourants. 



MI-17 helicopter bought from Russia. Later attempted 
to hire crew and pilots from airline companies and 
helicopter operations firms. 



Kamikuishiki 



Kamikuishiki 



Tokyo 



Osaka 




AUM owns 1 ,000 square meters of 
property for their HQ. 



Satian No. 7 completed. 



# 



k<Ra 



AUM's chief of science and technology stabbed. 



Hamaguchi died after being exposed toVX gas. 



Kamikuishiki 



*#* 



Gas odors near AUM facilities. 



Yokohama 



Kamikuishiki 






Nineteen people taken to hospital after they 
inhaled fumes in a train car. Source of fumes not 
found. 



Sarin by-product found. 



97 



!^ 



Tokyo J^^^^^^k Sarin subway attacks on March 20, 1 995. 



Nora State ^VUV/ Over 23 1 in seven towns in Nora suffer 

^^•^^^ rashes and eye irritation from unknown fumes. 



Matsumoto ^^ ^^ ^>UI L^ 7 die, 200 plus stricken by Sarin fumes. 

•^^ ^^# AUM owns real estate. 




la 



^ 



KiX>A 



Tokyo ^^hOR^^ Over 100 complain about noxious white 

fumes rising from AUM building. 



# 



Tokyo ^^f^Si^^ ^^^ ^'' ^^"°'^ attempt to kill 83 year old 

man with VX. 



Tokyo #k^J^^^k Three pieces of luggage containing 

V^^W sprayers were place in the Kasumigaseki subwoy 



station. 



Tokyo Vfflff/ Bag of sodium cyanide and o bag of sulfuric acid 



^-^ 



found together in Shunjuku subway men's room. 



Kamikuishiki ^^ntJ^^^ Reports tell of AUM scattered bones of 

^^ll|r^^_ dead followers outside compound after breaking then 

up in a large grinder. 



98 



Kamikuishiki 




!■ 



Tokyo 



B.^ 



Police seize machine gun parts and LSD at 
AUM complex. 



AUM memb>ers broke into a defense 

contractor office ond stole data on tonks and laser 

equipment. 



Aichi 




AUM members broke into a chemical plant 
and stole gunpowder and rocket fuel data. 



Tokyo 




AUM members lured day workers by telling 

them they were being employed as movie extras then 

preached cult infornfiation to them 



99 



APPENDIX & 




100 



APPENDIX H 




'  /-r. 






h(?)/^7t!>-a 



Ti-^^: 



>: , .^ 



v.'' 



■J^'CLASSlr 



riguTTe 3. Attache case lef- at Kasurczajeki Station 



101 



APPENDIX I 



March 1995 Aum Attack on the Tokyo Subway System 




102 



APPENDIX J 



«4tad5#<<-««*(S«««»*> 













^^^^^^^Bh. 




I 


/T 




tt) 
t 


 




z 


^i! 


o 

3 






in 






> 



« 

<0 (0 •■ 

•5 » S 
e) fl) O 

=5 So 
« £ 2 



103 

Senator NuNN. Our next panel will be Kyle Olson, Senior Staff, 
Arms Control and Proliferation Analysis Center of TASC, Inc.; 
Colonel Edward Eitzen, Jr., who is a doctor, the Chief, Preventive 
Medicine Department, Medical Division, U.S. Army Medical Re- 
search Institute for Infectious Diseases; and James A. Genovese, 
Chief, Chemical/Biological Antiterrorism Team, U.S. Army Chemi- 
cal/Biological Defense Command. 

I would ask all of you who are going to be testifying, before you 
take your seats, we swear in all the witnesses before the Sub- 
committee. So if you will just hold up your right hand, do you 
swear the testimony you will give before this Subcommittee will be 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God? 

Mr. Olson. I do. 

Colonel Eitzen. I do. 

Mr. Genovese. I do. 

Senator NUNN. Thank you. 

I believe Mr. Olson is going to lead off today, and I think all of 
you have performed great service for us, both in your discussions 
with staff and being here today. Your entire statements will be 
part of the record, and to the extent that you can summarize those, 
it will give us more time for questions, since we have one more 
panel after this one. It is not a panel; it is one witness. But I will 
ask Mr. Olson if you will begin, and we thank you for being here. 

TESTIMONY OF KYLE B. OLSON, SENIOR STAFF, ARMS CON- 
TROL AND PROLIFERATION ANALYSIS CENTER, TASC, INC. 

Mr. Olson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the oppor- 
tunity to speak with the Members of the Subcommittee this morn- 
ing. 

I am a member of the senior staff at TASC, Inc. and its Arms 
Control and Proliferation Analysis Center in Rosslyn, Virginia. In 
that capacity, I work on chemical and biological arms control, 
counterproliferation, and counterterrorism issues for government 
and private sector clients both here in the United States and 
abroad. 

It is with very little pleasure that I am able to say that the 
March 20 subway attack did not come as a surprise; in fact, it real- 
ized a concern I had known for several months. I first visited 
Japan in December of last year to investigate the Matsumoto sarin 
attack. As you know, that first attack received very little attention 
outside of Japan. In fact, I first became aware of it some 3 months 
after the attack when I was approached by the Nippon Television 
Corporation and asked to serve as a consultant on a broadcast com- 
memorating the 6-month anniversary of the great unsolved 
Matsumoto mystery. As I looked into the case, I found myself rath- 
er astonished by the things that I was discovering. It became my 
firm belief after a very short time that the Matsumoto victims had 
been the subjects of a terrorist attack. I also believed, based on sev- 
eral factors, that this had been a field test in preparation for a full- 
blown strike of larger proportions yet to come. 

I concluded that an unknown terrorist group had, for the first 
time in world history, demonstrated the ability and willingness to 
use a weapon of mass destruction against innocent targets. It was 



104 

clear to me that whoever had done it would strike again and that 
the next target would have to be much higher profile. In a report 
which I circulated both within Japan and here in the United States 
in January of this year, I specifically pointed out the vulnerability 
of the Tokyo subway during rush hour to such a nerve gas assault. 

I have revisited Japan about a half dozen times since that tragic 
Monday in March. I have had the opportunity to speak with mem- 
bers of the Aum Shinrikyo, with victims of the attacks in both 
Matsumoto and Tokyo, and with residents of Kamakuishiki, the 
cult compound/complex at the foot of Mt. Fujiyama. I have exam- 
ined mountain caches of highly toxic chemicals and seen police div- 
ers recovering pieces of assault weapons tossed into reservoirs by 
the cult north of Tokyo. I have even had the dubious pleasure of 
receiving phone calls and faxes at my office and at home from 
Tokyo-based members of the Aum Shinrikyo inviting me to visit 
the country on their behalf. 

In short, I have been well and rather truly engaged in this case 
longer than most people in this room even knew there was a case. 
Many if not all of my factual findings have already been shared 
with the staff and are incorporated, I think, within the excellent 
staff report which has been already entered into the record. As a 
result, I am not going to consume your time restating those facts, 
astounding, fascinating, and fi'ightening as they are. Instead, I 
would like to address some of the lessons that I think we can take 
away fi'om the story of the Doomsday Cult. 

If this were simply an isolated band of religious extremists on 
the other side of the world, that would be one thing. We might be 
able to discount it as just a Halloween story with which to frighten 
children. It probably wouldn't be something that this Subcommittee 
would have to worry about. But this is a lot more than that. 

The cult's acquisition and use of chemical weapons, as well as 
their plans and efforts to acquire other weapons of mass destruc- 
tion, touches on a host of issues of critical importance to this coun- 
try and to the international community as we strive to make sense 
of an unexpectedly changing world. Again, this Subcommittee 
should be applauded for casting its light on these questions. 

The story of the cult's multinational reach and its apparent suc- 
cess in pursuing an agenda of this kind without any outside inter- 
ference or without any outside apparent detection demand scrutiny 
even without the broader context. But as a case study in the poten- 
tial of modern terror, the Aum Shinrikyo's is a story we have to 
pay a lot of attention to. 

One of the lessons I think we can draw fi*om this — and it has 
been stated earlier by the Members of this Committee — is that the 
threat of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction has never 
been greater; and at the same time, it is never going to be less 
than it is right now. 

The world has become a more dangerous place. The U.S. State 
Department has concluded (based on its study of terrorist activity 
over the last decade or so) that in the last 5 years the number of 
terrorist events has declined. Conversely, the lethality of each of 
those individual events has, on average, increased. The technology 
of terror has escalated over the last half decade, and the escalation 
shows no sign of ending. 



105 



The decision by the Aum Shinrikyo to pursue weapons of mass 
destruction and their relative success in this pursuit is the logical 
extension of that trend. I would argue that, given the trend toward 
escalating violence by sub-national groups and by numerous stud- 
ies ot terrorist psychology, this is not a nightmare likely to dis- 
appear when we turn on the lights. To the contrary, the line in the 
sand has been irrevocably erased. 

From a security planning perspective, I believe we have to as- 
sume that we have entered a world in which chemical, biological 
and perhaps even nuclear cards are in the terrorists' hands. I do 
not believe it coincidental that in the weeks after the Tokyo attack 
Pn^H^K ' '''' ejFtr^emists in both the Philippines and Chile threat- 
ened the use of chemical weapons against civilian targets 

Ihe second point we take away and which has been touched on 
m the previous pane is that no one has an effective defense 
against terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, particu- 
larly chemical and biological weapons. It is a sobering truth We 
dont have the capability at present to effectively defend our cities 
against a clandestme attack involving these weapons 

hi'i ff T^A ""^ ?7^' '* P unlikely we would even known we had 
been attacked until people started to fall down. We don't have ade- 
quate vaccines on hand, nor do we have adequate planning in place 
at the local. State, or Federal levels to manage the effects of even 

bvlh^e InJ;.Tv^'r'°Pw'*^'^*ff BW attack of the kind planned 
aLin^f^w l^li^l""- We would probably fare a little bit better 
against CW, but that is primarily a function of the nature of the 
weapon, not a credit to our preparedness 

n J^ft ^^P^^^t""* "I D^fe^se has recognized the biological weap- 
ons threat and has devoted some considerable efforts to the prob- 
n^h"! fil^'*'""^/"/^ countering BW and also chemical weapons out 
li aZ fl^' Protectmg our forces. These effori;s need to be acceler- 
sunn^^W ^^f''''^^^^^''^ a,^d by this Congress as a means of as- 
th^^l f.u^ ^fu^^ J''?; 5^^* 1^^^ of defense is able to operate in 
the face of this threat. Effective military defenses, including a via 

on holT'l^al^t^'j^'^r^^ stockpiHng program, which is currently 
on hold awaiting further study within the interagency process 
could serve as the foundation for a meaningful civil defense pro: 
gram at some point down the road ueiense pro 

]Jw.n\^y^^'\''^ ""^ ^ commitment to protecting our civilian popu- 
offpr t'hl .L?"" ^ organized response we can realistically hope to 
ofLiaL Bur^fbf/ ^r^'^'i ^'''}^^^^^ ^^^Po^« ^«^^k is a form 
vors ' ''''"' ^^ ^^""^^ ^^^ P^^>^ fo^ ^he survi- 

Another of the lessons from Tokyo is that CW and BW are not 
high technology anymore. The cult attacks were not technically so- 
fh^f 'f^^^^ ?' ^^«S.^ted in Matsumoto or in Tokyo. You may recaU 
that at the time of the Tokyo attack a number of military specia 
ists stated their opinion that they didn't believe sarin had been 
Zfrl'J^^ '^u'^^y'- ^^ ^""^b^^ of fatalities was much too low 
Sow r'^rhp'i^f f r?t' '^'^ ^^ ^^"^^ «f the smells that we now 
know can be attributed to impurities in the sarin mix and to the 

^eiTlaf Th ' ^^^^If-t^d its evaporation were inZsisLnt ^^ith 
nerve gas. The experts were confused because the cult indeed got 
a lot of It wrong when they were cobbling their subway attack to- 



106 



gether. But keep in mind they put this plan together oyer a week- 
Ind The decision to attack was made on Fnday when the cult be- 
came aware that they were going to be subjected to pohce raids^ 
Th^ attack followed on Monday. If they had had more time, they 
could have probably put together a somewhat more impressive 

^^The'^lesson'here is that these weapons are dangerous even when 
you get them wrong. Much has been niade of the cult s scientific 
capabilities. I think it would be a mistake to focus so "juch on this 
aspect of it that we discount the danger from groups that dont re- 
cruit from Tokyo University. The technology of chemical weapons 
is 50 to^ years old. The cult's activities with CW and BW Present 
a roadmap for would-be users of this technology. CW, at the least, 
fs within V reach of any group prepared to P^^^ up the news- 
papers and read about how it was done in Japan. That certainly 
includes a number of organizations hostile to the interests of the 

^One^o/th?bits of good news, if there is some, is that the cult 
never really seemed to master the dark art of biological weapons^ 
At least if they did, they didn't demonstrate it in the field That 
^ey produced Ladly toins is beyond question. They certainly had 
a laboratory dedicated to this purpose as early as 1990 They re- 
portedly laced the foods of some of the members of the cult who fell 
out of favor with toxins and served them this delicacy as a way of 
maintaining discipline within the ranks. 

Sara himself and a group of his followers apparently traveled 
to Zaire a couple of years ago in a quest to a^q^^^e^he Ebola virus 
as a possible biological weapon. And just to clarify a point that was 
mised. Senator Nunn, by your question in the last Panel mdica 
tions seem to be that biological toxins have been released in Tokyo 
at^east once, and possibly twice. The Japanese Poh^e ^ave X" 
firmed at least one incident in which toxins were released into the 

^Tortunatdy, other than the cult members who found themselves 
ingesting toxins over dinner, it appears that no one else was in- 
iured by biological weapons from the cult laboratories. 

While it is somewhat reassuring to conclude .that while the cul- 
turing of organisms is easy, weaponizing them ^^ difficult it would 
be a mistake to assume that is a shield we can hide behind for very 
long I myself have been to at least two conferences this year at 
which experts have sat around in very large rooms discussing the 
technical errors made by the cult and openly discussing the nec- 
essary steps to make the weapons much more dangerous. 

It seems clear that the Aum Shinrikyo's bio ogical weapons re- 
search has estabhshed a foundation upon which other groups can 

verv likely and will build. „ t • i. + 

The fourth lesson has been referred to before. I ani going to put 

a slightly more bald face on it, but I want to be careful about how 

^ ^In\he case of the Aum Shinrikyo, I believe it is fair to say that 
our intelligence community let us down. To say that the Aum was 
not on their radar screens prior to the Tokyo attack says some 
rather unflattering things. The Matsumoto attack in June of last 
year was the biggest news story in the second most powerful nation 



107 



in the world for weeks. It constituted the first non-mihtary use of 
nerve gas. It shattered precedents. The additional fact that tens of 
thousands of Americans live and work in Japan would, you might 
thmk, have brought this to the attention of someone. 

Yet after a very brief flurry of interest within our intelligence 
ranks because of the sarin element of the story, this was appar- 
ently classified as a domestic Japanese issue. Instead of commit- 
ting more resources to learning about it, instead of pressuring the 
Japanese to tell us more about what they were discovering this 
was effectively pigeonholed. It was a little local interest story As 
1 say, It fell off our screen. It fell off our screen until 5,000 people 
tound themselves gasping for breath under the streets of Tokyo 

Let me say quite clearly that this is not an argument in favor 
u ^^^^^i^& o^r intelligence assets to investigations of everything 
that happens everywhere in the world, nor am I suggesting that we 
should be spying on the domestic affairs of our allies In the first 
case we cannot, and in the second we should not. But to have 
missed an event this large and this significant, and then to have 
consigned it to the status of an Oriental curiosity, given the avowed 
interest on the part of our political and military and security lead- 
ership in preempting terrorism, is simply not acceptable. 

The decision to allow the Japanese authorities to investigate was 
the correct one. The hope of reviewing their findings was logical 
but when no report was forthcoming, we should have insisted on 
being briefed in. And if that didn't work— and I acknowledge the 
reluctance of Tokyo to discuss this embarrassment openly— we 
should have examined our other options. 

One of which, by the way, might have been simply to read the 
f^^t^^^f newspapers and magazines that continued to pound away 
at the Matsumoto story right up to this year's subway attack Cer- 
tainly cables were sent from our Embassy. And, Senator Lugar 
your question is right on the money: Was anybody reading them*? 

When I went to Japan last year, it didn't take more than a few 
days to conclude that something ominous had indeed happened 
with implications that had to reach the United States. I had no 
Idea at that time how complex the truth was, but I knew it was 
important. 

The fifth point, and I say this at the risk of losing some friends 
in Japan, is that the Tokyo subway attack should never have oc- 
curred. I think the evidence is compeUing that the Japanese au- 
thorities Imew the Aum Shinrikyo posed a serious threat certainly 
weeks, and probably months, before the Tokyo took place 

l^vo weeks after the Matsumoto attack, critical events took place 
m the rural community of Kamakuishiki at the foot of Mt Fuii 
which is the headquarters of the Aum Shinrikyo cult. There were 
two releases of toxic chemicals which were reported by townspeople 
to authorities. They noted difficulty breathing and strange vision- 
related ailments. More significantly, they reported seeing people 
lying on the side of the road outside one of the cult compounds 
which we would subsequently learn was the infamous Satyam 7 
tne site of their hidden chemical weapons production facility 

We heard before that the cult produced the Matsumoto nerve gas 
at Satyam 7 and then probably discontinued work there because of 
an accident. The indications are rather clear that the events in 



108 



Kamakuishiki in July which left people in difficulty with labored 
breathing, which left members of the cult lying by the side of the 
road, were indeed related to that accident. . ^ ^ , ^ 

The incident in July was promptly investigated by Japanese au- 
thorities, yet they did not release their findings, which included 
discovering the presence of sarin, until January 1 of this year. Why 
the de^IyTAnd why issue the news on a holiday when it wouldn't 

^^One' can' speculate that upon establishing that there might be a 
tie-in with the cult, owners of the only large-scale industrial facili- 
ties in Kamakuishiki, police undoubtedly .^^fj^t h^^%f ^^^^.^^P 
by learning that the cult's leadership was in Matsumoto the weeK- 
end before the Monday, June 27, 1994 attack. They might have 
been expected to find some links between the cult and the three 
judges who were the apparent targets of that first attack. 

Combined with the almost constant stream of cult propaganda, 
in which they openly talked about sarin in almost mystical terms 
it il difficult to believe that the police were unable to make the 
same connections that a variety of investigative reporters were al- 
ready making. In fact, the cult's involvement was widely rumored 
on the streets in December of 1994, at the time of my first visit 



there. 



The fact that Asahara apparently ordered the subway attack 
upon learning from moles within the military (and probably the po- 
lice) that the authorities were finally preparing to raid the sect is 
a remarkable reflection on the ability of the cult together informa- 
tion and act on it. The other side of the coin is that despite having 
all the facts listed above, as well as many others at their disposal 
the Japanese Government was ultimately unable to move in a 
timely enough fashion to protect its civilian population. 

Senator NuNN. Mr. Olson, if I could interrupt there, how much 
of this reticence or reluctance or delay in coming to grips with this 
on the part of the Japanese authorities do you believe was related 
to the very sensitive question of religion and Japanese culture and 
society and the protections that had been built in to protect reli- 
^ons in effect, since General MacArthur helped the Japanese cre- 
fte a new government after World War II and new constitutional 

P^'^r Olson. Undoubtedly, the constitutional and cultural reasons 
behind the police's inaction were significant. They were substantial. 
The fact that the system is diff"erent from ours is one that i ac- 
knowledge right up front. I think that the Japanese police did a re- 
markabll job of investigation. I think the Japanese authorities 
have been diligent in their pursuit of this matter. But the fact re- 
mains that the information was out there. For whatever reason, 
the preventive actions could have been taken; actions should have 

been taken eariier. „, . ., . „^«^f o+ ^..n 

The fact remains the Aum Shmrikyo was not very adept at con- 
cealing its presence nor its involvement. If a group can leave a toot- 
print this big and operate with as free a hand as this cult enjoyed 
what does that say about the potential of smaller, more disciplined 

""Tet'meTus^' summarize. Senator. Thank you for your indulgence. 
I thank the indulgence of the Committee. The story of the Aum 



109 



Shinnkyo reads like a sensational novel, and yet it is true Some 
ot the most astounding details are probably not even on the table 
yet But It is a story that is a cautionary one in nature. There are 
a lot ot lessons to be learned and many actions to be taken to trv 
to minimize the chance of the story being repeated 

But a demoralizing truth may well be that whether or not we 
take appropriate steps, the lessons of the cult are being studied 
and taken to heart by those who would seek to surpass their teach- 
ers. Ihe age of super-terrorism appears to be upon us; and if so 
our best defense is knowledge. That is why reopening this matter 
today is so important. 

I salute the Members of the Subcommittee for focusing their at- 
„?K r-.''''i ^i'^ ""^^^ .^"".^ I'''' recognizing the greater dangers to 

tl'^lfafthte^ndrf tiii'p^^^^^^ *° ^^^"^^^^^ ^^^ '' ^^^ ^-^ 
Thank you. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Olson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. OLSON 

Sn'hl^n^tTf'i^L'^K" Chairman for the opportunity to speak with the Members of the 
Subcommittee this morning. I am a member of the Senior Staff at TASC Inc and 
Its Arms Control and Prohferation Analysis Center in Rosslyn, VirginiT In that ca 
pacity I work on chemical and biological arms control, couAterp?oTiferation and 

ItTs'^I^hZ'lTtT ^r g'^^^'-r^"/ ^"^ P"^^^^ '''"^^ clientsCeSd abroad 
attLk hTh nJ.^ "^^ P^^^'"'^ ^^^K^ ^" ^^^« *° «^y that the March 20 subway 
PrS L i T -! J ? surprise; m fact, it realized a concern I had known for sev- 
?qq4 M . '• V'^'*^ -^^P^ ^ December of last year to investigate the June 27 
outsid^ J^rn I fi^S? h^'^- ^ ^°" ^T' '^"' ^'''' ^''^'^ '•^^^-^d little attention 
asked bv thP NinrS.n T 1 ^^ ^n^^^ °^ '* ^"'"^ 2 ™°"*^« afterwards when I was 
asked by the Nippon Television Corporation to serve as a consultant on a broadcast 
they were preparing. As I looked into the case, I found myself astonished by my own 
discoveries It was my firm belief that the seven Matsumoto dead had beeJ S vTc 

'Cel 'l^eTSlT^^ i SZ^!?;^-' '^ — ^ factors.^SrtilL\Td 

fw fhl^Lt f ! persons behind that first attach would likely strike again and 
that the next target would be much higher profile. In my report circulated in thi« 

"Znl7onuiT.r ""^i^"' ^'^'l ^ ">^° P°^°^^ °"t the s^boEcVd tacSvSln^r! 
ability of the Tokyo subway system at rush hour to a neiVe gas assault 

h»H .K revisited Japan some half dozen times since that tragic Monday I have 
Sf. ./J^ V'^'^i^I''^^ ^ 'P^^ ^ith members of the Aum Shinrikyo w°th victims of 
n^H ti^'^ in Matsumoto and Tokyo, with residents of KamakS'ki I have exim 
p"ei ofTsTaulfwe^^no'' f ^'^^1^ ^oxic chemicals and seen police divers recovering 
p eces ot assault weapons tossed into reservoirs north of Tokyo I have even had the 
dubious pleasure of receiving telephone calls at home from the cClS offices in 
Tokyo, inviting me to visit their country 

In short, I have been well and truly engaged in this case longer than most oeoole 

have L'nThaTed ,^trvo^"'^"ff^" ^"^" ^^/' '^ ""* all of'my factua? finTn^s 
restat^^rth^^tl . ^""'^ ^'^^. ^ ^ ''^^"^t, I will not consume this body's time 
wXefeS^dTt'h's'X"^^^ ^°"^^'"^^ ^^^^""^^'^^ ^^^-'^ ^h^t haveLen so 

sto^^tfle'-Soomsia'^c'^uir'' '"" '^^ ^^""'^^ ^'^' "^ ''''^'' ^^^^ ^^^^ f™- the 

sidl^/'hT^nrlt' wonS^L°^^° isolated band of religious extremists on the other 
thp nnl w 1 ■' »7?"'^ ^ ^""^ th^°e- In fact, while the tragedy in Tokyo and 
wou?d be I '^ol^'t tol't^Th*"' r^^ ^ .lamentable, I might quIstlL wheE; this 
rHalloweenT,^^ ' Subcommittee. But this is clearly much more than 

and^eff^i^^'to^SiKthl^^n ^ ^°^ "'" °^ '^""^'^^' ^^^P^'^^' ^^^^ their plans 
nr, o k T "'.acquire Other WMD for use m promoting even greater horror tourhp.; 
on a host of issues of critical importance to^his cou^ntry an^d to thrSnational 



110 

community as we strive to make sense of an unexpectedly changing world. TTiis 
Subcommittee should be applauded for casting its light on these questions. The 
story of the cult's multinational reach and apparent success in pursuing its agenda 
without outside interference— or detection— demands scrutiny even without the 
broader context. The Aum Shinrikyo is a case study in the potential of modern ter- 
ror. We must study it for the lessons it teaches. 

I The Threat of Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction has Never 

Been Greater, and It Is Increasing 

The first and most immediate of these lessons is that the world has become a 
more dangerous place. The U.S. State Department has concluded that while the 
total number of terrorist attacks has gone down over the last 5 years, each attack 
has on average, become more deadly. While the end of the Cold War may have con- 
tributed to this reduction, by eliminating some of the state sponsorship enjoyed by 
violent groups during the 70's and 80's, those organizations that remain appear to 
be more bloodthirsty than ever. 

The decision by the Aum Shinrikyo to pursue weapons of mass destruction, and 
moreover their relative success in that pursuit, is the lo^cal extension of that trend 
As has been noted here, the nightmare of terrorists with chemical, biological, and 
nuclear weapons has been realized. I would argue that given the trend toward esca- 
lating violence by sub-national groups, as evidenced by the State Department survey 
and by numerous studies of terrorist psychology, this is not a nightmare that is like- 
ly to disappear when we turn on the lights. To the contrary, the line m the sand 
has been irrevocably erased. ,. j 

From a security planning perspective, I believe we must assume we have entered 
a world in which the chemical and biological, and perhaps even the nuclear, cards 
are in terrorists' hands. I do not believe it is coincidental that in the weeks after 
the Tokyo attack, terrorists in the Phillipines and in Chile both threatened the use 
of chemical weapons. 

II. We Do Not Have An Effective Defense Against WMD Terrorism 

We must also confront another sobering truth. We do not presently have the capa- 
bility in place to defend our cities against a clandestine attack involving chemical 
and biological weapons. In the case of biological weapons, it is unlikely we would 
even know we had been attacked until people began to fall. We do not have ade- 
quate vaccines on hand, nor do we have adequate planning in place at the local, 
State and Federal levels to manage the effects of even a small, relatively unsophis- 
ticated BW attack. We would probably fare somewhat better against CW, but more 
because of the localized nature of the weapon's effects than because of any efforts 

on our part. j u j 

The Department of Defense has begun to recognize the BW threat, and has de- 
voted some effort to the problems of detecting and countering biological threats, par- 
ticularly against our forces in the field. These efforts should be accelerated by this 
Administration as a means of assuring that at least our first line of defense is able 
to operate in face of this threat. Effective military defenses, including a viable vac- 
cine production and stockpiling program, could serve as the foundation for a mean- 
ingful civilian defense program at some point down the road. 

In the absence of a commitment to civilian defense, the only organized response 
we can realistically hope to offer the victims of a terrorist BW attack is a form of 
triage: Bury the dead, comfort the wounded, and pray for the survivors. 

III. CW AND BW Do Not Constitute High Technology Anymore 

The cult attacks in Matsumoto and Tokyo were not— I repeat, were not— tech- 
nically sophisticated. You may recall a number of military specialists in chemical 
weapons stated their opinion at the time of the subway attack that they did not be- 
lieve sarin had been used. The number of fatalities seemed to be much too low, and 
certain other aspects, such as the smells that we now attribute to impurities and 
other chemicals mixed into the "cocktail", were inconsistent with sarin as the mili- 
tary thought of it. The experts were confused because the cult indeed got a lot of 
it wrong when they cobbled the subway attack together; perhaps if the Aum 
Shinrikyo had taken more than one weekend to come up with their plans they 
might have been able to put together a more technically impressive show. 

But the lesson here is that these weapons are so dangerous that even when you 
get them wrong they work. Much has been made of the cult's scientific capabilities. 
1 think it would be a mistake to focus so much on this that we discount the danger 
from other groups that don't recruit from Tokyo University. The technology of CW 



Ill 



IS nfty-to-sixty years old, and the actions of the Aum Shinrikyo should be viewed 
as a bloody roadmap for would-be acquisitors. Chemical weapons, at the least are 
within the reach of any group prepared to pick up the newspapers and read about 
how It was done in Japan, certainly including a number of organizations hostile to 
tne United btates. 

One of the bits of good news, if there is some here, is that the cult never really 
seemed to master the dark art of biological weapons. That they produced deadly tox- 
ioon^^'"^ u^^u^^u question. They certainly had a dedicated laboratory as early as 
1990, m which they produced biological toxins. They reportedly laced foods with 
biotoxins and served them to cult members who fell from favor. They attempted to 
acquire the Ebola virus for possible use as a terror weapon. And they released bio- 
logical toxins in Tokyo at least twice. Fortunately, other than cult members them- 
selves who may have ingested the toxins, it would appear that no one was iniured 
by these weapons. •' 

It is somewhat reassuring to conclude that while culturing biological agent orga- 
nisms is easy, weaponizing their toxins is still somewhat difficult. Asahara himself 
reportedly grew angry and frustrated when the toxins, sprayed as an aerosol, failed 
to kill guinea pigs in the cults Kamakuishiki laboratory 

Unfortunately, most assessments suggest that the cult's mistakes would be rel- 
atively simple to correct; furthermore, their deliberate use of biological weapons on 
the busy streets of Tokyo and in its crowded subways— even ineffectively— should 
serve notice that the taboo against such weapons has lost its potency. It seems clear 
that the Aum Shinrikyo s BW research has estabhshed something of a foundation 
upon which other groups will build. 

rv. Our Intelligence Community Failed 

To say that the Aum Shinrikyo "wasn't on [their] radar screens" prior to the 
lokyo attack says some rather unflattering things about our intelligence commu- 
nity, ihe Matsumoto attack was the biggest news story in the second most powerful 
nation in the world for weeks. It constituted the first non-militaiy use of nerve gas 
and was a precedent-shattering terrorist event. Tens of thousands of Americans live 
and work in Japan, including, of course, elements of our armed forces 

Yet after a brief flurry of interest because of the sarin element, this case was ap- 
parently classified as a domestic Japanese issue. Instead of committing some re- 
sources to learning more, we deliberately decided to wait for the Japanese authori- 

PvPnh,/lW ThL ?Hi ^ ^"^' k'i^"?- ^^ '° '"^'^^^- ^d ^^ited. And waited. And 
eventually, this little pigeon-holed, local interest story fell off" the screen. Until 5 000 
people tound themselves gasping for their lives in the Tokyo subway on March' 20 
Let me say quite clearly that this is not an argument in favor of assigning our 
intelligence assets to investigations of everything that happens anywhere in the 
world, nor am I suggesting we should spy on the domestic affairs of our allies In 

avLt S^'f ^ ^^ ''^".u"*' f^^i ^" ^^^ ^^^°"^ ^^ should not. But to have missed an 
event this large, and then to have consigned it to the status of an oriental curiosity 
given the avowed interest on the part of our government leaders in preempting ter- 
rorism, is simply not acceptable. ^ 

fl^S^r,'^^"^'"'' ^° ^^^°u u^^ 'Japanese authorities to investigate, and then to review 
their findings was probably correct, as far as it went. But when no report was forth- 
TTp'lfn^nT/ °'^l'^ ^^r insisted on being briefed in. And if that dicfn't work-and 
I acknowledge the reluctance of Tokyo to discuss this embarrassment-we should 
have then examined our other options. 

One of which, by the way, might have been to read the Japanese newspapers and 
magazines that continued to pound away at the Matsumoto story right up until this 
years subway attack. Certainly cables must have been sent from ouf embassy 
Uidn t anyone bother to read them? 

fk!^^" \u^"^ ^"^ Japan last year, it didn't take more than a few days to conclude 

Sp TTn^fn Ql^f'""'?"^ ^^^'^ happened, with implications that certainly reached to 

J^L i^ , .^^- ^ ^^^ "° '^^^ h°^ complex the truth was, but I knew that it 
was important. 

us"f?LTriHct'th*^"/^^°'? services, the very people we depend upon to protect 
looking? ^^"''"^^ ^^'^^^'^^' °°* h^^« s^e" the same thing unless they simply weren't 

V. The Tokyo Subway Attack Should Never Have Happened 

The evidence is compelling that Japanese authorities knew the Aum Shinrikyo 
?u 1.,^ serious terrorist threat months before the subway attack. Two weeks after 

KL.^^*^hT'°K^*t^'=^/"^'^^J. "y^'^^^ ^°^ Pl^^« in the rural conTmunity of 
Kamakuishiki which undoubtedly focused police attention on the cult. This collec- 



112 

tion of small hamlets and farms at the foot of Mount Fuji experienced not one but 
two releases of a toxic chemical authorities would determine contained sarin. 

Townspeople complained of difficulty breathing and strange vision-related ail- 
ments. More significantly they reported seeing people lying by the side of the road 
near one of the compounds belonging to the Aum Shinrikyo. The cult in fact had 
built a chemical weapons factory in one of their buildings, the infamous Satyam 7, 
and had conducted experimental production of sarin there. Accidents, which injured 
a number of followers, are almost certainly the sources of the releases that prompt- 
ed the townspeople's complaints. 

The incident in July was promptly investigated, yet authorities did not release the 
information about sarin until January 1, 1995. Why the delay, and then why issue 
the news on a holiday, when it would not be noticed? 

Upon establishing that there might be a tie-in with the cult, police undoubtedly 
would have learned that the cult's leadership was in Matsumoto the day before the 
attack there. They might also have been expected to find the links between the cult 
and the three judges involved in adjudicating the land dispute that apparently trig- 
gered the sarin attack. 

Combined with the almost constant stream of cult propaganda about sarin — which 
believe it or not used to be a rather obscure chemical in most circles — it is difficult 
to believe that the police were unable to make the connections that a variety of in- 
vestigative reporters were making. In fact, the cult's involvement was widely ru- 
mored in December of last year, at the time of my first visit there. 

The fact that Asahara apparently ordered the subway attack upon learning from 
moles within the military and police that the authorities were preparing to raid the 
sect is a remarkable reflection on the ability of the Aum Shinrikyo to gather infor- 
mation and act upon it. The other side of the coin is that despite having had all 
the facts listed above, as well as many others, the Japanese Government was ulti- 
mately unable to move in a timely enough fashion to protect its citizens. 

Undoubtedly, there are a number of constitutional and cultural reasons why this 
was the case. In fact, there is probably at least one good doctoral dissertation in 
such a study. But the fact remains that the Aum Shinrikyo was not very adept at 
concealing its presence nor its involvement. If a group can leave a footprint this big 
and operate with as free a hand as this cult enjoyed, what does that say about the 
potential of smaller, more disciplined organizations? 

Summary 

The story of the Aum Shinrikyo reads like a sensational novel, and yet it is true. 
Some of the most astounding details may not yet be on the table. But if it is a re- 
markable story, it is also a cautionary one. There are many lessons to be learned, 
and many actions to be taken to try to minimize the chance that another such tale 
will be told. 

But a demoralizing truth may well be that whether or not we take the appro- 
priate steps, the lessons of the Doomsday Cult will be studied and taken to heart 
by those who may well seek to surpass their teachers. The age of super-terrorism 
may well be upon us; if so, our best defense is knowledge. That is why reopening 
this matter today is so important. 

I salute the Members of the Subcommittee for focusing their attention on this 
case, and for recognizing the greater dangers to which it alerts us. I look forward 
to answering any questions. 

Senator NuNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Olson. We will have 
some questions. We will go through our panel first if that is all 
right with you, Senator Cohen and Senator Lugar. 

Dr. Eitzen? 

TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. EDWARD M. EITZEN, JR. M.D., M.P.H., 
CHIEF, PREVENTIVE MEDICINE DEPARTMENT, MEDICAL DI- 
VISION, U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF IN- 
FECTIOUS DISEASES 

Dr. ElTZEN. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Sub- 
committee, it is a great honor to appear before you to address the 
possible impact of terrorist use of biological agents as weapons 
against the citizens of the United States. Limiting the effectiveness 



113 



of biological weapons of mass destruction presents a compelling 
challenge to our Nation which should be taken very seriously ^ 
fnr fh?"" f "^^^'''''^ ^"^ ^P^^J" ^^ y^" «^ *his issue include my service 
Spnf «fP?f ^t/q^'a ^' ^t^l «^ ^^^ Preventive Medicine Depart^ 
ment at the US. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 
Diseases, also known as USAMRIID. USAMRIID is the primary 
Army research facility concerned with medical and biolo^al de- 
fense for our government. ^^i^iugicdi ue 

As a physician my primary expertise lies in the area of medical 

ttTfhllT'^ Y""^'^^ ^^'^^' ^"^ ^°t i^ ^ff^^sive aspects of the 
use ot these agents as weapons 

Biological warfare, or BW, is the intentional use of microorga- 
nisms or of toxins derived to produce death or disease i^humans 
animals, or p ants^ Biological warfare threat agents fal intoThree 
major categories: Bacteria, viruses, and toxins 

Bacteria^e single-celled organisms that cause disease by either 

r^r^ent"".! pf?.^^. ^'"'T "" ^J  elaborating toxins which have det- 
rimental effects on human beings. Anthrax is an example of a bac- 
terial threat agent. Diseases caused by bacteria often respond to 
Sti^dcl' * ^^'^ antibacterial iugs commonly S^wn as 

Viruses are much smaller organisms which consist of genetic ma- 
terial, either DNA or RNA, surrounded by a protectivf layer vt 
ruses must invade the cells of an infected person in order to cause 
disease. Smallpox is an example of a viral threat agent. TheTs^ 

treat ^u^'lf" ^'""^rf ^^ ^'^^ ^^^^*^ ^^^ "^«^e difficult to 
treat, but may respond to specific antiviral drugs. Whereas there 

are many antibiotics available to treat disease clused bTbacteria^ 

^hreat agents, very few antiviral drugs are available for human 

Toxins are poisonous substances which produce adverse clinical 
effects, known as 'Jntoxication," in humans The botuhnum tS 
which are among the most toxic substances known, arrarexample 

threat^aLVs ThT ^H ^^"^^^ VT^%"^^^ ^'^ considered t" be 
mreat agents The adverse effects of toxins may be lessened bv 

treatment with antitoxins, which are antibodies directed Lainst 

specific toxin agents. Botulinum antitoxin is an example of fsne- 

boluhn^t^^pZonrn^^^ ^^ ^'^^^''^ '^ ^™ s^^^s^^o^f 

Inc^ '?^' T"""^"' ^^^ *«^^^«- Some characteristics of BW or bio^ 
K t^e'foHoVni'^Tl^^'^ make them dangerous weapons t- 
Irfn. t following. They may be dispersed in an aerosol cloud 
with such clouds being invisible because of the particle size of the 
aerosol being extremely small, on the order of 1 t^o Tmfcron in size 
they are odorless and tasteless; they are relatively inexpens^e to 
produce; they require considerably less technical Spe?tise to 
produce compared to other weapons of mass destruction?^the tech^ 
sh^Fth/ *^^'' dissemination may be more easily available off the 
shelf, they can spread downwind over very large areas- and finallv 
they are difficult to detect in the environment ' ' ^"^' 

nn^„?oT ?f biological agents could be used to attack susceptible 
populations. Some are lethal agents, producing death in a certa^ 



114 

percentage of victims of the attack, whereas others may only inca- 
pacitate. Examples of potentially lethal agents include anthrax, tu- 
laremia, botulinum toxins, plague, smallpox, hemorrhagic fever vi- 
ruses and the toxin ricin. Examples of agents which usually only 
cause incapacitation or illness are "Q" fever and Staphylococcal 
Enterotoxin B, also known as SEB. 

The effects of biological threat agents on humans vary with the 
particular agent used. Anthrax and botulinum toxins are two 
agents which could be disseminated by the aerosol route and be in- 

With anthrax, early signs and symptoms would include fever, 
malaise, and chest pain in the first 24 to 48 hours after exposure. 
Within 3 to 5 days, however, exposed individuals would become se- 
verely ill, rapidly developing shortness of breath and shock, and 
many would die within the next 24 to 48 hours. 

With botulinum toxins, persons exposed would begin developing 
weakness and visual difficulties as early as 24 to 36 hours after ex- 
posure. These early symptoms would be followed by difficulty with 
speaking and swallowing, followed by weakness of arm and leg 
muscles, and finally by paralysis of respiratory muscles and result- 
ing suffocation unless intensive medical care is provided. This is 
the clinical s3mdrome commonly known as botulism. In modern 
medical facihties, the case fatality rate for botulism is less than 5 
percent with good intensive care; however, patients may require ex- 
tensive care for long periods of time before they recover. 

Other biological agents such as plague, "Q" fever, and tularemia 
would normally produce lung infections, whereas inhaled toxins 
such as ricin or SEB would also cause breathing difficulties. For 
some of these agents, particularly those caused by bacteria, anti- 
biotic therapy is available and might be life-saving. 

Biological agents would not be difficult for terrorist groups to ac- 
quire, and knowledge of microbiology and its potential applications 
is widespread. A terrorist attack using an aerosolized biological 
agent could occur without warning, and the first sign of the attack 
might be hundreds or even thousands of ill or dying patients since 
biological clouds are not visible. Because the time before onset of 
symptoms with some biological agents can be as long as several 
days, the actual attack may be long over and the perpetrators gone 
by the time casualties begin to occur. 

A civilian biological attack scenario might differ in several as- 
pects from a threat to military forces in the field. Because civilian 
populations are not immunized against most BW agents, it has 
been estimated that casualty numbers could be very high. These 
estimates assume, however, that a terrorist group could produce 
and disseminate a BW agent in exactly the right particle size 
under perfect weather conditions and that a number of other fac- 
tors would fall into place. It would be technologically somewhat dif- 
ficult for a terrorist group to produce a biological agent in exactly 
the right particle size for inhalation. This would require a level of 
sophistication possessed by some state-sponsored offensive biologi- 
cal warfare programs. 

Other possible problems we would see from a terrorist attack 
might include the lack of adequate hospital beds to treat all the 
casualties, deficiencies of needed medications, and the fact that 



115 



many civilian health care providers have not been trained to recog- 
nize and treat BW agent casualties. 

Medical countermeasures against many of the biological threat 
agents are available. These include vaccines, antibiotics and 
antitoxins. In situations where susceptible humans can be identi- 
tied in advance of an actual attack, immunization with vaccines be- 
fore exposure can prevent illness. However, large-scale vaccination 
"vihan populations, as can be done in at-risk military forces is 
probably not feasible. However, post-exposure treatment with anti- 
biotics, certain vaccines, antitoxins, and supportive care can and 
will have to be relied upon. Pre-placement of adequate antibiotics 
and vaccine stocks with the ability to rapidly transport such phar- 
maceuticals to the area of an attack is, therefore, critical 

Training of civihan health care providers in localities that are 
likely to be targets of terrorists is also extremely important Such 
training is necessary so that early treatment measures would be 
more effective Most physicians do not see and treat illnesses such 
as anthrax and botulism in their daily practices. 

The United States is vulnerable to a terrorist attack with biologi- 
cal weapons. Biological weapons offer terrorists inexpensive weap- 
ons of mass destruction. The effects of the use of biological agents 
in this country are potentially devastating. Continued vigilance 
against this threat, to include close coordination between Federal 
State, and local planners, adequate resources for education of medi- 
cal professionals and first responders, and continued support of 
programs to develop medical countermeasures and diagnostics is 
the only prudent course of action. ' 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared testimony to the 
Committee. I thank you for the opportunity to represent the many 
dedicated service members, medical professionals, and scientists 
who work daily to defend our country against the threat posed by 
biological weapons. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Eitzen follows:! 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. EITZEN 

fn^!^' ^^^^™^°' distinguished Members of the Committee, it is my great pleasure 
to appear before you to address the possible impact of terrorist usf of WololicS 
agents as weapons against the United States and its citizens. Limiting the effective 
Tenget iur Sttn^'""" ^' '"'^P^''' '^"^^'^ destruction presents a compelling chal 

4 ^ears"nfrh?^A'f\°>,'Pp^^ ^°/°" ""l,^!^^" ^"""^ ^^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^'<^^ ^^ the past 
Armv'« hf.. ^h^f "^/he Preventive and Operational Medicine Department at the 
Armys biological defense aboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland, the U.S. Army Med- 
U S ^'rmv'MeSKi "r of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), a subordinate unit'^of the 
Arn;^ l.K^ ^ ""^^ Research and Materiel Command. USAMRIID is the primary 
n^^Vclf "^ concerned with medical biological defense. At USAMRIID, my de- 

sei^kes IlT?^l'/ ^'^'T ^''^^'" USAMRIID and military units, other military 
services, U.S. Government agencies, allied governments, and others who use the 
ons I al''J.nTh°"H'-^°'^ drugs developed there for defense against biological weap! 
fare" cZse t^ni^M f''^' r' °^ *•"" Army's "Medical Defense a'gainst Biological Wa?- 
Pr^ «nH ir taught four times yearly at Fort Detrick for military healthcare provid- 
C?;.H. Ta^^? *r"^?^ '°.i-^^ biological defense courses of the United Kingdom 
Canada, and Australia. In addition, I am the co-author of the "Medical Management 
of Biological Casualties Handbook" developed at USAMRIID, as well as the aSr 

?iX1''nVM7?^P*^''^°" "'"^^i^^' ^^•^^"^'^^^ ^«f^"«« i^ ^" upcoming volume Of the 
Textbook of Military Medicine. My position at USAMRIID has given me the chance 

^n nr^^f l" "r^"""" i°*^^^ge°<:y. national, and international bodies which respond 
to or deal with issues of biological warfare and terrorism. My medical qualifications 



116 



include board certification in the specialties of Emergency Medicine Pediatncs, and 
Preventive Medicine. Finally, I am a veteran of Operations Desert Shie d and 
Desert Storm and have been involved with biodefense programs since that time. 
After Desert Storm, I was a member of the first United >fations team to inspect the 
bi^logkal weapons 'program of Iraq, in August of 1991. My primary expertise lies 
in the area of medical defenses against biological agents. e ,.  ^ a^ 

Bioloeical warfare (BW) is the intentional use of microorganisms, or of toxins de- 
rived ffomlS organisms, to produce death or disease in humans, animals or 
plants Tological warfare threat agents fall into three major categories: Bacteria, 

''^ Ba'cteHrirelSgle-celled organisms that cause disease by either themselves in- 
vading body tissuel, or by themselves elaborating toxins which have detrimental ef- 
fects on human beings. Anthrax {Bacillus anthracis) is an example of a bacter al 
threat agent Diseases caused by bacteria often respond to specific treatment w th 
ant'bacSl drugs known as antibiotics. Penicillin and ciprofloxacin are examples 
of antibiotics which are effective against some bacteria. ^^tprial (DNA or 

Viruses are much smaller organisms which consist of genetic material ^DJNA or 
RNA) surrounded by a protective, coat that facilitates transmission between cells^ 
Virusermust invad J host cells in order to multiply and cause disease. Smallpox is 
ai example of a viral threat agent. The diseases produced by viral agents are more 
dSrfcuTto treat but may respond to specific antiviral drugs or specific antibodies 
d rected against the virus causing the illness. Whereas there are many antibactena 
drugs avSe to treat disease clused by bacterial threat agents, very few antiviral 
druls are available for human use. When bacteria or viruses invade the human 
bodf this is known as an "infection". Bacteria and viruses are often called replicat- 
in^'agents due to the fact that they are able to reproduce and multiply either in- 
side the human body or in appropriate culture media or tissue culture systems. 

Toxins are poisonous substances made by living organisms (or synthetically) 
which produce ^adverse clinical effects (known as "intoxication") in humans or other 
Inimals. The botulinum toxins, which are among the most toxic substances known 
are an example of a group of similar toxins which are considered to be threat 
aSnts The adverse effects of toxins may be lessened by treatment with antitoxins, 
Xch are ant1bod!Is, directed against specific toxin agents. Botulinum antitoxin is 
an example of a specific antitoxin which may preclude or decrease symptoms of 
botuUnum1ntoxicat?on. Toxins are not living organisms, bu '"^ther cellular by-pro^^^^^ 
ucts and therefore they do not replicate. Biological toxins also are not generally per- 
sistent or volatile: They do not therefore proluce a persistent vapor hazard in the 

environment, unlike some chemical agents ^ uvk ^^\rc. th*.m nnt^ntial 

The usual characteristics of biological threat agents which make them potent al 
weapons of mass destruction inclucfe: They may le dispersed in an aerosol cloud 
with such clouds being invisible to the human eye because the particle size of the 
Terosol is extremely small (on the order of 1 to 5 micrometers or microns in size), 
thSare odorlesT and tasteless; they are relatively inexpensive to Produce compared 
production of conventional, nuclear, or chemical weapons; they require consider- 
ably less technical expertise to produce compared to other weapons of mass destruc- 
tion- the usuaT technology for delivery of biological threat agents may be available 
off the shelf and may be as simple as a modified agricultural sprayer or other spray 
device Such could be mounted on an airplane, boat, car or other conveyance; they 
can sp^ad downwind over very large areas if disseminated properly under ideal 
weath^er ?ondftions of inversion and low wind speeds; they spare Phys^'^f^^^^-^tS;;^; 
and terrain features but still can kill persons within such str^^^ures finally they 
are difficult to detect in the environment. An epidemic caused by biological threat 
agents could create fear, and even terror and panic in a susceptible population, in 
addition to massive numbers of casualties. , . , . , ,^ , ij u^ k„ fi,« =,or 

Although the primary route of exposure to a biological attack would be by the aer- 
osol rou"f with inhalation of the agent, an adversary or terrorist could Possibly use 
biological threat agents to contaminate food or water supp les and cause infection 
or intoxication by the oral route. Attempts to contaminate a large water supply such 
as a reservoir with biological agents or toxins would be difficult due to the dilution 
effect as well as due to normal water purification methods such as chlonnation. 
Contaminating smaller water supplies or directly contaminating water near the end 
user might be more effective ways of delivering biologica agents via the oral route 
of exposure. Exposure through the skin or by intentional injection is also possible 
but considered to be less likely. This route has been and might be used again m 
assassination attempts. Infection or intoxication with biologica agents or toxins is 
not likely through intact skin, as human skin provides an excellent barrier against 
infection This is a significant difference from some chemical agents such as VX, 
which can cause effects with skin exposure. 



117 

A number of biological agents could be used to attack susceptible populations 
borne are lethal agents (produce death in a certain percentage of victims of the at- 
tack), whereas others may only incapacitate the victims of the attack (make them 
very 111). Examples of potentially lethal agents include anthrax, tularemia 
botulmum toxms, plague smallpox, hemorrhagic fever viruses, and the toxin ricin' 
h^xamoles of agents which usually only cause incapacitation are Venezuelan Equine 
Encephalitis (VEE) virus, Q Fever, and Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B (SEB) Al- 
though incapacitating agents may not be lethal, they may cause a great deal of ill- 

The effects of biological threat agents on humans vary with the particular agent 
used Many BW agents produce clinical syndromes similar to those^een in nature 
rrrnri^no- ^Tk^^^"^- mimical signs and symptoms can also vary with a given agent 

o^hv ,rfh^.H.n^°"w>K^ "^^'"^.^ P^"""" '" ^^P''"^^ ^^h^°"gh the skin, by ingestion, 
or by inhalation). With aerosol exposure to anthrax, early signs and symptoms 
would include fever malaise and nonspecific chest symptoms such as chest pain 
and possibly cough, the first 24 to 48 hours after exposure. Within 3 to 5 days W 

hrp^'th ?nH h'"t "i^^' "^M y- ^^'°?^ 'i^'^^^'y '"' '■^Pi'^'y developing shortness of 
breath and shock and would die within the next 24 to 48 hours. The case fatality 

to 90^^er^cenT^^° exposed with inhalation anthrax is estimated at 85 

vi=^ii H-ffi*" u''"™*- ^"^^l' P^^sons exposed would beein developing weakness and 
visual difficulties from about 24 to 36 hours to severafdays after exposure, depend- 
ing on the dose of toxin inhaled. These early symptoms would be followed by dif- 
ficulty with speaking and swallowing, then by weakness of extremity muscles and 
tmally by paralysis of respiratory muscles and suffocation unless intensive support- 
ive care such as ventilatory assistance is provided. This is the clinical syndrome 
commonly known as botulism. In modern medical facilities the case-fatality rate for 
botulmum intoxication or poisoning is less than 5 percent with good intensive care- 
however, patients may require extensive care for an extended period (weeks) before 

Other biological agents such as plague, Q fever, ,and tularemia would normally 
produce severe pneumonia (lung infections), whereas toxins such as ricin or SEB 
wou d also cause breathing difficulties if inhaled. Our ability to treat these patients 
?^?^i,o T? °° the agent inhaled: For some, particularly those caused by bacteria 
be iS-savin ' t^l^^'emia), specific antibiotic therapy is available and might 

fnr^«?'^'^ biological attack scenario might differ greatly from a threat to military 
nmnfi o f field /or several reasons. A terrorist attack using an aerosolized bio- 
logical agent might occur without warning, and the first sign of the attack might 
be hundreds or thousands of ill or dying patients since biological clouds are not vfsi- 
Sit^ fh^"^^ incubation periods with biological agents can be as long as several 
«rJ.'hv fh^*; "^^ attack may be long over and the perpetrators may have left the 
area by the time casualties begin to occur. 

.oPr^fk^^ civihan populations are not immunized against most BW agents, and be- 
or"v«," ,^«cir bave means to protect themselves physically (filtered respirators 
Z fhf w^ «^' ?.^"r?^*y numbers might be very high indeed. A report published 
«Li! World Health Organization in 1970 estimated that if 50 kilograms of anthrax 
spores were dispensed upwind of a population center of 500,000 people in optimal 

TbTed or S^'ir- h'^^'M^^V^ °f '^^ population of that area woSld be Xr Ss- 
abled or killed in such an attack, as shown in the following table: 

Hypothetical Dissemination by Airplane of 50 kg of Agent Along a 2 km line Upwind of a 

Population Center of 500,000 People * 

Agent Downwind ^^ . , _ __ 

Reach (km) L)ead Incapacitated 

Rift Valley Fever ' — i tttt^ 

Tick Valley Enceph :.::.:: , J0° 35,000 

Typhus ^'^^^ 35,000 

Bmceiiosis ::;::: .^ ^9,000 as.ooo 

Q Fever 1° 500 100,000 

Tularemia ll° ,„!?0 125,000 

Anthraif ^° 30,000 125,000 

"'"'^'^ »20 95,000 125,000 

•Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, WHO, 1970. 

Ipif. fr^o'Ii^'rK-^i P^°^"^^"& potentially massive numbers of casualties, other prob- 
lems from a biological terrorist attack might include the lack of adequate hospital 



118 



beds to treat all the casualties, deficiencies of special medications and antitoxins 
needed to treat casualties, the fact that many civilian health care providers have 
not been trained to recognize and treat BW agent casualties, and the possibihty that 
many of the local healthcare providers may have been exposed themselves during 

the attack and are also ill. i x- o d- i„^ 

How might a terrorist dispense a biological agent on a target population^ Biologi- 
cal agents might be released by a number of basic methods, most of which revolve 
around the aerosolization of the agent. . j  j u „, 

Other types of delivery systems for biological agents have been designed by var- 
ious countries with state-sponsored BW programs. These include bombs or bomblets 
which release the agent by exploding (generally very inefficient delivery systems), 
land and sea mines, pipe bombs, and other special devices. ■. v ^ 

Clandestine BW delivery means are also potentially available to teironsts. E.xam- 
nles include devices which penetrate and carry the agent into the body through the 
skin, such as pellets or flechettes, or means to contaminate food or water supplies 
so that the agent would be ingested. . r t^ a^^^ ^^.r. 

Biological agents may be delivered in either wet or dry form. Dry powders com- 
Dosed of very small particles tend to have better dissemination characteristics, and 
Kave advantages in terms of storage and handling. Dried agents require an in- 
creased level of technological sophistication to produce, although the technology to 
do such procedures as freeze diying or spray drying has been available in industry 
for a number of years. It would be technologically difficult for a terrorist group to 
produce a dry biological agent in the right particle size for inhalation. This would 
require a level of sophistication possessed by some state-sponsored off^ensive biologi- 
cal warfare programs. It is possible, however, that some groups have this level of 
expertise or could obtain support from a country which has an off^ensive BW pro- 

^""Ihe materials needed to make biological agents are not always difficult for terror- 
ist groups or countries to acquire. For example, Iraq purchased seed stocks that 
could be used to make biological agents from a U.S. commercial culture collection 
early in the development of their BW program. There have been several other at- 
tempted purchases of these types of agents historically, some recently. Some agents 
could also be harvested from animals which are infected and die from the diseases 

they cause in nature. ,. ,. • j j t<u,.^«^ o,«. 

Knowledge of microbiology and its potential applications is widespread. There are 
numerous people with the technical knowledge necessary to develop crude biological 
weapons. While cutting edge biotechnology research requires ari infrastructure ot so- 
phisticated laboratories, and production of sophisticated biological weapons may re- 
quire specialized equipment, some effective biological pathogens or toxins may be 
produced or harvested using relatively primitive techniques. Cases of attempted bio- 
logical sabotage have occurred within U.S. borders on several occasions. Even an at- 
tack which turned out to be a hoax had significant public impact: The case of a fair- 
fax Virginia man who in 1992 sprayed his neighbors with a fluid he claimed con- 
tained anthrax is illustrative. This incident resulted in the deployment of local haz- 
ardous material teams, the quarantine of the house involved, and numerous pa- 
tients presenting to the local hospital emergency department for care. A larger scale 
incident could potentially create a panic, and cause hundreds or even thousands ol 

people to seek medical care. , . . , r ..^ ^ ^u^^of 

The potential impact on health care facilities in the area of an attack or a threat- 
ened attack is tremendous. Emergency departments may experience tremendous 
backlogs of patients, open hospital beds may become scarce, intensive care units 
may be filled, and antibiotic stocks may be depleted. -x. , • , • , .^ c^u 

The possible scenarios for criminal or terrorist attacks with biological agents tall 
into four basic types: Product tampering as in the Tylenol tampering cases of the 
1980's- attacks on specific population groups within the United States which are 
perceived to be antagonistic to terrorist goals; sabotage of specific food groups or in- 
dustries such as contamination of an imported food product with a toxin or with 
pathogenic bacteria (as in the Chilean grape tampering case); or attacks directed at 
a U.S. city or a representative institution of the United States (a political, military, 

or economic target). ,,,.,, • i 4. e 4.u^ ^^a; 

Because of the variety of possible scenarios and the likely similarity of the medi- 
cal effects of such attacks to many endemic disease situations medical care provid- 
ers would have to be extremely alert to differentiate the initial cases resulting trom 
BW terrorism from a natural disease outbreak. 

Biological terrorism could range from the use of sophisticated BW weapons such 
as dried anthrax spores or botulinum toxins, to unsophisticated agents such as bal- 
monella or other common bacteria. The agent used and the mechanism of delivery 
may depend to a great extent on whether the terrorist or terrorists have the spon- 



119 



sorship of a state or government hostile to the United States. A state-sponsored ter- 
rorist group is, however, much more likely to have the wherewithal to produce cas- 
ualties on a large scale, whereas the unsupported single operative may still have 
a significant impact, but on a much smaller scale. The operative question may not 
be whether biological agents will be used as terrorist weapons against the United 
States, but rather when they will be used. 

Medical countermeasures against many of the biological threat agents are either 
available now or currently being developed. These include vaccines, antibiotics, and 
antisera. In situations where at-risk humans can be identified in advance of an ac- 
tual attack using biological agents, immunization before exposure with specific vac- 
cines provides protection from bacterial or viral infections, or from toxin poisoning 
Large-scale vaccination of civilian populations against biological threat agents as 
can be done m at-nsk military forces, is probably not feasible. Post-exposure treat- 
ment with antibiotics, certain vaccines (such as anthrax and smallpox vaccines) 
antitoxins, and supportive care will have to be relied upon. Specific treatments 
which may be effective include: Penicillin, doxycycline, or ciprofioxacin combined 
with anthrax vaccination in the case of anthrax; streptomycin or tetracyclines for 
tularemia; doxycycline for plague; and botulinum antitoxins for botulinum poison- 
ing. Pre-placement of adequate antibiotic and vaccine stocks with the ability to rao- 
idly transport such pharmaceuticals to the area of an attack is therefore critical 
Also critical is the niaintenance of a continuing reference laboratory capability as 
IS available within the Department of Defense, for diagnosis of disease caused by 
biological warfare agents. ■'^ 

Early epidemiologic analysis of a suspicious outbreak of disease, with early diag- 
nosis and treatment of persons already ill and others in the area of the attack (who 
are not yet symptomatic) will be necessary. Training of civilian healthcare providers 
in localities that are likely to be targets of terrorists is also extremely important 
Such training programs are needed to familiarize health workers with biological 
threat agents so that early treatment measures would be more effective Most physi- 
cians do not see and treat diseases or intoxications such as anthrax and botulism 
in their daily practices. 

The United States is vulnerable to a terrorist attack with biological weapons Bio- 
ogical weapons offer potential adversaries or terrorists weapons of mass destruction 
that can be produced easily and cheaply. The cost advantage of biological weapons 
was clearly illustrated by a 1969 United Nations report which estimated the relative 
cost of operations against civilian populations at $1 US/Km2 (square kilometer) for 
tmn^'f^ weapons, versus $600/Km2 for chemical, $800/Km2 for nuclear, and 
!t>/^,UUU/Km2 tor conventional armaments. 

The low cost, availability, relative technological feasibility compared to other 
^^nFfwVf mass destruction, ease of dissemination, difficulty of detection, 
deniability, and ability to cause mass casualties all make biological weapons ver^ 
attractive weapons of mass destruction. The effects of the use of biological agents 
i.o . i" '^.■^'■^ potentially devastating. We must continue to prepare to defend 
against and mitigate the effectiveness of these horrific weapons ^ ^ ^^ '° ''^'^'''' 
von forVhl'n"^"V^^'! concludes my prepared testimony to the Committee. I thank 
you for the opportunity to appear before you and represent the many dedicated serv- 
ice members, medical professionals, and scientists who work daily to defend our 
country both now and in the future against the threat posed by biological weaporl^ 

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Dr. Eitzen, for your testimony and all 
ot your assistance. 
Mr. Genovese? 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES A. GENOVESE, CHIEF, CHEMICAL/BIO- 
LOGICAL COUNTERTERRORISM TEAM, EDGEWOOD RE- 
SEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ENGINEERING CENTER US 
ARMY CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE COMMAND 

Mr. Genovese. Thank you, sir. Good morning, Mr. Chairman 
and members. I am James A. Genovese from the U.S. Army Chemi- 
cal and Biological Defense Command. It is a pleasure to be with 
you today to discuss the nature of the threat presented by the use 
ot chemical weapons. 



120 



Chemical weapons have been used in warfare for over 2,500 
years The first significant modern-day usage of chemicals as a 
warfare multiplier occurred during the First World War. 

On a glorious day in the spring in Ypres, Belgium, on April 2^, 
1915 a hissing sound could be heard coming from the German 
trenches in a sector where British and French forces had joined. 
That hissing sound was 6,000 chlorine gas cyhnders spewing their 
lethal contents upwind of those Allied Forces. 

Those chlorine gas cylinders are very similar to this air cylinder 
that I am showing you here. The Germans waited patiently for 
days for the right wind conditions, and when those wind conditions 
were right, they simply just turned the valve. Three hundred and 
fifty thousand pounds of chlorine gas fell upon those soldiers on 

The following excerpt from McWilliams and Steel's book "Gas— 
The Battle for Ypres, 1915" describes the horrors of the choking 
agent chlorine used at Ypres: Shrieks of fear and uncontrolled 
coughing filled the poisonous air. Terrified soldiers clutched their 
throats, their eyes staring out in terror and in pain. Many col- 
lapsed in the bottom of their trenches and others clambered out 
and staggered to the rear in attempts to escape the deadly cloud. 
Those left in the trenches writhed with agony unspeakable, their 
faces plum-colored, while they coughed blood from their tortured 

^Senator, those Allied soldiers were totally unprepared for that 
chlorine gas attack. Fifteen thousand casualties were reported in 
the press that day. -i... 

Chemical warfare agents are rapidly becoming a major military 
force in some of the developing countries. These agents can inex- 
pensively provide a substantial psychological edge to a country 
lacking a viable conventional military capability. tt .. j 

In the war between Iran and Iraq, from 1980 to 1988, the United 
Nations reports documented the use of chemical weapons by both 
sides Over 45,000 chemical casualties were reported. 

Chemical warfare agents are chemicals that have direct toxic ef- 
fects on humans, animals, or plants— with human beings being ob- 
viously the major target. There are three methods for producing 
chemical casualties within human beings: Through inhalation, 
through skin effects, and through ingestion. These methods are 
called routes of entry. • ,• .• r i.u 

The chart that is depicted here gives you an indication ot the 
characteristics of some of these hazards. Some examples of chemi- 
cal inhalation hazards are hydrogen cyanide, chlorine, and sarin. 
Hydrogen cyanide is a blood agent which directly inhibits respira- 
tion. Chlorine is a choking agent which attacks the lungs and 
causes severe choking and coughing. Sarin is an inhalation hazard 
that we classify as a nerve agent. Nerve agents inhibit the nerve 
transmission and muscle coordination within the body, and nerve 
agents are extremely toxic. . 

An alternate route of entry for toxic effects involves skin expo- 
sure material to chemical hazards. The skin exposure hazard is 
also indicated on the aforementioned chart. Two of them in particu- 
lar are unique in that they have different effects on the skin. One 
chemical is mustard. It is a liquid at room temperatures and 



121 



causes painful burns and blisters on its victims. Both mustard liq- 
uid and vapor can penetrate ordinary clothing, and because it va- 
porizes slowly, It is termed a persistent agent and can be extremely 
usetul in denying terrain to an enemy on the battlefield. 

Another skin exposure material is the nerve agent VX V-agents 
are also persistent and extremely toxic. VX can penetrate through 
the skin and produce its toxic effects. 

The last route of entry is by ingestion. Chemical hazards of this 
type are usually labeled poisons. The ingestion chart before you de- 
scribes the characteristics of the common poison cyanide. 

Cyanide, an analog of hydrogen cyanide, is readily available com- 
mercially and rapidly attacks the respiratory system. The Jones- 
town tragedy in Guyana in 1978 was a stark example of how effec- 
tive cyanide poisoning can be. 

To fully appreciate our vulnerability to chemical hazards it is 
important to understand how easily these hazards can be acquired 
Most industrial hazards like chlorine or phosgene are readily avail- 
able on the open market. Military-unique materials, such as nerve 
or blister agents, would probably have to be synthesized. Synthesis 
ot these particular agents like sarin requires some degree of tech- 
nical sophistication and a source for the appropriate precursor ma- 
lenais. 

Assessing vulnerability also requires consideration of a com- 
pound s volatility. For example, hydrogen cyanide is very volatile so 
Its use outdoors is limited. Dispersion of this agent in closed areas 
would, however, present a significant problem. Most hazardous in- 
dustrial chemicals and military-unique chemicals can be effectively 
disseminated using explosive ordnance or commercial sprayers A 
commercial sprayer can be as simple as this spray can of household 
disintectant that I am demonstrating here. Even simple pouring of 
a chemical onto a surface can be effective depending on where you 
pour it and what kind of chemical you are deploying. Typically 
volatile chemicals with moderate toxicity in closed spaces will 
cause the most concern. If the population density is high in the 
area around the chemical incident, then obviously the resultant 
casualties will probably be higher. 

Based on my experience— and this is my own personal experience 
and not necessarily the views of the administration or the Depart- 
ment of Defense— I firmly beheve that we have the technical exper- 
tise, training, and protection to meet virtually every chemical 
threat in a battlefield environment. I do, however, have some con- 
cerns It these horrific weapons were used in a civilian setting. In 
wartime, key targets are usually the combatants themselves who 
have protection and contingency systems, and they are trained to 
work in that hazardous environment. Our military extensively 
trains our forces to respond and, therefore, they are prepared. 

Un the other hand, responding to the use of chemical agents in 
a civilian setting presents significant challenges to our country 
lerronsts follow no rules of engagement. Incidents involving chem- 
ical agents sponsored by a terrorist group almost always target 
non-combatants. These non-combatants will not be trained or 
equipped TTiese are our basic civilians, the basic citizens out on 
the street. Chemical terrorism particularly in the civilian setting 



122 

will evoke a strong psychological response from targeted individ- 
uals. 

Another dimension regarding the possible use of these weapons 
is that chemical terrorism can be used to achieve effects other than 
anti-personnel. For example, the Chilean grape incident involving 
cyanide-tainted grapes damaged the Chilean economy. 

I would like to conclude by commenting where we are and where 
we need to go. Again, these are my own personal views, but I think 
that these are well-founded based on my experience, my profes- 
sional involvement with many of the agencies over the years. 

I believe that the Department of Defense has the unique capa- 
bilities and resources to effectively support and assist the lead gov- 
ernment agencies in their response to chemical terrorism and a 
chemical incident. I think, however, that we need to improve and 
refine our technical response in this critical area. My suggestions 
are as follows: 

First, we could initiate a national training program to facilitate 
the effectiveness of first responders and reduce casualties to the 
public. 

Second, we could estabhsh an exercise program that would test 
and refine all mission critical areas so that an integrated response 
force is realized throughout the United States. 

Finally, we could promote a new generation of research and de- 
velopment that specifically draws on existing military and commer- 
cial programs to handle this problem. That focus should be on cus- 
tomizing and improving response tools and techniques in this new 
mission area, thereby minimizing risk to the public and to the envi- 
ronment. Some key technical areas for development include hazard 
mitigation techniques, first responder protection, improved detec- 
tion and monitoring, and scenario-dependent hazard prediction and 
modeling. 

I hope my comments have been helpful, and I thank the panel 
for this opportunity to provide my insight into this crucial area. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Genovese follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. GENOVESE 

Good Morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I am James A. 
Genovese from the U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command. It is a 
pleasure to be with you today to discuss the nature of the threat presented by the 
use of chemical weapons. 

I presently serve as the Team Leader for the Chemical/Biological Counter- 
terrorism Team at the Edgewood Research Development and Engineering Center. 
My responsibilities focus on development of technological countermeasures to re- 
spond to a chemical or biological incident. In addition, I serve as a Cochairman of 
the Weapons of Mass Destruction Countermeasures Subgroup of the Technical Sup- 
port Working Group. This working group was established in 1987 to specifically ad- 
dress research and development necessary to counter terrorism and consists of rep- 
resentatives of over 40 governmental agencies I also serve as the chairman of an 
international research and development working group on chemical/biological terror- 
ism also sponsored by the Technical Support Working Group. 

I have over 20 years experience in the field of chemistry and have served the U.S. 
Army as a research chemist for approximately 14 years. The first 9 years of my 
service were devoted to developing chemical munitions for the Army's Retaliatory 
Chemical Munitions Program. 

Chemical weapons have been used in warfare for over 2,500 years. Six hundred 
years before the birth of Christ, Athenian troops won a battle by poisoning their en- 
emy's drinking water. During the American Civil War, several ideas for the use of 



123 

chemical weapons were considered including using projectiles to deliver hydrochloric 
acid and chlorine. !■ 2 

The idea of using chemicals as a warfare multiplier surfaced again some 50 years 
later during the First World War. Germany led the world in chemistry at that time 
and turned to chemists to provide a weapon. The weapon they chose was chlorine 
gas which, like phosgene, is classified as a choking agent. These agents attack the 
lungs to cause severe choking and coughing, and can be lethal. 

On a glorious spring day near Ypres, Belgium, on April 22, 1915, a hissing sound 
could be heard coming from the German trenches in a sector where British and 
French forces joined. The hissing sound came from 6,000 chlorine gas cylinders 
spewing their lethal contents upwind of the Allied Forces. 

An excerpt from McWilliams and Steel's book "Gas— The Battle for Ypres, 
1915" describes the horrors of the choking agent used at Ypres: Shrieks of 
fear and uncontrolled coughing filled the poisonous air. Terrified soldiers 
clutched their throats, their eyes staring out in terror and pain. Many col- 
lapsed in the bottom of their trenches and others clambered out and stag- 
gered to the rear in attempts to escape the deadly cloud. Those left in the 
trenches writhed with agony unspeakable, their faces plum-colored, while 
they coughed blood from their tortured lungs. 3 

The Allied soldiers at Ypres were totally unprepared for that chlorine gas attack. 
Over 15,000 casualties were reported in the press.'* 

Memories of World War I, when chlorine, phosgene, and mustard were used to 
kill thousands, are once again resurfacing in the minds of many. As the war be- 
tween Iraq and Iran so painfully revealed, chemical warfare agents are rapidly be- 
coming a major military force in some countries. These agents can relatively inex- 
pensively provide a substantial psychological edge to countries lacking a viable con- 
ventional military convential threat. ^-^ 

Over twenty countries are believed to possess chemical weapons or to have the 
ability to manufacture them. In the War between Iran and Iraq from 1980 to 1988, 
United Nations reports documented the use of chemical weapons by both sides. Over 
45,000 chemical casualties were reported. '^ 

Chemical warfare agents are chemicals that have a toxic effect on humans, ani- 
mals or plants— with humans obviously being the major target. There are three 
methods for producing chemical casualties within human beings: Through inhala- 
tion; through skin effects which include both absorption, through the skin, and der- 
mal wounds; and through ingestion of hazards through the digestive tract. These 
methods are called routes of entry. 

Toxic effects through inhalation are caused when a person or animal inhales the 
chemical hazard. Inhalation hazards are usually generated as gases or aerosols. 
Gases often are invisible. Aerosols are comprised of small particles. These particles 
can be either solids or liquids. 

Some examples of chemical inhalation hazards are hydrogen cyanide, chlorine, 
and Sarin. Hydrogen cyanide is a blood agent which directly inhibits respiration by 
interfering with a key enzyme in the body called cytochrome oxidase. This enzyme 
is responsible for the energy-producing mechanisms of the body. Chlorine is a chok- 
ing agent which attacks the lungs and causes severe coughing and choking. Sarin 
IS an inhalation hazard that is a nerve agent. Nerve agents inhibit the enzyme cho- 
linesterase which facilitates nerve transmission and muscle coordination. Nerve 
agents are extremely toxic. 

Toxic effects from chemical agents are based on the amount of that hazard that 
IS accumulated in or on the body. For inhalation hazards, it is the amount of that 
hazard we breathe into our lungs. 

To give the Committee an appreciation of the relative toxicity of some of these 
chemicals, a container with 48 ounces of chlorine, a choking agent; another con- 
tainer with 25 ounces of hydrogen cyanide, a blood agent; and a vial with about one- 
• •<• j-^" °""^^ °^ '^^ nerve agent Sarin can all produce up to 5,000 lethal casual- 
ties if disseminated effectively with maximum effectiveness. The chemical Sarin was 
the chemical that Supreme Truth Cult disseminated in the Tokyo Subway system. 



1 Victor A. Utgofr, The Challenge of Chemical Weapons, pes 1-3 

2BG Alden H. Waitt, Gas Warfare, pgs 8-9. 

3 James L. Mac Williams and R. James Steel, Gas— The Battle for Ypres, 1915, pgs 45-49 

"UtgofF, op. cit., pg 5. 

^UtgofT, op. cit., pg 6. 

^Albert and Leininger, Biochemistry, pgs 494-495. 

'Satu M. Someini, Chemical Warfare Agents, pgs xv, xvi £ind 1-4. 



124 

The following chart lists the characteristics of some of the more prevalent inhala- 
tion hazards: 

INHALATION HAZARDS 



Hazard type Chemical Etiect Form Toxicity 0"'co"^e 



Choking agent Chlorine Choking/ Gas Low to Incapacitation 

medium death 



Choking/ 

coughing 

Affects 

respirlion 

Lose muscle 

control 


Gas 
Gas 

Liquid 



Blood agent Hydrogen Affects Gas Low to Incapacitation 

Cyanide respirlion medium death 

Nerve agent Sarin Lose muscle Liquid High Death 



An alternate route of entry for toxic effects involves skin exposure to chemical 
hazards. The following Skin Exposure Hazard Chart describes the characteristics 
of two common skin hazard chemicals: 

SKIN EXPOSURE HAZARDS 



Hazard type Chemical Effect Form Toxicity Outcome 



Blister agent Mustard Burning/ Liquid/ t^edium Pain 

blistering vapor 

Nen/e agent VX Lose muscle Liquid High Death 

control 



One skin hazard chemical is mustard. It is a liquid at room temperatures and 
causes painful burns and blisters on its victims. It can, depending on the environ- 
mental conditions, present a significant vapor hazard. Both liquid and vapor can 
penetrate ordinary clothing. Because it vaporizes slowly, it is termed a persistent 
agent and can be extremely useful in denying terrain to an enemy on the battlefield. 
On July 12, 1917, the Germans again surprised the Allies by introducing mustard 
delivered by artillery shells to the battlefield. 

Another skin exposure hazard is the chemical VX. V-agents are persistent with 
very low vaporizing potential. Because VX is an oily, non-volatile liquid it can re- 
main in place for weeks or longer posing a continuing threat to those in the area. 
VX is an extremely toxic nerve agent that can penetrate through the skin to produce 
its toxic GiiGcts. 

The last route of entry for chemical agents is by ingestion. Chemical hazards of 
this type are usually labeled poisons. Most poisons usually are ingested by drinking 
or eating substances that have been contaminated with the poison. The following 
chart describes the characteristics of the common poison cyanide, an ingestion haz- 
ard: 

SKIN EXPOSURE HAZARDS 



Hazard type 


Chemical 


Effect 


Form 


Toxicity 


Outcome 


Blood agent 


... Cyanide 


Affects 
respiration 


Solid 


Low to 
medium 


Death 



Cyanide is readily available commercially as sodium or potassium salts. This po- 
tent analog to hydrogen cyanide works by the same principle: Rapidly attacking the 
respiratory system. The Jonestown tragedy in Guyana in 1978 was a stark example 
of how effective cyanide poisoning can be. 

To fully appreciate our vulnerability to chemical hazards, it is important to under- 
stand how easily these hazards can be acquired. Many industrial hazards like chlo- 
rine or phosgene are readily available on the open market. Equipment to make 
chemical agents and specific knowledge necessary for production can also be easily 
obtained. On the other hand, military unique chemical agents such as the nerve or 
blister agents, would probably have to be synthesized and therefore require a higher 
degree of technical sophistication. Synthesis of nerve agents like Sarin also require 
a degree of technical expertise and a source for obtaining the needed precursor ma- 
terials and corrosion-resistant equipment. 

Assessing vulnerability also requires consideration of the volatility of the agent. 
For example, hydrogen cyanide is very volatile so its use outdoors is limited. Disper- 



125 

sion of this agent in closed areas would, however, present a significant threat Per- 
sistent agents such as mustard or VX are not as volatile. They can be sprayed or 
poured onto large areas which will result in a contaminated area that will persist 
for a long time. 

Ti^^A;r™^*'^°^ ^"^ location of dispersion of the chemical hazard is important as 
well. Most hazardous industrial chemicals and military-unique chemicals can be ef- 
fectively disseminated using explosive ordnance or commercial sprayers. Even sim- 
ply pouring a chemical agent onto a surface can be effective under certain cir- 
cumstances. Typically, volatile chemicals with moderate toxicity in closed spaces 
will cause the most concern. If the population density is high in the area around 
the chemical incident, the resultant casualties will probably be higher. 

Based on my experience, I believe that the United States has the technical exper- 
tise, training, and equipment to meet virtually every chemical threat in a battlefield 
environment. I do, however, have some concerns if these horrific weapons were used 
in a civilian setting. In wartime, key targets are usually the combatants who have 
protection and contingency systems to allow them to function in a hazardous envi- 
ronment. Our military extensively trains our forces how to respond to and function 
in a hazardous environment. 

Responding to the use of chemical agents in a civilian setting presents significant 
challenges to our country. Terrorists follow no rules of engagement. Incidents involv- 
ing chemical agents sponsored by a terrorist groups almost always target civilian 
noncombatants. These non-combatants will not be trained or equipped. Chemical 
terrorism particularly in the civilian setting will evoke a strong psychological re- 
sponse from targeted individuals. 

It is incumbent upon our government to appreciate the nature of the threat pre- 
sented by chemical weapons and plan a good, effective response. We should insist 
that first responders are adequately informed, protected, and trained to handle 
chemical incidents against non-combatants. 

Another consideration is that terrorists could possibly use chemical agents to 
achieve effects other than anti-personnel. For example, the Chilean grape incident 
involving cyanide-tainted grapes damaged the Chilean economy. 

I would like to conclude by commenting where we are and where we need to go 
I believe that the Department of Defense has the capabilities and resources to effec- 
tively support the lead government agencies in their response to a chemical inci- 
dent. I think, however, that we need to improve and refine our response in this criti- 
cal area and offer three specific suggestions. 

First, we could initiate a national training program to facilitate the effectiveness 
of first responders and reduce casualties to the public. The program would be de- 
signed to educate all levels of government in responding to a chemical or biological 
incident. * 

Second, we could establish an exercise program that would tost and refine all mis- 
sion critical areas. These exercises would also help to ensure that response teams 
throughout the United States are effective and properly integrated. 

Finally, we could promote a new generation of research and development that 
draws from existing military and commercial programs. The focus should be on cus- 
tomizing and improving response tools and techniques in this new mission area 
tliereby minimizing risk to the public health and the environment. Some key tech- 
nical areas for development include hazard mitigation techniques, first responder 
protection improved detection and monitoring, and scenario-dependent hazard pre- 
diction and modeling. 

I hope my comments have been helpful and thank the Committee for this oppor- 
tunity to provide my insight into this crucial area. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

^°™P*°°,' James A. F. Military Chemical and Biological Agents. Caldwell, NJ: The 
leitord Press. 

Chemical I Biological Incident Handbook. Interagency Intelligence Committee on 

Terrorism, Central Intelligence Agency, 1995. 
Field Manual 3-5: NBC Decontamination. Washington D.C.: Department of the 

Army, 1993. 

Field Manual 3-7: NBC Field Handbook. Washington, D.C.: Department of the 

Army, 1994. 
Field Manual 3-9: Potential Military Chemical /Biological Agents and Compounds 

Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990. 
Field Manual 8-285: Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional 

Military Chemical Injuries. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1990. 



126 

Geissler, Erhard (Ed). Biological and Toxin Weapons Today. London: Oxford Univer- 
sity Press, 1986. Prepared for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 

Killinger, Mark H., et al. (Eds) Chemical/ Biological Incident Handbook. Seattle: Pa- 
cific Northwest Laboratory, 1993. Prepared for U.S. Department of Energy. 

Lehninger, Albert L. Biochemistry. New York: Worth Publishers Corporation, 1975. 

NacNaughton, Dr. Michael G. and Brewer, Joseph H. Environmental Chemistry and 
Fate of Chemical Warfare Agents. San Antonio: Southwest Research Institute, 
1994. 

McGeorge, Harvey J. II. Chemical / Biological Terrorism Threat Handbook. Wood- 
bridge: Public Safety Group, 1989. Prepared for Chemical Research Development 
and Engineering Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground. 

McWilliams, James L. and Steel, R. James. Gas! The Battle for Ypres, 1915. St. 
Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 1985. 

Somani, Satu M. (Ed). Chemical Warfare Agents. New York: Academic Press, Inc., 
1992. 

Spiers, Edward. Chemical Warfare. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 1986. 

Utgoff, Victor A. The Challenge of Chemical Weapons. An American Perspective. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. 

Wachtel, Carl. Chemical Warfare. Brooklyn: Chemical Publishing Company, Inc., 
1941. 

Waitt, Alden H., Brigadier General. Gas Warfare: The Chemical Weapon, Its Use, 
and Protection Against It. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944. 

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Genovese, Mr. Olson, 
and Dr. Eitzen. 

I have lots of questions for all of you, but I am going to cut mine 
short today and rotate it around because we do have one other wit- 
nesses, and all of your testimony has been very, very helpful today. 

First, Mr. Olson, I understand that you met with the head of the 
cult's Science and Technology Ministry — I believe the pronunciation 
is Murai. 

Mr. Olson. Murai. 

Senator NuNN. Murai — before he was assassinated and the news 
spokesperson for the cult, Mr. Jojru, before his arrest. What can 
you tell us about Mr. Murai and Mr. Joyn? 

Mr. Olson. I had the opportunity to speak with both gentlemen 
over the course of an hour or two in Tokyo. This was probably 3 
weeks or so after the subway attack. 

Senator NuNN. Talk right into that mike. 

Mr. Olson. Thank you. Hideo Murai struck me as being a rather 
true believer. He seemed to have a certain, if you will, Buddhist 
calm about him. At the same time, it seemed very clear to me that 
there were a great many things going on behind that rather calm 
exterior. 

Senator NuNN. He was the head of the so-called Science and 
Technology Ministry. 

Mr. Olson. Exactly. According to the authorities, he was the 
man who was essentially in charge of the development of almost 
all their weapons and was really very close to Asahara in terms of 
the hierarchy. 

In essence, I guess I would characterize Murai as probably a fa- 
natic. He was very comfortable with who he was, very comfortable 
with what he was doing. In fact, the only time that I really was 
able to get anything from him in terms of a break in his composure 
was at one point when he was discussing the chemical plant at 
Satyam 7 at Kamakuishiki, in which he acknowledged that they 
had purchased a material for some of the piping and vessels in 
there, a material known as hastalloy. Hastalloy is an extremely 



127 

corrosion-resistant material. Among other things, it is one of the 
materials that if you were going to milspec out a chemical weapons 
plant, you would specifically look for. Hastalloy, in fact, is on our 
controlled list of exports specifically because of its applications to 
chemical weapons production. So that was an interesting event. He 
was assassmated approximately a week after I spoke with him. 

Joyu, by comparison, and as has been noted before, enjoyed a tre- 
mendous amount of celebrity because he was the face man for the 
cult followmg the Tokyo attack. In fact, he became a teenage heart 
throb because of his regular appearances. He really seemed to 
enjoy the limelight. He also seemed, I think, to be very pragmatic. 
He seemed to feel that he was in control of the situation even when 
it was slipping away from him. 

He was one of the members of the cult who was most actively 
trying to get the cult to disband itself as a church in a rather, I 
think, cynical effort to try to hold onto its financial and commercial 
assets. 

Senator NUNN. And he was arrested? 

Mr. Olson. He was arrested about 2 weeks ago, I beheve. 

Senator NuNN. What was the charge against him? 

Mr. Olson. He is, I think, involved in withholding information 
regarding a kidnapping, if I remember correctly. He has not been 
charged specifically with any of the nerve gas events themselves. 

Senator NUNN. Mr. Genovese, what can you tell us about the 
technological expertise of the Aum? I believe you reviewed parts of 
the staff statement dealing with the purchases the Aum made in 
the United States. Can you tell us about the significance of the 
laser, the aluminum oxide, the filters, the batteries, and the small 
fans? 

Mr. Genovese. Yes, sir. What I would like to do is address them 
individually and then to summarize how I see those particular 
technologies fitting as a package for developing chemical ordnance 

Senator Nunn. Good. 

Mr. Genovese. First off, the Hobart laser, I am not totally famil- 
iar with this technology, but I assume it to be a high-energy laser 
These kinds of high-energy lasers can be used as a special seahng 
mechanism, especially if you are dealing with almost ceramic mate- 
rials that the Aum was working with. They have a particular mate- 
rial called aluminum oxide which has ceramic properties. That 
thing is very difficult to weld with conventional techniques. 

However, their choice for aluminum oxide suggests that they 
thought that whatever was going to go in those particular contain- 
ers would have to withstand the corrosive capabilities of some of 
the nerve agents. So they chose those particular materials. 

So those two pieces of information suggest, as well as there was 
also some allusion earlier by your staff on HEPA filters. The HEPA 
filters, the acronym means high-efficiency particulate absorber 
These filters are conventional filters that are used in all military 
respirators, which suggests that this operation that they were an- 
ticipating would involve possibly either a chemical or a biological 
process. 

So with those three pieces of information, it suggests to me that, 
in fact, the Aum was seriously looking at processing hazardous ma- 



128 

terials, specifically chemicals fi-om what I can see here at first 
glance. 

There were some other materials that they also acquired. Those 
were alluded to also by your staff statement, which included 
camcorder batteries and small fans and vials. Those to me — and I 
have worked in the chemical weapons area for a number of years. 
Those to me suggest that they were trying to configure some small 
devices to effectively disseminate chemical agent liquids and that 
they would use the fans to blow out the volatile liquids, the bat- 
teries to drive the fan's operation, and the vials to store the agent 
until it was disseminated. 

Senator Nunn. Why didn't more people die in the subway attack, 
Mr. Genovese? 

Mr. Genovese. These are my own opinions on this. Some of 
these I think are common sense, and others ones are just my own 
technical perspective as to how I saw that situation. Again, I am 
speaking only from the knowledge that I gained from journal arti- 
cles and newspapers. 

But I think, first, the purity of the S5nithetic materials that were 
used — there was some comment that there may have been a binary 
process and that maybe in the fact of making that binary process 
work that they didn't do a very good job of that. Also, maybe the 
starting materials of that binary process were not all that pure. So 
that will certainly affect the toxicity of those materials. 

The second thing is — and I think this is very important — their 
method of dispersion. I would call a leaky lunch box probably one 
of the poorest dispersion mechanisms that you could have, consid- 
ering even the volatility of sarin, which has about the same vapor- 
izing potential as water. So this pouring of the liquid onto the 
floors of the Tokyo subway was not the best way to disseminate 
sarin. 

I think in your staffs statement in the Matsumoto incident, it 
was alluded to that a truck with a heating system and a spraying 
system was used in Matsumoto. That seems like a more realistic 
and viable system if you are going to look for high casualties. 

I think the third reason why the casualties were lower is that 
there was good ventilation in the Tokyo subway system, and I 
think that tends to remove and dilute the hazard so that you don't 
get the chemical concentration that would normally — that you 
would see for high casualties. / 

Finally, another one, which is just my own personal feeling, is 
most of the lunch boxes were actually dispersed and disseminated 
inside the subway cars. And the cars themselves have a tendency, 
because they are a kind of physical barrier, will tend to at least 
preclude some of the vaporization that could occur throughout all 
the subway tunnels. 

Senator NuNN. Dr. Eitzen, isn't it true that a lot of the biological 
agents cause illnesses that are similar to illnesses that are having 
to be dealt with in the normal society? And if that is the case, how 
quickly could we really detect that certain rapidly spreading ill- 
nesses were really because of an attack? 

Dr. Eitzen. Senator, that is very true. Many of the early sjonp- 
toms of the diseases caused by biological warfare agents would be 



129 



similar to symptoms that physicians might see with a disease that 
they see every day, such as the flu or other types of illness 

However, I think that really the scale in terms of numbers be- 
coming 1 1 and also the time course of events would lead physicians 
in a local area of an attack, if they had the right epidemiologic per- 
spective, to say that there is something unusual going on here 
Sheer numbers as well as attack rates of illness as well as numbers 
people presenting to emergency departments for care should 
make the local public health officials pick up on the fact that there 
is an unusual event that has occurred. 

Also, with a number of these BW-caused illnesses, there are cer- 
tain clinical indicators that would indicate that there is something 
unusual, lor instance, a widened mediastinum on chest X-ray with 
anthrax^ So for those reasons, I think there would certainly be 
some indicators that this is an imusual event 
Senator Nunn. Thank you. 

Mr. Olson the Japanese police, I am told, have not yet completed 
the search of the biological facility, or at least one of the biological 
facilities is closed up, I understand, and the search has not yet 
been completed, I am sure because of possible dangers and haz- 
ards. But you have some details about that facility, I believe Could 
you share those with us? 

Mr. Olson Well, my information actually refers to an earher fa- 
cility, a facility that they had established back in 1990. I debriefed 
a member of the cult who had left the cult, left Aum Shinrikyo, and 
who had made himself available to talk, who described in some de- 
tail a large facility— again, this is circa 1990— in which they had 
tour or five large fermentation tanks; they had the appropriate 
equipment such as nitrogen feeds and other materials to support 
the growth within those fermentation tanks of what he concluded 
was Clostridium botulinum. 

He described a process by which the organisms were cultivated 
were harvested, then taken through into a laboratory where they 
were first fi-eeze-dned, then heat-dried into a cake. The cake itself 
was then pulverized. The resulting pulverized particles were then 
put into an aerosol. They then sprayed those on guinea pigs This 
was apparently at the specific direction of Asahara himself who 
had recruited this gentleman from the cult's ranks 

Senator NuNN. Sprayed those on what? I didn't hear you 

f.^l'^ o f^^u ^r^y^^ them on guinea pigs. They actually main- 
tained a stock of guinea pigs for experimental purposes 

Now, even back in 1990 they were not successful, apparently, in 
mastering the tncks required to take the toxin which they were ex- 
tracting and turn It into an effective weapon. But the description 
was rather extreme. 

That facility itself was apparently dismantled about 2 years ago 
though on my first yisit-excuse me, my second visit to Tokyo, the 
first one right after the subway attack, I did see photographs tken 

fW. 7 {? '^V" '^IT''^ °^^ ^f *^^ warehouses at the compounds 
there at Kamakuishiki, and sitting in the middle of an otherwise 
empty warehouse were the concentration tanks which had been 
used to collect the material fi-om the fermenters 
mvAlf fKof ^ I wasn't sure what they were. I have since satisfied 
myseit that, in fact, those were pieces of the original BW facility 



130 

Senator NuNN. Mr. Genovese, based on what you have heard this 
morning from the staff statement and Mr. Olson and so forth, do 
you beUeve that the Aum was going to be able to be successful in 
producing biological weapons at some point? Was that inevitable? 
Did they have enough infrastructure? Did they have enough mate- 
rials? Did they have enough expertise? Or do you beheve that they 
were doomed to failure? 

Mr. Genovese. Sir, I think that their attempts — and I am 
couching that with the fact that they had the money to buy the 
high technology equipment. I think with that in mind, the intent 
was there for them to seriously look at both acquiring or synthesiz- 
ing both chemical and biological materials. The materials and the 
equipment that I relayed to you earlier certainly suggest that they 
have a much higher level of sophistication than I would have ever 
expected out in the world. And that impressed me, but at the same 
time it concerns me that although they may not have all of the 
pieces together, they were certainly moving in the right direction 
and had the basic capability to start making things happen. And 
that certainly did concern me. 

Senator NUNN. Dr. Eitzen, do you have an opinion on that? 
Given time, were they going to be, in your opinion, based on what 
you have heard, were they likely to be successful in producing a 
real biological weapon that would do serious damage? 

Dr. Eitzen. Senator, based on what I have heard this morning 
about the cult— and this is a personal opinion— I believe that they 
eventually could be successful in growing biological agents. We 
know that they had some culture media in their compound in 
Japan that would allow them to grow many bacterial agents, in- 
cluding bacillus anthracis, or anthrax, and Clostridium botulinum, 
which is the organism which elaborates botulinum toxins. 

I think that with the right amount of effort and with the sci- 
entific expertise, the level of sophistication that they demonstrated 
in terms of their overall capability, I think that that is certainly 

possible. 1 ij 

Senator NuNN. In your assessment, a group like that that did 
succeed, if they had succeeded in producing biological weapons, 
which would have been more dangerous: The biological weapons or 
the chemical weapons? 

Dr. Eitzen. Senator, I think that if you look at the overall cas- 
ualty numbers that could be produced by chemicals versus biologi- 
cal weapons, and if you particularly take the worst-case weapons 
in terms of the biologicals — and I don't want to be too specific be- 
cause I don't want to give anybody ideas. But I think that certainly 
biologicals have a greater casualty-causing potential an order of 
magnitude higher than chemical weapons could produce. 

Senator NUNN. Mr. Olson, do you agree with that based on what 
you know? 

Mr. Olson. Yes, Senator. I don't think there is any question that 
their pursuit of biological weapons was a very eyes-open pursuit. 
They knew they were looking at developing a weapon that would 
have easily given them the ability to trump the Japanese military 
or police, and perhaps a lot of other people as well. 

Senator COHEN. Dr. Eitzen, I think that Senator Nunn perhaps 
asked you a leading question. He said. Based upon what you have 



131 

heard today, what was your assessment? I assume you have heard 
much more than what you have heard today, that you have been 
briefed for some time now, and so you are not just now forming a 
conclusion as to what you know as of this moment from this hear- 
mg. Is that correct? 

Dr. ElTZEN. Right. Yes, Senator, that is correct. 

Senator Cohen. So it is based upon what you, as one who has 
been m charge of deahng with the bio-defensive systems, have 
formed as an opinion much earher than today. 

Dr. EiTZEN. Yes, Senator. What I meant was that I just wanted 
to allude to the fact that this is a personal opinion of mine, not a 
position of the Department of Defense. 

Senator COHEN. Let me make an observation with respect to 
chemicals in particular, and perhaps biological weapons. Much of 
the technology for these weapons systems is based upon having ac- 
cess to Western technology. I mentioned Rabat earlier today, and 
we know that at least two of our closest allies were directly in- 
volved in the helping to construct that facility and for some of the 
containers that would contain the chemicals produced by that facil- 
ity So when you are talking about either deutsche marks or yen 
or dollars involved, you have got a big problem with Western soci- 
eties supplying the technology for these nations who are dedicated 
to developing either a chemical weapons or biological weapons ca- 
pability. 

We are the ones who are providing the technology. In some cases, 
it may be dual-use technology, so you have a problem. In some 
cases, it may be that some countries legitimately are trying to pro- 
mote their agriculture, and therefore they are developing agricul- 
tural insecticides. The same facility that can make an agricultural 
insecticide or pharmaceutical can make chemical weapon agents. 

So there are some problems related to the dual-use nature of 
some of our technology. But the fact is we have to raise high the 
roof beams and warn all of our allies and potential enemies of what 
the specter of a chemical weapons or biological weapons attack 
means and what it means for the rest of humanity to let this par- 
ticular genie out of its bottle. 

I am going to talk in a moment about Russia. They signed on 
as I recall, to the Biological Weapons Convention back in 1970 was 
it not. Dr. Eitzen? 

Dr. Eitzen. Actually, the convention was 1972, and I beheve they 
signed on shortly thereafter. 

Senator CoHEN. Shortly thereafter. The problem is it has no ver- 
ification regime. Is there any doubt in any of your minds that Mos- 
cow IS, in fact, complying with that particular treaty? 

As a matter of fact, just last month in London, there was a gi'oup 
of scientists gathered at the International Workshop on Anthrax, 
and according to one participant, the Russian researchers surprised 
the conference by publicly revealed they had genetically modified 
anthrax specimens to give them resistance to various common anti- 
biotics. It wasn't surprising to me that they are engaged in genetic 
modification, but what was surprising was that they would publiclv 
admit this. f j 

This poses, I would assume, a major problem for everyone. If in 
tact, we have developed some common antibiotics that would pro- 



132 

tect against anthrax, would this not give the Russian miUtary an 
advantage in their bio-warfare program? Dr. Eitzen, Mr. Olson, Mr. 
Genovese, any one of you? Isn't this a serious problem when you 
are talking about the genetic modification of anthrax? 

Dr. Eitzen. Potentially serious problem, Senator. It depends on 
which antibiotics they are able to induce resistance to and which 
antibiotics we choose to arm our soldiers with, if you are talking 
about a military scenario. 

Senator Cohen. Mr. Olson? 

Mr. Olson. Senator, I think we have to differentiate between the 
technologies that are available for major powers, such as the 
former Soviet Union, today the Russian Federation, and certain 
other nations around the world and what they can go about doing. 
And those are in many cases what we are talking about, gene splic- 
ing or biotechnology, we are talking about high-end technologies. 

On the other hand, there are many reasons to be afraid of bugs 
that can be produced using much cruder levels of technology, using 
technologies as we have seen in Iraq, for example. One of their 
methods of appropriating technology for their biological weapons 
program was simply to go to existing medical facilities and vaccine 
research facilities and strip the equipment out and take it off to 
their military laboratories. 

The problem of trying to set a barrier against the proliferation 
of these technologies is such that you simply can't lock the door 
and assume that the problem is solved. It is one that requires con- 
tinual vigilance. 

As you note, the biological and toxins weapons convention has no 
verification provisions. One of the positive steps that is occurring 
right now is that there is a multilateral effort to try to negotiate 
an addendum that will create some sort of a mechanism. It is not 
perfect 

Senator Cohen. Assuming you have the convention and it is rati- 
fied, isn't verification still going to be very difficult? 

Mr. Olson. All it gives you is a mechanism to begin trying to do 
if not the impossible, the extraordinarily difficult, yes. But in the 
absence of a verification regime, we have no mechanism even to at- 
tempt such a trick. 

Senator COHEN. Are we taking advantage of genetic engineering 
for defensive purposes, Dr. Eitzen? 

Dr. Eitzen. Yes, sir. We use those techniques in our laboratories 
in the development of new vaccines and, in fact, are working on a 
number of new vaccines that involve use of recombinant technology 
techniques to develop those. So, yes, sir, that technology certainly 
has both potential good as well as potential bad uses. 

Senator CoHEN. So on the one hand, the technology you can de- 
velop to defend can also be used in an offensive manner? 

Dr. Eitzen. Yes, sir. That is just one example of how many as- 
pects of these technologies have potential dual uses. 

Senator COHEN. Are you aware of a company called the Human 
Genome Sciences? 

Dr. Eitzen. No, Senator. 

Senator COHEN. Anyone here? 

[No response] 



133 

Senator COHEN. Well, I will hold that for later, then. It is a com- 
pany that apparently has made a presentation about a system that 
can rapidly sequence genes and use that information to design vac- 
cmes to viruses and bacteria. I hope at some point you will get the 
same briefing as some of our staff members have had. 

Mr. Chairman, I know we have another panel, at least one more 
witness to testify. I have other questions that perhaps I could sub- 
mit for the record for these fine witnesses. But I think what we 
have done with these hearings is raise the issue to a high enough 
level that we do get the sort of international cooperation that is 
going to be absolutely essential for every country to realize that it 
is not in their economic interest to be transferring technology 
which can contribute to the problem, understanding that you don't 
need necessarily to have high levels of technology. By the same 
token, we ought to do everything in our power to resist that pro- 
liferation. And it is not only a cult which happens to accumulate 
anywhere from $400 million to $1 billion, or whatever the figure 
might be. You also have nations who can have the capital to ac- 
quire these technologies and the various types of either chemical 
or biological agents from existing stockpiles of nations that may be 
under economic pressure to sell them. So it is not only the cult 
groups you have to be concerned about. It is about other nation's 
states who also sponsor terrorism. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NuNN. I want to thank all of you for being here. We will 
have another day of hearings tomorrow, but we are going to con- 
tinue on this subject. Senator Lugar is going to be involved in this 
and Senator Cohen and I for some time to come, because I think 
there are a number of us— hopefully a growing number— that be- 
lieve this is our top national security threat for the years to come 
So we appreciate all of you being here. 
Mr. Olson. Thank you. 
Dr. ElTZEN. Thank you, Senator. 
Mr. Genovese. Thank you. 

Senator NuNN. Our next witness is Yumiko Hiraoka who has in- 
dicated she is a nun, in her words, with the Aum Shinrikyo organi- 
zation and a sect leader in their Nev/ York office. She is here with 
her attorney, Jeremiah Gutman of New York. She has declined the 
Subcommittee's invitation to read or submit a prepared statement 
For the record, I would note that the witness, through her attor- 
ney, has requested that her face be disguised or otherwise ob- 
structed from publication. I had some misgivings about this re- 
quest, studied It carefully. Certainly she is a member, an acknowl- 
edged member of the Aum organization and, indeed, an officer of 
the cult. However, the letter I received from the attorney and the 
conversations the attorney has had with staff— and I will just read 
a couple of paragraphs from the letter, and then I will put the let- 
ter in the record. Quoting from Mr. Gutman, "Given the nature of 
the charges against Aum Shinrikyo and the fact that several of the 
people involved have already pleaded guilty, and given the alarm- 
ing nature of the allegations of homicide and violence made against 
some of the people involved, Ms. Hiraoka and I are extremely con- 
cerned for her safety. It is Kkely that members of Aum Shinrikyo 
will regard Ms. Hiraoka not only as an apostate, but also as a trai- 



134 

tor, and seek to wreak vengeance upon her." And he goes on, and 
I will put the letter in the record. 

In an abundance of precaution, I am going to acknowledge and 
oblige the attorne/s request by having her testify behind an 
opaque screen. This letter will be part of the record. She will be 
brought in the room in a few minutes.^ 

Senator NUNN. I would advise all the media in attendance here 
today that they should not attempt to capture the witness' image 
in violation of the Subcommittee ruling. At this time I would ask 
all media and persons in attendance with cameras or video equip- 
ment to turn them off, turn them to the back of the room, point 
the cameras down as she comes in the room. I will also, say, give 
them time to have a seat at the table, and then I will notify all 
the cameras to — that they can turn their cameras back on at that 
stage. But she will be protected by the screen. 

Now, if I don't have cooperation, I will have to empty the room. 
That will take another 15 to 20 to 30 minutes. I would prefer not 
to do that, but if I don't have complete cooperation, we will do that. 

Although Ms. Hiraoka, though a native Japanese speaker, does 
speak and understand some English, apparently with limitations, 
the Subcommittee because of these limitations has agreed to pro- 
vide her with a translator as needed to assist her in taking the tes- 
timony. 

So I would ask all the cameras to be turned off at this point and 
be turned to the back of the room. If you could not only turn them 
off but turn them to the back of the room, I don't want any of them 
pointing up here. And that would go for still photographs as well. 

At this point I would ask that the witness be brought in. All the 
cameras off? OK. Thank you for your cooperation. The witness will 
be brought in. 

We have Ms. Yuchita, who is the translator, on the far left; our 
witness is in the middle; and then her attorney is on this side. Mr. 
Gutman, as you know, we swear in all the witnesses before our 
Subcommittee. Rather than having your client stand, I will ask her 
to hold up her hand where she is seated, and I would ask the 
translator to explain to her that what I am doing is administering 
the oath. I will go slowly so that you can give her that. 

Would you hold up your right hand, please? Do you swear the 
testimony you will give before this Subcommittee will be the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Ms. Hiraoka. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. Thank you. 

Mr. Gutman, we swear in all the witnesses before the Sub- 
committee, as you know. We also would give your client a chance 
to consult with you on any question that you or she may indicate 
that you need time on. 

So if we ask a question where you or your client feels that you 
need to consult, you would be able to do that, and I would give the 
interpreter a chance to explain that also to the witness. 

Mr. Gutman. Thank you. Senator. 

Senator NUNN. Also, I would ask both the witness and the inter- 
preter to speak into the microphone. Do we have the microphone 



1 The letter appears as Exhibit No. 40. 



135 

up close enough now? If you could lean forward and speak directly 
into the microphone, maybe turn it up, and also the interpreter. 

I will ask the witness to please state your name and your present 
occupation. 

TESTIMONY OF YUMIKO HIRAOKA, AUM SHINRIKYO NUN AND 
SECT LEADER, NEW YORK CITY CHAPTER, ACCOMPANIED BY 
JEREMIAH GUTMAN, ESQ. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. [Interpreted from Japanese.] My name is Yumiko 
Hiraoka. My present occupation is a manager of the New York 
branch of Aum Supreme Truth. 

Senator NuNN. Could you give us your age*^ 

Ms. Hiraoka. Over 30. [Laughter.] 

Senator NuNN. Over 30. Could I ask you if you are under 40*? 

Mr. GuTMAN. You could ask, Senator. 

Senator NuNN. What is your age? 

Senator Cohen. Approximately. 

Senator NuNN. We will give you a leeway of a year or two. Just 
tell us close. 

Ms. Hiraoka. Over 35. 

Senator Nunn. Over 35. OK. Do you have any names other than 
the name you have given us this morning? Do you have any other 
names by which you are known? 

Ms. Hiraoka. My holy name is Suba. 

Senator NuNN. Is that your religious name? 

Ms. Hiraoka. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. So you have a religious name that is Suba? 

]VIs. Hiraoka. Yes. 

Senator Nunn. How long have you had that name*? 

Ms. Hiraoka. About 5 or 6 years. 

Senator NuNN. About 5 or 6 years. Thank you. 

How long have you been a disciple of the Aum Shinrikyo*? 

Ms. Hiraoka. About 8 years. 

.u^ ™*^^ ^^^^- ^^°^* ^ y^^^s. That would mean somewhere in 
the 1986-87 range? 

Ms. Hiraoka. I become monk 

Mr. Gutman. Nun, nun. 

Ms. Hiraoka. I am sorry. Nun, 1988. 
^x^^^^}^^ Nunn. 1988. Now, what do you mean by the word "nun'"? 
What does that mean in the Aum religion? 

Ms. Hiraoka. I renounced home life and I devoted my life to sal- 
vation for the other people. 

Senator NuNN. So the word "nun" means that you have devoted 
your life to the cause? 

Ms Hiraoka. I mean devoting my life to save other people, not 

L(J C Lilts. 

Senator NuNN. You have devoted your life to save other people"? 
Ms. Hiraoka. Yes. ' 

Senator Nunn. But is that a religious term in the Aum reliffion*? 
Ms. Hiraoka. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. Are there many nuns in the Aum religion*? Are 
you one of many, or are there just a few*? 
Ms. Hiraoka. Yes. 
Senator Nunn. There are many? 



136 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Might be reduced now, but my memory is total 
number of nuns and monks were 1,000 people, so probably nuns 
were about 500. 

Senator NUNN. And is a monk the same as a nun? A monk is a 
male and a nun female. Is that correct? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. What caused you to join the Aum organization? 

If you could interpret that for us? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I wanted to work for the other people for a long 
time, and also my primary motivation to be a nun was to save the 
other people, and also Master Asahara recommended me to be a 
nun. 

Senator NuNN. Who recommended? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Master Asahara. 

Senator NuNN. Asahara. And you met him where? Where did you 
meet him — Mr. Asahara? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. In Japan. 

Senator NuNN. In Japan? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes, in my town. 

Senator NuNN. In your town in Japan? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NUNN. And was he a religious leader at the time you 
met him? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes, he was. 

Senator Nunn. Did you hear him make a talk? Did you hear him 
make a speech, or did you meet him on a personal basis? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I listened to his lecture and after that I met him 
on a personal basis. 

Senator NuNN. Did he give a lecture at a university or was it a 
town meeting? Where did you hear him lecture? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. At a small town meeting. 

Senator Nunn. Small town meeting. Did many other people join 
at that time, or were you one of the few? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Many. 

Senator NuNN. Many? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Quite many. 

Senator NuNN. Quite a few. What did you do prior to joining the 
Aum? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I went to junior college to study English literature, 
and then after the graduation, I taught English to little children. 

Senator NUNN. You taught English. If you could go ahead, and 
when you are giving an answer, even if it is in Japanese, would 
you please just speak to the microphone so we hear your descrip- 
tion and then we hear the interpreter? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Oh, OK. To her? 

Senator NuNN. Just speak into the microphone, and then she 
will pick it up. 

Mr. GUTMAN. When you speak in Japanese, speak loud enough 
so the microphone hears it, and then 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I see. OK. 

Senator NuNN. When did you start working for the Aum? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. After becoming a monk — a nun. 

Senator NuNN. After you became a nun? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 



137 

Senator NUNN. And that was in about 1988? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. Did you become a nun immediately upon joining 
the organization? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. One month after. 

Senator Nunn. One month after. And did you accept full-time 
employment? Was that a full-time job? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Oh, yes. 

Senator NuNN. A full-time job. Had you by that stage graduated 
from college? What was your education? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes, I graduated from junior college already at the 
time. 

Senator Nunn. From junior college. Now, how long did you stay 
in Japan after you went to work for the Aum organization? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. About 4 years. 

Senator NuNN. OK. If I could ask the interpreted also, when you 
are interpreting what I am saying, if you could just go ahead and 
speak in the microphone, I think it is easy to understand for the 
people who are not seeing who is saying what, whether you are in- 
terpreting or whether she is giving direct testimony. 

For 1 year; was that right? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. About 4 years. 

Senator NuNN. About 4 years. When did you come to the United 
States? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. OK. First time to here is 1989. 

Senator NuNN. And how long did you stay at that stage? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Around 1 year and a half. 

Senator NuNN. About a year and a half? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. And what was your job then? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Assistant. 

Senator NuNN. Assistant? And where were you located? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. At the time, our New York branch was in Soho in 
New York. 

Senator NuNN. In New York. Did you have an office in New 
York? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator Nunn. And who was — ^you were assistant. Who was your 
immediate supervisor? Who was your superior? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Manager changes quite frequently, but the man- 
ager of the New York City branch office was my boss. 

Senator Nunn. And what was his name? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Mr. Joyu Fumihiro and another person is 

Senator Nunn. Mr. Joyn? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. And Ms. Hagesawa. 

Senator Nunn. Now, how long were you assistant? How long 
were you in the position of being assistant? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. One year and a half. 

Senator Nunn. One year and a half. Then what happened? Did 
you stay in New York? Did you become the full manager or leader*? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I went back to Japan. 

Senator Nunn. Went back to Japan. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I went back to Japan. 



138 

Senator NuNN. And how long did you stay in Japan at that 
stage? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Around 2 or 3 years. 

Senator NuNN. And when did you come back to the United 
States'^ 

Ms. HiRAOKA. 1993. 

Senator NUNN. 1993. And what was your position when you 
came back? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. New York branch manager. 

Senator NuNN. You called your position manager? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. And at that stage you were the boss? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. In the United States. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. Was anyone else in the United States above you, 
or were you the top person? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. At that time or right now? 

Senator NuNN. At that time. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. At that time I was the manager at the top. 

Senator NuNN. And were there any other offices other than New 
York? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. At the time? 

Senator NuNN. Yes. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. Where were the other offices? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I'm sorry. 

Mr. GUTMAN. Other than in New York. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I made a mistake. We only have our one office in 
New York. 

Senator NUNN. So when you came back in 1993, you had only 
one office and that office was in New York and you were the man- 
ager of that office? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. So you were the top person located in the United 
States in 1993? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NUNN. Are you still in that position today? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. You are the top person in the United States today 
of the Aum organization? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. And who do you report to back in Japan? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. About what? 

Mr. GUTMAN. Who gives you orders? Who tells you what to do? 

Senator NUNN. Who is your boss in Japan? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Depending on the contents, it is different. 

Senator NUNN. Different people. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Different person, yes. 

Senator NuNN. Go ahead and talk into the microphone. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. However, I tried to talk to the higher stage, higher 
level people, so I usually consult with the wife of Master Asahara. 

Senator NuNN. The wife of Master Asahara? 



139 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. The wife of Master Asahara, I consult with 
Master Asahara, so through his wife I consulted Master Asahara. 

Senator NUNN. Do you still communicate with him through his 
wife today now that he is going through the trial? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. No. 

Senator NuNN. Well, you don't communicate with her anymore 
now? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. No, I don't. I didn't communicate with her. I didn't 
communicate with the wife of Master Asahara. 

Senator NuNN. You did or did not? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Did not. 

Senator NuNN. Did not. Well, I understood you to say you did 
communicate with her. 

Mr. GUTMAN. Up to a certain point. 

Senator NuNN. All right. Maybe you could tell us when you 
stopped communicating with her. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Since there was an accident in Japan. 

Senator NuNN. Since the attack in Japan? Since the accident? 
You said accident in Japan? 

Mr. GuTMAN. That's what she— that's how she translated it. 

Senator NuNN. You said accident in Japan. And you mean by 
that the subway 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes, yes. 

Senator NuNN [continuing]. Chemical 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN [continuingl . Tragedy that happened in Japan 
where people were killed? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. And you termed that an accident? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I'm sorry. I meant it— I meant the accident as 
sarin gas attack. 

Senator NuNN. The accident on sarin gas. Now, since that, in 
your term, accident in March of 1995, with whom have you commu- 
nicated? Who is your boss since then? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Since then I don't have — I don't understand who 
is my immediate boss anymore. I don't have a clear understanding. 
So depending on the contents of the question, I consult it to the ap- 
propriate person. 

Senator Nunn. But there are several people you still talk to on 
the phone or by correspondence? You still are in touch with people 
in Japan in the Aum organization today? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. Not often, but yes. 

Senator NuNN. How do you communicate? Mainly by telephone, 
is that right? j j t^ 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes, over the telephone or fax. 

Senator NuNN. Fax or telephone. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator Nunn. Now, what are your duties with the Aum organi- 
zation? What are your responsibilities? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. In the New York branch? 

Mr. GuTMAN. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. Well, or any other duties you may have, New 
York branch, but other duties also? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. OK. New York. 



140 

The main activity of the New York branch office is the rehgious 
activities. We also deal with book sales, the Aum publishment. We 
teach the members and non-members yoga and meditation method 
and teach the law of the truth or Buddhist dogma, and the purpose 
of that is to have a spiritual development of the other people. 

Rarely, I was asked to check and do the research from Japan. 
Most of them are to purchase the books on Buddhism and purchase 
of the videos of the Buddhism. 

Senator NUNN. How many books do you sell in a year? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. It is about 100 books per year in New York City 
but it is — whole United States. 

Senator NuNN. About 100 books a year? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NUNN. What price do you sell the books for? What is the 
price? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Depending on the book, it's different. 

Senator NuNN. Just the range. 

Mr. GUTMAN. What's the cheapest and the highest? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. OK. The cheapest is $6.95. Highest is $14. 

Senator NuNN. How much do you get paid? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Me? 

Mr. GUTMAN. Yes. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I don't have a payment. I don't have a salary. They 
give me pocket money. 

Senator NuNN. Pocket money. 

Mr. GUTMAN. Tell him how much. 

Senator Nunn. They pay all your expenses, your expenses for liv- 
ing in New York? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes, for the rent, Aum Shinrikyo is pa3dng for my 
rent. 

Senator NuNN. Pays the rent. How many people work for you? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Right now? I'm the only one staff. 

Senator NuNN. What about in 1993 when you first took over as 
manager? How many people did you have working for you then? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Two people. 

Senator NuNN. Two people? And how were they paid? Did you 
pay them? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. None of them had regular salary. 

Senator NuNN. You just also paid them with what you call pock- 
et money? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes, they received pocket money. 

Senator Nunn. Is that paid with a check or is it paid with cash? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Cash. 

Senator NuNN. Cash. And where do you get the cash? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Where did I get the cash from? 

Senator NuNN. Who gives you the cash? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I was the one who got it. 

Senator NuNN. Well, where did you get the cash from that you 
gave them? Where did you get your cash from? Where was it — from 
where was the cash derived? From whom? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. In New York branch office, our income source was 
the donation of the members and support from the Japanese Aum 
Supreme Court. 



141 

Senator NuNN. But when you got cash, was that cash sent to 
your from Japan, or was it cash raised from members in this coun- 
try, or both? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Both. 

[Witness confers with counsel.] 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I'm sorry. I can't get your questions. I can't get 
your point. ^ 

Senator NuNN. Well, let's go ahead to another question How 
many members did you recruit? How many members of the Aum 
do you have now? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Around 25. 

Senator NuNN. In the United States? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. About 25 members? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. Very small group. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Very small. 

Senator NuNN. And how many of those people are paid by the 
Aum? f J 

Ms. HiRAOKA. The 25 members mentioned are the members but 
they are not monk nor nun, so they don't receive any money from 
Aum Supreme Court. 

Senator NuNN. OK. So they do not receive pay, then Thev are 
just -^ 

Ms. HiRAOKA. No. 

Senator NuNN. They are members. 

Mr. GUTMAN. Tell him how much you get 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Money? 

Senator NuNN. Yes. Approximately how much pocket money do 
you get a year? -^ 

Ms. HiRAOKA. For monk and nun? 
Mr. GuTMAN. You, personally. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. OK. One month is $80. Eighty dollars 
Senator NuNN. Eighty dollars how often? 
Ms. HiRAOKA. One month. 
Senator NuNN. One month. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. This is the pocket money from monk and nun 
Senator NuNN. Can you live off of $80 a month? 
Ms. HiRAOKA. Because only for my belonging 
Senator NuNN. OK. They pay your rent*? 
Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 
Senator NuNN. They pay your rent 
Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

^®"^^^^o^^^^- ^^ y^" live near your office? Do you live near 
your office? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. In the office. I live in the office 
Senator NuNN. You live in the office"? 
Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 
^.^enator NuNN. Who is the leader of the Aum organization world- 
Ms. HiRAOKA. I think Master Shoko Asahara 
Senator NuNN. Master Asahara"? 
Ms. HiRAOKA. Master Shoko Asahara. 
Senator NuNN. Is he also known as Matsumoto"? 



142 

Ms. HiRAOKA. His real name is Chizuo Matsumoto. 

Senator NUNN. His real name is Matsumoto? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Matsumoto. 

Senator NuNN. And Asahara is a religious name? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I don't know. 

Senator NuNN. You don't know. Did Mr. Asahara authorize the 
opening of the New York office? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. At that time I was not there, so I was not sure, 
but I think so. 

Senator NuNN. Do you know how many members there were in 
other parts of the world, or is your knowledge mainly limited to 
New York? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Before the sarin gas attack in Japan, I heard that 
in Russia there are 30,000 members and in Germany there are one 
or two, and about 100 members in Sri Lanka, but it might be a dif- 
ferent number now. 

Senator NuNN. Did you talk to other members in other parts of 
the world frequently, like Germany? Did you talk to people that be- 
longed to Aum in Germany? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Very rarely I talked to the people in branch office 
in Germany. 

Senator NUNN. Did you hear Mr. Asahara preach or give lectures 
about a battle with the United States, between Japan and the 
United States? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator Nunn. And did you hear that when you first joined the 
Aum? When did you hear him give those lectures about a battle be- 
tween Japan and the United States? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I listened to him lecturing about U.S. about war 
in 2 years — in these 2 years. 

Senator NuNN. Which 2 years? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Most recent. 

Senator NuNN. Most recently? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. Did he give this kind of lecture when you first 
joined in 1988, or was it just in the most recent 2 years? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Only recently, not in the past. 

Senator NuNN. Could you tell us about that in your own words? 
Could you describe what he was predicting? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. About the war between Japan and America? 

Senator NuNN. Yes. What did he say about that? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. The Japanese economic situation will be stag- 
nated, and there will be a war in Japan and many Japanese people 
will be harmed. 

Senator NuNN. Did he say that the war would be with the Unit- 
ed States? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes, he did. 

Senator NuNN. So it was going to be a war between Japan and 
the United States? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. When did he predict this would occur? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I don't recall the exact date, but I guess I heard 
it will occur in a few years. 

Senator NuNN. In the next few years? 



143 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. Did you believe that? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. At that time when I heard the lecture, I believed 
that. But now I started to doubt it. 

Senator Nunn. When did you start to doubt that? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Recently when there was the trial in Japan, I 
began to doubt Master Asahara's prediction, whether it's true or 
not. 

Senator Nunn. Could you tell us what you know about the sub- 
way— in your words, you called it an accident— the subway accident 
that occurred in March of 1995 in Tokyo? Could you tell us what 
you know about that? 

Mr. GUTMAN. If I may, Senator, I realize that the word "accident" 
was used in the translation, but if we could go back, what is the 
Japanese word she used and was it really "accident" or "incident" 
or something else? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. All I know about that sarin gas attack is through 
the media and what I listened — what I heard. 

Senator Nunn. Just your news media reports is all you kr-nw*? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator Nunn. No one called you from Tokyo or anywhere else 
and explained to you what happened? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. No. 

Senator Nunn. Did you intend to use the word "accident"? 

Mr. GuTMAN. You understand the difference between "accident" 
and "incident"? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. My English is not good. I'm sorry. 

Senator NuNN. Right, right. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. That's why maybe "accident" is not right word. 

Senator Nunn. So you mean to use the word "incident"*? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. Yes. 

Senator NUNN. I was going to ask you if you had any reason to 
believe it was an accident rather than a deliberate attack 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I don't know. 

Senator Nunn. You don't know? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I don't know. 

Senator NuNN. Did anyone ever call you from Japan after March 
of 1995 in the Aum organization or otherwise and explain to you 
what had happened in that Tokyo tragedy? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. No. 

Senator Nunn. No one ever did? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. No. 

Senator Nunn. Did you talk to Mr. Asahara after March of 1995? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I don't remember clearly. I don't remember if that 
was before or after the accident— after that sarin attack, but only 
once he called me 

Mr. Gutman. There again we have the word "accident." I don't 
think that is what she 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Incident. 

Mr. Gutman. Incident. 

Senator Nunn. Incident. So you did talk to him, but you do not 
know whether it was before or after March of 1995*? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Probably after the March 20. 



144 

Senator NUNN. You think you talked — you believe you talked to 
Mr. Asahara after the March 1995 attack? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. He called me, yes. 

Senator NuNN. He called you? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. Can you tell us what he told you? 

Mr. GUTMAN. Simply, what did he say to you? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I was asked to tell one statement to the American 
media. 

Senator NuNN. And what was that statement? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I don't think I can remember very well. 

Senator NuNN. Just tell us what you remember, your best mem- 
ory of what he told you. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Master Asahara said, the statement was 

Senator NuNN. Excuse me. Talk right into the mike, if you 
would. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. It's a kind of religious suppression, and we are the 
earnest Buddhist organization. So we have no relation to that 
Tokyo gas attack. 

Senator NuNN. When you say that he told you it's a kind of a 
religious operation — is that what you said? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Religious suppression. 

Senator NuNN. Suppression. What do you mean by it's a kind of 
religious suppression? What does that mean? 

[Witness confers with counsel. 1 

Mr. GUTMAN. She doesn't really understand the question. 

Senator NuNN. Well, we are just really trying to get her to say 
in her own words what he told her. 

Mr. GUTMAN. I understand. 

Senator NuNN. That is the question. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. He meant — the religious suppression means that 
the people — the Japanese Government blame Aum for the Tokyo 
gas attack. 

Senator NuNN. Did you talk lo him just one time, or did you talk 
to him several times after the March 1995 attack? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. That was only one time. 

Senator NuNN. Only one time. And he called you? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. Have you talked to his wife since March of 1995? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. No. 

Senator NuNN. Do you know Mr. Hiramatsu? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. Was he a member of the Aum organization? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. He was monk. 

Senator NUNN. He was a monk. Was he in Japan or was he in 
the United States? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. In Japan. 

Senator NuNN. He was in Japan? Was he a higher rank than 
you? Was he your boss? Did you report to him? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. He was a little bit higher than me. 

Senator NuNN. He was a little higher up? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NUNN. Did he give you directions? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 



145 

Senator NuNN. He gave you instructions? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator Nunn. Did Mr. Hiramatsu ask you to help him buy cer- 
tain goods from America? 

[Counsel confers with witness.] 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Mr. Hiramatsu told me on the phone and by fax- 
he gave me the direction to do this and to do that, so I followed 
his directions. 

Senator NuNN. So he was the person you took directions from in 
terms of making purchases in the United States? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator Nunn. Did you know, do you know a company by the 
name of Maha Posya? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Maha Posya? 

Senator Nunn. Maha Posya. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator Nunn. Could you tell us what you know about that com- 
pany? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. All I know is they are selling the computers. 

Senator NuNN. They are? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Selling the computers. 

Senator NuNN. Selling computers. Are you familiar with a cor- 
poration in Connecticut by the name of Zygo? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I have heard of it. 

Senator NuNN. Did you have conversations with Zygo? Did you 
try to make purchases there? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I called up them because Mr. Hiramatsu or Mr. 
Maki— I don't remember clearly— gave me the direction. 

Senator NUNN. Excuse me. Would you repeat that? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Mr. Hiramatsu or Mr. Maki— I don't remember 
which one— gave me the direction, and I followed their direction, 
and I contacted them. 

Senator Nunn. So you did contact Zygo Corporation? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. And you were taking direction from Mr. 
Hiramatsu? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Either Mr. Hiramatsu or Mr. Maki. I don't remem- 
ber. 

Senator Nunn. Someone. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Someone. 

Senator NuNN. And they told you what to buy; then you tried to 
buy it. Is that right? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes, he just— yes, he gave me that in a fax to— 
he sent a fax to me to do something, so I just did what he told me 
to do. 

Senator NuNN. Did you assist Mr. Hiramatsu in his attempt to 
purchase a very expensive laser measuring device? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. As for the purchase of this machine, I don't re- 
member it clearly. 

Senator Nunn. You don't? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Remember it clearly. 

Senator Nunn. You did try to purchase that type machine 
though; is that right? 



146 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I don't remember. Some kind of machine, but I 
don't remember. 

Senator NuNN. You don't remember what kind of machine? You 
did try to make purchases from Zygo Corporation, though; is that 
right? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I just followed the direction from Japan. 

IWitness confers with counsel.] 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Usually, this process — I will explain how I commu- 
nicate, how I get the direction, and how I follow the direction from 
Mr. Maki and Mr. Hiramatsu. 

Senator NuNN. OK. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. When I received fax from Mr. Maki or Mr. 
Hiramatsu, fax, I just simply cut out the Japanese part at the top, 
and I send the company the — I make a copy, then I send the fax 
to them. 

Senator NuNN. Did you know what the use of this equipment 
was intended to be? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I don't know. 

Senator NuNN. You didn't know about that? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I didn't know about that. 

Senator NuNN. Did you ever ask the question, what is this going 
to be used for? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I just 

Senator NUNN. The question is: Did you know that these devices 
that you were attempting to purchase based on the orders you had 
gotten were devices that could be used for military purposes? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I didn't know that. 

Senator Nunn. You did not know that? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I didn't know that. 

Senator NuNN. Did you have any discussions with the people in 
Japan about how they were going to use this equipment? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. No. 

Senator NuNN. You did not? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. No. 

Senator NuNN. So your testimony is you were simply carrying 
out their orders? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator Nunn. Are you familiar with a company called Bios)mn 
Technologies, Inc.? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes, I heard of that. 

Senator NuNN. You've heard of that? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. Did you make an order there? Did you try to 
make some purchases there? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I follow the same procedure as I explained before. 
I got the direction from Japan, and I follow the direction. 

Senator NUNN. Did you know what the equipment would be used 
for? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I don't know. 

Senator Nunn. You did not. Do you recall being asked by Mr. 
Hiramatsu or Mr. Maki to find out about how to make military 
knives? 

[Counsel confers with witness.] 



147 

Ms. HiRAOKA. What I remember about this subject is I remember 
either Mr. Maki or Mr. Hiramatsu contacting me, and they told me 
that in order to make an army knife in Japan, they are looking for 
steel. And they told me the specific thickness and weight to make 
the army knife. 

Senator NuNN. Did you try to purchase steel? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. At that time I contacted many companies to look 
for the specific steel. 

Senator Nunn. How much was the quantity? What quantity of 
steel? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I don't remember it well, but something with tons 

Senator NUNN. Tons of steel. Tons, lots of steel? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I don't remember. 

Senator Nunn. You don't remember exactly. Did Mr. Hiramatsu 
come to New York and take documents after the March 1995 at- 
tack? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator Nunn. He came to your office? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NUNN. Do you remember when that was? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Around March or — around March. 

Senator Nunn. In March of 1995? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. March or April or 

Senator Nunn. Did he take most of the paper and documents in 
your office? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Not all of them, but something related to his busi- 
ness. 

Senator Nunn. He took most of the documents relating to the 
purchasing? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NUNN. And most of the financial records? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes, financial records and bank records. 

Senator NuNN. He took most of the documents relating to pur- 
chasing most of the financial records and most of the bank records? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Also by faxing and correspondence. 

Senator Nunn. And most of the faxes going back and forth*? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator Nunn. Did you say yes? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator Nunn. Did he tell you why? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Because New York branch office might be inves- 
tigated by police. 

Senator NuNN. Might be investigated by police and that's the 
reason he took the records. 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. Did he indicate that they might be investigated 
relating to the March attack in Tokyo? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. No, he didn't say anything. 

Senator Nunn. He didn't say anything about that? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. No. 

Senator NuNN. Did anyone in the Aum organization ever tell 
you— anyone, not just the one we have talked about— that the at- 
tack in Tokyo had been carried out by the Aum organization*? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. From Japan or 



148 

Senator NUNN. Any member of the organization? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. No. I told you, I got only this information through 
media. 

Mr. GUTMAN. So the question is did anyone of them ever say to 
you, yes, we did it? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Oh. No, I haven't heard any. 

Senator NuNN. Nobody ever told you they carried out the attack? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. No. I didn't. 

Senator NuNN. If Mr. Hiramatsu or Mr. Maki called you today 
and asked you to contact U.S. companies to buy equipment, would 
you carry out those orders? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. No. 

Senator NUNN. You would not? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. No. 

Senator Nunn. Why? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Because — well, let me tell you my feeling. We are 
strict Buddhists, and we follow — we strictly follow non-violence. We 
don't even kill insects. And we are hoping for the people's liberation 
from the suffering. 

But if part of Aum Shinrikyo people did — were involved in sarin 
attack and other incidents, accidents, I truly regret it, and I am 
really feeling sad about it. 

[Pause.] 

Mr. GUTMAN. Can you catch up with that? 

Senator NuNN. Yes, why don't you tell us what she said now at 
this point? 

Ms. HiRAOKA. I have been watching the trial very closely, and 
until Aum prove its innocence definitely, I do not — I don't think I 
should — I should be reserved. 

Senator NuNN. Thank you for testifying. We appreciate your tes- 
timony, and we may need to get back in touch with you through 
your attorney. 

Mr. Gutman, we appreciate your cooperation. 

Mr. Gutman. Thank you for your courtesy. ' 

Ms. HiRAOKA. Thank you. 

Senator NuNN. We will have all the cameras now turned away, 
and we will resume this hearing tomorrow morning. When all the 
cameras have been turned away, you can have the witness leave 
the room. 

I have to go vote, so I am going to leave. 

Mr. Gutman. Thank you. Senator. 

Senator Nunn. We will include in the record a letter from the 
Australian Embassy.^ 

[Whereupon, at 2:31 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 



• The letter appears as Exhibit No. 13b in the Appendix on page 608. 



GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION 



WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1995 

U.S. Senate, 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room 
342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens, presiding. 

Present: Senators Stevens, Nunn, Cohen, Cochran, Glenn, and 
Levin. Also present: Senator Lugar [ex officio]. 

Staff Present: Daniel S. Gelber, Chief Counsel to the Minority; 
John F. Sopko, Deputy Chief Counsel to the Minority; Mary D. 
Robertson, Assistant Chief Clerk to the Minority; Alan Edelman, 
Counsel to the Minority; Mark Webster, Investigator to the Minor- 
ity; Renee Pruneau-Novakoff (Detailee, CIA); Richard Kennan 
(Detailee, U.S. Customs); Harold DameHn, Chief Counsel and Staff 
Director; Eric Thorson, Chief Investigator; Michael Bopp, Counsel; 
Stephen H. Levin, Counsel; Carla J. Martin, Chief Clerk; Mary 
Ailes, Staff Assistant; Katherine O'Connor, Receptionist; Albert 
McDermott (Governmental Affairs Committee); Randy Rydell (Sen- 
ator Glenn); Matt Sikes (Senator Nunn); Jim Bodner (Senator 
Cohen); Ken Myers (Senator Lugar); Rick Valentine (Senator 
Smith); Leonard Weiss (Governmental Affairs Committee); and 
Matthew Sikes (Senator Levin). 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STEVENS 

Senator Stevens. Good morning. Yesterday, during the opening 
day of these hearings, the Committee heard detailed testimony re- 
garding how the Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese religious cult with 
members worldwide, apparently carried out chemical weapons at- 
tacks on the people of Japan. Yesterda/s testimony painted a 
gloomy picture of how easily an organization bent on destruction 
can arm itself with chemical and biological weapons and how even 
the crude deployment of these weapons can be deadly. 

The Aum's chemical weapons attacks portray the threat from the 
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons as very much a re- 
ality, one that the United States and all nations must be aware of, 
must prepare for, and must work against. 

Today, this Committee turns from the shocking activities alleg- 
edly undertaken by the Aum to an examination of how we can min- 
imize such threats and whether we are prepared to respond to 
them if the need arises. Our witnesses will examine the problems 
experienced by the states of the former Soviet Union in protecting 

(149) 



150 

their massive chemical and biological weapons stockpiles, problems 
exacerbated by their struggles to adjust to democratic governments 
and market economics. 

The Committee will also hear from representatives of the agen- 
cies that have the Federal responsibility for combatting the threat 
of and responding to terrorist incidents, particularly those that in- 
volve weapons of mass destruction. After yesterday's disturbing tes- 
timony, we are all looking forward to hearing how well prepared 
we are to deal with the threat of chemical or biological weapons at- 
tack with the hope that we may determine what else our citizens 
must do to protect themselves and ourselves against this threat. 

Again, Senator Nunn, I commend you for these hearings and the 
minority staff for conducting the investigation. This is a difficult 
period for us. I go to another committee chairmanship and will 
probably not be back today, although I will try to get back. I do 
hope that you will call upon us if there is anything we can do to 
assist you, but once again, I turn the gavel over to you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR NUNN 

Senator Nunn [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
I know you are going to have to come and go during these hearings, 
Mr. Chairman, but I want to thank you very much and thank Sen- 
ator Roth and all the cooperation we have had from the majority. 

This Subcommittee has been unique for years. Senator Roth has 
been Chairman of it. I have been Chairman of it. I have been rank- 
ing member and he has been ranking member and we have always 
run it on a non-partisan basis. The minority has a much smaller 
staff, but we are able to run our own investigations in close concert 
and coordination with the majority. So in many ways, this is a 
unique Subcommittee. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much your 
splendid cooperation. 

I might also say, Senator Stevens, that your role on the Appro- 
priations Committee in dealing with the funding for the various 
elements of our nonproliferation effort is absolutely crucial and you 
have been a stalwart in supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduc- 
tion Program, the Nunn-Lugar program, and all of the programs 
that are dealing with these matters that we are going to hear dur- 
ing the course of the day, some of the soft spots and some of the 
areas where we really need to beef up. 

I thank you for what you have already done. You have been a 
real leader in this area and I know that we will continue to work 
together very closely. Senator Cohen and Senator Lugar are here 
again today and they have been, of course, leaders in this whole 
effort on nonproliferation also. 

Yesterday, we established the frightening case of the Aum 
Shinrikyo, the doomsday cult that carried out the sarin gas attack 
on the Tokyo subway system in March of this year, killing 12 and 
injuring over 5,000. The testimony showed this cult, which 
preached a philosophy of Armageddon between the United States 
and Japan, was a clear danger not only to the Japanese govern- 
ment but also to the security interest of the United States. 

As we heard yesterday, the Aum was a worldwide organization 
with tens of thousands of members, including scientists and tech- 
nical experts in Japan and Russia who were recruited to develop 



151 

weapons of mass destruction. The cult produced chemical weapons, 
including toxic chemical agents such as sarin, VX, phosgene, and 
sodium cyanide and had successfully used sarin on at least two oc- 
casions against large groups of innocent civilians. The Aum sci- 
entists were in the process of developing biological weapons, includ- 
ing anthrax, botulinum toxin, and "Q" fever. 

The cult actively engaged in obtaining sensitive technologies in 
the United States. We heard the leader of the cult from New York 
yesterday admit that she had engaged in purchasing technology to 
assist in weapons development, and they had acquired conventional 
armaments and attempted to acquire technology relating to weap- 
ons of mass destruction and technologies from the former Soviet 
Union as well as elsewhere. 

The Aum produces a remarkable example of the threat modern 
terrorism poses to all civihzed nations. The cult's rise and its ef- 
forts to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction raise numer- 
ous policy issues, however, that extend well beyond the specific 
threat posed by Asahara and his followers. The ease with which 
the Aum accessed the vast international supermarket of weapons 
and weapons technology is particularly troubling, especially in light 
of the current state of the economies and governments of the 
former Soviet Union. 

How much this cult acquired that we do not know about and how 
much more they could have obtained is a major unanswered ques- 
tion. How much the next group may be able to acquire is perhaps 
an even more important question. 

We will explore some of these issues with our first panel this 
morning as they discuss the security and accountability of chemical 
and biological weapon stockpiles in the former Soviet Union and 
the effectiveness of various arms control and nonproliferation re- 
gimes. Included in this panel is a former Russian chemical weap- 
ons scientist who will discuss his concerns with the controls over 
the massive stockpiles of weapons in Russia. 

Another troubling aspect of this case is that despite the Aum's 
overt and far-flung activities, no U.S. law enforcement or intel- 
ligence agency perceived them as dangerous, much less a threat to 
national security, prior to the March 20 subway attack this year. 
How does a fanatic intent on triggering an Armageddon between 
the United States and Japan with virtually unlimited funds and a 
worldwide network of operatives escape the notice of Western intel- 
ligence and law enforcement? What happened to the coordination 
between the United States and Japan? 

These are important and disturbing questions which we will ex- 
plore with our second panel later this morning. They include Gov- 
ernment representatives from law enforcement, the intelligence 
community, and public health services. 

The case of the Aum can provide us with many instructive les- 
sons about weapons proliferation, about the capabilities and hmita- 
tions of intelligence and law enforcement, and about the adequacy 
of our medical and civil preparedness. It is my hope, Mr. Chair- 
man, that with this set of hearings we will begin the important 
process of learning these lessons. 



152 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COHEN 

Senator Cohen. Thank you very much, Senator Nunn. 

As Senator Stevens indicated yesterday, because of your long 
work in this area and your leadership in this area, it is appropriate 
that you, in fact, should be serving as Chairman of the hearing. I 
think your statement has covered the basic elements that we wish 
to pursue this morning and we should proceed, unless, Senator 
Lugar, would you like to make a statement? 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR 

Senator Lugar. I have just a short statement, Mr. Chairman, 
and I will not cover the same ground that Senator Nunn has cov- 
ered. 

We were told yesterday that the Japanese cult was "not on the 
radar screen" of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies be- 
fore the sarin gas attack. That is surprising, considering the cult 
had accumulated over $1 billion in assets and established offices in 
six countries on four continents. Obviously, the response of the 
United States to this threat has not begun to approximate our 
stakes in the matter. 

A new level of commitment, effort, and resources is required, and 
that obviously is the basic reason for this hearing today. We need 
an effective mechanism to integrate the full range of policy tools in 
order to address effectively the dangers to our country from the 
proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction. 

I look forward to hearing the panelists. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows :1 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LUGAR 

Yesterday, we heard testimony on the worldwide activities of the so-called Japa- 
nese "Dooms-Day Cult." We were told that the Japanese cult was not "on the radar 
screen" of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies before the sarin gas attack 
on the Tokyo subway last March. This is surprising, considering the cult accumu- 
lated over $1 billion in assets and established offices in six countries on four con- 
tinents. 

Cult members actively recruited scientists and technical experts in Japan, Russia, 
and elsewhere in order to develop weapons of mass destruction. They succeeded in 
producing chemical weapons, including toxic chemical agents such as Sarin, VX, and 
sodium cyanide; and they were in the process of developing biological weapons, in- 
cluding anthrax, botulism, and "Q" fever. 

We learned how close we came to witnessing acts of nuclear, chemical, and bio- 
logical terrorism directed toward the United States. We were told how much more 
devastating the attacks in Tokyo could have been if the cult had simply waited a 
little longer and perfected their delivery systems. While the probability of a large 
scale nuclear, chemical, and biological exchanges between Russia and the United 
States has mercifully decreased since the end of the cold War, the probability of one 
or several weapons of mass destruction detonating in Japan, Russia, Europe, the 
Middle East or even the United States has increased. 

This morning, we must look to the future to determine what the United States 
and its friends and allies must do to guard against such threats. The United States 
must devise a program of action that is as focused, serious, and vigorous as our 
strategy during the Cold War. If we do not, then I believe the United States has 
every reason to anticipate acts of nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism against 
American targets before this decade is out. 

To date, the U.S. response to this new threat has not even begun to approximate 
U.S. stakes in the matter. A new level of commitment, effort, and resources is re- 
quired. We need a multifaceted, integrated strategic response to the challenge of 
technology diffusion. 



153 

It is clear to me following yesterday's hearing that what we need today is an effec- 
tive mechanism to integrate the full range of policy tools in order to address effec- 
tively the dangers to this country from the proliferation of weapons and materials 
of mass destruction. 

During the course of yesterday's hearings, several Members focused on the need 
for effective inelligence in countering proliferation successfully. 

Some witnesses yesterday emphasized the need for effective defense programs in 
order to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

We have also dealt in other hearings with the use of military force to deal with 
the problem of proliferation. 

Subcommittee staff discussed yesterday the utilization of export controls as a cen- 
terpiece of U.S. nonproliferation efforts. 

And lastly, reference was made repeatedly during yesterday's hearing to the sev- 
eral contributions that arms control treaties and agreements can make to the fight 
against proliferation. Senator Nunn and I both cited the Chemical Weapons Conven- 
tion that has been submitted to the Senate, and asked what contribution that Con- 
vention might have made in dealing with the circumstances that gave rise to the 
Tokyo subway attack. 

We all recognize that, as with any other policy instrument, arms control and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention in particular, is not the total answer. No one should 
expect the CWC to carry more of a burden than it was intended to bear. By the 
same token, the CWC may help us to reduce the scope of the chemical problem to 
more manageable proportions, and, for that reason, it must be considered in com- 
bination with other policy tools. 

I would hope that we might explore with our witnesses today an appropriate 
package of policy tools that will aid us in coping with a threat that is real and that 
will be with us for many years to come. 

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

Senator Nunn. We swear in all the witnesses for our Subcommit- 
tee, so if all of you will rise and raise your right hand and take 
the oath. 

Do you swear the testimony you give before this Subcommittee 
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so 
help you, God? 

Ms. Smithson. I do. 

Dr. Mirzayanov. I do. 

Mr. Leitenberg. I do. 

Mr. MoODiE. I do. 

Senator Nunn. Thank you. I believe this morning we are going 
to lead off, Mr. Chairman, with Amy Smithson, who is a Senior As- 
sociate at the Henry L. Stimson Center. Amy, we are glad to have 
you this morning. 

TESTIMONY OF AMY E. SMITHSON, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 
HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER 

Ms. Smithson. Thank you very much. 

Because we have lived under the shadow of a potential nuclear 
holocaust for over half a century, an incredible amount of time and 
energy has been focused on preventing the accidental or intentional 
launch of nuclear weapons. Few would argue that this was not 
time well spent, but it is often the less-obvious threat that mate- 
rializes. Therefore, I would like to thank this Committee for look- 
ing into the threat that chemical and biological weapons pose to 
the safety and security of U.S. soldiers and citizens. 

Since the end of the Cold War has pulled us back from the nu- 
clear brink, the threat that we face from chemical and biological 
weapons is equally, if not more, tangible than the nuclear weapons 
threat. This argument gains credibility in the aftermath of recent 
events in Tokyo. The testimony that we heard yesterday was quite 



154 

shocking, and this event was a wake-up call for me. In fact, it 
prompted me to examine more closely the security of Russia's 
chemical weapons stockpile, which even at the declared level of 
40,000 metric tons is the world's largest. 

Russia's declared stockpile is stored at seven different sites, as 
this map shows. I interviewed individuals who had been to four of 
these seven sites. The results of my research are presented in my 
prepared statement, which I will summarize for you now. 

Senator NuNN. All of your complete statements will be part of 
the record and entered into the record, so your summaries will 
highlight that and your complete statement will be in the record. 
I have read the statements, as well. 

Ms. Smithson. Thank you. Physical security is a catch-all term 
for the barriers, such as fences, that are supposed to impede an at- 
tack on one of these sites until the guards can respond. The phys- 
ical security at these sites is not nearly as abundant nor as ad- 
vanced as the measures one would find at sensitive Western mili- 
tary bases. In fact, it was characterized as similar to what one 
would find at a U.S. chemical weapons storage sites in the 1950s. 
One eyewitness described this physical security as "good enough to 
keep an honest man out." 

Gaps in physical security were more evident in some cases than 
in others. For instance, perimeter lights were seen at two of these 
sites, although they were few in number and appeared to be poorly 
maintained, but they were not seen at two other sites. The railway 
entrances into these facilities appeared to be a particularly egre- 
gious security shortcoming. No guards were seen at these gates, 
which were closed only with a padlock. 

If we can bring up the second chart now, I would like to talk for 
a moment about the physical security that was observed at individ- 
ual storage buildings. Some of these buildings are made of wood 
and have wooden doors. Others are made of concrete blocks, but at 
the rear of these buildings, there are large mesh grills. At three of 
the sites that were visited, the only physical barrier to the entrance 
of these buildings was a single-key padlock. 

Intrusion detection devices, in this instance rudimentary circuit 
breakers, were observed on the doors of the buildings at one of 
these sites and possibly at another site. Such devices were not ob- 
served on the buildings at the two other sites that were visited, nor 
for that matter were electronic intrusion detection sensors observed 
at the perimeter of any of the four sites. 

Senators you do not have to be an expert in security to see the 
problems here. It would appear that all that is necessary to gain 
entrance into these storage buildings is a bribe, a dark night, some 
dark clothing, a little bit of muscle, and a crowbar. Yes, I said a 
crowbar. You do not need dynamite to jimmy a padlock, pry open 
a mesh grill, or loosen the boards on a wooden building. Many 
American homes have more sophisticated and probably more abun- 
dant physical security than was observed at these storage build- 
ings. 

Perhaps it is useful to recall at this point that some 32,000 met- 
ric tons of Russia's arsenal are lethal nerve agents. Some of these 
munitions, such as artillery shells, weigh between 90 and 100 
pounds when they are fully loaded. They are quite portable. These 



155 

same artillery shells can be fired fi-om any of the tens of thousands 
of Soviet-made artillery pieces that are scattered around the globe. 

Furthermore, because tamper-proof seals are apparently not 
being used across the board, it appears that chemical agent can be 
siphoned from bulk storage containers. 

Such deficiencies in physical security are compounded by the 
methods that are apparently being used to keep track of Russia's 
chemical arsenal, which offer opportunities for insider theft. All in 
all, Russia's chemical weapon storage sites may well be more vul- 
nerable to theft from within and attack from without than Russia's 
nuclear facilities. 

Given these circumstances, I have two recommendations to offer. 
First, prudence would dictate that additional funds quickly be set 
aside to help buttress the security at these sites via the Nunn- 
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Perimeter security 
could be strengthened by adding lights and closed-circuit TV, which 
would allow guards to more rapidly identify and respond to intrud- 
ers. More rugged locks, doors, and tamper-proof seals are also in 
order. These and other measures could markedly enhance the secu- 
rity of these facilities. 

The amount called for is modest in comparison to most defense 
expenditures, on the order of tens of thousands, not hundreds of 
millions. To date, $55 million has gone to assist Russia's chemical 
weapons destruction program. These resources are being put to 
very good use, so I am not suggesting that Peter be robbed to pay 
Paul. ^ ^ 

Second, the quickest route to bring outside inspectors into these 
facilities to inventory and further secure these weapons is through 
the Chemical Weapons Convention. As of this month, this treaty 
has been waiting 2 years for an up or down vote in the Senate. I 
am deeply concerned that the Senate has not recognized the oppor- 
tunities that the Convention presents to address not only Russia's 
assorted chemical weapons problems but the worldwide problem of 
chemical weapons proliferation. 

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to use this op- 
portunity to introduce a new Stimson Center report. The title just 
about says it all. 

Senator NUNN. What is the title? 

Ms. Smithson. The U.S. Senate and the Chemical Weapons Con- 
vention: The Price of Inaction. i 

The costs of the Senate's failure to provide its consent to ratify 
this treaty are more palpable with each passing day. Without the 
Convention, there is a gaping hole in U.S. nonproliferation policy. 
Without the Convention, we deprive ourselves of very useful tools, 
routine and especially challenge inspections, to investigate our con- 
cerns about chemical weapons programs in Russia and elsewhere. 
Without the Convention, we deny the intelhgence community a 
steady flow of information that it has stated would help sharpen 
its proliferation assessments. 

The lack of U.S. participation in the Convention undercuts not 
only its long-term viability but other efforts to control dual-use 
technologies and materials. If this treaty flounders, the attempt to 

1 See Exhibit No lb in the Appendix on page 445. 



156 

add meaningful verification provisions to the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention will also probably fail. 

The Senate's inaction on the Convention also underscores the gap 
that is increasingly evident between U.S. rhetoric and U.S. action. 
America claims to be the leader of the post-Cold War world. This 
treaty outlaws a category of weapons that is universally abhorred. 
A decade ago, Congress mandated that the Army unilaterally de- 
stroy well over 95 percent of this stockpile. If the Senate cannot 
give its consent to ratify this treaty, just what kind of leadership 
can American citizens and the world expect of Washington? 

These are just a few of the points identified by the report's au- 
thors, which include Senator John Glenn and also Mike Moodie, 
who is testifying here today. This report also comes with additional 
counsel from former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, 
former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, and Senators 
Nancy Kassebaum, John Kerry, and Joe Biden, as well as the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association, among others, to get on with 
the business of ratifying this treaty. 

Senator Lugar, I think you hit it right on the mark yesterday 
when you asked the question, why is the Senate not debating the 
Chemical Weapons Convention? 

In conclusion, even though the specific problems of lax security 
at Russia's chemical weapons storage sites have preoccupied me of 
late, it is hard to ignore the overall problem of chemical weapons 
proliferation. At present, about 30 countries are believed to be har- 
boring chemical weapons capabilities or stockpiles. 

Senators in the absence of purposeful action to address these 
problems, U.S. soldiers are more likely to encounter chemical weap- 
ons on some foreign battlefield and chemical terrorism is more like- 
ly to migrate to America's shores. 

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Smithson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. SMITHSON 

On March 20th, religious zealots in Japan broke a taboo against use of weapons 
of mass destruction by terrorists and, in the process, provided an ominous glimpse 
into future acts of terrorism. Contrary to most expectations and fears, the weapon 
of choice was not nuclear, but chemical. Twelve were killed and over 5,000 injured 
when the nerve gas sarin was released during the morning rush hour on Tokyo s 
crowded subway system. i Now that this line has been crossed, other terrorists and 
leaders of rogue states may try to follow in Aum Shinrikyo's path. 

Moreover U.S. policy makers need only recall the terrorists acts in New York City 
in 1991 and Oklahoma City in 1995 that stunned the whole world to face the ugly 
possibility that chemical terrorism could migrate to U.S. shores or even originate 
here. President Bill Clinton observed, "In light of what happened in Japan, all ad- 
vanced countries should be very, very concerned about the prospect of the merger 
of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction.'"^ For example, the effective use of 
chemical agents instead of conventional explosives in the 1991 terrorist attack 
against the World Trade Center would have totally devastated the building's occu- 
pants within a few moments.^ 

' Nicholas D. Kristof, "Hundreds in Japan Hunt Gas Attackers After 8 Die: Police Tighten Se- 
curity Steps at Stations," New York Times, 21 March 1995, Al; Lois Ember, "Tokyo Subway At- 
tack; Chemical Weapon Possible Terrorist Tool," Chemical & Engineering News (27 March 
1995) 6-7; "Gas Attacks Renew Fears For Japanese," Washingion Post, 15 July 1995, A20. 

-i President William J. Clinton, Joint Press Conference by President Clinton and President 
Boris Yeltsin, Moscow, 10 May 1995. 

••'See Victor A Utgoff, The Challenge of Chemical Weapons: An American Perspective (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 241-2. See also. Anthony H. Cordesman, "One Half Cheer for 



157 

When the Soviet Union collapsed, much attention was given to the possibility that 
nuclear weapons or their components could find their way into the wrong hands. 
The frightening prospect of "loose nukes" prompted Senators Richard Lugar (R-Indi- 
ana) and Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) to launch a program to help Russia, Belarus, 
Ukraine, and Kazakhstan secure these weapons and begin safely dismantling their 
delivery vehicles according to treaty requirements. The Cooperative Threat Reduc- 
tion (CTR) program got off to a slow start because umbrella agreements had to be 
negotiated with the former Soviet states and the Defense Department had to award 
contracts to U.S. companies to provide the appropriate goods and services.'' How- 
ever, there is widespread agreement that the CTR program has made impressive 
strides in improving the security of former Soviet nuclear weapons, facilitating the 
dismantlement of delivery vehicles, and providing assistance and opportunities to 
enable Russia's nuclear experts to apply their skills to peaceful uses, not to nuclear 
proliferators or terrorists. 

Perhaps because U.S. policy makers have been so preoccupied with addressing the 
nuclear agenda, comparatively little thought has been given to chemical matters 
However, it is prudent to examine the potential for theft and black marketeering 
of Russia's chemical weapons given Japan's horrifying encounter with chemical ter- 
rorism. Nerve agents, including VX, sarin, and soman, comprise over 80 percent of 
Russia s 40,000 metric ton chemical arsenal. ^ With regard to Russia's chemical 
weapons storage facilities, Russian Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mikhail Kolesnikov re- 
cently described the security measures at these facilities as "inadequate," pointing 
out that the chemicai arsenal is "more vulnerable to theft" since the location of Rus- 
sia's seven storage facilities has become a matter of public record.*^ This information 
was classified until mid-January 1994, when Rossiiskaya Gazeta published the 
amount and types of chemical agents stored at each site.'' Russia's blister agents- 
mustard and lewisite— are stored at Gorny and Kambarka. The remaining sites are 
Kizner, Leonidovka, Maradykovsky, Pochep, and Schchuche. These sites store most- 
ly nerve agents, such as VX, sarin, and soman. 

Some of those who have been to Russia's chemical weapons storage facilities pro- 
vide a disquieting picture regarding the security of the sites. The following para- 
graphs provide a general description of the security provisions that appear to be in 
place at four of the seven Russian storage sites. « While this description is based on 
first-hand accounts, some caveats must be attached to it. First, these eyewitnesses 
may not have noticed all of the security measures present. Second, Russian officials 
may have purposefully changed their practices while visitors were present or after 
they left to protect the integrity of their security measures. Third, Russian officiaLs 
may have controlled the visit so that outsiders saw only partial views of the facili- 
ties. Fourth, the differences observed in security from one site to another may be 
attributed to one or more of these factors. Finally, these accounts may be biased to- 
ward Western security practices. 

Security for chemical weapons has three basic components: physical barriers at 
a particular site, human controls/guards, and the system of accountability Ideally 
these components work together to block theft from outside or inside the facility' 
Physical barriers are items such as fences, locks, and other security devices in- 

l^L ^^^, Pitting the Chemical Weapons Convention in Military Perspective," in Ratifyine the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, ed. Brad Roberts (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 1994), 44. 

••Dunbar Lockwood, "Getting Down to Business," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51 no 1 
•J^^aryFebruary 1995): 12-3. For more on the former Soviet nuclear arsenal and the evolution 

the CTR program, see Zachary S. Davis and Jason D. Ellis, "Nuclear Proliferation: Problems 
in the States of the Former Soviet Union," CRS Issue Brief IB91 129 (Washington, D.C  Library 
ot Congress, Congressional Research Service, 28 June 1995); Amy F. Woolf and Theodor W 
Oaidi. 

s About 70 percent of the 32,500 metric tons of nerve agent in Russia's stockpile is in air-deliv- 
ered munitionr,. Walter L. Busbee, "Now for the Heavy Lifting: Destroying CW Stockpiles in the 
United States and Russia, in Ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention 111 

Russian Security Inadequate for Chemical Weapons Storage," Agence France Presse 2 Au- 
gust 1995. 

^Igor Vlasov, "Chemical Splinters in Russia's Body," Rossiskaya Gazeta, 15 January 1994 3 
the author interviewed people who had visited one or more Russian facilities, asking them 
about security measures they did or did not observe. Those interviewed were at these facilities 
'^.^^'■y'^g periods of time, from hours to days. Several of these individuals, who had different 
altiliations, gave descriptions of specific sites. The author has elected to provide a general de- 
scription, accompanied by examples, without identifying the particular sites involved. She would 
like to emphasize that no one who spoke with her revealed classified information For a rare 
and brief public account of a U.S. inspection conducted under the Wyoming Memorandum of Un- 
derstanding, see Joseph D. Richard, "Team Morris' Inspects Russia's Pochep Facility " On-Site 
/nsi^ftts 6, no. 8 (September 1994): 4-5. 



158 

tended to deter an attack against a facility or impede the attackers until guards can 
respond. Guards at a facility control access to the compound, monitoring the perim- 
eter and checking vehicle and pedestrian traffic to prevent unauthorized personnel 
from entering. If the physical security at a facility were to be breached, it is the 
responsibility of these troops to respond, engage, and fend off attackers. The system 
of accountability entails the procedures that a nation uses to keep track of chemical 
weapons in the inventory and the chemical agent in bulk storage at various sites. 

PHYSICAL SECURITY AT RUSSIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS STORAGE SITES 

In general, outsiders who have been to Russian chemical weapons storage facili- 
ties characterize the security at these sites as similar to the measures commonplace 
at U.S. storage facilities in the 1950s. Since then, the United States has switched 
to an approach that employs significant physical barriers, intruder alarms, and 
other electronic sensors monitored from a central security control room.^ In contrast, 
Russian chemical weapons storage facilities have the bare basics of physical security 
for a sensitive military site — multiple exterior fences, storage buildings, and pad- 
locks, lo 

One of the storage sites visited was a stand-alone facility, but the others were in- 
side or collocated with a larger military compound. ^^ Normally, the chemical weap- 
ons storage area had different entrances for pedestrians, road vehicles, and railroad 
cars. At two sites, a two-gate entrapment system was used at the main entry. 
Guards were present at the main gates at all facilities. ^^ Railroad entrances — 
padlocked double-opening fences were observed — did not appear to be guarded. '^ 
More than one individual observed that the railroad tracks into the restricted chem- 
ical storage area were rusted, with grass overgrowing the tracks, and did not look 
like they had been used in a long time.i^ At one facility that was adjacent to an- 
other compound, an unguarded gate in the fence separating the two areas could be 
seen.^""' 

Different combinations of fences are used for perimeter security at Russian chemi- 
cal weapon storage sites. Some fences were chain-link, some were barbed wire, and 
some were apparently electrified. Two concentric exterior fences were erected at 
some sites, three or four fence lines at others. Some fences were in good repair, oth- 
ers appeared to be poorly maintained. At one site where the storage facility was in- 
side a larger compound, a wall, approximately eight feet high, had been erected 
around the chemical weapons storage area.^^ One interviewee described the outer 
fencing as "tall cattle fences."^'' The zone between the innermost and outermost 
fences was cleared and well-maintained at some sites, allowing for foot or vehicle 
patrols. In some cases, a clear zone was established outside the outermost fence and 
a worn path indicating perimeter patrols was evident. In other cases, the outermost 
fence was directly adjacent to a village or wooded area, and the direction of the ob- 
served paths indicated pedestrian traffic to and from a nearby village, not perimeter 
guard activities. 18 According to one individual, at one site "there had been clear 
zones," but this area was not well-maintained. ^^ At two sites, perimeter lights along 
the fence line were seen, but the lights were few in number and did not appear to 
be well-maintained. 20 Perimeter lights were not observed at the other facilities. ^i No 



9 Interviews by author, 28 July 1995, 31 July 1995, and 11 August 1995. 

lointerviews by author, 28 July 1995, 31 July 1995, 11 August 1995, 21 August 1995, 30 Au- 
gust 1995, 31 August 1995, 18 September 1995. 

II Interviews by author, 28 July 1995, 31 July 1995, 31 August 1995, 18 September 1995. Ac- 
cording to Representative Glen Browder (D-Alabama), family housing units were inside the larg- 
er military compound at one storage site, with children playing nearby the restricted chemical 
storage area. Interview with Congressman Glen Browder, Washington, D.C., 14 September 1995. 

'•^Interviews by author, 28 July 1995, 31 July 1995, 31 August 1995, 18 September 1995. At 
one of the entries to the restricted area at one site, the guard was inside a plexiglass booth 
and pedestrians had to pass through a turnstile. Interview by author, 21 August 1995. In a two- 
gate entrapment, entering vehicles are stopped between the outer and inner gates, while the 
guard checks identification prior to opening the inner gate. 

'■'Interviews by author, 31 July 1995, 21 August 1995, 31 August 1995, 18 September 1995. 

'■•Interviews, 28 July 1995, 11 August 1995. 

'•''Interview by author, 31 August 1995. 

'"Interviews by author, 28 July 1995, 31 July 1995, 11 August 1995, 21 August 1995, 31 Au- 
gust 1995, 18 September 1995. 

'''Interview by author, 18 September 1995. 

'^Interviews by author, 11 August 1995, 21 August 1995, 31 August 1995. 

'^Interview by author, 18 September 1995. 

■^"Interviews by author, 28 July 1995, 31 July 1995, 31 August 1995 

2' Interviews by author, 11 August 1995, 21 August 1995, 18 September 1995. 



159 

electronic security devices, such as closed-circuit or low-light TV cameras, were ob- 
served on or near the exterior fences. 22 

Some storage buildings were constructed with cement blocks and had wooden or 
steel-faced doors. 2a Others were made only of wood and had wooden doors and win- 
dows with bars. The roofs of these buildings were often made of tile or wood. At 
one site, holes could be seen in the roof, but at other sites, the buildings were well- 
maintained. The buildings at one facility had just been reroofed.24 Several people 
mterviewed observed nothing other than a single-key padlock on the doors to stor- 
age buildings. 25 At one sight, the doors to storage buildings had an additional bar 
across the door required a separate device or key to unlock, but the lower section 
of these doors had unsecured lift-up "dog doors" used for first-entry monitoring. 
Given the "material of construction and the kinds of locks they used, it was nothing 
that a locksmith couldn't defeat," said one interviewee.26 Intruder detection de- 
vices—probably a circuit-breaker mechanisms— were observed on the doors to indi- 
vidual storage buildings at second site and possibly at a third. 2? No one recalled 
electronic or other intruder detection sensors on the other openings to these build- 
ings (e.g., windows). 28 

Inside these buildings, munitions were kept in racks, similar to the storage of 
wine bottles, or stacked horizontally on wooden pallets. Bulk storage drums were 
elevated on beams to facilitate monitoring for corrosion or a clean-up effort in the 
event of a leak.29 Smaller items, like munitions and storage drums were numbered 
most likely with production lot, not serial, numbers. 3° Missile warheads also ap- 
peared to be marked with production lot numbers. Each warhead had its own num- 
bered storage container.^i At one site, caged birds were kept inside the cement stor- 
age buildings— a time-tested method of detecting whether chemical agent is present. 
The death of the bird is a likely indicator of a leaking weapon or container.32 

The munitions and bulk storage containers observed were well-maintained in 
good to excellent condition.33 As Congressman Glen Browder (D-Alabama) reported 
after a visiting a Russian storage site in 1994, "The chemical shells and warheads 
which we inspected appeared to be in good condition, having been manufactured be- 
tween the early 1950s and mid-1980s, and were battiefield-ready."34 

Interviewees did not observe physical barriers, such as an large obstacle that 
would have to be moved, in front of storage building doors. Nor were tamper detec- 
tion seals seen on any storage building doors.35 Seals were used sporadically at 
some sites, apparently not at all at others. For example, the large 50-cubic meter 
storage tanks and storage drums were scaled at one site, but at another, these large 
storage tanks apparently were not sealed. The containers for missile warheads were 
sealed at one site, but the other items there were not sealed. The seals that were 



! ?oa7'oT^^^ ^''^^°''' ^^ •^"•y ^^^^' 31 July 1995, 11 August 1995, 21 August 1995, 30 Au- 
gust 1995, 21 August 1995, 18 September 1995, Browder did not observe any electronic surveil- 
lance or intruder detection equipment at one site. Interview with Browder, 14 September 1995 

."^alTV^^^y ^''^^'"■' ^^ -^"^y ^^^^' 31 July 1995, 11 August 1995, 21 August 1995, 31 Au- 
gust 1995, 18 September 1995. Some of the cement block buildings at one site had large open- 

28^JurS™^^^ ^ ^^ ^ ^^^^' ^^^^ '^^''^ covered by a wire mesh grill. Interview by author, 

temb^r ^199r^ ^^ ^"''^°'^' ^^ "^"^^ ^^^^' ^^ '^"'^ ^^^^' ^^ ^"^^* ^^^^' ^^ ^""^^^ ^^^^' ^^ ^^P' 
"Interviews by author, 31 July 1995, 11 August 1995, 21 August 1995, 30 August 1995. 
^••Interview by author, 18 September 1995. 

27Interview by author, 28 July 1995. At one site, an individual saw what might have been 
a roller or switch on the door, but could not be certain that that was the case. The accompanying 
soldier did telephone someone before unlocking the door to enter the building. Interview by au- 
thor, 31 August 1995. 

28 Browder did not observe any electronic surveillance or intruder detection equipment at one 
site. Interview with Browder, 14 September 1995. Nor did others observe such devices on stor- 
toL oT^a"'' '^.^Anr^o'i'^i"^^- Interviews by author, 28 July 1995, 31 July 1995, 11 August 
1995 21 August 1995, 30 August 1995, 18 September 1995 

Interviews by author, 31 July 1995, 11 August 1995, 21 August 1995, 18 September 1995 

tembe^'r 199^^ °''' ^^ "^"'^ ^^^^' ^^ '^"'^ ^^^^' ^^ ^"^^* ^^^^' ^1 August 1995, 18 Sep- 

3' Interviews by author, 31 August 1995, 18 September 1995 
32 Interview by author, 31 July 1995 

cn'f\''QQ^'?^o^^/"u^°''',^£'^"'y ^^^^' 31 July 1995, 11 August 1995, 21 August 1995, 31 Au- 
gust iy95, 18 September 1995. 

A ^^^Pc ^^^" Browder, Memorandum to Representative Ronald V. Dellums, Chairman House 

Armed Services Comniittee, "July 3-10 Codel to Concerning Chemical Weapons," 25 Jul'y 1994 

35 Interviews by author, 31 July 1995, 11 August 1995, 31 August 1995, 18 September 1995' 



160 

observed were wire-loop or lead seals that were dated and numbered. Ostensibly, 
either the seal has to be broken or the wire cut to open them.^^ 

GUARDS AND ACCOUNTABILITY AT RUSSIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS STORAGE SITES 

Physical security aside, more than one individual interviewed dwelled on the 
human component of security at Russia's chemical weapons storage facilities. As 
noted, main gates were guarded and the identification of visitors was checked before 
they were allowed to enter. Visitors were issued badges.-'^ Armed perimeter patrols 
were seen at some sites, but not at others. Guards were not stationed at individual 
storage buildings at the time that visitors were there. The troops encountered were 
courteous and well-disciplined. Morale was good; these soldiers did not appear to be 
discontent.-'** One individual observed that there were "No signs of things falling 
apart around the seams," but another noted that one site was poorly maintained.-*^ 
Soldiers had expressed concerns about "bandits" in the area, recalled one 
interviewee. ■^^ 

Following Soviet precedent for tracking the whereabouts of weapons, the soldiers 
at these facilities use a "personalized" system of accountability. Officers are person- 
ally responsible for the chemical weapons stored within a given number of buildings, 
usually one to five buildings. With smaller items such as artillery shells, this means 
that a single officer can be responsible for hundreds of weapons. If something is 
missing, this officer is held accountable. Written records are kept, and the location 
of munitions or drums is noted on a planograph or a diagram of the building's con- 
tents. A computer database, however, is not used."*^ 

At some sites, soldiers stated that they entered storage buildings frequently, even 
on a daily basis, for maintenance and inventory activities. '^^ Such statements could 
not, of course, be confirmed. However some individuals witnessed inventory and 
maintenance procedures. For example, racks of munitions, stacked from the floor to 
the ceiling, were painstakingly inventoried, as were rows of storage drums. Results 
were recorded on the aforementioned planograph.'*^ Soldiers used a 15-foot long dip- 
stick to measure the level of agent in the 50-cubic meter storage tanks. They also 
conducted an analysis of the contents to ascertain the concentration of key chemi- 
cals. To prevent the rupture of storage drums, it is standard Russian procedure to 
open these drums periodically to relieve the gas pressure that builds up inside. Stor- 
age drums, tanks, and munitions were checked for signs of disrepair or corrosion.'''* 

EVALUATING THE SECURITY OF RUSSIA'S CHEMICAL ARSENAL 

In some respects, the security measures described above do not appear to be too 
far out of order. Thieves cannot just walk off with a 50-cubic meter tank full of 
chemical agent. '•^ Racks of artillery shells are placed so close together that it would 
be difficult to maneuver lifting equipment inside the building to cart off several 
racks of artillery shells.''^ Some storage sites are a restricted area inside of a larger 
military compound, which would make it more difficult to violate security. In other 
words, the way that Russian chemical weapons and bulk agent are stored creates 
some built-in security features. 

In other instances, this account raises some grave concerns, especially for those 
who are familiar with routine security procedures at sensitive U.S. military sites. 
By U.S. standards, Russian chemical weapon storage facilities unquestionably ap- 
pear to be vulnerable to attack from outside and theft from within. In the discussion 
that follows, apparent shortfalls are identified and possible scenarios for foul play 
are raised. General U.S. standards of physical security and accountability practices 
are presented as a point of comparison. 



36 Interviews by author, 28 July 1995, 31 July 1995, 11 August 1995, 18 September 1995. 

37 Interviews by author, 31 July 1995, 21 August 1995, 31 August 1995, 18 September 1995. 

38 Interviews by author, 28 July 1995, 31 July 1995, 11 August 1995, 21 August 1995. At one 
site, the enlisted soldiers were "run-of-the-mill," not the type of soldier that would be assigned 
to guard sensitive military facilities in the West. The officers were "clearly disgruntled at having 
to open the facility" to outsiders. Interview by author, 18 September 1995. In contrast, Browder 
noted that inside the chemical weapons storage section, his hosts were quite open to having him 
look around the site. Browder, interview by author, 14 September 1995. 

3^ The first comment was made in an 11 August 1995 interview; the second in a 18 September 
1995 interview. 
'"'Interview by author, 31 August 1995. 
■«i Interviews by author, 30 August 1995, 31 August 1995. 
"^Interviews by author, 31 July 1995, 30 August 1995. 
''3 Interviews by author, 31 July 1995, 31 August 1995. 
''■'Interviews by author, 31 July 1995, 11 August 1995. 
''"'Interview by author. 11 August 1995. 
'"'Interview by author, 21 August 1995. 



161 

Shortcomings in the physical security were readily apparent at the Russian stor- 
age facilities visited. For example, perimeter fences lacked electronic sensors and in- 
trusion detection devices. In the absence of well-maintained clear zones and perim- 
eter lighting, attackers have more cover for a stealthy approach. Railroad entrances 
at these facilities could be a particularly egregious breach of perimeter security 
since they were apparently unguarded and secured only with a single-key padlock ^^ 
Single-key padlocks were frequently the only visible barrier to entrance at individ- 
ual storage buildings. Additional physical barriers were not seen. In the majority 
of cases, intrusion detection devices apparentiy were not instailed."" A lone padlock 
on any door, especially a wooden door, is hardly an impediment to thieves or 
attackers. At the one site where storage tanks and drums were sealed the tech- 
nology used was not tamper-proof''^ 

These measures fall far short of the physical security at U.S. chemical weapons 
storage sites. For example, two continuous lines of intrusion detection sensors as 
well as imaging systems (e.g., closed-circuit TV, radar, and infrared detectors) but- 
tress perimeter fencing, lighting, and clear zones. Where appropriate vehicle bar- 
riers such as concrete blocks, ditches, and posts embedded in the ground are situ- 
ated to prevent vehicles from crashing gates or fences. In addition, huge concrete 
blocks are placed immediately in front of the entrance of U.S. bulk storage build- 
mgs, which are built of concrete and sometimes also bermed. These so-called "King 
lut blocks are so heavy that a forklift must remove them to enable access US 
regulations require that two soldiers be present to open a storage building Each has 
possession of a separate key to unlock one of the two high-security padlocks on the 
door. When entry occurs, at least one other soldier will be alerted. Balanced mag- 
netic switches or other intrusion detection sensors are placed on all doors windows 
and movable openings of U.S. storage buildings. These sensors, which are tamper- 
protected automatically notify the security control center, which is manned 24 
hours a day, of intrusions of perimeter and individual building security ^o Table 1 
compares the security measures generally practiced at U.S. storage sites with the 
physical security observed at some Russian storage sites. 

Of the physical security at Russian chemical weapons storage sites one 
interviewee characterized it as suitable "to keep an honest man out," another as "ru- 
dimentaij. -1 A much harsher assessment was offered by another individual who 
concluded 'You could really walk into that place without any problem "52 Browder 
observed that "Their facilities were not as secure as ours, especially regarding phys- 
ical security^ 53 Yet another person acknowledged the shortcomings in physical se- 
curity, but thought that Russia's chemical weapons are probably "secure as long as 
the people who are guarding them want them to be safe." 54 This statement brings 
up a different set of concerns related to the Russian system of accountability and 
potential problems among Russian troops and chemical weapons experts. 

A fair amount of Russia's chemical agent is in bulk storage containers One is not 
counting munitions as much as tons of agent. While measurements from large stor- 
age tanks provide a rough idea of how much agent is there, these circumstances 

^Hnterviews by author, 21 August 1995, 30 August 1995, 31 August 1995 
49^" f'^,'!u^ ^y author, 11 August 1995, 21 August 1995, 31 August 1995' 
««..lTLfi "^""^ '°°P "" le^l seals without detection, the thief would need to replicate the 

1970s Fhl?nnL^ '°'P"''' """r ^^^, '^^^ This type of sealing technology was common in the 
Jqq? Anofhl^ ' hamper-proof seals can now be readily obtained. Interview by author, 28 July 
Jtrifif^^'^°'' u°^u'^ ^^^l ^^^ Russians also use a "primitive" string Ld clay pot seal 
rethreiH?n/f hi f ■' "^^^u^ '^u ^u ^^r^^'' ^l un-threadmg the string to gain access and then 
nnln^ il^^ ^ K1 i"f ^*"'°"1^ the clay m the pot. As noted, much more advanced seal tech- 
nology IS available. Interview by author, 30 August 1995 

DC Tii'm^^i!rr?u''T''''^ ^^^f ^'',".'^y P'-°Sram, Army Regulation 190-59 (Washington, 
1995 ?i^ir^«riQq^ -^fr^' ^J i^^f k^^u*'- ^^^' 1^^^- 3^- Interviews by author, 11 Augus 
nr;r.'i5= f 1 1^ ^ f t't 1^ 1"^^^ l^^^' ^^^" documents that stipulate the security and safety 
LtlnnTJfi ^r\^* }1^ *=^^/?'*=?^ weapons storage sites include Chemical Surety. Army Regu 
rlZ, ^A 'Washington DC.: Department of the Army, 12 November \9m- Safely: Toxic 
Chemical Agent Safety Standards Ps^mpMet 385-61 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the 
unf^nn nnTr ^, being revised); Medical Seruices: Occupational Health Guidelines for the Eval- 
'if'°'lf"^.Control of Occupational Exposure to Mustard Agents H, HD, and HT, Pamphlet 40- 
/,nL/ W 5T^"' Pr  D^artment of the Army, 30 August 1991); Medical Services- Occupa- 
ZeZ,CArn''^n'^'J^/^n^r ^valuation and Control of Occupational Exposure to Nerve 
Agents GA, GB GD and VX {Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 4 December 1990) 

51 Interview by author, 11 August 1995, 18 September 1995 

''''Interview by author, 21 August 1995. 

53 Interview with Browder, 14 September 1995 

54 Interview by author, 28 July 1995. 



162 

could present an accountability problem.^^ Chemical agents are not stable and tend 
to deteriorate gradually. Unless the seals on these tanks are tamper-proof and daily 
measurements, both of quantity and quality, are taken and cross-checked by individ- 
uals that are not within the immediate chain of accountability, it would be difficult 
in the event of a discrepancy to tell whether chemical agent leaked or was stolen. 
In other words, there did not appear to be significant obstacles to prevent someone 
from systematically skimming small quantities of agent out of bulk storage contain- 



ers 



56 



Moreover, the soldiers, not the ofTicer accountable, are apparently conducting the 
inventory and maintenance chores. Therefore, another possibility is that with so 
many munitions, a number of artillery rounds could disappear before the officer in 
charge might notice.-^'' What is not known at this point is what procedures, if any, 
the Russian military has for cross-checking these records. If inventory records are 
not routinely and randomly cross-checked by others outside the immediate unit and 
facility where accountability in the Russian system apparently rests, it would not 
be a great challenge for one or more soldiers to falsify these records. In short, theft 
appears to be possible if Ivan, the individual soldier, is so inclined; if a colleague 
and Ivan conspire; or if an outsider coopts or disables Ivan. 

In contrast, accountability at U.S. storage facilities is institutionalized, collective, 
and computerized. U.S. storage igloos and bunkers are infrequently opened for ran- 
dom inventory and maintenance activities. When a soldier engages in maintenance 
chores or takes an inventory count, his work is double-checked and cross-checked 
by others to ensure its accuracy. A written planograph and computerized records are 
updated accordingly. These records account for the number and type of munitions 
in each bunker and at each storage facility. Munitions are tracked by serial number 
and/or production lot number. Officials at a central record keeping unit in Rock Is- 
land, Illinois, also review this data. The commanding officer here is the individual 
accountable for the U.S. chemical weapons inventory. Units from this central com- 
mand are randomly sent to the eight storage depots in the United States to check 
the accuracy of these records. ^^ 

In all fairness, U.S. security and accountability at U.S. chemical storage facilities 
are not perfect. Furthermore, U.S. newspapers often describe breaches in security 
or acts of vandalism at U.S. regular military bases. Problems also occur with the 
reliability of the military personnel at sensitive U.S. facilities. The armed services 
do no publicize such incidents because they are embarrassing and detract from pub- 
lic confidence in the safety of the military bases in their midst. At U.S. chemical 
weapons storage sites, disgruntled soldiers — "the Timothy McVeighs of this world," 
as one interviewee put it — could be among the personnel. However, because of the 
redundancies in the U.S. physical security and in the system of accountability, a 
malcontent would have to recruit others in different units in order to defeat the 
physical security and the system of accountability. The odds of an insider success- 
fully stealing chemical agent or munitions from a U.S. facility without being caught 
somewhere along the way are quite low.^^ 

One must also understand that the redundancy and technical sophistication that 
gird the physical security and accountability at U.S. chemical weapons storage sites 
did not appear overnight. For instance, U.S. recordkeeping has been computerized 
to some extent for a long time and has gradually improved to make the records 
more specific. Also, it was not that long ago that rabbits were kept in U.S. storage 
bunkers to indicate whether the munitions within had leaked. What may be viewed 
as old-fashioned methods are nonetheless proven and work well. 

Some of the fundamental differences in apparent Russian and U.S. security provi- 
sions are due to the nature of the respective Russian and American chemical weap- 



^^ Interview by author, 8 August 1995. 

5fi Interviews by author, 28 July 1995, 30 July 1995. 

57 Interviews by author, 21 August 1995, 30 August 1995, 31 August 1995. 

5« Interviews by author, 7 September 1995, 30 August 1995, and 31 August 1995. The arsenal 
at a ninth U.S. facility, on Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean, is currentiy being destroyed. 
The one-ton bulk storage tanks present at some U.S. facilities are sealed and occasionally 
weighed to ascertain whether any agent is missing. 

•^^ Interview by author, 30 August 1995. Note that there have been numerous threats of terror- 
ist use of chemical weapons, including one instance in 1975 where 53 canisters of the blister 
agent mustard were stolen from a U.S. chemical weapons storage facility in West Germany. The 
terrorists, probably associated with the Baader-Meinnof gang, did not carry out their threat and 
some, but not all of the stolen agent was recovered. In another example, a neo-Nazi skinhead 
group had plans in 1992 to kill children in a Dallas Jewish day-care center using cyanide. For 
a listing of reported threats, possession, and use of chemical agents for terrorist purposes, see 
Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the Open Literature 
(Toronto: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, June 1995), 82, 84-5. See also Robin Wright, 
"Many Nations Seen Vulnerable to Poison Use," Los Angeles Times, 21 March 1995, 1. 



163 

ons stockpiles. For instance, many U.S. chemical weapons such as the M-55 rocket 
are "full-up," with the explosives and propellents inside the munition. U.S. storage 
buildings are therefore built to withstand an explosion of high explosives and to con- 
tain the chemical agent. The explosives and propellents for Russian chemical weap- 
ons are reportedly stored apart from the part of the munition that contains the 
chemical agent. Since there is less inherent danger for an explosion within a Rus- 
sian chemical weapons storage building, there is not a pressing safety requirement 
for especially sturdy storage buildings. 

As for some of the noticeable disparities related to accountability, the current Rus- 
sian system is manpower-intensive largely because the Soviet Union could command 
significant human resources for a task. The officers in charge of Russia's chemical 
facilities are simply following precedent. The U.S. approach to accountability grew 
out of necessity. U.S. bunkers are tightly secured and not entered as frequently be- 
cause as the U.S. stockpile aged, more leaks occurred.^" In other words, the United 
States battened down the hatches and switched to a system of quarterly storage 
monitoring inspections and random checks initially for personnel and public safety 
reasons. 

However, with a personalized system of accountability and minimal physical bar- 
riers, there appear to be some gaps in security at Russian facilities. Moreover, as 
one interviewee pointed out, the storage sites are a long way from Moscow and the 
borders of the former Soviet Union are becoming increasingly porous. "Sooner or 
later, someone will make [the soldiers at these sites] a better offer than Moscow 
does. If something was missing, it is likely to be an inside job." ^^ With Russia's ail- 
ing economy and the limited resources now available to the Russian armed forces, 
the potential thus exists for insider theft and black marketeering for personal eco- 
nomic gain. 62 Wayward political affiliations could also be the motivating factor be- 
hind an inside theft from a Russian chemical weapons facility. 

If such an incident were to occur, another concern raised was the preparedness 
of Russian authorities to respond. Do local military units and national authorities 
routinely assess the security vulnerabilities of these facilities? Do they have recov- 
ery plans and the equipment to execute them? Do they conduct training exercises 
to practice the recovery of chemical weapons? How quickly can Russian authorities 
mobilize to respond? ^3 At this point, the answers to such questions are not known. 

Some might ask why anyone would bother to steal Russian chemical weapons 
when chemical agents are not that difficult to make, compared to a nuclear device. 
The ingredients and equipment are commercially available, and the formulas for 
many chemical agents are common scientific knowledge. 6"* Of course, it has always 
been difficult to predict what disturbed workers, rebels, or terrorists will do, but 
those who want to inflict the most serious harm may seek military-strength chemi- 
cal agent. Terrorists may be able to concoct a chemical agent, but it as not as easy 
as some might believe to make highly eflective chemical agent. For instance, evi- 
dence indicates Aum Shinrikyo's chemists were unsuccessful in their attempts to 



60 From 1983 to 1994, there were 1,862 leaks within the U.S. stockpile. U.S. Army Chemical 
Demilitarization and Remediation Activity, Annual Status Report on the Disposal of Lethal 
Chemical Weapons and Materiel (Department of the Army, 15 December 1994), 37. 

61 Interview by author, 28 July 1995. 

62 During a report on French television showing an image of Saratov, a reporter intoned, "You 
can get in here almost at will. But it ought to be one of the best guarded places in Russia, one 
of the six or seven storage centers for thousands of tonnes of toxic gas formerly produced by 
the Soviet Union. . . . Everything leads one to believe that the least self-respecting terrorist 
would have no difficulty in hold of a few liters. Here everything is for sale and everything can 
be bought." "Official On Availability of Chemical Weapons in Russia," France-2 Television Net- 
work, 21 March 1995, FBIS Translation. Saratov is actually a military academy, where training 
of Russia's chemical troops occurs, not one of Russia's chemical weapons storage facilities. The 
equivalent in the United States is Ft. McClellan in Alabama. 

63 Interview by author, 31 August 1995. In a related readiness issue, Browder noted that the 
preparedness of Russian soldiers to respond to an accident or incident with chemical weapons 
appeared to be meager. Interview with Browder, 14 September 1995. Noting that the fire-fight- 
ing equipment within the restricted area consisted of axes, sand-filled buckets, and buckets for 
bailing water, another interviewee described their "ability to respond to fire or security threats 
was marginal to nonexistent." Interview by author, 18 September 1995. All U.S. storage facili- 
ties conduct routine vulnerability assessments and have plans and drills to practice a response 
to locate and recover stolen munitions. Chemical Agent Security Program, 22, 31-2. 

6'' Many of the same chemicals that can be used to produce pharmaceuticals, textile dyes, and 
{jesticides can also be used to make chemical agents. For this reason, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention contains unprecedented verification provisions that control such "precursor" chemi- 
cals and require reporting and inspection within commercial chemical industry. While such pro- 
cedures will help international inspectors track and assess commercial activities with dual-use 
chemicals, the ingredients, equipment, and know-how to make chemical weapons will be on the 
open market indefmitely. 



164 

manufacture high-grade sarin. ^^ Their failure ultimately saved the lives of thou- 
sands who were in the Tokyo subway last March 20th. 

Another factor to consider is that chemical weapons are easier to use than nuclear 
weapons. With chemical weapons, thieves do not have to overcome the security de- 
vices or Permissive Action Links (PALS) that are often placed on individual nuclear 
weapons. Nor do they have to figure out the launch codes and sequences that are 
likely to frustrate an attempt to use a stolen nuclear weapon. Instead, the would- 
be users of chemical weapons purchased on the black market or stolen from a facil- 
ity can shield themselves with protective clothing and gas masks that are commer- 
cially available. If they have artillery guns or aircraft, they have the option to use 
chemical munitions as is or to drain them and fashion their own crude delivery sys- 
tem.*'*' "Once stolen, a chemical weapon is far easier for a terrorist or rebel military 
group to use than a nuclear weapon." ^^ Moreover, the use of poison gas is not per- 
ceived as being as heinous as the use of nuclear weapons. ^^ 

When asked to assess the threat of Russian nuclear weapons being stolen versus 
the possibility of Russian chemical weapons theft, one interviewee viewed the threat 
as "very much the same."^^ Others interviewed differed with this opinion. They be- 
lieved that Russia's chemical arsenal presents a far more exposed and appealing 
target for potential thieves or attackers.''" 

Although security apparently varies from facility to facility, security at Russian 
nuclear facilities was described as generally better than the security observed at 
Russian chemical weapons storage sites. Russian nuclear facilities have redundant 
perimeter fences; steel doors on storage buildings; electronic sensors; and serial 
numbers, seals, and PALs on warheads, which have accompanying containers that 
each have their own "passport" control documents. Using a 1 to 10 scale, with 10 
being the highest grade of security, one interviewee rated U.S. nuclear security a 
9.9, Russian nuclear security an 8, U.S. chemical weapons security a 9-i-, and Rus- 
sian chemical weapons security a 3.''^ From another individual, the security of Rus- 
sian chemical weapons also received a rating of 3, while security at U.S. storage 
sites was rated from 8 to 10, depending upon the facility. ^^ 

Finally, U.S. policy makers should also be cognizant of the gradual disintegration 
that has taken place throughout Russia's complex of research, production, and stor- 
age facilities. Tne effects of economic hardship show not only in the apparent dif- 
ferences in physical security and maintenance observed from one storage facility to 
another. Hundreds of chemical weapons experts are out of work. With less and less 
cohesion among this research community, the temptation for these experts to sell 
their knowledge to the highest bidder will increase if they cannot find more produc- 
tive and peaceful ways to support themselves and their families. Unlike nuclear de- 
velopment programs, where a relatively small number of people know all of the cru- 
cial information about making a nuclear weapon, the knowledge threshold for chem- 
ical weapons is not nearly as high. A larger number of Russian chemical weapons 
specialists know enough to benefit greatly the efforts of would-be chemical weapons 
proliferators.''^ 



''"'Interview with Kyle Olson, Washington, D.C., 14 September 1995. Olson is writing a book 
about the recent events in Japan. 

^^The Aum Shinrikyo cult executed its attack on Tokyo's subway by placing low-grade sarin 
in two-ply plastic bags and using umbrellas or other sharp objects to puncture these bags 
quickiy before exiting the subway cars. Unsuspecting passengers left on those cars were quickly 
overcome with fumes, which also made their way into the subway stations when the effected 
trains stopped to release passengers. Interview with Olson, 14 September 1995. Olson also ob- 
served that Russian chemical weapons are comparatively safe to transport since the high-explo- 
sive component reportedly is stored separately from the chemical munition. 

•^■^ Interview by author, 30 August 1995. 

^8 Throughout history, warring parties have resorted to chemical weapons more frequently 
than nuclear weapons, which the United States used twice against Japan at the end of World 
War II. Chemical weapons were a hallmark of World War I and the 1980s Iran-Iraa War. China 
and Abyssinia also suffered chemical attacks during World War II. For more on the history of 
chemical weapons use, see Edward M. Spiers, Chemical Weaponry: A Continuing Challenge 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989). 

<=9 Interview by author, 28 July 1995. 

■'"Interviews by author, 30 August 1995 and 31 August 1995. 

""This individual had been to numerous Russian nuclear facilities and had in-depth knowl- 
edge of Russian chemical weapons storage facilities. Interview by author, 30 August 1995. 

■^2 Interview by author, 18 September 1995. 

^■'Interview by author, 8 August 1995. For more on the different technology thresholds under- 
lying nuclear and chemical weapons, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Tech- 
nologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, December 1993). On chemical weapons proliferation, see U.S. Congress, Office of Tech- 
nology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, December 1993); Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, Inter- 



165 

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

From outward appearances, Russia's chemical weapons storage sites appear to be 
vulnerable — to theft from within and attack from without. In all candor, many 
American homes have more sophisticated physical security than was observed at 
some Russian chemical weapons storage sites. For about $200, sometimes less, U.S. 
citizens can have motion sensors, door and window contacts, and alarms installed 
and monitored 24 hours a day for an additional $22 monthly fee. Alarms bring pri- 
vate security or local police to the scene.'''' 

Failure to improve the security at Russian chemical weapons storage facilities in- 
creases the odds that chemical agent of Russian origin will find its way onto the 
black market and into an ethnic conflict, subway system, or building somewhere. 
Innocent civilians will suffer the repercussions. 

Again, the Russian government appears to have recognized the security at these 
sites as an issue in need of attention. Col. Gen. Stanislav Petrov, the commander 
of the Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops, has requested additional 
funding to upgrade security at Russia's chemical weapons storage facilities since the 
locations have become a matter of public knowledge. Worried that this disclosure 
might fuel the worsening crime situation in Russia, Petrov noted that his already 
strained budget has been stretched even further by a Ministry of Defense effort to 
increase guard duty, upgrade the effectiveness of "engineering protection, and carry 
out vigilance exercises" at chemical weapons storage sites. ''^ With few rubles avail- 
able, the Kremlin must balance requests for improved security against domestic con- 
cerns about the environmental safety of Russia's chemical weapons stockpile, espe- 
cially the blister agents at Gorny and Kambarka, and proposals to upgrade safety 
at chemical sites at an estimated cost of 21.6 billion rubles.''^ If environmental con- 
cerns are not addressed, it may be more difficult for the Russian government to per- 
suade local communities to cooperate with the program to destroy the Russian 
chemical arsenal. For a government being pressed to keep its treaty commitments 
to eliminate its chemical stockpile, the choice is a difficult one. 

While the CTR program was initiated to address the safety and security of all 
weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union, the overwhelming majority 
of the Nunn-Lugar funds have gone toward nuclear security and disarmament. This 
focus on nuclear safety, security, and dismantlement was appropriately geared to 
the problems recognized at the time. To date, $55 million or roughly five percent 
of the over $1 billion in CTR funds has gone toward assisting the chemical weapons 
destruction program in Russia. 

For a rather modest amount, the United States could help Russia markedly en- 
hance security at these sites. Perimeter security could be strengthened to allow 
guards to detect and respond to intruders more rapidiy. Lights and closed-circuit TV 
could be added. Physical security at individual buildings could be reinforced with 
better doors, locks, and King Tut blocks. More advanced seals would also appear to 
be in order. Such low-tech improvements will be less expensive and easier for the 
Russians to operate and maintain. 

The United States might also consider providing early warning monitors or in- 
truder detection — systems for heightened perimeter and storage building security. 
Another option would be to furnish computers so central inventory records could be 
maintained in a computerized database. To address the problem of "brain drain" of 
Russia's chemical weapons expertise, the United States might set up employment 
and aide projects under the umbrella of the CTR program, similar to those set up 
for Russia's nuclear experts. 

In addition, U.S. officials might also constructively engage Russian authorities in 
a dialogue about response and recovery procedures to be used in the event of an 
attack or theft of chemical weapons. The U.S. Army routinely conducts vulnerability 
assessments of U.S. storage facilities. Response plans are tailored to each site and 
troops train and practice drills to test them and ensure readiness in the event of 



national Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Federation of American Sci- 
entists and Greenwood Press, 1991); U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Serv- 
ices, Countering the Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat in the Post-Soviet World, 102d 
Cong., 2d sess.. Committee Print No. 15 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing OfTice, 
1993). 

''''This information reflects prices and services quoted by two home security companies, ADT 
and Brinks, on 30 August 1995. More elaborate systems are available. 

■'^Ahatoliy Yurkin, "General Urges More Funds for Guarding Chemical Weapons," ITAR- 
TASS, 2 August 1995, FBIS Translation. 

''^"Over R509 Billion Needed to Destroy Chemical Weapons," Novosti, Moscow, 1 August 1995, 
FBIS Translation 



166 

an actual theft or attack.'''' Such capabiHties and experience would be well worth 
sharing with Russian authorities. 

In the midst of a struggle to bring federal spending under control, Congress cor- 
rectly has its sights focused on improving government services to U.S. citizens at 
the lowest practicable cost. Such an intense focus on domestic matters can often re- 
sult, however, in proposals that win points with the voters but in the end weaken 
U.S. national security. For example, some in Congress have called for cuts in the 
CTR program as a whole.''" Others in Congress have proposed reducing funds for 
assistance to Russia's chemical weapons destruction program or have sought to por- 
tray certain CTR programs, such as those geared toward conversion of defense facili- 
ties, as ill-conceived. Such proposals are short-sighted. 

The CTR program is an astute investment in U.S. and international security. U.S. 
security interests are being well served by aiding the security and dismantlement 
of former Soviet nuclear weapons, and funds should not be diverted from the impor- 
tant tasks that the CTR has underway in order to attend to security at Russian 
chemical weapons storage facilities. 

The measures recommended above could yield substantial improvements in the 
security of Russia's chemical weapons stockpile, and exorbitant sums would not be 
required to enact them. Given the line crossed by Aum Shirtkyo and the political 
and economic circumstances in the former Soviet Union, the U.S. Senate would be 
prudent to set aside additional funds for assistance to reinforce security at these 
sites. The price of assisting Russia now is much lower than the cost that may be 
incurred later if this problem is not promptly addressed. 

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Ms. Smithson. 

Our next witness will be Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, Former Chief of 
Counterintelligence Department, State Research Institute of Or- 
ganic Chemistry and Technology in Russia. Dr. Mirzayanov has 
been an outspoken critic of the continuing Russian chemical weap- 
ons program. Dr. Mirzayanov will give us his firsthand account of 
the Russian program and any of his other concerns he might like 
to share with us. 

Dr. Mirzayanov, we are glad to have you this morning. I believe 
you are going to be giving your opening statement in English, as 
I understand it, and then you will for questions need the inter- 
preter, is that correct? 

Dr. Mirzayanov. Yes. 

Senator NuNN. Anytime you need the interpreter, raise your 
hand. If we are going too fast, raise your hand. We want you to 
not only understand clearly the questions we ask but also under- 
stand the dialogue here at the table, so let us know if we are going 
too rapidly because I certainly would like an interchange between 
the various people testifying, if you have comments on the other 
persons' testimony. 

You may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. VIL S. MIRZAYANOV, FORMER CHIEF, 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT, STATE RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE OF ORGANIC CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY, 
MOSCOW, RUSSIA 

Dr. Mirzayanov. Respected ladies and gentlemen and honorable 
Senators, I have the honor of testifying in front of you because of 
my personal experience, knowledge in my 26 years of work in the 
State Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology, 
GosNIIOKhT, which is the main developer of chemical weapons in 



''''Military Police: Chemical Agent Security Program, Army Regulation 190-59, 22, 25, 31-3. 

■"Tor fiscal year 1996, the Clinton administration requested $731 million for the CIR pro- 
gram. The House of Representatives cut this request by $171 million, the Senate by $6 million. 
As of this writing. House and Senate conferees had not arrived at a final decision about CTR 
funding. 



167 

Russia. I worked there in the capacity of the senior lead scientific 
researcher, chief of the department in charge of protection against 
foreign technical intelligence, up until I was dismissed from my 
work in January of 1992. 

Over my many long years at GosNIIOKhT, I became conscious 
of my own involvement in criminal work on the development and 
production of weapons of mass destruction. This feeling became in- 
tolerable for me around the beginning of the perestroika period, 
when the announcement was made that all problems would be 
solved by the peace and disarmament process and by the democra- 
tization of Russia. 

Nonetheless, these claims were contradicted by reality, especially 
at my institute. It seemed that for the top level of the military- 
chemical complex, times had not changed. On the contrary, work 
on the development and testing of new chemical weapons intensi- 
fied, becoming more goal-oriented. 

That was the reason why I published an article on October 10, 
1991, in Kuranty about the two-faced policy of the leadership of the 
military-chemical complex. Their programs to produce chemical 
weapons went against the bilateral agreement negotiated between 
the United States and the USSR about stopping the development, 
production, and testing of chemical weapons, even though that 
treaty was not yet activated. 

Events of that time connected with the collapse of the USSR 
overshadowed my allegations. Despite additional attempts to bring 
these problems to the attention of the Russian politicians, for a 
long time, my revelations did not become the substance of discus- 
sion in either Russia or the West. This changed after I published 
a second article with coauthor Lev Fedorov in the daily Moscow 
News on September 16, 1992. 

This time, there was an immediate reaction from the KGB. On 
October 22, 1992, a month after publication and after giving an 
interview to the Baltimore Sun, my apartment was searched and 
I was arrested and sent to the notorious Lefortovo Prison. I was ac- 
cused of divulging state secrets, on the basis of secret lists which 
were never published. I was fi'eed from jail pending trial but re- 
mained under house arrest during the period of investigation, 
which lasted more than a year and a half. 

An expert commission was established, consisting largely of rep- 
resentatives ft-om the military-chemical complex. They confirmed 
that the information contained in my article regarding the creation 
and testing of new systems of chemical weapons, including binary 
weapons, was accurate. The information was not technical and 
could not be classified. Nevertheless, a deputy from the Procurator 
General's office in Russia, which is equivalent to your Attorney 
General's office, signed an accusation and a trial followed. 

Since the court refused to admit the unlawfulness of the charges 
which were based on classified lists of secrets that violated the 
Russian Constitution, I refused to participate in my own trial in 
order not to become an accessory to the crime of violating the con- 
stitution. I was arrested again, sent to a maximum security prison 
and held there for 26 days along with common criminals. 

The mounting pressure of world public opinion, expressed by 
science and political leaders, caused the Procurator to overturn the 



168 

charges. The trial was stopped. I was found not guilty because of 
lack of evidence and I was released from prison in February 1994. 

My concerns are reflected in detail in my article, "Dismantling 
the Soviet-Russian Chemical Weapons Complex: An Insider's 
View", which the Stimson Center published in October 1995 in a 
report titled "Chemical Weapons Disarmament in Russia: Problems 
and Prospects". I am not going to dwell on these concerns in detail. 

However, we should all be aware of existing loopholes that might 
permit wrongdoing. If I am not mistaken, regulations that prohibit 
the export of potentially dangerous chemical compounds from Rus- 
sia currently do not include the new chemical agents developed at 
GosNIIOKhT and their precursors. This could, of course, create 
some opportunities for the misuse of these chemicals. 

A further confirmation of this danger is that General Anatoly 
Kuntsevich and his people are currently under investigation by the 
KGB for theft of chemical weapons in 1993 and attempted theft in 
1994. It is important to stress that General Kuntsevich and his 
people are not brave enough to act on their own without their 
bosses' consent. 

A good cover for any efforts to proliferate chemical weapons could 
have been a 1992 agreement between the governments of Russia 
and Syria on the creation of a pan-Arabic ecological center that was 
supposed to be dealing with not only ecological problems but also 
with the problems of protection against chemical weapons. 
Kuntsevich became the executive administrator of this program 
from the Russian side, organizing experiments in GosNIIOKhT 
with the participation of Director Viktor Petrunin and Professor 
Georgi Drozd. 

According to Drozd, his laboratory synthesized the standard sam- 
ples of the chemical agents, registering their physical and chemical 
characteristics, et cetera. Several airplanes with cargo were sent to 
the aforementioned center in Syria. The investigation initiated by 
the KGB after the complaint of the deputy director of 
GosNIIOKhT, Viktor Polyakov, ended in the dismissal of General 
Kuntsevich, who was then chairman of the presidential committee 
that is supposed to oversee chemical weapons disarmament in Rus- 
sia. 

My concern here is not about the amount of stolen or intended 
dichloranhydride of m ethyl phosphonic acid, even though this chem- 
ical is a precursor for the synthesis of soman, sarin, Substance 33, 
Substance A-230, and other chemical agents. Even if several tons 
of this chemical precursor were sent to Sjrria, this amount would 
not be enough to organize the production of weapons, though it 
could be enough to begin scientific research for the development 
and testing of new poisonous agents. My understanding is that 
S3rria does not have its own scientists working in the field of chemi- 
cal weapons. Therefore, I naturally concluded that Russian special- 
ists were supposed to work with this precursor. 

This statement brings me to one of my main worries. I would like 
to point out the problem of the brain drain of chemical weapon spe- 
cialists from Russia to other countries. Because of the deteriorating 
condition of the military-industrial complex in the former Soviet 
Union, many specialists in the field of chemical weaponry do not 



169 

have enough sources of income to support their famiHes and are 
ready to go anywhere to earn money. 

In my opinion, we were all very lucky that the notorious gas at- 
tack in the Tokyo subway was prepared and carried out by dilet- 
tantes. Had true professionals from Russia executed it using mili- 
tary-strength sarin, there would have been a real catastrophe. Nat- 
urally, professionals would know how to carry out such horrible at- 
tacks with the most effectiveness. They would fmd ways to disperse 
chemical agents that caused much more damage. I hope that you 
will take steps to prevent this from happening. 

If the United States could provide funds to support employment 
or retraining of Russian chemical weaponry specialists, as they so 
wisely did in the case of the nuclear specialists, it would be an im- 
portant contribution to strengthening world peace and security. 

Another one of my principal concerns is the danger of dissemina- 
tion of chemical weapons, a danger far greater than the spread of 
nuclear weapons. I will be direct. Russia's stockpiles are stored in- 
appropriately, without proper provisions to make sure that they are 
not stolen. 

Unfortunately, this is not only my opinion. My view is shared by 
some representatives from Duma I talked with in February of this 
year. The general contractor of the Basalt Research and Develop- 
ment Association informed me that there are several million units 
of weapons — missiles, bombs, rockets, et cetera — kept in store- 
houses in Russia. Naturally, it is virtually impossible to control 
this huge amount of weaponry without computerized inventory-tak- 
ing methods. 

Since corruption flourishes in contemporary Russia, including in 
the military, the possibility of theft of chemical weapons by guards 
is very high. One factor which would make such theft easy to ac- 
complish is that the warheads with chemical weapons are kept sep- 
arately from the powder charges, so a potential criminal would not 
have to worry about accidental explosion. 

Also, the warheads are hermetically sealed against possible 
transportation accidents, meaning a thief would run no risk of acci- 
dental exposure to poisonous gas. Furthermore, considering that no 
customs agency has any equipment to detect poisonous agents, 
there are very few obstacles to prevent illegal export of chemical 
weapons from Russia. 

Chemical agents can also be easily carried out from the scientific 
research institutes which are working with chemical weapons. The 
procedures to take inventory of chemical weapons there are purely 
formal and not an obstacle to those workers who might want to 
steal these weapons. 

My own efforts to improve the system during my work at 
GosNIIOKhT were not successful. Later, I warned about such dan- 
ger in my presentations at the public conferences in 1993 and 1994. 
I stressed that the KGB is not particularly interested in fir-m con- 
trol over poisonous substances and chemical weapons. As to the 
possibility of theft in military institutes, it is even more likely be- 
cause the army has control over its own resources and, as far as 
I know, up until recent years, KGB activity there was almost non- 
existent. 



170 

I am sure that the system of international inspections provided 
for under the Chemical Weapons Convention will help address this 
problem. International inspectors would be able to count these 
weapons and keep track of them until they are destroyed safely. 
Given the aforementioned circumstances, it is very important that 
outside inspectors begin to exercise control over this situation as 
soon as possible. 

In addition, the Convention's inspections can bring under proper 
control the new kinds of chemical weapons I wrote about in my ar- 
ticles, the ones not included in the list of controlled chemical sub- 
stances, including some dual-use chemical compounds, the Conven- 
tion for the first time provides for routine inspections in industry 
to make sure that these chemical components are used only for 
commercial products. It also allows challenge inspections at any 
place to investigate problem situations. These are very strong tools 
and I hope that you will do your part to see that they are applied 
in Russia by pressing for the Senate's ratification of the Conven- 
tion. Thank you. 

Senator NuNN. Thank you very much, Dr. Mirzayanov. 

Milton Leitenberg, is that the correct pronunciation? 

Mr. Leitenberg. Light, like electric light. 

Senator NUNN. Mr. Leitenberg has spent the last several years 
studjdng the Russian biological weapons programs. Mr. Leitenberg 
has completed a detailed study of the biological warfare program 
in Russia and the former Soviet Union, which I believe is part of 
your testimony today. Mr. Leitenberg is a Senior Fellow at the 
Center for International and Security Studies at the University of 
Maryland. 

Mr. Leitenberg, we are glad to have you. 

TESTIMONY OF MILTON LEITENBERG, SENIOR FELLOW, CEN- 
TER FOR INTERNATIONAL AND SECURITY STUDIES, UNIVER- 
SITY OF MARYLAND 

Mr. Leitenberg. Thank you very much, Senators. I appreciate 
the opportunity to testify. I will talk a bit more broadly on biologi- 
cal arms control, in addition to the Russian program. I wanted to 
talk about four issues: First, what we know about the Russian pro- 
gram; second, a bit about proliferation of BW to other countries, 
and as a subset of that, something about potential terrorist use of 
biological weapons or the absence of past terrorist use; and third, 
a bit about developments in BW arms control, particularly in the 
last 5 or 6 years. 

The Biological Weapons Convention has 5-year Review Con- 
ferences. It was signed in 1972 and went into force in 1975. After 
the Third Review Conference in 1991, when the Cold War was 
over, there began a move for verification. There had been no ver- 
ification under the treaty. That was not something the Soviet 
Union would consider until 1986, with the European CBMs in 
Stockholm and then the INF treaty in 1987. But from 1991 on, that 
has been accelerating and I want to say a bit about that and a lit- 
tle bit about the problems of verification. 

But first three things about BW and BW arms control which are 
unique. First, that the treaty was the only one, the first and for 



171 

a long time the only one, which did away, we thought, with a whole 
category of one of the three weapons of mass destruction. 

Second, the United States had a BW stockpile, and in advance 
of the treaty did away with the stockpile, between 1969 and 1972. 
That is altogether unique. 

The third thing is unfortunate and is also unique and that is 
that one of the two major superpowers, the former Soviet Union, 
was in generic violation of the treaty. We did not and could not get 
an admission of that. Our official Government statements since 
1984 in the annual noncompliance statement to the Congress had 
stated that they were in violation. 

It was not until 1992 that President Yeltsin, coming to this coun- 
try, was forced by the Nunn-Lugar legislation, which said that be- 
fore any Nunn-Lugar monies could be given to aid dismantling of 
the Soviet nuclear infrastructure, the President had to state that 
the Soviet Union and then Russia was at least in the process of 
compliance with all arms control treaties. That forced Mr. Yeltsin 
to admit that the Soviet Union had been in violation. 

Then it took a bit longer, until in September 1992, under what 
was called the trilateral process between the Americans, the Brit- 
ish, and the Russians, to obtain an admission that the Russian gov- 
ernment, too, perhaps had been in violation for a while. In a con- 
tinuation of the old style, was the Russian government issued an 
edict, a decree, saying that the BW program was ended, and that 
from that point on there would not be an offensive BW program. 
The United States has had its doubts about that since. 

First, a bit about BW proliferation. The BW treaty was signed in 
1972, and came into force in 1975 and at that time, according to 
U.S. Government statements, there were four countries that had 
biological weapons. France and Britain had them, too, but the Brit- 
ish probably gave up their offensive program around 1956 or so, 
the French just around 1972. But since the treaty came into force, 
the U.S. government states that about 10 countries have BW pro- 
grams, and we have to examine that word "about". I understand 
that former CIA Director Woolsey recently raised the 10 to 12. 

The problem is that the official U.S. Government statements 
which I am going by, either in the arms control treaty noncompli- 
ance documents to the Congress, or in the testimony by the heads 
of Naval Intelligence — there were three successive statements in 
1989 and 1990 — these I find, as an arms controller, unfortunate. 
They are always ambiguous. They are full of phrases about "sus- 
pected of having," or "capability", and no one outside the govern- 
ment knows what "capability" means. Does that mean an offensive 
research program? Does it mean testing? Does it mean 
weaponization? Does it mean production and stockpiling? Those 
things are never explained. 

There is a classified statement to the Congress in the Chemical 
and Biological Weapons Elimination Act, Public Law of 1991, 102- 
182. The Congress receives a classified statement describing which 
countries in the world have biological and chemical weapons pro- 
grams. However, a non-governmental arms control specialist has 
no means to match that against the public unclassified non-compli- 
ance statements. 



172 

That would be very important for you to do, particularly in the 
last year or two, for example, when both the American and British 
government identified South Africa as having had a BW program. 
South Africa never appeared in the public non-compliance state- 
ment. Israel would be also a country that one should examine as 
to whether it was on that classified statement or not. 

My prepared submission includes a table based on unclassified 
official Government statements, including a Russian Foreign Intel- 
ligence Service report of 1993. I included a British press compen- 
dium because I assumed it was based — I am guessing, I have no 
direct knowledge — that it was based, nevertheless, on British gov- 
ernment information because it matches the number of countries, 
10, that the British Defense Ministry also refers to as having BW 
capability. 

It is important to notice that the countries that developed BW 
after World War II, both major powers and now third world coun- 
tries that we think are developing or have these programs, if you 
go down this list, you will see that every one of them either has 
also developed nuclear and chemical weapons or at least two of the 
three. According to former CIA Director Woolsey, again, most coun- 
tries who do go on to develop BW do this after having developed 
CW. 

A large number of those 10 countries, about half of those that we 
suspect of having BW programs, are in the Middle East. The fact 
of Israeli nuclear weapons has to be taken into account and usually 
never is. It is always assumed that that Israeli nuclear weapons 
are relevant to why Arab mideast states make chemical weapons 
but nobody has explicitly drawn that connection to their BW pro- 
grams. We do not know if there is a specific casual relation, but 
nobody has drawn it, in any case, to BW, even though it is always 
drawn to CW. 

A few comments about Iraq because we know the most about 
Iraq's BW program, due to the aftermath of the Gulf War and the 
UNSCOM process. UNSCOM is the U.N. commission that is able 
to travel inside Iraq and to look anyplace at any time. The first im- 
portant point is that we would never have learned all that we did 
except for that process. 

The second important point is that Iraq has lied all through the 
5 years, consistently, every 6 months or so, as late as July and Au- 
gust. Only the defection of the general who headed the entire 
weapons of mass destruction programs, which forced Iraq to dis- 
close a lot of information. That is very important because it would 
have been catastrophic if the sanctions had been revoked before 
that, which was exactly what Iraq was hoping for, and what France 
and Russia and China were urging at the UN Security Council. It 
was only the defection of General Kamel that ended that pressure. 
Therefore the sanctions are still there, and we know the Iraqi BW 
program was not disclosed to UNSCOM before in anything close to 
its completeness. 

The other thing that is very important is that every nation from 
the developing world that has gone into the development of weap- 
ons of mass destruction, either nuclear or chemical or biological, 
has had to depend on technology transfer from advanced industrial 
countries, and not just those in the West. China, can be the sup- 



173 

plier as well. But they have all had to depend on that, and we 
know that in several of these countries — Iraq was a perfect case — 
a large amount of the technology, a great majority of it came from 
Western countries in Europe — France, Britain, West Germany in 
particular, Switzerland. The bacterial cultures came from the Unit- 
ed States. 

There are several important lessons here. The first is that infor- 
mation about such technology transfers was available to Western 
intelligence agencies. We were apparently monitoring that, and we 
were adding up the sum of money that Iraq was spending for such 
imports. 

The second is that nothing was done in response to that informa- 
tion. The late 1980s was a particular period in which the Bush ad- 
ministration made the diplomatic judgment that it would be more 
useful to try and talk Iraq into collaboration, rather than publicly 
disclosing and explaining what Iraq was doing. 

The third point is that the technology importation process would 
have been hindered by export control measures. The Australia 
Group, which has negotiated export control measures for chemical 
weapons among 26 countries did not do this for biological weapons 
until mid- 1993. It is not insignificant that Iran, who the United 
States suspects of having a biological weapons program, has spent 
several years of diplomatic effort trying to get the Australia Group 
abolished. 

A brief comment regarding BW and terrorism. Historically — for 
50 years after World War II — there has been no terrorist use of 
BW. I wrote my testimony before listening to yesterday's study by 
the Committee staff. Nevertheless, I am still skeptical regarding 
some of the allegations that relate to BW agents in the activities 
of the Aum group in Japan, and which we can go into in questions. 

I state repeatedly in my prepared statement that the Aum group 
failed in making botulinum toxin. They were trying to for 3 or 4 
years, but the product apparently did not work. That is very sig- 
nificant, because that group had an incredible amount of money. It 
had its own facilities to work in. It imported the appropriate tech- 
nology: fermenters, milling machines, vacuum dryers and so forth, 
and it had some technically trained people, and again, no lack of 
money. 

As an arms controller I have always heretofore thought that the 
biological weapon problem, and I have been working on this subject 
for over 30 years now, since the early 1960s, was a problem of pro- 
liferation to states, and at least heretofore was not a problem of 
terrorist use. Several of the countries in the Mid-East that we sus- 
pect of having BW programs — Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya — these are 
all countries that have sponsored terrorist groups, and have sup- 
plied such groups with explosives and other kinds of technology. 
They have not heretofore — at least, heretofore — helped terrorist 
groups do an3dhing in the way of BW. 

The best thing that I think the Senate could do to stop further 
biological weapon proliferation, however, would be, to pass the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. That would show that the United 
States was interested in a serious verification regime in the chemi- 
cal and biological weapons area, and these two are usually consid- 
ered together. That would show that we are really interested in a 



174 

verification regime in at least the chemical area and hopefully it 
is going to move to the biological area. 

That means getting the Chemical Weapons Convention to the 
Senate floor, and not having a situation where one Senator can 
block an arms control treaty on a weapon of mass destruction — in 
fact, two treaties on weapons and mass destruction if you include 
START — a treaty that was presented in 1984 by Mr. Bush when 
he was Vice President, was signed by the Bush administration, and 
which took over 20 years to negotiate. That just does not make 
sense to any arms controller who does not sit in the Senate. 

Just a few words on verification and we will turn to the BW pro- 
gram of Russia and the former Soviet Union. Consideration of BW 
verification has proceeded since 1991 and then particularly since 
the end of 1993, when a report was submitted by a group of experts 
convened by a special session of the nations that are treaty signato- 
ries. They are referred to as "states parties to" the Biological Weap- 
ons Convention. 

The American Government is now interested in seeing the same 
kinds of transparency measures that we worked out with Russia in 
1992 in the trilateral process become part of a protocol which 
would be attached to the Biological Weapons Convention. These in- 
clude on-site inspections, a verification capability with on-site in- 
spections and with mandatory data exchanges; both of these being 
mandatory, the data exchanges and the on-site inspection capabil- 
ity. The protocal would have to be separate from the Convention, 
and it would have to be ratified separately. 

Most other Western countries have, in fact, been interested in 
such additions of verification capability since 1991. We were a bit 
over-cautious for various reasons in the Bush administration. That 
has changed now, and hopefully the verification protocal will go 
ahead by next year when there is the next BWC Review Con- 
ference. 

Along with the verification experts meetings that have been 
going on during the past 2 or 3 years, a series of model inspection 
exercises were held, some international and some national. The 
international ones were the U.S., British, and Russian ones under 
the trilateral process, where we have gone to some of their facilities 
and they have gone to some of our facilities. 

However, in the verification experts process, Canada, The Neth- 
erlands, and Britain did inspection exercises of pharmaceutical 
plants in their own countries. One purpose was to examine a con- 
sideration that the Bush administration had raised, which was that 
such inspection exercises could compromise commercial security re- 
quired by industrial firms. These three nations carried out inspec- 
tion exercises in pharmaceutical companies in their countries and 
decided that the problem could be overcome, and that there would 
not be any compromise of commercial secrecy. 

One last word on verification. The material that was prepared for 
Congress in recent years in two reports by the Office of Technology 
Assessment, and also in a Congressional Research Service report, 
were very pessimistic, negative overall, about the capabilities of 
BW verification. The basic reasons given are because the produc- 
tion equipment is dual purpose, and as people repeat, the facilities 



175 

do not have to be very large in size, though most of them that have 
been built by nations in the past have been sizeable. 

My prepared statement includes a set of tables prepared by the 
Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center in 1993. Those are the 
U.S. BW intelligence people. The tables consider five indicators of 
BW facilities — BW facilities of states, not terrorist ones: Funding 
and personnel, facility design, equipment and security, technical 
considerations, safety and process flow. They total 40 different as- 
pects. The tables match the 40 aspects in BW facilities and in 
pharmaceutical and vaccine plants to see whether they are similar 
or whether they are different. They indicate a rather substantial 
capability to differentiate between the civil and the military facili- 
ties. 

Now to turn to the question of the BW program of the former So- 
viet Union and the present Russian program. As I indicated, the 
U.S. and UK finally obtained an admission that the former Soviet 
Union had been in violation. I will just read a brief statement from 
the 1992 U.S. Arms Control Compliance Report which sums it up: 

"The United States has determined that the Russian offensive bi- 
ological warfare program, inherited from the Soviet Union, violated 
the BWC, at least through March 1992. The Soviet offensive BW 
program was massive and included production, weaponization, and 
stockpiling. The status of the program since that time remains un- 
clear. The modernization of biological agent capability and its toxin 
research and production in the territory of the former Soviet Union 
remains a problem." That was in January, 1993, in other words, 
written at the end of 1992. 

We then got the trilateral statement with the Russians, and the 
critically important sentences in that statement, signed by the 
three countries together, were that a so-called mobilization capac- 
ity — mothballed agent production facilities — that these now be dis- 
mantled. The Russians call them "experimental technological lines 
for the production of agents," that these were to be closed down 
once and for all. In addition, the group that ran this program in 
the Ministry of Defense should be disbanded. Apparently, it was 
just renamed. And also that the program was to be cut by half, by 
50 percent in personnel and 30 percent in budgeting. 

The U.S. and UK nevertheless remained worried about the pro- 
gram, largely because of a series of defectors from first the Soviet 
Union and then Russia, who reported that it had not been stopped. 
President Clinton and Secretary of Defense Perry have been con- 
tinuing through 1994, and I assume in 1995 as well — to press the 
most senior members of the Russian government, their counter- 
parts on the Russian side, to make sure that the offensive portion 
of the Russian BW program is absolutely ended. 

Under the trilateral process we have the ability to visit their BW 
facilities. How many were there? How big was the program? That 
was a bit of a surprise to an arms controller. The United States 
had one R&D institution. Fort Dietrick. We had one test site in 
Utah, Dugway. We had one production facility. Pine Bluff. 

It turns out that the Russians had about 20 facilities in all. 
There were five under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense, 
two under branches of the Ministry of Defense, and there were an- 
other 15 or 16 under a non-Ministry of Defense organization re- 



176 

sponsible for microbiological production. It is referred to as 
Biopreparat in short. It has a much longer name in Russian. 

The Biopreparat facilities did, some of them, partly civilian along 
with military work, some only military work, some all civilian 
work. But there were that many (15-16) that did at least some BW 
work. In fact, in the early 1990's our greatest concern appeared to 
be the Biopreparat facilities, and those were the ones that we went 
to inspect first under the trilateral program. 

So the program was very large. It may have had tens of thou- 
sands of employees. Again, at least an order of magnitude larger 
than the U.S. program had been at its peak in 1968 or 1969. 

Because of some of the questions that the Committee has been 
most interested about in terms of the Russian chemical weapons 
program, the size of the stockpile and the security of that stockpile, 
those questions may not pertain to the Soviet "B" program. The 
only time that the U.S. Government has referred to a Soviet BW 
"stockpile" was in its 1992 statement. There followed a leak to the 
press which indicated that our intelligence people had some notion 
about the size of that stockpile. 

But there has never again been an official public statement by 
the Americans or the British about a Soviet BW stockpile, and it 
does not appear in the U.S. -UK-Russian trilateral statement of 
September 1992. So I think the present assumption is that there 
is not a stockpile of BW agents sitting somewhere in Russia, weap- 
ons or agents, and that, therefore, security of such a stockpile is 
not an issue. The BW issue was that mobilization capacity, in other 
words mothballed production capability, and was that gone or was 
it not gone? Then there is the same question about the possible ex- 
odus, brain drain, of former Soviet and presently Russian people 
working in BW. 

Regarding the conversion of the former Russian BW facilities, I 
prepared a large study about their conversion last year, and Ms. 
Harrington in the Department of State, who is the person that 
works the most closely on that, has just published a paper on the 
same subject a few days ago, of three or four pages. 

There is not a good understanding of what all the 20,000 or so 
people that formerly worked in the Russian BW program are pres- 
ently doing. The latest Russian submission under the confidence- 
building measures of the treaty states that there are only 6,000 
people still working in those institutions. In its 1993 declaration 
Russia still named 12 institutions, the five military, and the seven 
formerly Biopreparat. (In 1994 this was apparently further reduced 
to eight.) But we do not have a good grasp, I do not think, of the 
overall picture. 

My own training before I went into arms control was in bio- 
chemistry. I taught subjects such as molecular biology, and I there- 
fore have an understanding of the nature of research in a BW lab- 
oratory. There should be no group of technical personnel working 
on any kind of weapon: nuclear, chemical, missile, all the rest, that 
should be easier to convert than personnel working on BW. All the 
production facilities are essentially the same as would be used for 
civilian production and the kind of technical knowledge and capa- 
bility that the researcher has is exactly the same as in the civilian 
area. 



177 

In the former Soviet Union, there is an incredible need for medi- 
cal products and pharmaceuticals, and everybody agrees on that. I 
think we have been suggesting approaches to Russian conversion 
that are misdirected. We have been stressing joint ventures with 
Western companies that could produce pharmaceutical products for 
export that meet the production standards in the West. Most 
former Soviet pharmaceutical production and vaccine facilities do 
not meet those standards. But to get the maximum number of peo- 
ple into civilian work that were previously at work in the BW field 
in Russia, you should focus on products that can be sold in Russia 
and in the other former Soviet Republics. 

There is in fact some Nunn-Lugar funds, a very small amount, 
that is being used in one of these former Biopreparat facilities. 
That is under the Department of Defense. There is also a bit more 
out of the Department of Energy and NASA. 

Another problem with some of these U.S. aided "conversion" ef- 
forts is that because of the way those programs are designed, they 
could be open to criticism that we are tr3dng to obtain benefits for 
our own BW defense program. I think that is a motivation that 
should be entirely avoided. What we should be interested in is get- 
ting the maximum number of Russian research and related person- 
nel in those facilities at work on commercial pharmaceutical prod- 
ucts that can be sold within the former Soviet Union, in all the CIS 
countries, for consumption there. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leitenberg follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. LEITENBERG 

Senator Roth, Senator Nunn, Committee members, I appreciate the opportunity 
to testify on issues deahng with Biological Weapons Arms Control. 

I have submitted a background study for the record, which discusses four subjects: 

• what was learned in recent years regarding the BW program of the USSR, 
and now Russia, and what is its present status; 

• proHferation of BW: the state of pubhc knowledge regarding those other coun- 
ties known or strongly suspected of having BW programs, and the question 
of possible use of biological weapons by terrorists; 

• developments in BW arms control since 1975, particularly in the last half- 
dozen years, and the move towards a verification capability for the Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC); 

• some discussion of the possibilities and problems of BW verification. 

Most of my presentation will be devoted to the issues dealing with the BW pro- 
gram of the USSR and now Russia, but I would like to make several points regard- 
ing each of these other major topics. 

First, some basic points dealing with biological weapons arms control. 

The Biological Weapons Convention was signed on April 10, 1972, and came into 
force on March 26, 1975, when the U.S., the UK and the USSR deposited their in- 
struments of Ratification of the Convention. 

It has had three unique distinctions. It was the first, and for a long time only, 
post WWII disarmament treaty in which an entire class of weapons of mass destruc- 
tion was done away with. Or so it was assumed at the time, and the arms control 
community by and large thought biological warfare had been removed from the 
scene. Contrary to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty of 1968, there were to be no 
preferred group of countries that would continue to retain the weapons. Biological 
weapons were to be prohibited to all, into the future. This was the first major and 
unique distinction of the subject 

The second was that one of the two superpowers — the United States— which did 
possess biological weapons, gave them up and destroyed them, even before the trea- 
ty came into being: 

Biological weapons provide a case in which the usual approach to arms in- 
filtration was reversed. Instead of first negotiating a treaty and then imple- 



178 

meriting its provisions, an entire class of weapons was renounced by a 
major possessor without any prior international agreement. This was in No- 
vember 1969, when President Nixon, after extensive review, declared that 
the United States would unconditionally renounce the deployment, procure- 
ment, and stockpiling of biological weapons, would destroy all stocks of 
agents and weapons, and would convert facilities for their development and 
production to peaceful purposes. 

The United States chose this policy at the time to dissociate biological from chemi- 
cal weapons, the combined and historical framework under which arms control de- 
liberations on them had been carried on for many years in Geneva. Article 9 of the 
BWC was an undertaking to continue negotiations to achieve a chemical weapon 
disarmament treaty — but an additional 22 years would pass before that would be 
achieved on January 1993. The BWC additionally carried no verification provisions; 
on-site verification was not something that the USSR would consider or accept be- 
fore Stockholm in 1986 and the INF Treaty in December 1987. 

There was however a third major and unique distinction of the BWC: in 1992, 
Russia admitted that the USSR had been in gross, generic violation of the treaty, 
the only instance in which one of the superpowers admitted to having been in total 
violation of a post WWII arms control treaty. By the end of the 1980's it had also 
become clear that a half dozen or more countries had decided to develop biological 
weapons in the intervening years. Thus the assumed achievement of the 1970's had 
been at least in part reversed. Chemical weapons had been used in the war between 
Iraq and Iran in the 1980's, and in 1991, allied troops that fought Iraq ran a risk 
of being attacked by both chemical and biological weapons. From the mid- 1980's on, 
there had also been movement to strengthen the BWC and add some kind of ver- 
ification provisions to it, accelerated by the verification provisions in the chemical 
Weapons Convention, signed in January 1993. In 1994 it was also reported that 
"U.S. military doctrine on nuclear weapons since 1993 has assumed the possible use 
of nuclear weapons to deter or respond to a chemical or biological attack . . .," al- 
though there is no official U.S. statement to this effect. All of these factors put BW 
back in the active arms-control agenda. 

THE PROLIFERATION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 

The years since 1972 and 1975, when the Biological Weapons Convention was 
signed and then entered into force, have been a disappointment for arms control in 
the biological field. One official U.S. estimate is that "The number of nations having 
or suspected of having offensive biological and toxin warfare programs has increased 
from 4 to 10 since 1972," and as the same statement noted, some of the 10 nations 
in question ". . . are signatories of the BWC." A recent statement by former CIA 
Director Woolsey has, I understand, raised the "10" to "12." A substantial number 
of these countries are in the Middle East, and these have either not signed or not 
ratified the BWC. In 1992 the Bush administration made a concerted effort but 
failed in the attempt to convince several of the major Middle East antagonists to 
either sign and/or ratify the BW Convention. 

With the exception of the USSR and then Russia, and Iraq as a result of the Gulf 
War and the UNSCOM process which followed it, there has however been no inter- 
national pressure or penalty applied against any of the suspected BW states. Until 
around 1988 no national or international spokesman even made reference to the de- 
velopment, and since then, it has been virtually only U.S. spokesmen that have done 
so, but within severely restrained limits. The statements have been constantly 
plagued with ambiguities in their descriptive terminology, such as the words ". . . 
or suspected of having . . ." in the statement quoted above. In 1990 the Chief of 
Naval Operations told Congress that "3 countries worldwide now have bacterio- 
logical weapons," and that 15 others were suspected of developing them. Three 
weeks later the Director of Naval Intelligence identified Iraq, Syria, and the USSR 
as the three "assessed to have (BW) capability." His predecessor had also identified 
China, Taiwan, and North Korea by name. But what the U.S. governments' criteria 
were for the categories of "suspected", "developing", and "capability" was never spec- 
ified, although in this particular pair of statements "capability" apparently meant 
weapons possession. A statement in the 1992 British Defense White Paper uses the 
same pattern of ambiguous phrasing, noting that "about ten (nations) have or are 
seeking biological weapons." What was worse, the number of nations "developing" 
or with "capability" were frequently aggregated with those doing the same for chem- 
ical weapons. What one wanted to know explicitly was which nations had BW pro- 
grams, which had gone into weapons development, testing or weaponization, and 
which into production or stockpiling of BW agents and weapons. That information 
was publicly unavailable. The Chemical and Biological Weapons Elimination Act of 



179 

1991 (P.L. 102-182) requires an annual report by the President to Congress which 
contains a complete list of known or suspected BW programs, including those that 
are classified. 

Since the U.S. government has been severely and persistently restrictive in the 
information that it has released on BW proliferation, perhaps it is assumed that 
more explicit information would prompt additional nations to take up BW develop- 
ment. I do not know if that is the reason or whether other diplomatic considerations 
are the cause. But I believe that the ambiguities are bad for BW arms control, and 
had for anti-proliferation efforts. Since the U.S. listings obviously omit countries 
that have biological defensive research programs — such as the UK, Sweden, The 
Netherlands, in addition to the U.S. and others — by implication at a minimum those 
countries it identifies are to be assumed to have offensive programs of varying de- 
grees. My understanding is that the U.S. government does not, however, think that 
any nation is currently "producing" or stockpiling BW agents. 

An important additional question for Congress is whether the annual classified 
compilation it receives from the U.S. government is complete or not. There were ap- 
parently years in which the Bush Administration withheld inclusion of China, and 
with the recent U.S. and British government disclosures on the former South Afri- 
can program, it would be important to check if that appeared in the classified notifi- 
cation in former years, as well as perhaps other countries. 

I have compiled a table on BW proliferation based on unclassified U.S. disclo- 
sures, and on entries in the 1993 Russian Foreign Intelligence Service report on pro- 
liferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is important to note that virtually no 
nation that has gone into a BW development program has done that without also 
developing or procuring one of the other weapons of mass destruction, chemical, or 
nuclear weapons. The paper that I have submitted for the record includes a discus- 
sion on each of the listed countries, containing the maximum information that is 
publicly available. 



Nations Having BW Programs At Least Approaching Weaponization 

Russia: Ambiguity regarding continuation of offensive program 



U.S. Gov't Arms 


Adm.'s Brooks,' 


U.S. and 


Russian Federa- 




Control Compli- 


Studeman, Trost 


UK govern- 


tion 2 Foreign In- 


The Guardian^ 


ance Reports to 


(1988, '90, '91); 


ments 


telligence Report, 


(UK. 1991) 


Congress (93.95) 


Sec. Cheney, '90 


(1995) 


1993 





Middle East 

Iraq XX X 

Libya XX XX 

Syria X . X X 

Iran XX X 

Israel X 

Egypt X X 

South/East Asia 

China XX X 

North Korea X XX 

Taiwan ? X X 

India" ? 

South Korea ? 

Vietnam X 

Laos X 

Africa 
South Africa X 

' "Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, before the Seapower, Strate- 
gic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, on Intelligence Issues," 14 March 
1990, p. 54. 

"Statement of Rear Admiral William O. Studeman, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, before the Seapower, Stra- 
tegic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, on Intelligence Issues," 1 March 
1988, p. 48 

"Statement of Admiral C.A.H. Trost, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, before the Senate Armed Services Commit- 
tee on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1991 Budget of the United States Navy," February 28, 1990. 

"Remarks Prepared for Delivery by the Honorable Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, American Israel Public Af- 
fairs Committee, Washington, DC, 11 June 1990," News Release, No. 294-90, p. 4. 

2 Proliferation Issues: A New Challenge After the Cold War. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Russian 
Federation Foreign Intelligence Report, (translation), JPRS-TN[5-93-007, March 5, 1993. 

^ The Guardian, (UK), September 5, 1991. This source is included because it is assumed to derive its information 
from UK government sources, which have referred to "around 10" nations with "or seeking" BW. However, the inclu- 
sion of Laos and Vietnam seem very dubious, particularly if they refer to the U.S. '"/ellow Rain" allegations of the 
mid-1980s. 



180 

"In 1994, a Congressional Research Service report included a table of nations either possessing or having "pro- 
grams" of weapons of mass destruction For Biological Weapons it listed Russia as the only nation with "possession 
confirmed," Iraq as "clear intent" (which, by 1994, should also have been in the "confirmed" column), China, India, 
Pakistari, North Korea. Taiwan, Iran and Syria as "probable possession" and Egypt and Libya as "suspected pro- 
grams " The interesting — or anomalous — listings are of India and Pakistan, which have not otherwise been included in 
any unclassified official US, listings. 

J M. Collins el. al. Nuclear. Biological and Chemical Weapons Proliferation: Potential Military countermeasures. 
Congressional Research Service, 94-528S. July 5. 1994, page 2. 

(Other versions of this table, essentially based on the sources in footnote 1, were 
published by Elisa Harris (1991), Nicole Ball and Robert McNamara (1990), and 
Steve Fetter (1991), the Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Prolifera- 
tion of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1993, p. 82, and Ivo Daalder (1994).) 

Of those countries that developed BW after World War II to the stage of weapons 
acquisition, virtually all either acquired all three categories of weapons of mass de- 
struction (nuclear, chemical, and biological), or at least two and have made attempts 
at a third: 

• the United States, USSR, France, the UK, China, and South Africa procured 
all three; 

• Iraq, had chemical and biological, and was in advanced development of nu- 
clear; 

• Israel, has nuclear and chemical; biological is unknown; 

• Iran, has chemical and biological; seeks nuclear; 

• Libya, has chemical; has sought nuclear for decades, and is seeking biological; 

• Syria has chemical and biological; 

• North Korea has chemical; sought nuclear, and accepting the Russian assess- 
ment, apparently has biological; 

• India and Pakistan have nuclear, chemical and biological are unknown; 

• Taiwan has chemical. South Korean chemical is ambiguous, and both had in- 
cipient nuclear programs in the late 1970's. 

According to a statement by former CIA Director Woolsey in 1994, nations devel- 
oping and procuring BW have usually done so following their procurement of CW, 
and it has frequently been stated that various Arab states in the Middle East devel- 
oped chemical weapons because of Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. There are 
no statements or analyses that have extended this rationale specifically to their de- 
velopment of biological weapons as well, although it is an easy, logical extension to 
make. In Anthony Cordesman's phrase. "Nations that are interested in biological 
weapons are already interested because they offer an alternative to nuclear weap- 
ons. . . ." It would not be altogether surprising if one learned that some govern- 
mental policy group in these states that had considered or was urging the acquisi- 
tion of nuclear weapons had spun off the suggestion to develop biological weapons. 
Nevertheless, nothing is publicly known regarding the policy decisions in these 
states regarding BW development. 

I want to comment here in particular only on Iraq, about whose BW program we 
now know the most. 

• First, that we learned what we did only as a coincidence of the Gulf War, the 
severe and intrusive restrictions that were placed on Iraq under resolutions 
of the United Nations Security Council, including the UNSCOM process [the 
United National Special Commission], with its authority to go anywhere in 
Iraq, inspect any site, repeatedly, and obtain all information dealing with all 
of Iraq's former programs to develop and produce weapons of mass destruc- 
tion. Economic sanctions would have obviously never have produced any of 
these disclosures. 

• Second, that the Iraqi government had lied continuously, even as late as in 
its July 6 "disclosures" and its August 4 "Full, Final, and Complete Disclo- 
sure." Iraq's credibility is nil, and everything must be verified. Under condi- 
tions of a police state determined to lie, UNSCOM and the inspections were 
not able to turn up major portions of the relevant evidence regarding docu- 
ments, culture media, research personnel, destruction or non-destruction of 
agents, etc., only strong suspicions as a result of discrepancies. UNSCOM 
noted in August that "Iraq has now acknowledged a much more extensive 
program than UNSCOM had been able to piece together over four years 
through a process of gathering independent information outside the country 
and then confronting Iraq with it." 

• Finally, that it would have been catastrophic to have revoked the sanctions, 
as Iraq continuously demanded and its UN Security Council advocates — Rus- 
sia, France, and China — urged, prior to UNSCOM's absolute certainty that 



181 

Iraq had thoroughly compHed with the original provisions of the UN Security 
Council's resolutions. Clearly, Iraq had hoped to get the economic sanctions 
lifted without fully disclosing its BW program. Only the defection on August 
7 of General Kame ruined that plan. 

In addition, every nation that has produced weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, 
chemical, and biological — and most particularly those in the less industrialized or 
"developing" nations, have relied on external assistance: the purchase and importa- 
tion of technology, equipment, and personnel. The personnel — advisers, scientists, 
technicians — bring knowledge. Iraq's BW program was no exception. Equipment, 
technology, and materials were procured overseas, from the USSR, France, West 
Germany, and even the United States. And a substantial amount of this was late 
in the game. 

In 1989 Iraq bought a wide variety of biotechnology equipment from various Ger- 
man supply firms, and additional fermenters, also from Germany. Altogether, 24 
West German firms were involved in the construction of production facilities for bio- 
logical and chemical weapons in Iraq; the chemical weapons production infrastruc- 
ture being by far the larger of the two. During the late 1980s U.S. intelligence serv- 
ices reportedly tracked the exports of dual use equipment that could be used for pro- 
ducing biological weapon agents from European countries to Iraq, and concluded 
that Iraq had spent approximately $100 million on its BW program between 1980 
and 1990, and that Iraq was producing and stockpiling BW agents. 

This has several clear implications: 

• Information was available to Western intelligence agencies. 

• Nothing was done, however. In fact, the late 1980s was a period in which the 
Bush Administration was following a diplomatic agenda of courting Iraq to 
solicit its good behavior. 

• The process could have been severely handicapped, if not stopped, by Western 
export controls. The Australia Group, 26 nations with agreed export control 
procedures for materials that could lead to the production of chemical weap- 
ons, extended its agreements in June 1993 to manufacturing equipment and 
agents that could produce BW. It is certainly significant that Iran — a country 
that possesses chemical weapons and is suspected of having developed biologi- 
cal weapons — spent several years trying to get other nations to support it in 
a campaign to pressure the Australia Group to disband. 

THE POTENTIAL USE OF BW BY EXTRA-NATIONAL, OR "TERRORIST" GROUPS 

There have been many warnings over a period of several decades of the possible 
use of BW by terrorist groups. The reason given is the ostensible ease of preparation 
of such agents. Nevertheless to this date no such use has ever taken place. The most 
serious attempt to produce an agent, which nevertheless failed, was made by the 
Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group in the early 1990s. The same group did go on to 
manufacture and use the chemical agent Sarin in 1994, and then in March 1995 
in Tokyo. Over a period of 50 years, there is a record of no more than a half dozen 
threats worldwide by groups or individuals to use BW. 

There are two significant aspects of the Aum Shinrikyo attempt. The first is that 
although it appears to have been the most serious attempt on record, with no lack 
of resources and time, it failed. The second is that the perpetrating group was most 
certainly not an ordinary "terrorist" group. As for resources, they were virtually un- 
limited in financial terms, the group had established front companies for purchas- 
ing, had bought the appropriate equipment, had years in which to work, and had 
a small staff of scientifically trained personnel. Nevertheless, they failed to produce 
the agent that they were trying to make. 

My own view is that the major problem regarding biological weapons is to prevent 
its development by states. I still think that is the case. The greater number of states 
that develop BW, the greater will be the eventual likelihood that it may be taken 
up for use by terrorist groups. If the U.S. Senate wants to inhibit the possible even- 
tual use of BW by terrorists the most effective thing that it could do would be to 
support the forthcoming protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention that would 
have greatly strengthened verification provisions, including provisions for manda- 
tory on-site inspection, even though such a convention would have direct impact 
only on states. And the best way to do that would be to have the Senate ratify the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. That would be a crucially important step, establish- 
ing the U.S. interest in a serious verification regime in the C and B area. And that 
obviously means getting the treaty to the Senate floor, and ending the ability of a 
single U.S. Senator to prevent a major arms control treaty on one of the three cat- 
egories of weapons of mass destruction — a treaty that the Bush Administration had 



182 

championed, that the United States signed, and that took over twenty years of 
international negotiations to achieve — from being put to the U.S. Senate for ratifica- 
tion. 

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL SINCE THE THIRD BWC REVIEW CONFERENCE 
(1991); MOVEMENT TOWARD VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES, AND THE POSSIBILITIES AND 
PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION 

By 1994 the United States was interested in seeing that a series of "transparency 
measures" similar to those that the United States, Russia, and the UK had agreed 
on in the trilateral process in September 1992, be extended on an international 
basis to all States Parties of the BWC. That included mandatory data exchanges, 
or declarations, and mandatory on-site visits. Both aspects are essential: whatever 
will be decided on must be mandatory and there must be some on-site inspection ca- 
pability. The administration should be pushing as hard as it can to see that a new 
Protocol to the BWC that will be ready in time for consideration at the Fourth Re- 
view Conference in 1996. 

The purpose of the mandatory declarations would be to provide a database on the 
facilities that were of the greatest potential danger to the BWC, the most convert- 
ible, and the easiest to disguise. That includes all facilities with high containment, 
all that used listed organisms, and all national biological defense programs. Over 
a period of years such declarations would presumably provide a profile of "a national 
pattern of activity." If that profile changed it could provide reason for an on-site 
visit. Such visits would have to take place on relatively short notice, and they would 
be to any declared or undeclared site, or to a site of alleged use of BW. 

The U.S. government's position is now the same as that of all the other Western 
nations, that having more information is unquestionably better than having less, 
and that there must be an on-site inspection capability. Nations that stay out of the 
regime will be suspect. For those that join the regime, the ability to demand inspec- 
tions will supply the international community with leverage and pressure. There is 
no leverage at all without such a regime. The important point is not that there 
might still not be 100 percent absolute certainty of discovering a violator, but that 
without it, there is no ability whatsoever to go in and look. The Protocol would re- 
quire a new cycle of ratifications, separate from the BWC. There would have to be 
some kind of secretariat and inspecting agency, analogous to the OPCW provided 
for by the Chemical Weapons Convention. 

The verification problem is simply the ability to find and then to distinguish pro- 
hibited from permitted activity. In BW this is complicated by the fact that the facili- 
ties — at least in theory — need not be very large, although all the national facilities 
identified to date have been sizable, and the equipment is for the most part dual 
purpose. 

In the 1990s, two circumstances gave rise to a substantial group of BW inspec- 
tions, some as national exercises, and some on an international and official level: 

• The U.S.-Russia-UK "Trilateral" process led to U.S.-UK inspection visits to 
Russian facilities, and to Russian inspections of facilities in the U.S. and UK. 

• As part of the VEREX process, three Western governments — the UK, The 
Netherlands, and Canada — ran trial inspections of commercial facilities in 
their respective countries. 

The British, Canadian and Dutch government exercises were carried out specifi- 
cally to ascertain if serious, intrusive inspections of commercial facilities could be 
carried out without the compromise of commercial proprietary information. Their re- 
ports to the VEREX stated that that was possible without any great problems. 

Reports to the U.S. Congress by the Congressional Research Service (1994) and 
the Office of Technology Assessment (1993) have emphasized the similarities be- 
tween equipment used for peaceful purposes — ^vaccine production — and military 
ones — the production of BW agents — and the resulting difficulties in inspection and 
verification for BW. 

I would like to submit evidence that emphasizes the ability to distinguish. These 
are a set of tables prepared by the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center in 
1993 entitled "Signatures for Biological Warfare Facilities." It divided indicators 
into five categories: 

• funding and personnel, 

• facility design, equipment, and security, 

• technical considerations, 

• safety, and 

• process flow. 



183 

Under each of these categories it Hsted a series of either common or quite dissimi- 
lar characteristics in a "BW facihty" and in a "legitimate faciUty." For example, the 
nature of waste treatment, location of air filters, air pressure gradients, the location 
of refrigerated bunkers, facility security, etc. Forty such characteristics were evalu- 
ated and provide substantial differentiation between the BW facility and the pre- 
sumptive pharmaceutical or other commercial site. 

Signatures for Biological Warfare Facilities 

(ARMED FORCES MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER) 



1. Funding and Personnel 
BW Facility 

1. Military funding 

2. High Salary 

3. Funding exceeds product/research 
output 

4. Scientists/technician ratio high 

5. Limited Ethnic diversity 

6. Elite work force/foreign trained 

7. Foreign language competency 

8. High ratio of military to civilian 

2. Technical Considerations 
BW Facility 

1. Pathogenic or toxic strains 

2. Test aimed at killing animals 

3. Facilities for large animals such as 
monkeys 

4. Negative air flow 

5. No commercial products 

6. Weapons filing equipment 

3. Facilities, Security, and Equipment 
BW Facility 

1. Access control: High walls, guard 
towers, motion detectors, video 
cameras, elite security force, badges 
and clearances 

2. Transportation provided 

3. Quarantine facilities on compound 

4. Foreign travel restricted, highly 
available 

5. Refrigerated bunkers secure area 

6. Advanced software, external data base 
access ADP security high foreign 
access 

7. Static aerosol test chambers 

8. Military with weapons expertise 

9. Rail or heavy truck required for 
weapons filling facility 

4. Safety 

BW Facility 

1. Physical barriers to prevent animal to 
animal and animal to human 
transmission 

2. HEPA filters present, exhaust 

3. Dedicated biosafety personnel 

4. Infectious and toxic agent trained 
medical staff 

5. Decontamination equipment and 
showers 

6. Large capacity pass through 
autoclaves 

7. Dedicated waste treatment 

8. Special sterilization of waste 

9. Test animals sterilized before final 
disposal 



Legitimate Facility 

1. Private enterprise or nonmilitary 

2. Salary within normal limits 

3. Average or underfunded for expected 
output 

4. Average ratio 

5. Integrated work staff 

6. Local trained work force 

7. Limited foreign language capability 

8. Military personnel unlikely 

Legitimate Facility 

1. Non-pathogenic or non-toxic strains 

2. Test aimed at protecting animals 

3. Facilities for smaller animals, specific 
inbred strains 

4. Positive air flow 

5. Commercial products 

6. Bottle filling equipment 

Legitimate Facility 

1. Average security, badges at most 

2. Public/private transport 

3. No quarantine 

4. Unrestricted but not readily available 

5. Cold rooms in facility 

6. Open information except for 
proprietary information 

7. No aerosol test chambers 

8. No need 

9. Only light truck transportation 



Legitimate Facility 

1. Physical barriers designed to prevent 
animal to animal and human to 
animal transmission 

2. HEPA filters possible, intake 

3. May or may not be present 

4. Dedicated highly trained staff not 
likely 

5. Not needed or large scale 

6. Small bench top autoclaves 

7. Waste treatment common with local 
facilities 

8. May or may not exist 

9. Animals may not need to be sterilized 
before final disposal 



184 



5. Process Flow 

BW Facility Legitimate Facility 

1. Raw material consumption doesn't 1. Raw material consumption relates to 
equal output output 

2. Large volume fermenters (greater 2. Large or small scale fermentation but 
than 500 liters) cell cultures (lOOO's of cell culture and eggs in smaller 
culture flasks/roller bottles) volume 

embryonated eggs (lOO's thousands) 3. Air pressure gradients keep 

3. Air pressure gradients keep microbes contaminants out of vessels 

in vessel 4. Labelled by product, batch number, 

4. finished product — wet stored at low date, etc. 

temperature in sealed (often double 5. Milling equipment is not operated in 

packaging) containers — not readily biohazard areas 

identifiable 6. Storage in temperature controlled 

5. Milling equipment operated in environment, clean warehouse 
biohazard protective suits conditions 

6. Storage — low temperature, high 7. Non-issue 
security, bunkers with biocontainment 

7. Munitions — special filling buildings 
and/or explosives handling facilities 

THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM OF THE FORMER USSR AND PRESENT-DAY RUSSIA 

The 1992 U.S. government arms control compliance report (released on January 
19, 1993) stated 

The United States has determined that the Russian offensive biological 
warfare program, inherited from the Soviet Union, violated the Biological 
Weapons Convention through at least March 1992. The Soviet offensive BW 
program was massive, and included productions weaponization, and stock- 
piling. The status of the program since that time remains unclear. . . . The 
modernization of biological agent capability and its toxin research and pro- 
duction in the territory of the former Soviet Union remains a concern. 

The only other reference to former Soviet BW "stockpiles" was an April 1992 
Washington Post press report that claimed that "Western Intelligence" had devel- 
oped an estimate of the size of that stockpile by stating that Russia was only report- 
ing "10 percent" of the amount that these intelligence sources believed existed. How- 
ever, there has never again been any official government reference to a Russian BW 
stockpile, and no suggestion of one appears in the September 1993 U.S. -UK-Russian 
trilateral statement. In addition, as the Russians have constantly denied having 
maintained any BW stockpiles, it is not clear when or under what circumstances 
the "10 percent . . . reporting" by Russia took place. 

For these reasons, some of the questions that the Committee focussed on in rela- 
tion to the Russian chemical weapons stockpile — its size, its location, its security, 
risks of diversion of any portion of it — may not pertain to the Russian biological 
weapons program. The key questions that do exist are the nature and size of the 
remaining Russian BW program and the "mobilization capacity" — mothballed agent 
production facilities — and the degree to which it had or has not been dismantled or 
destroyed. The possible emigration of relevant Russian scientific personnel is also 
an issue, or the transfer of their knowledge by working for a foreign nation while 
remaining in the USSR. 

In 1984, the U.S. government stated that the USSR was violating the Biological 
Weapons Convention. However, it was a defector from within the Soviet BW R&D 
establishment who reached London in 1989 that prompted President Bush and 
Prime Minister Thatcher to repeatedly press Soviet President Gorbachev on the 
issue. It was only on the eve of President Yeltsin's visit to the United States in Feb- 
ruary 1992 that the conditions stipulated in the Nunn-Lugar legislation forced a 
Russian admission that the USSR had maintained a BW program that violated the 
Biological Weapons Convention. That legislation required President Bush to certify 
that the USSR and then Russia was committed toward compliance with all arms 
control agreements before any U.S. financial assistance could be provided to aid in 
the dismantling of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the 
USSR/Russia. 

In the succeeding months, however, the British and U.S. governments remained 
apprehensive about the Russian BW program and whether activities continued that 
violated the BWC. In September 1992 they obtained Russian agreement to the es- 



185 

tablishment of a "trilateral" process of information sharing and mutual site visits 
in an effort to increase the transparency of the Russian program and to bring an 
end to any possible activities not permitted by the BWC. The trilateral statement 
"confirmed the termination of offensive research, the dismantlement of experimental 
technological lines for the production of agents, and the closure of the biological 
weapons testing facility" in Russia. It also "dissolved the department in the Ministry 
of Defense responsible for the offensive biological . . ., cut the number of personnel 
involved in military biological programmes by 50%, (and) reduced military biological 
research funding by 30%." 

U.S. and British concerns apparently continued, however. In April 1994 U.S. offi- 
cials were quoted in the press as saying, "We have evidence that leads us to under- 
stand that there is still an offensive biological weapons program underway (in Rus- 
sia). . . . We are very concerned that large aspects of the program are continuing. 
. . . Yeltsin's decrees have not filtered down to the working levels." The unclassified 
version of a special U.S. government report in October 1994 on Russian compliance 
with biological and chemical arms control agreements stated that "The U.S. contin- 
ues to have concerns about Russia's compliance with the BWC." The U.S. govern- 
ment has continued to press these issues directly with President Yeltsin, by Presi- 
dent Clinton during his visit to Moscow in January 1994, during U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Perry's visit to Moscow in March 1994, and at the September 1994 Yeltsin- 
Clinton Summit meeting. Given the history of these events since 1989 — a period of 
six years — it is unfortunate that neither the Soviet nor the Russian senior military 
or political leadership hasn't sought to do away with any residual portions of the 
USSR's offensive BW program in a patently open and visible way so as to remove 
as much grounds for doubt as feasible. 

How big was the Soviet and then Russian BW program? It was apparently an 
order of magnitude larger than that of the United States at its pre- 1969 peak. In 
1987, under the BWC CBMs, the USSR reported the five BW laboratories that it 
maintained under the direct control of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. However, the 
U.S. and British governments became concerned about a second system of facilities 
that were under the nominal jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of the Medical and 
Microbiological Industry, which has mostly been referred to as the "Biopreparat" or- 
ganization (or Glavmikrobioprom, the Main Administration of the Microbiology In- 
dustry). A still-classified 1992 U.S. intelligence report referred to "16 known and 
suspected (Soviet) biological weapons facilities," up from nine previously "identified," 
a number that was soon increased to twenty. What is even more important is that 
this entire secondary system was only established in 1973: the Soviet institutes, lab- 
oratories, and administrative structure that were in violation of the BWC were es- 
tablished for the greatest part after the 1972-1975 period, after the United States 
dismantled most of its BW research apparatus and destroyed its production facility 
and BW stockpile, and the BWC came into force. 

In its 1993 BWC declaration, Russia listed the five primary Ministry of Defense 
facilities and seven others as remaining, with a combined staff of at least 6,000. 
Under the trilateral process, the U.S. and UK have been able to make visits to the 
Biopreparat facilities, but although it has been trying to negotiate visits to the five 
facilities run by the Ministry of Defense, these site inspections still have not taken 
place. 

Conversion of former BW R&D institutions should be easier than in perhaps any 
other kind of former defense facility. The need within Russia for civiHan products 
that these institutions could produce is both manifest and enormous. Nevertheless, 
it is extremely difficult to obtain information on what is taking place in these twen- 
ty-odd institutions by way of conversion. The U.S. Department of Defense, NASA, 
and the Department of Energy all have small programs of aid and involvement with 
several of these institutes. However, I think there are important questions regard- 
ing the judiciousness of some of these programs. The International Science and 
Technology Centers (ISTC) are also attempting to aid the conversion of several of 
these institutes. The major issues should not be privatization or the production of 
products exportable to the West, but rather 

• large-scale and more rapid demilitarization of the institutes 

• broader employment within them by the production of products needed within 
Russia and the other areas of the former USSR. 

Regarding the emigration of personnel from these institutes, information is very 
sketchy, but there has apparently been some. My only information is dated, over 
two years old, and indicates a low level in numbers, some tens of individuals appar- 
ently, and some of those have come to the United States. 



186 



SUMMARY 



Biological weapons were fortunately not laid to rest in the years 1972 to 1975. 
Several nations nave gone on to develop the capability to produce BW at short no- 
tice, and have done so precisely in the years since the Biological Weapons Conven- 
tion came into force. 

The USSR's and presently Russia's continuing slowness in putting a certain and 
definitive end to any portions of its own BW program not permitted under the BWC 
has been a severe impediment to international efforts to stop and to reverse any 
further trends towards BW proliferation. First, because Russia inherited one of the 
two major post-WWII offensive BW programs, and which the USSR had continued 
despite signing and ratifying the BWC. That established an extremely damaging 
precedent and the apparent continued resistance to making a determined show of 
reparations by wiping out any non-permitted remainders of the program once and 
for all only add further damage to the BWC. It is important that Russia remove 
whatever secrecy remains surrounding its BW establishments, both military and ci- 
vilian. Second, because it weakens the combined efforts of the major powers in ap- 
plying pressure on those nations that have more recently developed BW programs 
to begin reversing and expunging them. 

Nations that have developed BW programs in recent years such as Iran and Libya 
are not particularly open to argument. The major institutional indicators, secrecy 
and the role of military or intelligence agencies in funding and managing BW pro- 
grams, are constant indicators of problems, and most certainly when all three occur 
together. Much more thought should be given to the pressure of sanctions by the 
international community. Following the additional example of Iraq, a state that had 
gone on to develop BW despite having signed (although not ratified) the BWC, much 
more thought particularly needs to be given to the circumstances in which a State 
Party to the BWC shows evidence of developing the prohibited weapon system, and 
the sanctions that should be applied in such instances. 

It appears that the next year will see the proposal of an international verification 
regime as a Protocol to the BWC. It would require an international monitoring orga- 
nizations probably similar to that which has been established under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. It is very likely that such a regime will provide for the oppor- 
tunity for both routine and challenge on-site inspections to facilities or locations in 
member states. Domestically, the U.S. government runs the risk of having impeded 
its current efforts to defeat the further spread of a weapon of mass destruction by 
greatly exaggerated concerns several years ago regarding corporate commercial se- 
crecy. Trial inspections carried out by several western nations in recent years as a 
contribution toward producing a strengthened verification regime for the BWC 
showed that this was a manageable concern. It will be important for the U.S. gov- 
ernment to maintain its focus on stemming BW proliferation as its first and over- 
whelming priority in that field, and that all its other considerations that relate to 
that effort be so adapted as to aid in that endeavor. 

Senator Nunn. Thank you, Mr. Leitenberg. 

Mr. Moodie, we are pleased to have you back with us. Michael 
Moodie is the President of the Chemical and Biological Arms Con- 
trol Institute, a non-profit research organization established to pro- 
mote the goals of arms control and nonproliferation and former As- 
sistant Director of Multilateral Affairs of the U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency. Mr. Moodie will discuss what actions 
the U.S. Government needs to take regarding the chemical and bio- 
logical area. 

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL MOODIE, PRESIDENT, CHEMICAL 
AND BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL INSTITUTE 

Mr. Moodie. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a privi- 
lege to appear before the Subcommittee today. 

I was asked to begin to try to bridge the previous discussions of 
yesterday and this morning on the nature of the current prolifera- 
tion threat and the panel to follow addressing policy responses. I 
would begin with a basic question: Are current U.S. policy ap- 
proaches adequate to the task of responding to the problem of pro- 
liferation in the post-Cold War order? 



187 

I would submit that both the international security environment 
and the global processes for developing and disseminating tech- 
nology have radically altered in the last several decades; yet, con- 
ceptual and policy thinking remains locked in modes more appro- 
priate to an earlier time. My bottom line is that the United States 
needs an innovative strategy that challenges traditional ways of 
thinking about proliferation. 

I would like to highlight four aspects of conventional thinking 
that must be critically reexamined. First, discussions of prolifera- 
tion, official and unofficial, have been fixated on the nuclear dimen- 
sion. Other dimensions of the proliferation challenge, however, that 
I have pointed out in my written statement, pose risks potentially 
as consequential and perhaps more imminent than the spread of 
nuclear weapons. 

To me, this nuclear fixation must be overcome. The problem is 
not just about nuclear weapons or even about weapons of mass de- 
struction. One could argue it is not even about weapons an3miore. 
In my mind, the core of the proliferation problem in the post-Cold 
War security environment is the diffusion of technology, some of it 
advanced, some of it simple, all of it potentially deadly. Prolifera- 
tion today is as much about lasers and computer software as it is 
about plutonium and anthrax. 

If the problem is recast in these terms, it is essential to recognize 
that it is not the technology itself that is beneficial or harmful but 
how that technology is used, and that is the result of human 
choice. It is critical to appreciate this fundamental point because 
the essential focus of our policies should not be on den3ring key 
technologies, as is now often the case, but on channeling the 
choices of those, whether leaders of states or non-state actors, to 
whom that technology is increasingly available. 

Second, more attention must be paid to the decision making proc- 
esses of proliferators, both at the state and the sub-state level. The 
efforts of Iraq, North Korea, and other proliferators reflect deci- 
sions as complex as the multiple capabilities they are trying to ac- 
quire. Although it is admittedly difficult to secure information re- 
garding these decision making processes in many countries and 
particularly with sub-state groups, getting inside that process is 
absolutely essential, and insights gained from looking at that proc- 
ess may open new policy approaches. 

At the sub-state level, a major question raised by the attack in 
Tokyo is why terrorist groups have not used such weapons before, 
despite WMD technology that is now many decades old. The fact 
that it was the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan that resorted to chemical 
weapons perhaps provides one clue. 

In my view, the Aum is not a group akin to those which emerged 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, such as the IRA or some of the 
militant Palestinian groups. These groups resorted to terror to 
achieve specific political objectives. Their weapons of choice were 
the gun and the bomb, those favored by terrorists throughout his- 
tory. An important part of their approach was to claim responsibil- 
ity for particular incidents, sending the message that similar inci- 
dents would occur in the future if the desired action by govern- 
ments were not taken. 



188 

The Aum Shinrikyo's attack in Japan had none of these features. 
In not claiming responsibihty for the subway tragedy, the attack 
was not tied to any government action or concrete objective. With 
no stated goal, the attack appeared more as an act of random vio- 
lence than a political undertaking. In general, in my view, the Aum 
Shinrikyo appears to have more in common with bizarre religious 
cults, only that the Aum directed its violence outward towards soci- 
ety as well as inward toward members of the sect itself. 

A group such as the Aum, therefore, is something new, some- 
thing of a hybrid, and groups such as these seem to be willing to 
use violence, including weapons of mass destruction, just to hurt 
society. A critical first step in dealing with these new groups is to 
learn better how such a group thinks and the factors involved in 
the decisions they make. 

Third, not all members of the international community view the 
proliferation problem through the same lenses. Some developing 
countries, for example, consider nonproliferation efforts of the Unit- 
ed States and the other industrial nations, such as the Australia 
Group and the missile technology control regime, as hypocritical, 
selective, and discriminatory. 

Major differences exist over the competing needs to protect tech- 
nology on one hand and share technology on a global base on the 
other. Those differences are now a theme in virtually every current 
or recent multilateral arms control forum, including the conference 
to decide on the extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 
the work in The Hague on implementation of the Chemical Weap- 
ons Convention, and efforts to develop measures to bolster con- 
fidence in compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention. 
Some means must be found to bridge these differences over tech- 
nology sharing. 

Finally, if this portrayal of the proliferation problem as a multi- 
faceted challenge of technology diffusion is correct, no single solu- 
tion to the problem will suffice. Too often in the past, those respon- 
sible for different aspects of policy have worked in isolation from 
one another. An effective government mechanism to integrate the 
full range of policy tools, an approach that is sensitive to the bal- 
ance that must be drawn among the use of these instruments, has 
not really existed. 

But a number of tough questions exist with respect to each policy 
element that should be incorporated into such an integrated strat- 
egy, and let me briefly highlight a couple. 

First, effective intelligence, as has been pointed out here over the 
last 2 days, is absolutely critical in countering proliferation suc- 
cessfully. It is also difficult. The biggest intelligence coups related 
to biological weapons programs, for example, in Russia and Iraq, 
have been for the most part in some way related to defectors. 

What then are or should be our expectations regarding intel- 
ligence capabilities in this area? How should the traditional tension 
between investment in national technical means and investment in 
human intelligence capabilities be resolved in meeting the pro- 
liferation challenge? 

Another issue not often examined is what intelligence demands 
are created when proliferation occurs? One example is the use of 
intelligence for target identification supporting the possible use of 



189 

military power to take out a WMD facility. Do we today have the 
necessary intelligence capabilities, recognizing that during the Gulf 
War, a number of Iraqi WMD facilities apparently were not identi- 
fied? 

The impact of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
can be diminished if effective defensive programs are incorporated 
into the strategic approach. One defense program issue raised by 
the Tokyo tragedy is civil preparedness against a potential terrorist 
attack. To what extent should it be made a national priority? As 
an open society, the United States will never enjoy total invulner- 
ability against those committed to making such attacks. But how 
can civil emergency preparedness be improved so that the con- 
sequences of an attack, should it occur, are minimized? 

The U.S. Government has made progress in this area and some 
municipalities have conducted exercises to facilitate coordination of 
law enforcement, medical, and other services that must be in- 
volved, but are those efforts enough? Have efforts been adequate 
across the country? 

Another aspect of the defense program is military preparedness 
and the capability of U.S. forces to operate effectively in a WMD 
environment. A number of published reports over the summer raise 
questions regarding the level of preparedness and the proper con- 
figuration and training of U.S. forces for operations in areas where 
proliferation has occurred. It also poses the question of acquisition 
policies for such contingencies, including missile defenses, an issue 
with which Congress has struggled for some time. 

Export controls have been a centerpiece of U.S. nonproliferation 
efforts. Their effectiveness, however, in my view, is of growing con- 
cern in light of the dual use nature of much of the technology that 
now has relevance in the security arena. In a report for our insti- 
tute provided to the Subcommittee, Brad Roberts of the Institute 
for Defense Analyses provides some striking statistics on trade in 
these materials that are summarized in my written statement. 

These trade and investment figures do not necessarily imply that 
the recipients are pursuing weapons of mass destruction programs. 
They do suggest that the issue is no longer whether a state has the 
technological capability or the access to technology and material to 
provide itself with weapons of mass destruction but whether it has 
the political will and makes the choice to do so. 

Arms control treaties and agreements, such as the as-yet 
unratified CWC, can also make several contributions to the fight 
against proliferation. You have heard about some of them already 
this morning. I would note, however, that arms control, as any 
other policy instrument, is not a panacea, and we should not expect 
arms control agreements to carry more of a burden than they were 
originally designed to bear. 

One aspect of arms control in my view deserves special attention. 
It has been an issue that the international community has tradi- 
tionally avoided raising in polite company. That is, what to do in 
response to instances of noncompliance. In 1963, Dr. Fred Ikle 
wrote a classic article entitled, "After Detection, What?" I expect 
Dr. Ikle is still looking for an answer. 

Differences with our allies as well as with the Russians over the 
Krasnoyarsk radar, the incident in Sverdlovsk, or the reluctance of 



190 

the Security Council to move against a North Korea clearly in vio- 
lation of its NPT obligations demonstrate that responding to non- 
compliance is one of the most politically contentious questions in 
the arms control arena today. More deliberate attention must be 
given to appropriate responses to violations of arms control agree- 
ments before they occur, as we should expect they will. 

Finally, an integrated anti-proliferation strategy must involve a 
wider range of players than has heretofore been the case. For ex- 
ample and perhaps most importantly, how do we integrate into 
nonproliferation efforts the private sector, which today is by far the 
most significant conduit for the global dissemination of technology? 

Clearly, there is a strong need for innovative thinking in order 
to fashion an effective approach to the problem of the diffusion of 
militarily-relevant technology. An integrated strategy that chal- 
lenges conventional wisdom, that focuses on the gaps in thinking 
and policy, and that addresses these and other tough questions is 
essential. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moodie follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. MOODIE 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your invitation to testify before the Sub- 
committee. It is an honor to do so. 

I have been asked to begin to bridge the previous discussion of the nature of the 
current proUferation threat and the panel to follow addressing policy responses. I 
would like to do so by focusing on a series of questions raised by the current U.S. 
approach to the challenge of nonproliferation and possible policy options. 

THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION 

The challenge of proliferation today reflects the complexity of the post-Cold War 
world in that responding effectively to the challenge requires balancing several com- 
peting, equally valid interests. The critical issues not only relate to national security 
and global peace and stability, but they also have significant repercussions for eco- 
nomic interests including U.S. high technology trade and economic development in 
industrializing countries. 

Are current U.S. policy approaches adequate to the task of responding to the chal- 
lenge of proliferation in the post-Cold War era? The collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Iraq's challenge to the international community. North Korea's rogue actions, and 
the subway attack in Japan, have all highlighted new dimensions of the threat con- 
fronting the global community. Serious questions exist as to whether business as 
usual — embodied in strategies of technology denial — will work in today's world. That 
world is one in which many of the same technologies that can be used in potentially 
destabilizing military applications, can also make widespread and valuable contribu- 
tions to society. It is a world in which those technologies are increasingly available 
on a global basis. Although both the international security environment and the 
global processes for developing and disseminating technology have radically altered 
in the last twenty years, conceptual and policy thinking remains locked in modes 
more appropriate to an earlier time. The United States needs an innovative strategy 
that challenges traditional ways of thinking about proliferation in order to identify 
new policy approaches more responsive to the problems Washington will confront in 
the years ahead. 

REEXAMINING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 

Five aspects of conventional thinking about proliferation in particular must be 
critically examined. 

First, discussions of proliferation — official and unofficial — have been fixated on the 
nuclear dimension of the issue. The problem, however, is far more complex that just 
the spread of nuclear weapons. Other dimensions of the proliferation challenge pose 
risks potentially as consequential and perhaps more imminent than the spread of 
nuclear weapons, including 

• increased interest in biological and chemical weapons; 

• ongoing acquisition of advanced conventional weapons; 



191 

• development of missiles of increasing range and accuracy; 

• widespread availability of light arms that have killed many more people than 
weapons of mass destruction; 

• growing interest among many countries in the world in acquiring subsystems 
and components; 

• increasing acquisition by the global community of enabling technologies that 
enhance military performance such as computer-aided design and manufac- 
turing systems, systems integration software, precision guidance, advanced 
information technology, etc.; 

• global dissemination of sophisticated technology production techniques; and 

• greater application of technology generated in the commercial sector to the se- 
curity arena. 

The nuclear fixation in proliferation discussions must be overcome. The problem 
is not just about nuclear weapons, or even weapons of mass destruction. One could 
argue it is not even about weapons anymore. The core of the proliferation problem 
in the post-Cold War security environment is the diffusion of technology — some ad- 
vanced, some simple, but all potentially deadly. Indeed, the term "nonproliferation" 
may no longer be adequate to describe the goal; perhaps a more accurate description 
of the task is "managing diffusion of militarily-relevant technology. 

If the problem is recast in these terms, the first step in dealing with it is to recog- 
nize that the impact of technology in the security arena is the product of human 
choice. Technology may help define the context within which choices are made, cre- 
ate new paths for the chooser, or change the calculations of costs and benefits asso- 
ciated with certain courses of action. The result, however, is determined by individ- 
uals. It is not technology itself that is beneficial or harmful, but how it is used. This 
fundamental point is critical to those who must respond to the proliferation chal- 
lenge, because it highlights the fact that the basic task should not be focused on 
the technology, but on channeling the choices of those to whom that technology is 
available. 

Second, much of the recent analysis tends to define proliferation as the primary 
concern and the political environment in which it occurs — usually characterized by 
conflict — as derivative. (This portrayal is suggested in the labeling by some Clinton 
administration spokesmen of regional security problems as "demand side prolifera- 
tion.") Such an approach tends to drive policy toward a narrow focus on technology 
and its denial to countries of concern. 

A strong case can be made, however, that the relationship between conflict — 
whether it is between states or within a state — and proliferation is just the reverse 
of this now-common portrayal. It is the existence of conflict that drives the parties 
to consider using new tools of violence. The impact of this view should be to promote 
policy approaches that emphasize both national and global norms against the mis- 
use of technology and heighten the disincentives for potential proliferators. It should 
also lead to emphasis on combining policy instruments — intelligence, defense pro- 
grams, military options, export controls, in some cases law enforcement, arms con- 
trol, and so on — into an integrated approach which has been largely absent to date. 

Third, more attention must be paid to the decision making process of proliferators 
both at the state and sub-state level. In many proliferation discussions, that process 
is often portrayed as if a state moves in sequence from one weapons systems to the 
next ("Well, nukes were too hard or too expensive, so I'll try biological weapons"). 
In reality, the process is usually not sequential, but simultaneous and across the 
board. Iraq, for example, not only had an elaborate nuclear weapons program, but 
also had tens of thousands of munitions filled with chemical agents, an active offen- 
sive biological weapons program, an indigenous missile development program, and 
a tank army larger than those of Britain and France combined. North Korea is on 
everyone's list for pursuing all weapons of mass destruction as well as a missile pro- 
gram, to say nothing of the concern over its army with its huge artillery capability 
deployed not far from Seoul. 

The efforts of these and other states do not reflect simple choices, dependent on 
single factors such as technology capability or costs. Rather, those decisions are as 
complex as the multiple capabilities they are trying to acquire. Although it is admit- 
tedly difficult to secure information regarding decision making processes in many 
countries, insights gained from looking at that process may open new policy ap- 
proaches. It is particularly imperative because many of the states who are on vir- 
tually all the lists of suspected proliferators — Syria, Libya, and Iran for example — 
are also often on lists of states sponsoring terrorism. 

At the sub-state level, a major question raised by the attack in Tokyo is why have 
terrorist groups not used such weapons before. Chemical weapons technology is 
more than eighty years old; modern biological weapons were first developed sixty 



192 

years ago. As the Aum Shinrikyo demonstrated, the science involved in developing 
these capabilities is not beyond the grasp of many people with reasonable scientific 
backgrounds. The self-restraint that terrorist groups have shown is difficult to ex- 
plain. 

The fact that it was the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan that resorted to chemical weap- 
ons perhaps provides a clue. The Aum is not a group akin to those which emerged 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, such as the IRA, the Basque separatists, or some 
of the militant Palestinian groups, who resorted to terror to achieve specific political 
objectives. These, groups used terror to attempt to move governments toward de- 
sired concrete actions. Their weapons of choice were those favored by terrorists 
throughout history — the gun and the bomb. An important part of their approach 
was to claim responsibility for particular incidents, sending the message that simi- 
lar incidents would occur in the future if the desired action were not taken. The 
use of terror was often directed toward prompting such an excessive government re- 
sponse that it would alienate the general populations. With respect to these political 
terrorist groups, the question remains whether they are interested in exploring the 
chemical and biological weapons options. It should not be taken for granted that 
they are. 

The Aum's action in Japan had none of these features. In not claiming respon- 
sibility for the subway tragedy, the attack was not tied to any government action 
or concrete objective. With no stated goal, the attack appeared more as an act of 
random violence than a political undertaking. In general, Aum Shinrikyo appears 
to have more in common with bizarre religious sects, only the Aum directed its vio- 
lence outward toward society as well as inward toward members of the sect. The 
Aum Shinrikyo also seems to have combined its use of violence with activity resem- 
bling the workings of organized crime. A group such as the Aum, therefore, is sorne- 
thing new, some kind of hybrid. The appearance of groups such as these — willing 
to use violence, including perhaps weapons of mass destruction, just to hurt soci- 
ety^omplicates the ability of responsible officials to develop effective counters. It 
increases the burden on law enforcement and intelligence capabilities, which remain 
the foundation for dealing with terrorists, regardless of their weapon of choice. A 
critical first step is to learn better how such groups think and the factors involved 
in the decisions they make. 

Fourth, not all members of the international community view the problem of tech- 
nology diffusion through the same lenses. Some developing countries, for example, 
view nonproliferation efforts of the United States and other industrial nations as 
hypocritical, selective, and discriminatory. The traditional approach of technology 
denial through mechanisms such as the Australia Group and the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR) are especially resented. 

Disputes over proliferation and how to balance the competing needs to protect and 
to share technology on a global basis have become a leitmotif of multilateral arms 
control. Major differences over technology are a theme in virtually every current or 
recent multilateral arms control effort, including the conference to decide on exten- 
sion of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the work in The Hague on imple- 
mentation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and efforts to develop meas- 
ures to bolster compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). 

These differences over technology are part of a broader challenge that makes it 
more difficult to deal with technology diffusion problems, raises the stakes regarding 
what is involved, and generates an urgency that cannot be ignored. A new tier of 
increasingly technologically-capable states has emerged. The fundamental challenge 
is to integrate this new tier of states into a global system that promotes stable re- 
gional and global security yet meets their growing insistence for a meaningful role 
in the evolving international system. What is at issue is no less than the distribu- 
tion and exercise of global power into the foreseeable future. 

If these states are denied, they can prompt enormous disruption in the security 
environment, impede important arms control progress, and exacerbate a festering 
sore created by profoundly different views over the appropriate distribution of power 
in the post-Cold War system. The challenge for the United States and its allies is 
not to give in to the demands of these states. Rather, the challenge is to recast the 
system in such a way that these states share — and see they share — a stake in it. 
If they do, then they can formulate their requirements in ways that will diminish 
proliferation pressures. 

Finally, if this portrayal of the proliferation problem as a multifaceted challenge 
of technology diffusion is correct, no single solution to the problem will suffice. Rath- 
er, a multifaceted, integrated strategic response is required. Too often in the past, 
however, those responsible for different aspects of policy have worked in isolation 
from one another — arms controllers focused on negotiating and implementing agree- 
ments, export controls were applied by a different group, defense programs devel- 



193 

oped by yet another bureaucracy. An effective government mechanism to integrate 
the full range of policy tools, one that is sensitive to the balance that must be drawn 
among the use of different instruments, has not really existed. 

INTEGRATING DIVERSE POLICY INSTRUMENTS 

A number of tough questions exists, however, with respect to each policy element 
that should be incorporated into an integrated strategy. Answering these questions 
entails hard policy choices with significant ramifications. Highlighting some of those 
questions briefly include the following: 

1. Intelligence 

Effective intelligence is critical in countering proliferation successfully. It is also 
difficult. The U.S. government has made important progress in this area, through 
such measures as creation of the Nonproliferation Center at the Central Intelligence 
Agency. But the task remains daunting. The biggest intelligence coups related to bi- 
ological weapons programs — for example, in Russia and Iraq — have been for the 
most part the result of defectors. As already mentioned, it is extremely difficult to 
get inside the decision making process of some countries of greatest proliferation 
concern and an even harder challenge when addressing sub-state groups. These are 
processes that do not lend themselves to examination through national technical 
means. What then are or should be our expectations regarding intelligence capabili- 
ties in this area? How should the traditional tension between investment in national 
technical means and investment in human intelligence capabilities be resolved in 
meeting the proliferation challenge? 

Another issue not often examined is what intelligence demands are created when 
proliferation occurs? In such situations, what are the intelligence requirements to 
support implementation of other options? One example is the use of intelligence for 
target identification supporting the possible exercise of military power to take out 
a WMD facility. Do we today have the necessary capabilities, recognizing that dur- 
ing the war in the Gulf a number of Iraqi WMD facilities apparently were not iden- 
tified? 

2. Defense Programs 

The impact of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can be diminished 
if effective defensive programs are developed. These programs have several dimen- 
sions: 

Medical and scientific research must be supported to protect U.S. forces in the 
field with effective antidotes and vaccines. But, given limited resources, what bal- 
ance should be drawn between working on traditional agents that are the most like- 
ly candidates for CW and BW weapons programs while hedging against surprise 
through examination of exotic, new agents? How far should U.S. work go in the ex- 
amination of weapons effects, recognizing that such information also could be used, 
if it became publicly available, to support an offensive weapons program? 

The question of protecting civil populations is also difficult. In the event of U.S. 
intervention into regions in which chemical or biological weapons could be used, 
what priority should be given to protecting civilians working in areas of military sig- 
nificance, such as ports, airfields, or logistics centers, that could be subject to WMD 
attack? Their vulnerability demonstrates that biological weapons in particular do 
not necessarily have to be massive in terras of casualties to be strategic in impact. 

One issue raised by the Tokyo tragedy is civil preparedness against potential ter- 
rorist attack. To what extent should it be made a national priority? As an open soci- 
ety, the United States will never enjoy total invulnerability against those committed 
to making such attacks. But how can civil emergency preparedness be improved so 
that the consequences of an attack, should it occur, be minimized? Some municipali- 
ties have conducted exercises in responding to such scenarios to facilitate coordina- 
tion of the law enforcement, medical, and other services that must be involved. Have 
those efforts been adequate across the country? 

Another aspect of the defense program is military preparedness and the capability 
of U.S. forces to operate in a WMD environment. At the Global '95 wargame played 
in Newport this summer, biological and chemical weapons scenarios were the sub- 
ject of significant play for the first time. According to published reports, the mili- 
tary's operational planning for such contingencies was found lacking. There were 
also media stories in June 1995 commenting on a Department of Defense report in 
which the detection, identification, and characterization of chemical and biological 
weapons was determined to be the greatest shortfall in U.S. military capabilities to 
counter weapons of mass destruction. Other shortfalls included robust passive de- 
fenses to enable continued operations in a WMD environment, including defense 
against cruise missiles, and theater missile defenses. The issue of defense against 



194 

missile attack is one with which the Congress has struggled for some time. While 
controversial, exploration of the technical and political options should be continued. 
These reports raise questions regarding the proper configuration and training of 
U.S. forces for possible operations in areas where proliferation has occurred. It also 
poses the question of acquisition priorities for such contingencies. The U.S. military 
has recognized the need to confront these tough choices, and all the services have 
initiated efforts to determine their future requirements. 

3. Military Options 

The use of military force in dealing with the problem of proliferation is also a con- 
troversial issue. If the goal of U.S. efforts, however, is to deter proliferation by rais- 
ing the costs too high, by demonstrating that such efforts will not bring proliferators 
closer to their goals, or by denying them the ability to exercise the option even if 
they acquire it, then military capabilities must be part of the U.S. policy repertoire. 
Secretary of Defense Perry reportedly has given Special Operations Command the 
mission to develop preemptive ways to deal with chemical and biological attacks, 
but the exploration of options certainly will extend beyond this single organization. 

4. Export Controls 

Export controls have been a centerpiece of U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Their ef- 
fectiveness, however, is of growing concern in light of the dual-use nature of much 
of the materials, technology, and equipment that now has relevance in the security 
arena. In a report for the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, Brad 
Roberts of the Institute of Defense Analysis provides some striking statistics: 

— The value of chemical exports from the developed world to the developing one 
increased from $33 billion to $57 billion between 1980 and 1991; materials con- 
trolled by the Australia Group constitute less than one percent of this amount. 

— Annual direct investment in developing countries by U.S. chemical manufactur- 
ers doubled from $4.05 billion to $9.98 billion between 1983 and 1983. 

— In the biological arena, the number of licenses for the export of microorganisms 
and toxins grew from 90 in 1991 to 531 in 1994 (while denials numbered one 
in 1991 and four in 1994). 

— The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention shipped biological reagents to 
41 mostly developing countries in 1994, up from 24 in 1991; every year virtually 
every country in the world receives shipments from the American Type Culture 
Collection covering a range of types of biologies but including pathogenic mate- 
rials, presumably for medical diagnostic and treatment purposes related to con- 
trolling the outbreak of infectious diseases. 

— One survey of the unconventional weapons programs of Iran, Syria, and Libya 
reveals that over 300 suppliers in 38 countries have provided them with dual- 
use items. 

These trade and investment figures do not necessarily imply that recipients are 
pursuing weapons of mass destruction programs: They do suggest, however, that the 
dual-use nature of technology and materials relevant to proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction are increasingly available if states make the decision to exploit 
them. 

Another aspect of this issue relates to training. In the United States, a significant 
proportion of graduate students in the subspecialties of the natural sciences are 
non-American. Leaders of firms in the rapidly growing biotechnology sector point 
out they could not be competitive if they could not hire non-U. S. nationals. Most 
of these students and employees are pursuing their efforts for beneficial medical, 
scientific, or commercial purposes. Some of them, however, could return to their re- 
spective countries and turn their knowledge to more malevolent purposes. 

The future utility of export controls, therefore, must be questioned in a world in 
which technological capability is so widespread. It has become fashionable in pro- 
liferation discussions to talk about 'Virtual nuclear powers," that is, states with the 
capability quickly to provide themselves with nuclear weapons should they make the 
decision to do so. The world is also replete with "virtual biological and chemical 
weapons states." Increasingly, the issue is not whether a state has the technological 
capability to provide itself with weapons of mass destruction, but whether it has the 
political will and makes the choice to do so. 

5. Arms Control 

Arms control treaties and agreements can make several contributions to the fight 
against proliferation: 

• They establish global norms against which the behavior of states can be 
measured; 



195 

• They create important legal regimes criminalizing a range of behavior deemed 
unacceptable by the international community and providing a concrete basis 
for action against those involved in illicit activity. 

• They represent levers to mobilize the international community in the face of 
potential threats; and 

• They can reinforce deterrence by denying proliferators the benefits that might 
be derived from pursuing such a program or by forcing them along paths that 
are more difficult, more costly, more complex, and arguably more visible. 

Arms control, however, as any other policy instrument, is not a panacea. As a 
product of hard-fought negotiations, an arms control agreement entails compromises 
among competing political objectives of the negotiating parties. As such, we should 
not expect arms control agreements to carry more of a burden than they were in- 
tended to bear. Arms control can reduce the scope of a potential problem, but it does 
not eliminate it. That is why it must be used in combination with other policy tools. 

One aspect of arms control deserves special mention given its implications for the 
fight against proliferation. It has been an issue that the international community 
has traditionally avoided raising in polite company — that is, what to do in response 
to instances of noncompliance. In 1963, Dr. Fred Ikle wrote a classic article entitled 
"After Detection — What?" I expect Dr. Ikle is still looking for an answer. The issue 
of responding to noncompliance is one of the most politically contentious questions 
in the arms control arena. One need only remember the Russian violation of the 
ABM Treaty with the Krasnoyarsk radar or its noncompliance with the BWC as evi- 
denced by the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax incident. These issues were almost as dif- 
ficult political issues between Washington and its allies as they were with Moscow. 
Another example is the reluctance of the United Nations Security Council to act in 
the face of a clear violation by North Korea of its NPT obligations. 

If the international community is unwilling to act in the face of violations of glob- 
al norms embodied in international agreements, regardless of the elegance of their 
provisions, they are useless documents. More deliberate attention must be given, 
therefore, to appropriate responses to violations of arms control agreements before 
they occur — as we should expect they will. 

Finally, an integrated strategy to meet the challenge of technology diffusion must 
involve a wider range of players than has heretofore been the case. Here, too, tough 
questions appear. For example, how do we arrive at common answers to these ques- 
tions with other technology suppliers, both among our traditional allies and among 
the new suppliers? Can regions committed to their own end-use monitoring build 
new forms of trans-governmental and trans-business control mechanisms (eg., the 
European Union's license-free-zone concept)? Perhaps most important, how do we in- 
tegrate into nonproliferation efforts the private sector which today is by far the most 
significant conduit for the global dissemination of technology? What ultimately is in- 
volved is a shift away from coordinated, but essentially unilateral strategy of tech- 
nology denial to a genuine multilateral, and multifaceted strategy of technology 
management. 

Clearly, there is a strong need for innovative thinking in order to fashion an effec- 
tive approach to the problem of the diffusion of militarily-relevant technology. A 
process that challenges the conventional wisdom, that focuses on the gaps in think- 
ing and policy, and that addresses these and other tough questions is essential. 

Thank you. 

Michael Moodie 



Michael Moodie is President of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Insti- 
tute (CBACI), a nonprofit research organization established to promote the goals of 
arms control and nonproliferation. He brings to his leadership of the Institute more 
than twenty years of experience addressing international security issues in govern- 
ment, the policy research community, and academia. 

In government, Mr. Moodie served from March 1990 to Januaiy 1993 as Assistant 
Director for Multilateral Affairs of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA) where he was responsible for such issues as chemical and biological weap- 
ons, conventional arms control, and confidence building measures, as well as U.S. 
policy relating to the arms control work of the Geneva-based Conference on Disar- 
mament (CD) and the United Nations First Committee. Mr. Moodie was especially 
involved in the negotiations concluding the Chemical Weapons Convention for which 
his bureau was the interagency lead. Mr. Moodie was also involved in regional arms 
control, serving as Chairman of ACDA Coordinating Groups on Korea and Latin 
America, and as a member of similar groups on the Middle East and South Asia. 
He was also head of the U.S. delegation to both the 1991 Biological Weapons Con- 



196 

vention Review Conference and the 1992 Review Conference of the Environmental 
Modification Convention. 

From 1983 to 1987, Mr. Moodie served as Special Assistant to the Ambassador 
and Assistant for Special Projects at the U.S. Mission to NATO, where he con- 
centrated on such issues as the NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional balance, conven- 
tional arms control, and alliance defense industrial cooperation. 

In the policy research community, Mr. Moodie has held senior research positions 
at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Center for Strategic and Inter- 
national Studies, where he was also Senior Advisor to the President. He has served 
as Visiting Professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and as 
a consultant to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. 

Mr. Moodie is currently a member of the Editorial Board of the Washington Quar- 
terly. He was educated at Lawrence University and the Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy, Tufts University. 



THE ARENA 



"It is not the critic that counts . . . The credit belongs to the man in the arena" — 
Theodore Roosevelt 

Rethinking Export Controls on Dual-Use Materials and Technologies: From 

Trade Restraints to Trade Enablers 

By Brad Roberts 

Between rhetoric and disinterest lies an important story about the function of ex- 
port controls on dual-use materials and technologies. The rhetoric is offered by the 
Non-Aligned Movement, which attacks such controls as contrary to the cooperative 
frameworks established in the global treaties — and as intended to keep undeveloped 
nations both weak and insecure. The disinterest is offered by western arms control- 
lers, whose belief in supply-side control as an essential tool of nonproliferation leads 
them to pay little heed to the nonaligned view (or to uncomfortably and quietly ac- 
cept it as on the mark). The reality of dual-use export controls is rather different 
from the picture painted by both camps. To understand their function clearly re- 
quires an appreciation both of the changing nature of the global economy and of the 
chaotic political forces unleashed in the international system by the end of the Cold 
War. 

DUAL-USE controls 

The structure of export controls on materials and technologies with both commer- 
cial applications and military utility in terms of the construction of weapons of mass 
destruction has grown quite elaborate over the last decade, as concerns about weap- 
ons proliferation have deepened. In the nuclear domain, export controls are coopera- 
tively applied by the exporting states in support of the global control regime (the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPTI)); illicit diversion is monitored under the 
safeguards system as supplemented by national technical means. In the biological 
domain, trade in sensitive materials and technologies is monitored by the Australia 
Group in support of the global disarmament regime (the Biological and Toxin weap- 
ons Convention [BWCI]); efforts are currently underway to strengthen the verifica- 
tion and compliance components of this regime. In the chemical domain, the Aus- 
tralia Group plays the critical coordinating role in what its members define as a 
bridging function until the new Chemical weapons Convention (CWC) is fully and 
effectively implemented. Each treaty establishes as a principle that compliance will 
bring benefits of cooperation for peaceful purposes in the relevant materials and 
technologies. Outside of this regime encompassing these three treaties are other ad 
hoc export control mechanisms, such as the missile technology control regime and 
the nascent successor to the cold war-vintage CoCom (Coordinating Committee on 
Export Controls). 

Over the last decade there has been a major effort among supplier states to tight- 
en and otherwise improve these controls. The Australia Group itself was founded 
in 1985 in order to tighten national licensing procedures for export controls and to 
improve international coordination; its original focus on the precursors of chemical 
warfare agents expanded subsequently to include the technology of their production 
and then biological warfare materials and technologies. 

The gist of the nonaligned critique is that the major states have excessively fo- 
cused on the punitive functions of these regimes while ignoring their obligations to 
promote cooperation. They reject export controls as trade restraints and call instead 



197 

for programs to subsidize technology transfer and cooperation. A few members of the 
Non-Aligned Movement have attempted to hold the process of strengthening and ex- 
panding the global treaty regime hostage to more substantial efforts by the devel- 
oped states to implement the cooperative agenda. They reject the other ad hoc mech- 
anisms as illegitimate because they are not founded on a globally negotiated bar- 
gain. 

PATTERNS OF COOPERATION FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES 

Have export controls functioned to constrain trade and cooperation? A brief survey 
gives some basis for arriving at an answer. 

In the nuclear domain, despite rigorous controls on both technologies and mate- 
rials at a time of growing concern about nuclear proliferation — and a virtual aban- 
donment of nuclear power as a source of power generation in the United States — 
international trade and cooperation have flourished. One indicator is the flow of nu- 
clear dual-use technology from the United states: between 1985 and 1992, the Unit- 
ed states issued 336,000 licenses for the export of nuclear-related dual-use items, 
valued at $264 billion. i 

This trade is supplemented by various formal governmental programs to promote 
cooperation. In the case of the United States, these are numerous. The United 
States has agreements with EURATOM as well as 27 mostly developing countries 
to cooperate on deriving the benefits of nuclear energy in the fields of physical and 
chemical sciences, food and agriculture, industry and earth science, human health, 
radiation protection, nuclear power, safety of nuclear installations, nuclear fuel 
cycle, and radioactive waste management. It has supported over 2,500 specific tech- 
nical cooperation projects. Between 1958 and 1989, the United States gave $79 mil- 
lion to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA); from 1990 to 1994, it contributed an additional $60 million. 
Voluntary additional support to the IAEA in the form of extrabudgetary contribu- 
tions has also regularly been provided by the United states and includes an annual 
series of training courses, the provision of cost4ree experts to the IAEA head- 
quarters, and fellowships for foreign students and professionals to train in nuclear- 
related fields in the United States. Almost 4,000 foreign nationals from more than 
80 other NPT countries received Ph.D. training in nuclear physics, nuclear chem- 
istry, and nuclear engineering between 1974 and 1995. The United States also as- 
sists NPT parties in peaceful nuclear development by performing technical training 
missions overseas and hosting foreign visitors in the United States. Since 1986, 
45,000 Department of Energy (DoE) specialists have performed technical assistance 
missions overseas while nearly 54,000 scientists and engineers from numerous de- 
veloping countries party to the NPT have visited DoE facilities for training pur- 
poses. ^ 

In the chemical domain, trade and cooperation are also extensive. In 1993, the 
global market for chemical and allied products totalled $1.26 trillion (in the U.S. 
economy, these products constitute the largest exporting sector). The value of ex- 
ports of chemicals from the developed world to the developing one increased from 
$33 billion to $57 billion between 1980 and 1991.3 Materials controlled by the Aus- 
tralia Group constitute less than one percent of this amount. Direct investment in 
developing countries by U.S. chemical manufacturers doubled from $4.05 billion to 
$9.98 billion between 1983 and 1993 (these are annual investments). •* Furthermore, 
in the period of tightened controls by the Australia Group, the developing worlds 
share of the U.S. investment pie has not shrunk-investment in the developing world 
by U.S. chemical manufacturers remained a steady 21 percent of total U.S. industry 
investment between 1983 and 1993. ^ Formal government-to-government cooperative 
programs for the peaceful uses of chemicals have not been initiated, not least be- 
cause their relevance in the face of this extensive global trade would be nil. 

In the biological domain, patterns, are more difficult to discern. In the commercial 
area, trade and investment patterns vary among different sectors, with extensive 



^Nuclear Nonproliferation: Export Licensing Procedures for Dual-Use Items Need to Be 
Strengthened. GAO/NSIAD-94-119 (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, April 1994). 

^Fact Sheet: The United States Commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1995 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1995). Data drawn from pp. 
13-20. ^^ 

3 Figures in current year dollars. In constant dollars, with 1987 as base, the growth was from 
$42 billion to $47 billion. United Nations Yearbook on International Trade Statistics. 1992. dd: 
S 50-53. *^^ 

* Figures provided by the U.S. Chemical Manufacturers Association, April 1995. Figures in 
current year dollars. In constant dollars, with 1987 as base, the growth was from $4.57 billion 
to $7.63 billion. 

5 Figures provided by the U.S. Chemical Manufacturers Association, April 1995. 



198 

international diversification of the pharmaceutical industry, a growing global mar- 
ket in the agricultural applications of biotechnology, and a capital intensive research 
and development effort with regard to biotechnologies generally.^ In the govern- 
mental area, programs of collaboration on disease control are numerous. Extensive 
international collaboration on childhood vaccines has been undertaken under the 
aegis of the world Health Organization. The United Nations International Develop- 
ment Organization (UNIDO) helped to launch the International Center for Genetic 
Engineering and Biotechnology, an autonomous intergovernmental organization, to 
promote training in and the transfer of biotechnologies. The world Bank has created 
investment programs for agricultural applications in biotechnology, thereby facilitat- 
ing the creation of specialist firms in many parts of the world. The U.S. Agency for 
International development sponsors basic research in biotechnology in foreign uni- 
versities and elsewhere. 

There is also a little noted — and growing — trade in biomedical applications. Micro- 
organisms and toxins are exported by the United States (among others) and the 
number of licenses issued for the export such materials grew from 90 in 1991 to 531 
in 1994 (license application denials numbered one in 1991 and 4 in 1994).'' The Cen- 
ters for Disease Control and Prevention shipped biological reagents to 41 mostly de- 
veloping countries in 1994, up from 24 in 1991.^ Every year virtually every country 
in the world receives shipments from the American Type Culture Collection covering 
a range of types of biologies but including pathogenic materials, presumably for 
medical diagnostic and treatment purposes related to controlling the outbreak of in- 
fectious diseases. 

There are other indicators of the nature and extent of the international flow of 
dual-use materials and technologies. In 1991, the United States issued 38,000 dual- 
use export licenses; only a few hundred license applications were denied or not acted 
upon. In 1992, that figure dropped to 21,060, in large part because of a revision to 
U.S. export laws and a narrowing of the scope of restraint.^ Another indicator is the 
success of key states of proliferation concern in tapping into the global dual-use 
market. One recent survey of the unconventional weapons programs of Iran, Syria, 
and Libya reveals that over 300 suppliers in 38 countries have provided dual-use 
items to them.^'' 

To be sure, this data is incomplete. Its focus on U.S. industries and programs ob- 
scures the existence of numerous other sources of supply and cooperation. In the nu- 
clear and chemical domains at least, non-U. S. sources are substantial. Moreover, the 
trade statistics are gross calculations and not always comparable across years or 
trade sectors. Furth,er research would certainly cast far greater light on these pat- 
terns. 

But the essential outlines are nonetheless clear. The global trade in dual-use ma- 
terials and technologies is booming. So too is technology transfer through invest- 
ment by developed countries in the developing world. The dual-use component has 
not been isolated from broader trends in the global economy of the last decade — 
an economy in which the volume of exports has grown at a rate twice that of cumu- 
lative GDP growth, while the volume of foreign direct investment has grown at a 
rate twice that of export growth. This growth of the dual-use sectors is striking-es- 
pecially at a time Of heightened proliferation concerns in the developed countries. 

THE IMPACT OF CONTROLS 

Thus the rhetoric of the nonaligned appears to be at odds with the facts. The pat- 
tern of extensive cooperation in the peaceful application of these items is undeni- 
able. This pattern extends far beyond what governments alone might be capable of 
creating with aid programs or government-subsidized investment in technologies 
and materials of specific treaty relevance. And in a global economy of the type that 
has emerged over the last decade, with rapid growth in exports and investments, 
the foundations are being laid for future growth. 

But what then are the utility of export controls? If technology is flowing so freely, 
do they have any utility at all? The classic case for export controls is that they re- 
tard weapons acquisition programs while also making them moire costly. They con- 



^U.S Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Biotechnology in a Global Economy, OTA- 
BA-94 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, October 1991). 

''U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, Special Licensing Division, 
April 13, 1995. 

"Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Infectious Diseases, March 
29, 1995. 

^ U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement, 1993. 

^° Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, a report of the Simon 
Wiesenthal Center, Los Angeles, Calif., August 1992. 



199 

tinue to serve this function even in a time of technology diffusion, although the time 
they buy and the costs they impose are shrinking. Reaping these benefits requires 
a broader international effort that integrates new sources of supply — as seen in the 
chemical and biological (and missile) area, but less so in the nuclear one. 

But export controls take on new functions in the new global economy. In an econ- 
omy in which industry and the firm are the primary conduits of trade and invest- 
ment, such controls provide a way for industry to police itself In an economy in 
which dual-use items are rapidly diffusing, such controls provide a way for states 
to maintain a degree of transparency in international exchange so that egregious 
misuses can be investigated, identified, and isolated. In an economy of multiple sup- 
pliers of sensitive technologies, they provide a way to balance competitive and coop- 
erative interests of different states. 

Put simply, the primary utility of export controls is trade enabling, not trade re- 
stricting. Their function is to create confidence among suppliers that recipients will 
use their acquisitions for peaceful permitted, not military, purposes. If they were to 
be with drawn, trade, investment, and cooperation would likely suffer. In the bio- 
logical area, the coming boom in biotechnologies might be severely constrained by 
a loss of such confidence, as the industry is hemmed in by doubts about misuse in 
countries whose nonproliferation credentials are suspect. In the chemical area, trade 
and investment would be increasingly constrained by the kind of political pressure 
put on German industry in the wake of revelations about sales to the Libyan chemi- 
cal warfare program. In the nuclear area, the passing of safeguards would cause a 
significant diminution in the international trade in sensitive items, and a curtail- 
ment of cooperative programs to all but a few key allies. 

Some leaders of the nonaligned assert that the problem with export controls is 
not their restrictive character but their selective application. To be sure, the export 
controllers have not always been fair or effective. But statistics do not even support 
the case that export controls have kept all sensitive materials out of the hands of 
suspect proliferators. In the nuclear domain, during the period 1985 to 1992, the 
United States approved 54,862 licenses (worth $29 billion) for nuclear-related ex- 
ports to 36 countries of proliferation concern, one-half of which went to 8 countries 
that have sought or are seeking nuclear weapons; of these, approximately 1,500 li- 
censes were issued for exports to end-users involved in or suspected of being in- 
volved in nuclear weapons development or the manufacture of special nuclear mate- 
rials. ^^ This suggests that exports are being restricted only where their proliferation 
significance is clearly established (and perhaps not even consistently in those cases). 
It also illuminates the role of industry in helping to redress concerns about dual- 
use technology diversion. Backed by the U.S. legal system and intelligence-derived 
information, and infused with a nonproliferation ethic, U.S. industry plays an im- 
portant role in making transparent technology usage even in countries of prolifera- 
tion concern. 

The fact that some developing countries are less successful in gaining access to 
international trade and investment flows may also have an explanation other the 
export control one. Some such countries are as isolated from the global economy as 
they are unaligned in the diplomatic community, and have failed to adopt the eco- 
nomic reforms that have opened others to foreign economic inputs. Chemical indus- 
try specialists report, for example, that the significant barriers to further invest- 
ment in developing countries derive from the failure of some such countries to pro- 
tect intellectual property rights and to remove other domestically created invest- 
ment restrictions. 

IMPLICATIONS 

Four stand out. 

First, the international debate on dual-use export controls needs a new founda- 
tion. Allies of effective control — and of broader international cooperation — do a dis- 
service to their cause in leaving the debate about export controls to those 
nonaligned states that depict them in their most reprehensible form. The inter- 
national political economy of the 1990s and the future is not the one that gave birth 
to the nonaligned worldview. Export controls can play a positive role — especially 
where they are essentially implementation mechanisms for the global treaty regime. 

Second, in joining this debate, it is not good enough for the developed countries 
simply to state their bonafides or to tout the virtues of export controls as trade 
enablers. There is a political significance to the nonaligned critique that has gained 
momentum in the developing world. That critique now extends beyond export con- 



^^ Nuclear Nonproliferation: Export Licensing Procedures for Dual-Use Items Need to Be 
Strengthened, GAO/NSIAD-94-119 (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, April 1994). 



200 

trols and the ad hoc coordinating mechanisms to the global treaty regime itself. Ex- 
tension of the NPT was held up at least in part to Iran's success in gathering sup- 
port for its view that Article IV has been inadequately implemented. Strengthening 
of the BWC through addition of a verification and compliance protocol is being held 
up at least in part by demand of the nonaligned, led again by Iran, for more sub- 
stantial enforcement of Article X (the parallel to Article IV in the NPT). The effort 
to bring the CWC into force is also held hostage to those who prefer that the Aus- 
tralia Group cease to exist when the CWC enters into force, in contrast to the pref- 
erence of Australia Group members that their harmonized controls of chemical pre- 
cursors remain in place until the CWC is fully and effectively implemented. The de- 
bate over the purpose and utility of dual-use export controls — and thus over the cri- 
teria for participation in the various export control regimes — has held up the cre- 
ation of the CoCom successor regime. 

In the face of this political agenda, to assert that export controls have positive 
and not negative value is not enough. The control community must deal better than 
it has with the charges of bias and ineptitude. It must make the case that such con- 
trols are fairly applied to block trade only to those with weapons programs or aspi- 
rations, and not simply to states out of favor with one or two powerful states in the 
international system. 

Third, the dual-use export control debate should and can be an opportunity for 
deepening the patterns of political cooperation among states. Such patterns have 
grown very fluid with the passing of the Cold War. Coalitions are forged, wane, and 
are then remade along new lines as international exigencies require. The ad hoc ex- 
port control coordinating mechanisms and the global treaties are tools for creating 
sustainable coalitions derived from globally embraced norms of state behavior. If 
this is a luxury created by the new political circumstance, it is a necessity born of 
the diffusion of dual-use materials and technology. 

Yet this opportunity seems hardly noticed by the people interested in arms control 
and nonproliferation in the United States. The international export control debate 
has largely become a shouting match between the United States and Iran, from 
which others seek to distance themselves. Sharp emotions distract attention from 
the important lesson for the United States in sustaining effective export controls. 
It is no longer leader of a cold war coalition against the Evil Empire, but first 
among equals in a globalizing economy and an unstable international political order, 
where the exigencies of multilateral diplomacy are borne uncomfortably by a United 
States that finds them unfamiliar and discomfiting. When individual states are con- 
sistently targeted for selective denial, there is a political requirement to make a 
public case for such treatment that withstands international scrutiny. 

A fourth implication is for arms control. Although a post<old war agenda has yet 
to come into clear focus, future tasks can be discerned in the patterns of economic, 
technological, and political activities described here. Whether or not weapons pro- 
liferate will turn increasingly on political decisions shaped by a wide ^'ariety of fac- 
tors-domestic, regional, and global-to turn weapons potential into weapons prowess, 
not simply on decisions to acquire weapons potential. This points to the growing im- 
portance of the NPT, BWC, and CWC as embodiments of internationally agreed 
norms and as mechanisms for marshalling coalitions to meet the challenges of 
states not party to those norms. Their importance derives also from what U.S. par- 
ticipation in them implies about U.S. engagement in cooperative strategies in its 
unipolar moment. 

Acknowledgement: The author is grateful for commentary on earlier drafts bay 
Richard Cupitt, Michael Moodie, Graham Pearson, Ernest Preeg, Terrence Taylor, 
Debra Van Opstal, Gordon Vachon, and Michael Walls. Any mistakes are the au- 
thor's responsibility. 

Brad Roberts is editor of The Washington Quarterly and chairman of the CBACI 
research advisory council. 

CBACI 1995 

The Arena is an issue paper series published by the Chemical and Biological Arms 
Control Institute (CBACI) as a forum for discussion of critical issues related to 
international security, arms control and nonproliferation. Viewpoints expressed are 
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect positions of CBACI. 

CBACI is a nonprofit corporation established to promote the goals of arms control 
and nonproliferation, with a special, although not exclusive focus on the elimination 
of chemical and biological weapons. It fosters this goal through an innovative pro- 
gram of research, analysis, technical support, and education designed to provide a 
strategic perspective and deepened understanding of contemporary arms control 



201 

challenges to government, industry, and other interested entities that share these 
principles. 

If you have ideas for future issue papers or questions about points raised in this 
paper or relating to arms control and proliferation in general, contact the Institute 
by phone at (703) 739-1538, or send a fax to (703) 739-1525. 

Michael L. Moodie, Executive Editor 

Geoffrey W. Nagler, Managing Editor 

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Moodie. 

I am going to make my questions short. We have a lot of ques- 
tions we would like to ask this panel but we have another panel 
and we have a target of trjdng to get through here by 12 to 12:30, 
so I am going to make my questions short and then rotate it. 

Dr. Mirzayanov, could you tell us more about the case of General 
Kuntsevich, who was a former member of President Yeltsin's Com- 
mittee on chemical weapons and who, I understand, was recently 
indicted by the Russians for smuggling chemical weapons to the 
Middle East? Could you tell us what you know about that? 

Dr. Mirzayanov. [Translated from Russian.) I can say that on 
April 4, 1994, the KGB had started an investigation on General 
Kuntsevich and a group of researchers, including Mr. Petrunin, Di- 
rector of GosNIIOKhT, and Mr. Drozd. On April 6, already, Gen- 
eral Kuntsevich was dismissed from his post, but the main problem 
is that all those people were only witnesses in the case. The inves- 
tigation was especially interested in Mr. Drozd confirming the alle- 
gation that along with laboratory equipment, a precursor was also 
sent to Syria. 

My opinion is that part of it is true but part of it is a political 
game. During this last year, bosses of General Kuntsevich were not 
satisfied with the way he handled his job. This is especially true 
of General Petrov and his assistant, General Yevstafyev, who 
thought that Kuntsevich was paying too much attention to the 
process of destruction of chemical weapons and was not too much 
worried about saving the potential of Russia. 

My opinion is that General Kuntsevich is not the worst among 
the generals in the chemical forces of Russia, but to a certain ex- 
tent, he is not quite sincere. He is not a sincere person. 

I think that part of this truth that the investigation already 
knows is enough to take more severe measures towards General 
Kuntsevich. 

I must say that General Kuntsevich did not act on his own. No 
doubt that he was in agreement, he acted in consent with his supe- 
riors. In particular, cooperation with Syria was not the initiative of 
Kuntsevich. He was only told to do this. 

This is why I think that, at the moment, someone has just de- 
cided to sacrifice Kuntsevich for the sake of some political goals. 

Senator NuNN. Let me ask you this question, if I could, because 
I want to be able to rotate it. Some people would cite, including 
some in the Congress, some outside, would cite this example of a 
person very high up, a senior general now being indicted for selling 
those weapons, cite that as evidence that we are not able to enter 
into a chemical weapons agreement with Russia and other coun- 
tries because of corruption and because of that kind of a breach of 
trust. How would you respond to that? 

Dr. Mirzayanov. [Translated from Russian.] I would answer to 
this that certainly those generals who have initiated this whole 



202 

case are strongly against chemical disarmament. But the Chemical 
Weapons Convention is a product of 20 years of hard work of many 
researchers, politicians in many countries. So any negative im- 
pulse, any negative effect on this process of ratification would make 
Russia even more non-transparent in the sense of chemical weap- 
ons and we would return to the starting point. 

Mr. MOODIE. Mr. Chairman, could I make a comment on your 
question? 

Senator NUNN. Yes. 

Mr. MOODIE. Two quick points. First, one of the reasons that 
some Senators are concerned about the CWC in relation to General 
Kuntsevich is that they have described him as a "key negotiator" 
of the Convention. When I was at ACDA, my bureau had respon- 
sibility for the interagency leadership on the CWC negotiations, so 
I had to follow those talks very closely and spend some time in Ge- 
neva at the talks. 

It is my recollection, it is the recollection of some of the people 
in the U.S. delegation, and it is the recollection of the head of the 
Russian delegation to the talks that General Kuntsevich may have 
come to Geneva for 1 or 2 days, but he never was involved in the 
negotiations at the table. 

The second point I would make is that until the CWC enters into 
force, there is no legal international law against trade in these ma- 
terials. The only international legal prohibition on chemical weap- 
ons is the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans use of CW. All the 
other aspects — production, development, research, trade — there is 
no prohibition against those. So if he was in violation of anything, 
it would have been in violation of Russian domestic law and the 
CWC does provide some measures to strengthen that area, as well. 

Senator NuNN. Thank you. 

The final question I have. Dr. Mirzayanov, to your knowledge, 
were chemical weapons ever sent by the Soviet government to the 
Middle East? 

Dr. Mirzayanov. [Translated from Russian.] Yes, I am aware of 
testimony of one of the colonels who participated in transportation 
of modern chemical weapons to the Middle East in the former So- 
viet Union. 

Senator NuNN. What country? To what country did those weap- 
ons go? 

Dr. Mirzayanov. [Translated from Russian.] He did not say. He 
did not name the country, but we can take a guess. What he was 
saying is that those chemical weapons were not meant for use in 
only one country, but including Syria. 

Senator Nunn. Was that during the days of the Soviet Union or 
has that kind of shipment continued under Russia? 

Dr. Mirzayanov. [Translated from Russian.] No, this took place 
in the Soviet days and this colonel was ready to go public in a situ- 
ation that would become critical for him. 

Senator NuNN. Did he go public? 

Dr. Mirzayanov. [Translated from Russian.] No, he did not. He 
did not go public because the current Russian laws and the absence 
of a ratified Convention on chemical weapons do not inspire people 
to go public with revelations of this sort. 

Senator NUNN. Thank you. 



203 

Senator Cohen? 

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Senator Nunn. 

Dr. Mirzayanov, there are some ironies in what you have been 
testifying to here today. No. 1, you have indicated that the chemi- 
cal weapons developed by the Soviet and Russian governments are 
hermetically sealed so they are very safe. One would hope that the 
craftsmanship that has been dedicated to Russian military weap- 
onry is superior to that in the commercial sector, such as 
Chernobyl, in terms of protecting the public against leakage of ma- 
terials. We assume that to be the case. 

The system of protection for these hermetically-sealed weapons 
was always that of personnel. You had many armed personnel that 
were stationed to protect their being stolen or used for other pur- 
poses. Now we have the situation in which the personnel are no 
longer there or, in many cases, have been corrupted, either by 
those seeking to purchase some of these materials or by organized 
crime. 

We have heard nothing here today about the role of Russian or- 
ganized criminal gangs. We have had other testimony in other set- 
tings that there may be as many as 5,500 gangs operating in Rus- 
sia, even in Moscow. They have been successful in many respects 
in penetrating both the military and the government officials 
through corruption. 

None of our witnesses have addressed themselves to that issue 
and perhaps you could enlighten us as to whether, from your expe- 
rience, you know whether organized crime is actively seeking to 
gain access to such materials. 

Dr. Mirzayanov. [Translated from Russian.] I would like to say 
that I agree with you completely that chemical weapons in Russia 
face tremendous danger of theft, both from personnel and from or- 
ganized crime. To my mind, we are just simply lucky that this has 
not happened yet. We are just fortunate, because nobody has yet 
ordered for such theft to take place. I think if someone has an 
order to get these chemical weapons, there will not be many prob- 
lems of getting them. 

Senator COHEN. Could you tell us whether or not the Russians 
are prepared or were prepared to violate the Chemical Weapons 
Convention upon its ratification? In other words, were steps being 
taken to surreptitiously violate the treaty, assuming that it is rati- 
fied? 

Dr. Mirzayanov. [Translated from Russian.] To my mind, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention is created in such a way that any 
potential violations can be overturned. I have indicated in my arti- 
cles that the lists of chemical agents that are being controlled do 
not include some of the agents that are being developed. This was 
my main concern. That is why I went public in my articles before, 
when the process of ratification started. But after my articles and 
after a number of consultations with my fellow researchers, I have 
come to the conclusion that all these types of agents can be con- 
trolled under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 

Senator Cohen. Let me express a personal opinion here at this 
time. I think there is no treaty that can be drafted that cannot be 
circumvented by any country that is dedicated to doing so. It is my 
personal belief that the Russian government was undertaking ac- 



204 

tivities to prepare for the circumvention of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, as they did for the Biological Weapons Convention. 

That is a personal judgment on my part. It does not mean we 
should not have such conventions, but that is an issue that we 
have to address. I know that Senator Nunn is anxious to move on 
quickly, but just let me make a couple of quick points. 

I think in your statement. Dr. Leitenberg, you pointed out the 
issue of the trilateral countries sa5ang that they have confirmed the 
termination of offensive research and dismantlement of experi- 
mental technological lines for production of agents, etc. That may 
be true, but, in fact, we know that the Russians lied in the past 
about Krasnoyarsk for years. Do you recall this? We maintained 
that they were building an ABM battle management station in vio- 
lation of the ABM Treaty. They said, no, we are building it for 
tracking satellites. It took years of pressure until they finally yield- 
ed the truth that they were, in fact, building it in violation of the 
treaty. 

They lied for years. Mr. Gorbachev, the architect of glasnost, lied 
about their biological weapons activities for years. Finally, when 
President Yeltsin came to the United States, he admitted that they, 
in fact, had a biological weapons program. 

So there is a history behind this. The question is, why should we 
believe them now? I would come back to what President Reagan 
said. We must trust, but verify. So the verification regime is going 
to be the most extensive and the most intense that we can call 
upon. 

But I want to say something else, one final point. Senator Nunn 
and others, if you would permit me just to comment briefly on a 
subject matter that is in the news today. One of the lead stories 
in both The New York Times and The Washington Post, and I as- 
sume every other major paper, deals with the CIA and the issue 
about the contamination of intelligence that was given to our policy 
makers. Great criticism is being directed toward the CIA at this 
time. 

The American people ought to know also that it is an institution 
filled with human beings with human failures, but there are great 
successes that are being achieved even as we speak which will 
never be told and cannot be told. Successes cannot be discussed in 
public, but there are many successes underway in the field of 
human intelligence. 

It is true that, on the one hand, we need this extraordinary tech- 
nological capability for verification, but we also need human intel- 
ligence. And many times, success results not just because of the 
scientists in the labs but also operatives in the field, in that very 
dark and dangerous world of espionage. 

So I think that story has to be told, as well, because I think that 
people are getting the impression that the United States intel- 
ligence agencies, and the CIA in particular, have done nothing but 
misuse their powers and are filled with individuals who cannot per- 
form up to standards of excellence that we demand. They do out- 
standing work, notwithstanding the failures that we are all reading 
about. 

I think that has to be said because to verify treaty compliance 
in the field of biological weapons and chemical weapons we are 



205 

going to have to rely upon human intelUgence, as well as all of the 
scientific equipment that we can develop and deploy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Nunn. Thank you, Senator Cohen. 

I would subscribe to that statement. The mistakes of the CIA are 
going to have to be rectified. There is going to have to be some 
house cleaning and there is going to have to be some restructuring. 
There is going to have to be a modernization. The missions are 
going to have to be reexamined, all of that, but we are going to con- 
tinue to need the best intelligence that we can possibly gather. 

The world today is not as high-risk as it was. There is not as 
much high risk of a nuclear confrontation, but there is also less 
stability than we had during the Cold War and more dangers of 
proliferation by far and even more dangers of the use of a weapon 
of mass destruction than there was during the Cold War, so we all 
have to put that in perspective. 

I might also say the same thing about our domestic law enforce- 
ment. The FBI is going to have to correct a lot of the mistakes that 
were made, Waco and other places, but if you look at the number 
of terrorist incidents we have had in this country compared to the 
number we could have had over the last 10 or 15 years, I think 
there are some real success stories that, again, have not, as Sen- 
ator Cohen has said, been told, that those of us dealing with this 
are familiar with. 

One success story that has been told now is the fact that our in- 
telligence community kept insisting that Iraq was not coming clean 
during these U.N. inspections. As we have heard one of our wit- 
nesses say today — I believe it was Mr. Leitenberg — it would have 
been a disaster had we lifted the sanctions while they were still 
Ijdng in Iraq about their BW program and about their chemical and 
about some of their nuclear programs. So that is one that you have 
to chalk up on the plus side. 

Let me again rotate over to Senator Lugar. 

Senator LuGAR. Thank you very much, Senator Nunn. 

Mr. Moodie, I have just a short question but it deals with your 
thought that proliferation of both technology as well as materials 
may occur and is non-stoppable. The point you have made is that 
our mission really is, as you said, the channeling of choices of those 
leaders to whom such technology is increasingly available. 

In other words, given the fact that these instruments of destruc- 
tion will come into the hands of various countries, or sub-state 
groups or even religious cults, our challenge is trying to determine 
how we channel or frame the decisions of leaders possessing such 
destructive means. Why do groups such as this think as they do? 
Why does somebody want to destroy a society without having a po- 
litical objective? 

Can you sketch out how you do this? In other words, what in- 
struments do we need in policy making, so that the President, Cab- 
inet officials, the CIA and so forth may begin to think through how 
to channel those decision-making processes? What institutional 
changes are implied by this? 

Mr. Moodie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wish I had all day. 

I think the first point is that no single instrument is going to do 
it. You have to make everything work together towards the same 



206 

objective — having an impact on the decision making that is in- 
volved in choices to go for weapons of mass destruction. 

At the government level, I think what you have to do is raise the 
costs as high as you can through both international and national 
activities. You have to demonstrate that the weapons of mass de- 
struction program that a state might embark upon is not going to 
get it to the point that it wants to go, that you can deny it its objec- 
tives regardless of whether it acquires weapons of mass destruc- 
tion. 

You raise the cost too high, which is why, although I have some 
problems with export controls as the centerpiece of our strategy, I 
do not think you should throw them out entirely because I think 
they help raise the costs. 

I think that you demonstrate that proliferators are going to be 
severely punished if they, in fact, violate the kinds of international 
norms that people are trying to enshrine in things like the Chemi- 
cal Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention. That 
means, in my view — I did not mention it in my oral statement, but 
in my written remarks — that we have to consider what kinds of 
military options should be part of our policy repertoire to raise the 
costs, in fact, to channel their choices away from this option, basi- 
cally because they are not going to get what they want to get by 
the use of these kinds of instruments of violence. 

You incorporate a diplomatic effort. You have to create an inter- 
national norm embodied in legal agreements like the CWC, the 
BWC. You have to have export controls. You have to have diplo- 
matic activities. You have to have defense capabilities so that 
proliferators will be denied the fruits in the event that they want 
to use them against, say, U.S. interventionary forces. We must 
have an adequate defense so that they are denied that objective 
through the use of these programs. It is only by this kind of inte- 
grated approach that you are going to get to the point where you 
want to be. 

Senator LUGAR. Is this likely to be ultimately effective if we take 
a position that essentially all of these sanctions have to be multi- 
lateral, or should we make clear that some situations are serious 
enough that we are prepared to act unilaterally to deal with such 
violations? I raise this question because I tend to come down on 
that side. 

If we are to channel the decisions of would-be proliferators, our 
credibility comes down to the fact that the U.S. is prepared to use 
military force, export controls, and other instruments to ensure 
that proliferators are severely punished — in other words, land on 
top of them with a ton of bricks so that there is no ambiguity. Ab- 
sent that, we will remain in a debate, even with good friends like 
the British, the French, the Germans, the Japanese, as to whether, 
collectively, we are prepared to do this and who should do what 
and so forth. I do not think that gets the job done, if I follow your 
logic. 

Mr. MOODIE. I think you have to do both, in the sense that ulti- 
mately it has got to be the psychological orientation of the entire 
international community that helps channel these choices away 
from proliferation. That means getting more states willing to take 
this problem seriously. 



207 

One of the points I tried to raise was that there are a number 
of countries in the world that do not see the issue quite the way 
we do and would handle it differently. They view the MTCR, the 
Australia Group, as hypocritical. These states are not just the radi- 
cals in Iran but others. These export control regimes are seen as 
discriminatory. They are seen as an economic ploy, in essence, to 
keep the underdeveloped countries down while the industrialized 
world goes ahead with the benefits of things that we are denying 
them. 

There is a psychology there that has to be addressed seriously so 
that countries can follow the lead of a country like Argentina, 
which has changed significantly its attitude towards international 
proliferation issues and the protection of technology in the last 4 
or 5 years. 

So part of it has to be a multilateral agreement because some of 
the tools we have available are not going to work unless they are 
multilaterally imposed. Sanctions, I think, is a good example. We 
can impose sanctions unilaterally. If others do not, they are going 
to have no impact whatsoever. 

At the same time, I think we also have to demonstrate that in 
some situations where it is appropriate, we are willing to take ac- 
tion ourselves. I am not advocating that we conduct a series of U.S. 
"Osiraq reactor" raids of the kind the Israelis did, but it is not 
something that we should dismiss out of hand, either, for every sit- 
uation. It should be part of our policy options, our contingencies, 
and we have to continue to explore what the best kinds of activities 
are that will help us in that area. 

So I do not think it is an either/or choice. I think we are going 
to have to work aggressively in both areas. 

Senator LuGAR. Thank you. 

Senator NUNN. I believe Mr. Leitenberg wanted to respond to 
that, also. 

Mr. Leitenberg. I wanted to comment on two points, and to Sen- 
ator Cohen. In Mike Moodie's original statement he talked about 
what to do when we know about noncompliance. I think unilateral 
sanctions are much more important than we usually give them 
credit for. Regarding the statement that they are not effective un- 
less everybody else joins in; you cannot get them to be effective un- 
less you start them. 

Back in the late 1970s, when the United States convened the 
London Suppliers Group on nuclear problems and we were fiercely 
battling the French regarding their reactor sales to Pakistan and 
the Germans regarding their reactor sales to Brazil, all of that 
would never have succeeded unless the Carter administration had 
not made certain domestic decisions: to cancel the Clinch River 
Breeder reactor, to cancel plutonium reprocessing. It would have 
been diplomatically inconceivable to apply the pressure on coun- 
tries with the economic potential of France and Germany, which 
had their own notions about the desirability of reactor sales, unless 
we had shown that we were ready to put something of our own on 
the line. 

I think much more has to be done in the circumstances when we 
know that there is a treaty violator. We have said in noncompli- 
ance statements that some of the nations with BW programs are 



208 

signatories of the treaty. They have not ratified, but they have 
signed it, we beheve they are violating its provisions, but nothing 
is done. There is no penalty, and there has to be a penalty. 

I would like to comment on Senator Cohen's statement. When 
the IAEA was embarrassed to discover that Iraq had violated the 
IREA nuclear safeguards also, nobody thought that those safe- 
guards should be abolished. We never can say, "you are going to 
be 1,000 percent certain that you are going to fmd every violation." 
But if the problem is that big, the regime hopefully will deal with 
95 percent of it, at least. But without that, there is no handle at 
all. We would not get those Russian admissions of those past lies 
if there was not that trilateral process 

Senator COHEN. Or present lies. 

Mr. Leitenberg [continuing] . If there was not some way of get- 
ting into the Russian laboratories and getting a handle on the situ- 
ation. 

Yesterday you asked a very important question which I would 
like to be able to answer: The question was not addressed to the 
right group yesterday. You referred to the instance at the recent 
meeting in London, the anthrax meeting where the Russians had 
come forward and said they had put in the genetic markers for an- 
tibiotic resistance. You were rather astonished that they admitted 
it. 

Well, we have been pressuring them for 3 years to admit to 
things like that. We have been very, very persistent because under 
the CBMs of the Biological Weapons Convention there is a thing 
called the Form F submission, in which they were supposed to re- 
port on all their past offensive BW programs back to 1945, and 
they did not. And we have been repeating that they did not. So we 
want them to admit to those things. That is the first point. 

The second is that under our own definitions of what is per- 
mitted under defensive research — and the Russians are permitted 
a defensive program, we have a defensive program, the British do, 
the Swedes do, the Dutch do — that gets very, very difficult. Be- 
cause we have defined the permissibility of defensive research in 
a very maximalist way, that we can look at any potential threat, 
develop it in the laboratory, and be able to test against it. By our 
own definition, therefore, that would definitely be permitted under 
a defensive research program. 

The third point is that they probably did that back in 1985 or 
1986. It is not likely that they did it since 1992, since the trilateral 
statement. They probably did that in the mid-1980s, or at least we 
think so. 

Senator Cohen. Thank you. 

Senator NUNN. Senator Cochran? 

Senator CoCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

I was thinking as I was reading your statements and listening 
to the testimony and questions about the unfortunate experience 
that we had when the Chernobyl accident occurred. We were fear- 
ing the intentional use of nuclear power as a threat to the security 
of the United States and then we found out from that experience 
that a nuclear accident anywhere can be a nuclear accident every- 
where and can affect the well-being of people all around the world. 



209 

I wonder if that is a similar concern in the biological and chemi- 
cal weapons area. Given the signing of these Conventions, is it 
enough just to sign the Conventions or should we insist, or is it a 
provision in the Convention that these stockpiles should be de- 
stroyed, should be done away with? 

I know when we were negotiating with the Soviet Union on the 
subject of chemical weapons banning, the question came up. Do we 
continue to produce chemical weapons and stockpile them in Ar- 
kansas or wherever we had them, or should we begin a unilateral 
program along with that to show good faith that we are not going 
to produce these weapons? They are inherently dangerous and we 
are not going to ever use them. Why produce them? 

Is it a part of the regime, or should it be, that these stockpiles 
should be done away with, and how do we go about achieving that 
goal? I ask that question to everyone. Ms. Smithson? 

Ms. Smithson. Thank you. We have already stopped our produc- 
tion programs unilaterally. We have also unilaterally begun to de- 
stroy our chemical weapons stockpile. The Chemical Weapons Con- 
vention requires that states possessing these weapons destroy them 
within a 10-year time frame. 

In the case of Russia, I think that everyone recognizes that eco- 
nomic circumstances there will make it very difficult for them to 
meet this deadline, and we have begun offering them assistance in 
destroying their stockpile. Russia can request a 5-year maximum 
extension of this deadline. Thus, the Convention does include a re- 
quirement for states around the world to begin destroying these 
stockpiles. 

Senator COHEN. Mr. Leitenberg? 

Mr. Leitenberg. The answer is the same. We have no "B" stock- 
pile. We do not think any other Western country does. In fact, my 
understanding is that the U.S. Grovemment does not think that 
anyone is presently — any of those nations it talks about as having 
BW programs — that none of them are presently producing "B" 
agents. I understand that is the Government's assessment. 

So there may be no stockpiles in this case, and under the memo- 
randum of understanding in 1989 between the United States and 
the former Soviet Union and transferred to Russia, there was the 
agreement to destroy bilaterally our stockpile and theirs and that 
was transferred to the Chemical Weapons Convention. 

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NUNN. Thank you. Senator Cochran. 

Senator Cohen, do you have any other questions? 

Senator COHEN. Just one other question. Doctor, Senator Nunn 
had indicated that the Russians had transferred some chemical 
weapons to Syria and possibly other nations. Could you tell us if 
you know in what amounts, how much was transferred and when? 

Dr. MiRZAYANOV. [Translated from Russian.] Unfortunately, I am 
not aware, not only me, but my colleagues, as well, are not aware 
of the details and this aspect still needs to be worked on. 

Senator Nunn. I want to thank all of our panel, Mr. Moodie, Mr. 
Leitenberg, Ms. Smithson, Dr. Mirzayanov. We appreciate very 
much you being here. This Subcommittee is going to continue our 
focus in this area for some time to come. We think it is one of the 
most important national security problems we face and I know all 



210 

of you, by your own priorities in life, agree that it is a very impor- 
tant matter. We look forward to continuing to receive the benefit 
of your research and your wisdom and your views. Thank you very 
much. 

Our next panel, if I could ask all the panel members to come up, 
includes Dr. Gordon Oehler, Director, Nonproliferation Center, 
Central Intelligence Agency; Ms. Connie Fenchel, Director, Strate- 
gic Investigations Division, Office of Operations of the U.S. Cus- 
toms Service; John O'Neill, Chief of the Counterterrorism Section, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation; H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Sec- 
retary of Defense, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, 
U.S. Department of Defense, and Dr. Frank E. Young, Director, Of- 
fice of Emergency Preparedness, Public Health Service. 

Before all of you get comfortable and settle down, we swear in 
all the witnesses before the Subcommittee, so if each of the wit- 
nesses could please hold up your right hand and we will swear all 
of you in. 

Do you swear the testimony you give before the Subcommittee 
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 
help you, God? 

Mr. Oehler. I do. 

Ms. Fenchel. I do. 

Mr. O'Neill. I do. 

Mr. Holmes. I do. 

Dr. Young. I do. 

Senator NuNN. Thank you. Please have a seat. 

Dr. Oehler, I believe we will start with you and just work our 
way from left to right down the table. We welcome your statements 
today and we will introduce your entire statement in the record. I 
would encourage our witnesses to summarize in about 10 minutes, 
if you can do that. We do not want to leave out any important 
points but we would like to have some time for questions. 

Dr. Oehler? 

TESTIMONY OF GORDON C. OEHLER, DIRECTOR, NONPRO- 
LIFERATION CENTER, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Mr. Oehler. Thank you. Senator. I thank you for the invitation 
to be here today, as well, and I would like to thank Senator Cohen 
and Senator Nunn for their kind remarks about the work that the 
CIA does do that is done well. We deserve criticism where we make 
mistakes but I think we also deserve some credit where we do 
things right, and I thank you very much for those comments. 

I certainly do not need to convince this group of the importance 
of weapons of mass destruction and what they can do to civiliza- 
tions around the world. Currently, we have pointed out that there 
are some 20 countries, nearly half of them in the Middle East, that 
have weapons of mass destruction of one type or another or are try- 
ing to develop them. 

As you have heard in some of your briefings, the technologies as- 
sociated with chemical and biological weapons have legitimate civil- 
ian and military applications, and while we attempt to restrict 
trade in these goods and technologies, obviously all trade cannot be 
banned. Thus, countries wanting to develop chemical and biological 



211 

weapons mask acquisitions as part of legitimate business trans- 
actions. 

Much of our attention in the past has been focused on state-spon- 
sored mihtary programs, and as recent revelations from Iraq show, 
this attention has not been misplaced. The unprecedented inspec- 
tions conducted in Iraq by the United Nations revealed much about 
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program and underscores the 
complexity faced by international efforts to curb the spread of these 
weapons. 

In the wake of the recent defection of two high-level Iraqis, the 
Baghdad government turned over to the United Nations Special 
Commission, the UNSCOM, and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency a large cache of weapons of mass destruction-related docu- 
ments and they have revealed even more information in extensive 
discussions with both U.N. organizations. 

These revelations underscore our longstanding judgment that the 
Iraqis have made efforts to deceive the UNSCOM and the IAEA. 
This resulted in UNSCOM Chairman Rolf Ekeus's delivery of a 
strongly-worded report to the U.N. Security Council several weeks 
ago critical of Iraq's progress in fiilfilling its obligations to come 
clean. 

The recent declarations show the mind-boggling scale of Iraq's 
chemical and biological weapons program. For example, in the area 
of chemical warfare, in addition to the 150 tons of nerve agent 
sarin and 411 tons of the blister agent mustard that they declared 
earlier, the Iraqis finally admitted to an extensive program to de- 
velop the more toxic and more persistent nerve agent VX. They ad- 
mitted to producing 65 tons of chlorine intended for the production 
of VX and to more than 200 tons each of two controlled precursors. 
Together, these would have been sufficient to produce almost 500 
tons of VX. I would like to point out that only 10 milligrams are 
needed for a lethal dose. 

Iraq developed a true binary sarin-filled artillery shell, 122-milli- 
meter rockets, and aerial bombs in quantities beyond prototype 
level. They admitted that they flight tested a long-range variant of 
the scud missile with a chemical warhead in April 1990. 

If it is possible, the declarations concerning their BW program 
are even more terrifying. According to their oral declarations made 
since mid-August, a total of 6,000 liters of concentrated botulinum 
toxin and 8,400 liters of anthrax were produced at the Al Hakam 
facility during 1990. An additional 5,400 liters of concentrated 
botulinum toxin were produced at the Daura Foot and Mouth Dis- 
ease Institute during the period November 1990 to January 15, 
1991. Four hundred liters of concentrated botulinum toxin were 
produced at Taji and 150 liters of concentrated anthrax were pro- 
duced at Salman Pak. 

Continuing, they produced, as they say, 340 liters of concentrated 
Clostridium perfringens, which is a biological agent that causes gas 
gangrene. They said that they had static field tests of anthrax 
simulant and botulinum toxin conducted using aerial bombs as 
early as March 1988. Animals were used as test subjects and they 
had live firings of 122-milUmeter rockets filled with BW agents 
conducted in May of 1990. 



212 

Large-scale weaponization of BW agents began in December of 
1990. Iraq declared that they filled more than 150 bombs and 50 
warheads with agents. All of these weapons were dispersed to for- 
ward storage locations during the Gulf War. 

And finally, Iraq worked to adopt a modified cargo aircraft with 
a drop tank for biological agent spray during operations beginning 
in December 1990. The tank could be attached either to a piloted 
fighter or to remotely-piloted aircraft. It was designed to spray up 
to 2,000 liters of anthrax on a target. While the Iraqis claim the 
test was a failure, they noted that there were three additional drop 
tanks modified and stored, probably ready for use. 

Iraq is certainly not our only concern. Iran's chemical weapons 
buildup, for example, runs contrary to the image it is trying to 
present in the disarmament arena. Even after signing the CWC in 
January 1993, Tehran continues to upgrade and expand its chemi- 
cal weapons production infrastructure and chemical munitions ar- 
senal. Iran is spending large sums of money on long-term capital 
improvements to its chemical weapons program as part of this ex- 
pansion, and this tells us that Tehran fully intends to maintain a 
chemical weapons capability well into the foreseeable future. 

As further evidence of Iran's intention, Tehran is continuing its 
drive begun during the Iran-Iraq War to acquire increasingly toxic 
nerve agents and soon should have a production capability for 
these agents, as well. It is also developing a production capability 
for the precursor chemicals to alleviate the need to import re- 
stricted raw materials. 

As I noted earlier, much of our attention in the past had been 
focused on military programs. We are beginning to see that the use 
of weapons of mass destruction is no longer restricted to the battle- 
field. Terrorist groups are showing an increased interest in using 
these chemical agents to kill their opponents. 

For example, Tajik opposition members laced champagne with 
cyanide at last year's New Year's celebration, killing six Russian 
soldiers and the wife of another and sickening several others. Press 
reports of the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, in Southeast 
Turkey poisoned Turkish water supplies with cyanide. 

But as has been discussed at length in your hearings, the attacks 
by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo really brought this trend to 
the front pages. The attacks in Matsumoto, Japan, in June of 1994 
and Tokyo in March, as you know, killed a total of 19 people and 
injured more than 5,500. 

The forthcoming trial of Aum Shinrikyo's leader, Shoko Asahara, 
has resulted in a number of revelations about the cult's activities. 
The press reports state that in 1993, Asahara ordered his followers 
to pursue a capability to produce sarin. The large, agent production 
facility which resulted from that order was operational in about 
March of 1994. 

You have heard of the evidence of possible testing of sarin on 
sheep in Australia. Aum Shinrikyo planned to produce enough 
chemical agent to annihilate a large Japanese city by spraying it 
from a helicopter. Aum Shinrikyo had purchased a Russian heli- 
copter and two drones that, with modifications, could have been ca- 
pable of delivering these chemical or biological weapons. 



213 

Japanese authorities have determined that Aum Shinrikyo was 
working on developing the chemical agent VX in addition to the 
sarin used in the subway attack. And again, if that were not 
enough, Aum Shinrikyo was working on biological agents, as well. 
Press reports allege that atomizers were found at the cult's Mount 
Fuji compound that were intended to spread botulinum toxin. 

Testimony by Aum Shinrikyo followers state that in June 1993, 
senior Aum leaders released anthrax from the top of a building in 
Tokyo. Some local residents complained of a bad smell over a 4-day 
period around the attack and reported it to the police. 

Aum Shinrikyo was able to legitimately buy all of the compo- 
nents that it needed to build its chemical and biological infrastruc- 
tures. The technical know-how to put the pieces together is avail- 
able through open-source literature, including over the Internet. 

Terrorists' interest in chemical and biological weapons really is 
not surprising, given the relative ease with which these chemicals 
can be produced in simple laboratories. The large numbers of cas- 
ualties they can cause is of interest to some of the new terrorist 
groups, and, of course, they have great interest in residual disrup- 
tion of infrastructures, as we have seen with other terrorist acts. 
Although popular fiction and national attention have focused on 
terrorist use of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons 
are more likely choices for these groups. 

Stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction can only be 
accomplished through international cooperation, and several inter- 
national organizations have been established or are in the process 
of being established for just this purpose. You are familiar with 
them. There is the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
which just passed the indefinite extension here this year; the CWC, 
which you have discussed at length; the Biological Weapons Con- 
vention; the Australia Group, which restricts the flow of chemical 
weapons and biological weapons materials and production tech- 
nologies; and the Missile Technology Control Regime for hindering 
the development of ballistic missiles of proliferation concern. 

The U.S. intelligence community, participating with other Gov- 
ernment agencies, is waging an aggressive campaign to curb the 
spread of these weapons of mass destruction. These efforts encom- 
pass developing new technologies to detect research and develop- 
ment, testing, production, weaponization, and deployment and use 
of chemical and biological weapons. We are developing a list of col- 
lection indicators to alert policy makers to possible impending use 
of chemical and biological weapons and we are working with U.S. 
law enforcement agencies to try to minimize the threat to U.S. in- 
terests. 

In sum, the revelations from Iraq verif3dng the horrendous extent 
of CW and BW programs and the actual terrorist use in Japan 
should serve as a wake-up call to all governments of the world. 
Preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist 
groups and the development of military capabilities in third world 
countries will require both a careful internal scrutiny by all coun- 
tries and an aggressive and cooperative international effort. Thank 
you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Oehler follows:] 



214 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. OEHLER 
THE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THREAT 

Overview 

The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) — a term that includes 
chemical weapons and biological weapons, among others — is a global problem that 
cuts across geographic, political, and technological lines. Proliferation oi these weap- 
ons is being undertaken by some of the largest and smallest, richest and poorest 
countries, led by some of the most reactionary and unstable regimes. Currently, 
some 20 countries — nearly half of them in the Middle East and South Asia — already 
have or may be developing these weapons. Many proliferators are convinced that 
they need to develop WMD and associated delivery systems to protect their national 
security. (See Annexes A and B for descriptions of chemical and biological agents.) 

Many of the technologies associated with WMD programs, especially chemical and 
biological technologies, have legitimate civilian or military applications unrelated to 
WMD. Trade in those technologies cannot be banned. This paradox enables pro- 
liferating nations to acquire technologies and materials to develop chemical and bio- 
logical weapons. For example, chemicals used to make nerve agents are also used 
to make plastics and to process foodstuffs. A modern pharmaceutical industry could 
produce biological warfare agents as easily as vaccines and antibiotics. 

As dual-use technology and expertise continue to spread internationally, the pros- 
pects for chemical and biological terrorism increase. The relative ease of production 
increases our concern that the use of both chemical and biological weapons is attrac- 
tive to terrorists. Moreover, the proliferation of WMD to more and more nations has 
increased the possibility that one or more of these states may choose to provide such 
weapons to terrorists. 

At least as worrisome is the likelihood that terrorist groups or cults may have the 
technical sophistication to acquire or develop chemical and biological weapons. The 
incidents staged earlier this year by the Japanese cult Aum Shinnkyo demonstrate 
that the use of WMD is no longer restricted to the battlefield. Japanese authorities 
have determined that the Aum was working on developing the chemical nerve 
agents sarin and VX. The Aum was able to legitimately obtain all of the components 
that it needed to build its massive chemical and biological infrastructures. However, 
terrorist gr6ups and violent sub-national groups need not acquire the massive infra- 
structure that the Aum had assembled. Only small quantities of precursors, avail- 
able on the open market, are needed to manufacture deadly chemical or biological 
weapons for terrorist acts. Extremist groups worldwide are increasingly learning 
how to manufacture chemical and biological agents, and the potential for additional 
chemical and biological attacks by such groups continues to grow. 

Iraq: A Country Study 

This country study examines the magnitude of Iraq's chemical and biological war- 
fare programs and underscores the complexity faced by international efforts to curb 
the spread of these weapons. Details about the breadth of Iraq's chemical and bio- 
logical warfare programs are presented to demonstrate the broad range of weapons 
that a state sponsor of terrorism has available in its arsenal and could provide to 
terrorists if it so chooses. 

The unprecedented inspections conducted in Iraq by the UN have revealed much 
about Iraqi WMD programs. In the wake of the recent defection of two high-level 
Iraqis, the Baghdad government turned over to the United Nations Special Commis- 
sion (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a large cache 
of WMD — related documents and have revealed even more information in extensive 
discussions with both UN organizations. The sudden revelation of new information 
underscores the longstanding judgment that the Iraqis have made efforts to deceive 
UNSCOM and the IAEA. Such behavior resulted in UNSCOM Chairman Ekeus's 
delivery of a strongly worded report to the UN Security Council several weeks ago 
that was critical of Iraq's progress in fulfilling its obligations under the UN Resolu- 
tions imposed following the Gulf War. Iraq's latest revelations include: 

Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program. The recent revelations demonstrate the ability 
of countries to hide these capabilities in the face of intrusive international inspec- 
tion regimes. 

• The Iraqi program to develop the nerve agent VX actually began as early as 
May 1985 and continued until December 1990 without interruption; Iraq 
claimed previously that its program spanned only the period April 1987 to 
September 1988. 

• Iraq admitted producing 65 tons of chlorine, intended for the production of 
VX, and had more than 200 tons each of the precursor chemicals phosphorous 



215 

pentasulfide and diisopropylamine. Together, these three precursors would 
have been sufficient to produce almost 500 tons of VX. 

• Iraq developed a true binary sarin-filled artillery shell, 122-mm rockets, and 
aerial bombs in quantities beyond prototype level. 

• An Al Husayn missile with a chemical warhead was flight-tested in April 
1990. 

• Iraq received significant assistance from outside suppliers. 

Iraq's Biological Warfare Program. The Iraqi Government adopted a policy to ac- 
quire biological weapons in 1974. Research and development began in 1975, but 
went into hiatus in 1978. In 1985, Iraq restarted biological weapons research and 
development. Initial work focused on literature studies, until bacterial strains were 
received from overseas in April 1986. 

(The following information is based on oral declarations made since mid-August. 
Assurances as to the validity or comprehensiveness of the information cannot be 
given until the formal declaration is received.) 

• A total of 6,000 liters of concentrated botulinum toxin and 8,425 liters of an- 
thrax were produced at Al Hakam during 1990. An additional 5,400 liters of 
concentrated botulinum toxin were produced at the Daura Foot and Mouth 
Disease Institute during the period November 1990 to January 15, 1991; 400 
liters of concentrated botulinum toxin was produced at Taji; and 150 liters of 
concentrated anthrax were produced at Salman Pak. 

• Production of Clostridium perfringens (a biological agent that causes gas gan- 
grene) began in August 1990. A total of 340 liters of concentrated agent was 
produced. 

• Static field trials of anthrax simulant and botulinum toxin were conducted 
using aerial bombs as early as March 1988. Effects were observed on test ani- 
mals. Additional weaponization tests took place in November 1989, with 122- 
mm rockets. Live firings of 122-mm rockets filled with agents were conducted 
in May 1990. 

• Large-scale weaponization of BW agents began in December 1990. Iraq filled 
more than 150 bombs and 50 warheads with agent. All these weapons were 
dispersed to forward storage locations. 

• Iraq worked to adapt a modified aircraft drop tank for biological agent spray 
operations beginning in December 1990. The tank could be attached either to 
a piloted fighter or to a remotely piloted aircraft that would be guided to the 
target by another, piloted aircraft. The tank was designed to spray up to 
2,000 liters of anthrax on a target. Iraq claims the test was a failure, but 
three additional drop tanks were modified and stored, ready for use. 

THE GROWING TERRORIST THREAT 

The Aum Shinrikyo attacks in June 1994, in Matsumoto, Japan, which killed 
seven and injured 500, and on the subway in Tokyo in March, which killed 12 and 
injured 5,500, were the first instances of large-scale terrorist use of chemical agents, 
but a variety of incidents and reports over the last two years indicate a growing 
terrorist interest in these weapons. These incidents include, but are not limited to; 

• Tajik opposition members lacing champagne with cyanide at a New Year's 
celebration in January 1995, killing six Russian soldiers and the wife of an- 
other, and sickening other revelers. 

• Press reports of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party, a guerrilla group that 
opposes the Turkish Government) in southeast Turkey poisoning Turkish 
water supplies with cyanide. 

Such examples reflect an increased interest in and a capability to produce chemi- 
cal and biological agents. Open source literature — including access to the Internet — 
provides instructions on how to make some chemical agents. 

Terrorist interest in chemical and biological weapons is not surprising, given the 
relative ease with which some of these weapons can be produced in simple labora- 
tories, the large number of casualties they can cause, and the residual disruption 
of infrastructure. Although popular fiction and national attention have focused on 
terrorist use of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons are more likely 
choices for such groups. 

• In contrast to the fabrication of nuclear weapons, the production of biological 
weapons requires only a small quantity of equipment. 

• Even very small amounts of biological and chemical weapons can cause mas- 
sive casualties. The fact that only 12 Japanese died in the Tokyo subway at- 
tack de-emphasizes the significance of the 5,500 people who required treat- 



216 

ment in hospital emergency rooms. Such a massive influx of injured — many 
critically — has the potential to overwhelm emergency medical facilities, even 
in a large metropolitan area. 

• Terrorist use of these weapons also makes them "weapons of mass disruption" 
because of the necessity to decontaminate affected areas before the public will 
be able to begin feeling safe. 

The Aum Shinrikyo 

The forthcoming trial of Aum leader Shoko Asahara has resulted in a number of 
revelations about the cult's activities. Press reports allege that: 

• Asahara ordered the capability to produce sarin beginning in 1993; a large — 
agent production complex was not operational until March 1994. 

• Some evidence suggests that the group may have tested sarin on sheep in 
Australia. Press reports claim that examination of some 30 sheep carcasses 
at an abandoned Aum site in Australia revealed the presence oi sarin and 
other organophosphorous pesticides. 

• Aum planned to produce enough agent to annihilate a large Japanese city by 
spraying it from a helicopter. Aum possessed a Russian helicopter and two 
drone airplanes that, with modifications, could have been capable of deliver- 
ing chemical and biological weapons. A high-ranking Aum member reportedly 
obtained a helicopter pilot's license in the U.S. Press reports also allege that 
Aum was considering chemical attacks using remote-controlled aircraft. 

• Afler the breakup of the Soviet Union, Aum expanded its activities in Russia, 
claiming some 30,000 followers there in addition to the 10,000 in Japan. 

• Aum's Russian element broadcast religious radio programs into Japan from 
the Russian Far East. 

• Video news footage indicates that a Russian-made GSP-11 toxic gas detector 
was found at the Aum compound in Japan. Designed to be used on the battle- 
field, the Russian detector can also be used in a nerve agent production/han- 
dling facility. 

• Asahara intended the simultaneous chemical strike on 10 locations in the 
Tokyo subway to be a massive mystery attack that would divert attention 
from the cult. 

Although the Aum Shinrikyo case demonstrates that terrorists can produce CW, 
they also may be able to directly acquire these weapons via other means: 

• theft of agents from research labs; 

• acquisition of commercially available poisons; 

• theft of chemical munitions held by the military; 

• black market activity; 

• receipt of ready-made chemical weapons from a state sponsor. 

EFFORTS TO CONTROL CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION 

U.S. Policy Initiatives 

Stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been a prominent 
goal of U.S. national security and foreign policy planning for several decades. Since 
the 1960s, when the U.S. sponsored the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT), this country has recognized that proliferation is a global problem 
and that combating it requires high levels of international cooperation. The United 
States has, at times, exerted unilateral influence, successfully in several cases, to 
discourage proliferation, but remains committed to supporting multilateral efforts to 
stem proliferation. 

The U.S. and other countries seeking ways to address proliferation of WMD have 
focused efforts on four aspects of the problem: 

• Preventing states from acquiring WMD through the use of obstacles, such as 
export controls, sanctions against suppliers, or, in extreme cases, military ac- 
tion; and by fostering improvements in the international security environ- 
ment directed toward reducing the perceived needs for such weapons through 
implementation of arms control arrangements, such as the NPT, the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). 

• Capping or rolling back existing programs by creating disincentives to deter 
states from developing such weapons or persuading them to reverse course by 
imposing sanctions, severing of travel and communications links, diplomatic 
isolation, implementing and strengthening credible verification regimes to 
international controls, and even military action under the provisions of Chap- 



217 

ter VII of the United Nations charter; or with incentives, such as ofTering ben- 
efits to states that agree to forgo efforts to acquire WMD — financial or tech- 
nical assistance or exemptions from some export controls. 

• Fostering deterrence of the use of WMD through regional or global arms con- 
trol arrangements such as political accommodations, economic measures, mili- 
tary confidence-building measures, and arms controls that reduce the security 
threats used to justify the acquisition of WMD. 

• Adapting military forces and emergency assets to respond to threats, ensuring 
U.S. forces' ability to operate against proliferated weapons. 

International Measures 

Chemical and biological weapons treaties are one element in the strategy to elimi- 
nate such weapons. The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of chemical and bio- 
logical weapons, but places no restriction on their production or possession. The 
CWC, opened for signature in 1993 and subsequently signed by 159 countries, bans 
the use, development, storage, or transfer of chemical warfare agents and their asso- 
ciated technology. The CWC will enter into force 180 days after the 65th country 
deposits its instruments of ratification. (To date, 40 countries have ratified the 
CWC.) In addition, the Convention requires States Parties to enact national legisla- 
tion to control and monitor the export of some dual-use chemicals. The CWC will 
make it both more difficult and more costly for CW proliferators and terrorists to 
carry out their activities. 

The BWC, ratified by 137 countries, prohibits the development, production, stock- 
piling, or transfer of biological agents and weapons and mandated the destruction 
of all existing stocks. At a BWC Special Conference, held in Geneva in September 
1994, the U.S. promoted the development of a legally binding instrument that in- 
creased transparency of activities and facilities that could have biological weapons 
applications in order to help deter violations of, and enhance compliance with, the 
BWC. 

The Australia Group (AG) was formed in 1984 as a result of the use of chemical 
weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. It is an informal forum of states whose goal is to dis- 
courage and impede proliferation by harmonizing national export controls on CW 
precursor chemicals and manufacturing equipment, sharing information on target 
countries, and seeking other ways to curb the use of chemical weapons. It has since 
been expanded to include biological weapons. 

However, we believe that, despite international prohibitions, many countries with 
offensive chemical and biological weapons programs probably will press ahead with 
those efforts over the next ten years. Several countries of proliferation concern — in- 
cluding Libya, Syria, and Iraq — have so far refused to sign the CWC, and some 
chemical weapons-capable countries, such as Iran, have signed the CWC but show 
no signs of ending their programs. 

Existing nonproliferation regimes and embargoes on chemical and biological weap- 
ons-relevant material and equipment have impeded but not stopped proliferation of 
those weapons. However, with the eventual ratification of the CWC and the imple- 
mentation of a mandatory BWC compliance regime, new modalities will be emplaced 
that may increase the transparency of some biological and chemical weapons-related 
activities. By continuing to focus on export controls, the AG also will remain a via- 
ble force in curtailing the spread of chemical and biological weapons. 

Iran's chemical weapons buildup, for example, runs contrary to the image it is try- 
ing to present in the disarmament arena. Even after signing the CWC in January 
1993, Tehran continues to upgrade and expand its chemical weapons production in- 
frastructure and chemical munitions arsenal. Iran is spending large sums of money 
on long-term capital improvements to its chemical weapons program as part of this 
expansion, which tells us that Tehran fully intends to maintain a chemical weapons 
capability well into the foreseeable future. As further evidence of Iran's intentions, 
Tehran is continuing its drive — begun during the Iran-Iraq war — to acquire increas- 
ingly toxic nerve agents and soon should have a production capability for these 
agents. It also is developing a production capability for precursor chemicals it needs 
to support chemical agent production, and within several years may become vir- 
tually independent of imported raw materials. 

A further example of Tehran's deceptive disarmament initiatives is the drive it 
is leading among lesser developed countries to link ratification of the CWC with 
elimination of AG export controls. AG controls are complicating Iran's chemical 
weapons program expansion. If Iran were to succeed in eliminating these tougher 
controls, it would be able to acquire much more easily the precursor chemicals, pro- 
duction equipment, and technology it needs for its chemical weapons program. 



218 

Intelligence Community Support 

In support of U.S. policy and international regimes, the U.S. Intelligence Commu- 
nity, together with other government entities, is waging an aggressive campaign to 
curb the spread of WMD. These efforts encompass: 

• developing new technologies to detect chemical and biological weapons. 

• developing a list of collection indicators to alert collectors and analysts prior 
to use of chemical and biological weapons. 

• working more closely with other governments and with U.S. law enforcement 
for early detection of WMD programs. 

Outlook 

Curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction among Third World countries 
and their acquisition by terrorist groups will require the continuation of an aggres- 
sive and cooperative international effort. Successful measures toward this end in- 
clude educating the public, policymakers, and other government entities about the 
complex issue of proliferation and making available a mix of resources to address 
this troublesome problem. 

Annex A 

Chemical Agents 

Chemical warfare * agents are among the easiest WMD to produce. The toxicity 
of chemical agents falls generally between that of the more deadly biological agents 
and that of conventional weapons. The earliest chemical agents, first used in World 
War I, were far less sophisticated and far less lethal than those developed in subse- 
quent decades. Proliferating nations have tended to first produce blister agents and, 
as their technologies advance, to develop the more lethal nerve agents. 

Types of CW Agents 

Choking agents are the oldest CW agents. This class includes chlorine and phos- 
gene, first used in World War I. These agents have a corrosive effect on the res- 
piratory system that causes the lungs to fill with water and choke the victim. These 
agents are delivered as heavy gases that remain near ground level and tend to fill 
depressions. They dissipate rapidly in a breeze and are among the least effective 
traditional CW agents. 

Blood agents are absorbed into the body primarily by breathing; they prevent the 
normal utilization of oxygen by the cells and cause rapid damage to body tissues. 
This class includes cyanide and cyanogen chloride. They are highly volatile and in 
a gaseous state dissipate rapidly in air. These agents are most effective when deliv- 
ered in a surprise attack. 

Blister agents are used to cause medical casualties; they affect the eyes and lungs 
and blister the skin. Such agents are simple to produce, and include sulfur mustard, 
nitrogen mustard, and lewisite. Sulfur mustard is considered by some as the ideal 
CW agent. It presents both a respiratory and a percutaneous (skin) hazard, forcing 
personnel to wear masks and protective clothing. It is persistent and presents a 
long-term hazard, forcing decontamination of the battlefield. 

G-series nerve agents, developed in the 1930s, cause paralysis of the respiratory 
musculature and subsequent death, in sufficient concentration. They include tabun, 
sarin, soman, and GF. These agents act rapidly and may be absorbed through the 
skin or the respiratory tract. Some agents, such as tabun and sarin, tend to be rel- 
atively nonpersistent, creating a short-term respiratory hazard on the battlefield. 

V-series nerve agents, developed in the 1950s, are similar to, but more advanced 
than, G-series agents. This class includes VE, VG, VM, VS, and VX. These agents 
are more toxic and more persistent than the G-agents and present a greater skin 
hazard. They are used for long-term contamination of territory. 

Production of CW Agents 

Many CW agents, particularly choking, blood, and blister agents, are relatively 
easy to produce. Some of their technologies are more than 80 years old, making 



'Chemical warfare (CW) can be considered the military use of toxic substances such that the 
chemical effects of these substances on exposed personnel result in incapacitation or death. It 
is the impact of chemical effects instead of physical effects (such as blast and heat) that distin- 
guishes chemical weapons from conventional weapons, even though both contain chemicals. In 
many cases in the Third World, there can be considerable confusion as to what is a chemical 
weapon and what is not. Some countries consider smoke, flame, incendiary, or riot control weap- 
ons to be chemical weapons and label them as such. In addition, conventional weapons can in- 
flict casualties resembling those caused by chemical weapons. 



219 

them accessible by virtually any Third World country and many terrorist groups. 
Newer agents, particularly nerve agents, are somewhat more difficult to produce. 
However, much of the technology to produce these agents is widely available in the 
public domain and, as demonstrated by the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, these agents 
can be produced by a determined terrorist group. 

Production of CW agents is similar to that of legitimate commercial compounds. 
Both involve use of standard chemical process equipment. Some of the more sophis- 
ticated equipment is distinctive enough to warrant special consideration, and some 
of this equipment is controlled by the Australia Group. In particular, equipment 
that is exceptionally resistant to corrosion has important applications for CW be- 
cause of the highly corrosive compounds encountered in CW agent production. 

Methods of Delivery 

Development of a dispersal device is somewhat more technologically complex than 
the production of chemical agents. Many conventional munitions, such as bombs, ar- 
tillery shells, grenades, and mines, can be modified to deliver chemical agents. A 
spray tank, commercially available for dissemination of agricultural chemicals from 
aircraft, can be used to disseminate chemical agents. Similarly, ground-based aero- 
sol generators used to disseminate pesticides can be used for CW purposes. 

Annex B 
biological agents 

Many developing countries see biological weapons — like chemical weapons — as 
having a twofold utility: as a "poor man's atomic bomb," intended to deter attacks 
from stronger, unconventionally armed neighbors; and as a relatively cheap force 
multiplier that can help compensate for shortcomings in conventional arsenals. 

Because much of the same biotechnology equipment employed by modern pharma- 
ceutical programs or laboratories associated with modern hospitals can be used to 
foster a biological weapons program, identification of an offensive biological war- 
fare ^ program can be extremely difficult. Most equipment used in BW-related pro- 
grams has legitimate applications, providing potential proliferators with the ability 
to conceal BW activity within legitimate research and development and industrial 
programs. The manufacture of vaccines for human or veterinary use can camouflage 
the production of large quantities of BW agents. 

A number of experts speculate that terrorists might acquire biological agents more 
easily than chemical agents. And both BW and CW would be far easier to develop 
than nuclear weapons. 



Types of BW Agents 

BW a 
lethality 



ifpes of BW Agents 

BW agents differ widely in infectiousness, length of incubation period, and 
thality. 



• Bacteria are single-cell organisms that are the causative agents of anthrax, 
brucellosis, tularemia, plague, and numerous other diseases. They vary con- 
siderably in infectivity and lethality. 

• Rickettsiae are microorganisms that resemble bacteria in form and structure 
but differ in that they are intracellular parasites that can reproduce inside 
animal cells. Examples of rickettsial diseases that might be used for BW in- 
clude typhus. Rocky Mountain spotted fever, and Q fever. 

• Viruses are intracellular parasites that are about 100 times smaller than bac- 
teria. They can infect humans, crops, or domestic animals. An example of a 
virus that might be used for BW is Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis. VEE 
virus causes a highly infectious disease that incapacitates but rarely kills. A 
virus's strength can be altered to increase its efficiency. A particularly power- 
ful strain of an endemic pathogen could simply be blamed on a chance natural 
mutation. 

• Fungi do not generally cause disease in healthy humans. Fungal diseases 
are, .however, devastating to plants and might be used to destroy staple crops 
and cause widespread hunger and economic hardship. Examples of plant 
fungal pathogens include rice blast, cereal rust, and potato blight. 

• A toxin is a poisonous substance made by a living system, or a synthetic ana- 
logue of a naturally occurring poison. An enormous variety of toxins are man- 



^ Biological warfare (BW) can be considered the military use of living organisms or associated 
materials that are intended to cause disability, disease, or death in humans, animals, or crops — 
for hostile purposes. Agents include pathogenic micro-organisms, toxins and bioactive sub- 
stances, which may be weaponized, using both military and civilian-type delivery systems. 



220 

ufactured by bacteria, fungi, marine organisms, plants, insects, spiders, and 
animals. 

Production of BW Agents f „„ fhof ha« 

RW agents are relatively easy and inexpensive to produce for any nation that has 

a modesUy sophistka ed pharmaceutical or fermentation industry. Mass-production 

iSS&pi::rs?coS;^.n^^^^ 

mate production. 

Methods of Delivery . , , -^u oo o \\n,,^\A 

BW aeents are nonvolatile solids that would be disseminated either as a liquid 
slurry or a dry powder of freeze-dned orgamsms or toxin. Possible delivery systems 
range in Complexity and effectiveness from an agricu Rural ^P^ay^^^^V^'lt^ed on a 
[fuck to a specialized cluster warhead carried on a ballistic missile. The key to pro 
ducing large-scale respiratory infections is to generate an f ^.^^ , "^^^f^^f^Sia 
suspended microscopic droplets, each containing from one to thousands of bacterial 
or vims particles. Fogs and smokes are examples of visible aerosols. 



221 




Faiiujah Complex, frag. ^5 km H'frf of Bagdad. 



as'j';-!* "^ H/Sfe 



222 




^.-Jte^V (tr* 



223 



('<>nlarnin;iti{l Siiis I (1.111 III! M.i.h 1495 Vumk 

'in (111 I 



wa- 



\ 



Korakuen 

hongo \ ,. 



^ 



Tokyo 




V 



mftsode 






/ Humtyncho 












awsu^' 



^a. 



.ow;-> station Ahere che>' 



Ttain mates SM&way siatiofv 

S'jDAay lines affected by chemical attaci' 

— Chiyoaa une 

H!t?!v3 Une 



"?Nifi SCI*-: •. i*^. 



224 



r" 




purcluiSCd hy \urn \hii 



^:MM'M lA-lM 



225 



^Senator NUNN. Thank you, Dr. Oehler. I appreciate your testi- 
Ms. Fenchel? 

TESTIMO>JY OF CONNIE J. FENCHEL, DIRECTOR STRATEGIC 
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION, OFFIck OF OPERAT ONS OF 
FICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE ' 

Ms. Fenchel. Thank you, Senator and members of the Sub- 
committee. 

the irs^^n^jn^rc? ^^^•' ^^? P'^'^'l^" °^ Strategic Investigations for 
the U.S. Customs Service. I have been a special agent for the Cus- 

ye^i ^fTgrO^aWhrerT^' '' ^''"^- '''"'""' '' ""'' ^^ "^'"^ 

I would like to summarize my remarks before the Subcommittee 

r^cord^^"^^ ^^ complete statement be submitted for the 

partofthe reTd.^^'^'^' '^^'''^'"' "" '^ ^^"^ statements will be 
Ms^Fenchel. Thank you. Senator, I come here today to describe 
the efforts of the U.S. Customs Service to thwart the proliferation 
ot weapons of mass destruction by countries, organizations and 
groups who threaten our global security. As you are well aware 

iJli '''''' ""xf ^-^ ^^^'■dians of our borders, the Customs Service pro- 
tects our Nation from the illegal importation of goods that are 
harmful to our security and economy. We are at the front lines in 

nil'i^fff "'^^Z'?^^ international and domestic terrorism, enforcing 
nine different laws in this arena. ^ 

We are tasked with the mission of stopping terrorist tools from 
entering this country before they can harm our Nation's people. In 
our over 200-year history, the Customs Service has been the Lard 
lans of our Nation's borders from illegal imports. Over the past 15 
years our authorities have been expanded to include the protection 
of our country from illegal exports, as well 

of hnw^^Tc?'""^^^' ^ T'" F'''''''^^ ^°" ^^^h «°"^e tangible examples 
of how Customs investigates subjects whose goal is to supply ter- 
ronst countries and organizations. But first, I would like to convey 
some important information about how our export control program 
works. This information will illustrate to you how complex^SS eT 

Our export control program is the mechanism through which the 
Customs Service protects the global community from the prolifera- 
tion of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear chemical 
and biological weapons. As the Subcommittee is aware, no US 
company still manufactures chemical weapons, but the precursors 
and components used to manufacture these agents are still avail- 
able in the United States because many of these components have 
a legitimate and necessary purpose 

thpr^-h'^^'^ charged with ensuring that the legitimate export of 
these chemicas and equipment is conducted without harm to our 
iho K!"f "^i"'^^ ensuring that these same materials do not fall into 
J^lcTft rT ^d^^^^^?^^- ™s daunting task is essential to the 
role of the Customs export control program. 



226 

The Customs Service conducts its export control pro-am 
through a four-pronged approach. This approach is known as the 
four "F's and it is divided into interdiction, investigations, intel- 
Hgence coordination, and international cooperation and training. 

Customs interdiction efforts are conducted at the more than 300 
ports of entry and exit, including international airports, land bor- 
ders and sea ports. Customs has 6,000 inspectors assigned to in- 
spect people and cargo upon entry into the United States. Author- 
ity is derived from the export control statutes, as well as other laws 
and regulations that permit the warrantless search of persons, ves- 
sels, vehicles, other conveyances, and cargo for detecting illegal ex- 
ports. r>. . i. «• 4- • 

The investigations prong of the Customs Service export ettort is 
the responsibility of the Customs Office of Investigations. We have 
4 400 employees. It is composed of over 2,400 special agents, ma- 
rine enforcement officers, and air interdiction officers, along with 
323 pilots and 300 Customs intelligence analysts. This workforce is 
charged with the investigation of smuggling both inbound and out- 
bound, money laundering, narcotics trafficking, and the fraudulent 
importation of goods. j oi r^ 

Customs has 20 domestic special agents in charge and Zl Cus- 
toms attache offices overseas. These offices are composed of a cadre 
of investigators that possess highly-developed expertise m enforc- 
ing Customs laws and regulations. . 

In the export investigations field, special agents are trained m 
the detection and investigation of illegal technology and arms ex- 
ports. Export control investigations last year resulted in the arrest 
of 242 people and the seizure of 809 illegal shipments of goods. 

One of the most important elements of export enforcement strat- 
egy is our industry outreach program called Operation Gemini. Op- 
eration Gemini is a program where Customs agents solicit the co- 
operation of exporters, manufacturers, and freight forwarders 
throughout the United States to act as the eyes and ears of the Of- 
fice of Investigations. 

The Gemini program has a two-fold purpose. The first purpose 
is to provide exporters and freight forwarders with the information 
to ensure that their exports comply with the appropriate export 
regulations. Aside from ensuring compliance, the Gemini contacts 
also afford Customs with the ability to gain the lawful cooperation 
of exporters and to sensitize them to the possibility that some of 
the commodities they export could be sought by individuals who 
seek to divert technology into weapons programs or seek to obtain 
a commodity or munition for an end user that would not be li- 
censed. 

Information is provided to exporters during Gemini contacts to 
ensure compliance with all the applicable export regulations. Gain- 
ing the cooperation of the exporting community may be the single 
most important factor in detecting subjects who pose a threat to 
our national security by dealing in weapons of mass destruction. 

The third prong in our export control strategy is intelligence co- 
ordination. The Customs Service works in close cooperation with 
the intelligence community to glean valid intelligence data to assist 
Customs export investigations. The intelligence community has a 
vast apparatus for the collection and dissemination of intelligence 



227 

data regarding potential persons and entities involved in weapons 
proliferation. 

I would like to provide the Subcommittee with more details of 
how we have fostered better cooperation and coordination with the 
mtelhgence community, but I would prefer to discuss these matters 
in a closed session as they are sensitive. 

The fourth prong of our enforcement strategy is international co- 
operation and training. The U.S Customs Service possesses a 
wealth of talent and information in the export enforcement field 
Many countries have little to no export control laws or regulations 
Although many of these countries have been willing to assist in 
U.S. export investigations and have cooperated with our attaches 
overseas, they have not had the ability to investigate export viola- 
tions. 

Customs lends its expertise through hands-on training, lectures, 
seminars, and other training schools to countries around the world' 
The newly-independent states of the former Soviet Union have 
been particularly receptive to U.S. efforts to develop export controls 
and enforcement programs. Customs officers have participated in 
training programs for 30 countries in the past 2 years. The inter- 
national cooperation of customs services and police agencies to 
thwart weapons proliferation is the cornerstone of these training 
programs. 

As recently as September of this year, the U.S. Customs Service 
co-hosted, along with the German Customs Service, a seminar on 
nuclear smuggling in Garmisch, Germany. The seminar was at- 
tended by over 100 participants representing 32 countries, all ex- 
changing information on methodologies for detecting the smuggling 
of radioactive materials. 

In 1995 alone. Customs provided export control and enforcement 
training assistance to Khazakstan, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Esto- 
nia, Belarus, Poland, Krygstan, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Mac- 
edonia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. In addition. Customs 
maintains numerous mutual assistance agreements and customs- 
to-customs cooperation agreements with many countries. 

It IS important to understand that the nuclear-biological-chemical 
threat is a global one. As you can see from the two world and re- 
gional maps illustrating countries of chemical-biological warfare 
concerns, the issue of CBW proliferation is not localized. The coun- 
tries colored in red are CBW countries of concern. The countries 
colored in green are countries of diversion concern. 

Now I would like to speak specifically of some of the investiga- 
tions the Customs Office of Investigations has conducted recently 
that illustrate our efforts in controlling CBW agents, pathogens 
and equipment. 

I know the Subcommittee is particularly interested in the Aum 
Shinrikyo cult. The Customs Service has three investigations that 
involve this cult, two in San Jose, California, and one in New 
Haven Connecticut. One of the San Jose cases resulted in the sei- 
zure of 400 gas masks which were purchased by the Aum cult and 
destined for Japan. This shipment was scheduled to be exported on 
March 22, 1995. However, the shipment was recalled from the 
treight forwarder on March 20, 1995, when the broker heard of the 
sarin gas attack. 



228 



I have with me today one of the gas masks that was subse- 
quently surrendered to the Customs Service by the broker. As you 
can see, these masks are Israeh mihtary surplus. You can see the 
Israeli markings on the box, the Hebrew markmgs on the box _We 
have 399 other ones of these in seizure right now. Our mvestiga- 
tion IS continuing in New York, where the gas masks were origi- 
nallv purchased by a member of the Aum cult 

The San Jose Customs office also conducted an investigation into 
the Aun?s attempt to acquire a sophisticated laser from a Northern 
California manufacturer. On March 3 1995, an Aum sect member 
attempted to purchase a custom welding and cutting laser trom 
this company. The value of the laser was estimated at $400,000. 

TheTct member who was negotiating for the laser with the 
California company did not possess the technical expertise to an- 
swer specific information from the laser company. The Aum mem- 
ber initiated a telephone conference between the California com- 
pany and an individual identified as Mr. Murai, who was sup- 
posedly the Aum sect's lead engineer. Our investigation has 
fearned that Mr. Murai has been identified as Hidel Murai, the 
Aum cult's minister of science and technology. 

Despite additional information received from Murai, the company 
was unable to identify the exact application for which the laser was 
needed by the Aum cult. The sect members never contacted the 
California company again about the laser. 

On April 23, 1995, Murai was murdered outside the Aum head- 
quarters in Tokyo. Murai's assailant was identified as an individ- 
Saf associated with Japanese organized crime^The exact motive for 
Murai's assassination has not been estabhshed. 

In 1993 Aum representatives approached a Middietieid, Con- 
necticut, company for the purpose of purchasing an interferometer. 
The company manufacturers interferometers, which are sophisti- 
cated devices used to make critical measurements of pohshed sur- 
faces by means of a laser. This technology has nuclear applications^ 
The international sales administrator for the company advised 
the U S Customs Service through the Operation Gemini program 
that the company planned to demonstrate the system to the Aum 
representatives, but the Aum representatives failed to bring the 
material they wanted measured by the interferometer. There were 
no sales and no exports by the company to the Aum cult. 

I would like to give an example of one other case that Customs 
conducted involving sarin gas. In 1988, Juwhan Yun, a naturalized 
U S citizen, formerly Korean, was doing business as president ot 
Komex International in Newark, New Jersey. Komex was an ex- 
porting company involved in weapons shipments and did most ot 
its business with South Korea. Yun made inquiries of a New York 
company about purchasing ammunition for South Korea However, 
the company beheved that the end user was other than the Kepub- 
lic of South Korea and contacted the U.S. Customs Service. 

A Customs undercover special agent contacted Yun under tne 
guise of an arms broker. From June 1988 until Yun's arrest in Jan- 
uary 1989, the Customs agent, posing as an arms dealer, nego- 
tiated with Yun for purchase of TWO missiles, stinger missiles, 
classified U.S. missile technology, radar systems, and other detense 
articles and munitions. In all of the dealings with Yun, he failed 



229 

to obtain a valid export license issued by the United States Depart- 
ment of State and thereby violated the Arms Export Control Act. 
A court-ordered wiretap of Yun's phone and fax machine con- 
ducted m 1988— in November 1988, a fax from a co-conspirator in 
London named Charles Caplan was received which requested Yun 
to procure from his American supplier, which was the Customs un- 
dercover front company, a large quantity of sarin nerve gas. 

In an overt act to further the conspiracy, Yun traveled to London 
to meet Caplan and his associates and opened a bank account at 
the Korea First Bank under a fictitious name. Yun eventually wire 
transferred funds to the undercover front company and returned to 
the U.S. with specific instructions for procuring the CW agent. Yun 
asked the undercover agent for 500 MK94 gas bombs and 500 
MK116 "weteye" bombs filled with hquid sarin. This was over 250 
tons of sarin. This amount would contain over 1.25 billion lethal 
doses of the nerve gas. Both of these bombs were designed to be 
dropped from an aircraft. 

Yun suggested to the Customs undercover agent that he mislabel 
the sarin bombs as crankshafts on the export documents and to 
procure a false export license. Yun agreed to pay $100,000 to the 
undercover agent to obtain the falsely-documented license. Yun ex- 
plained to the undercover agent that he should provide a false end 
user for the crankshafts and stated they were destined for Mozam- 
bique or Pakistan, rather than the intended destination of Iran. 

On January 12, 1989, Yun was arrested in Newark. Yun was 
tried in the District of New Jersey and convicted of conspiring to 
export nerve gas, but acquitted of attempting to export bombs. No 
bombs ever left the United States. Yun was sentenced in Septem- 
ber 1989 to 30 months in prison. Charles Caplan was indicted by 
a Federal grand jury and Caplan is currently an outstanding fugi- 
tive. We have with us a wanted poster for Charles Caplan. 

The description of these cases are brief They do not reflect the 
months upon months of investigative activity that is required to 
bring an export case to a successful conclusion. These cases are 
staffing-intensive. Monitoring of electronic surveillance takes hun- 
dreds of staff hours. Development of undercover operations and 
covert identities requires extensive development to ensure the true 
nature of our operations are not apparent. 

The cost of these operations is also extremely high. Many times, 
these cases are so costly and so staffing-intensive they cannot be 
conducted. This is not to say that we permit violators or violations 
to go unchecked, but the success of undercover operations has al- 
ways been the fact that they detect violations that could not have 
been detected under normal scrutiny. 

I hope this information demonstrates to the Subcommittee the 
important role that Customs plays in thwarting the proliferation of 
chemical and biological warfare agents and terrorist organizations 
Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Fenchel follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CONNIE J. FENCHEL 

Good morning/afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee 
ihank you for this opportunity to discuss the role of The U.S. Customs Service in 
the interdiction of components for developing chemical and biological warfare 
agents. I am the Assistant Director for Operations of the Office of Investigations of 



230 

the Customs Service. I direct the activities of the Strategic Investigations Division 
which is responsible for the Customs Service's export control and enforcement activi- 

'^To understand the Customs Service's role in controlling the export of commodities 
and equipment used in the development of nuclear, biological or chemical warfare 
(NBC) agents or weapons, as well as our efforts to thwart the acquisition of such 
agents by terrorist organizations, it is important to understand the Customs berv- 
ice's role in export control and enforcement. We are at the front lines in the war 
against international and domestic terrorism, enforcing nine different laws in this 
arena. We are tasked with the mission of stopping terrorists tools from entering 
this country and before they can harm our nation's people. 

Customs Role in Export Control 

As you are aware, the Customs Service is the first line of defense in ensuring the 
safety of our nations's borders. As such. Customs is responsible for ensuring that 
all goods and persons entering or exiting the United States do so in accordance and 
adherence with all the United States laws and regulations. With this mandate, Cus- 
toms derives its responsibilities for export control. Export control and enforcement 
can be divided into three (3) principle areas: 

• Commodities Export Control 

• Arms and Munitions Export Control 

• Foreign Policy Sanctions and Embargoes 

These three areas encompass the foundation of Customs export control efforts. 

Commodities Export Control 

The control of commodities is described as the licensing of exports of dual-use 
commodities which can be used in the development of weapons of rnass destruction 
including nuclear weapons, chemical and biological agents and missile systems, ihis 
dual use technology is licensed under the authorities of the Export Administration 
Act (EAA) by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Export Administration^ 
The EAA describes the requirements for exporting commodities from the United 
States to countries throughout the world, both friend and foe. The EAA provides the 
Customs Service with a broad range of authorities to search persons, cargo and con- 
veyances to ensure that exports of such commodities are appropriately licensed and 
that the end-use of such commodities is not for use in the development of weaponry 
Under the EAA the precursor chemicals and biological pathogens which can be used 
in the manufacture of warfare agents, are controlled. It is important to understand 
that the same precursor chemicals and biological pathogens used in the development 
of warfare agents also have a lawful and practical application. For instance, a pre- 
cursor used in the development of a chemical warfare agent is also used in the man- 
ufacture of fluoride toothpaste. A biological pathogen used in the development of a 
vaccine can also be used to manufacture a de.idly antipersonnel agent. In addition 
to controlling these chemicals and biologicals, the EAA also controls much of the 
equipment and materials that is used in the development of nuclear weapons and 
the manufacture of chemical and biological warfare agents. Again, this equipment 
also has a legitimate dual-use. 
Arms and Munitions Controls 

The second area of export control is the control of munitions, arms and weaponry. 
The export licensing authority for munitions is the U.S. Department of State. The 
Arms Export Control Act (AECA) is the law which controls the sale and export of 
munitions, weapons systems, and other military equipment such as CBW protective 
clothing and equipment. The AECA and its applicable regulations contained in the 
International Trafficking in Arms (ITAR) regulations control items that are inher- 
ently military in character, including: 

• chemical agents with military application; 

• equipment for the dissemination, detection and identification of and defense 
against NBC warfare agents and weapons; 

• the technical data used in or related to NBC production; and 

• any defense services including training to foreign persons in the design, devel- 
opment, production, or use of any defense article including NBC agents and 
weapons. 

The AECA and ITAR provide the Customs Service with the exclusive authority 
for enforcing munitions export control. The Customs Service for the past 14 years, 
has acted as the law enforcement arm of the State Department for controlling mili- 
tary exports from the United States. 



231 

Foreign Policy Sanctions and Embargoes 

The third area is foreign policy export controls such as embargoes (partial or full) 
and economic sanctions and restrictions. These export controls are an integral part 
of the President's foreign policy mission. Sanctions, embargoes and restrictions 
against countries that violate international law or are involved in human rights vio- 
lations are sanctioned under several laws including the Trading with the Enemy Act 
and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. These statutes, among 
other things, permit the Administration to prevent exports of a given commodity or 
all exports as a whole to a given country. These export controls are also enforced 
by the Customs Service. 

These three areas form the foundation through which Customs controls the ex- 
ports of dual use technology, munitions as well as enforcing the foreign policy of the 
President including the export of materials used in the development and dissemina- 
tion of weapons of mass destruction. 

Export Control Approaches for Enforcement: The Four I'S 

The Customs Service utilizes a four-pronged approach to attacking the broad proc- 
ess of export controls and enforcement. This approach is known as the Four I's and 
IS divided into Interdiction, Investigation, Intelligence Coordination and Inter- 
national Cooperation and Training. 

Interdiction 

Customs Interdiction efforts are conducted at the more than 300 ports of entry 
and exit including international airports, land borders and seaports. Customs has 
approximately 6,000 inspectors assigned to inspect people and cargo upon entry into 
the United States. A core of those inspectors are dedicated to export control Au- 
thorities derived from the previous mentioned statutes as well as other laws and 
regulations permit the warrantless search of persons, vessels, vehicles, other convey- 
ances and cargo for detecting illegal exports. The special cadre of inspectors that 
conduct export inspections are trained in the sophisticated methods of detecting ille- 
gally exported goods. 

Inspectors are also aided by a wide array of computerized systems which help nar- 
row the volume of potential targets of opportunity and verify legitimate exports. 
Customs now has a computer interface with the four export licensing agencies of 
the Federal Government. Customs interfaces with the export licensing and enforce- 
"^^"^^r^^^o'"^ of these agencies via the Treasury Enforcement Communications Sys- 
tem (TECS). This system interfaces on a real-time basis with: 

• The Department of Commerce's Bureau of Export Administration ECASS Sys- 
tem which contains data on the export licenses of dual-use commodities- 

• The Department of State's Office of Defense Trade Controls System on' muni- 
tions and defense articles licensed for export; 

• The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control which provides 
suspect information on sanction and embargo violations directly into TECS- 
and 

• The Drug Enforcement Administration's online system of licensing the ex- 
ports of narcotics precursor chemicals and materials. 

This multi-agency system is currently used in a cumbersome manner, requiring 
the user to query each sub-system separately. But the Customs Service is in the 
process of developing a new, cohesive system which combines these assets into a 
one-stop query for all export licensing. The creation of the Automated Export Sys- 
tem will enable Customs inspectors to review the exportation paperwork more 
quickly and target those shipments which may be suspected of containing illegal ex- 
ports, unlicensed goods, misdescribed commodities or other means to thwart our 
U.S. export controls. In these days of a right-sized workforce. Customs must work 
smarter to ensure compliance with export laws without impeding legitimate exports 
Ihis automated system is one effort to work smarter through better use of tech- 
nology. In addition. Customs continues to develop inspectional aids on the cutting 
edge ol technology to ensure rapid inspections of cargo and persons with as little 
intrusion as possible. 

Investigations 

The Investigations prong of the Customs Service's export effort is the responsibil- 
ity ot the Office of Investigations and its 4400 employees. The Office of Investiga- 
tions IS composed of 2480 special agents, marine enforcement officers and air inter- 
diction officers along with 323 Customs pilots and 300 Customs intelligence ana- 
lysts. This workforce is charged with the investigation of smuggling (both inbound 
and outbound), money laundering, narcotics trafficking, and the fraudulent importa- 



232 

tion of goods. Customs has 20 domestic Special Agents in Charge and 21 Customs 
Attaches offices overseas. These offices are composed of a cadre of investigators that 
possess highly-developed expertise in enforcing Customs laws and regulations. In 
the export investigations field, special agents are trained in the detection and inves- 
tigation of illegal technology and arms exports, sanction and embargo violations as 
well as the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Export 
control investigations last year resulted in the arrest of 242 people and the seizure 
of 809 illegal shipments of goods. 

Export Control and Enforcement 
Arrests and Seizures - FY 1989-1993 




1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 



f'C'^ri^ Vc^r 



Arrests 



Seizures 



The Office of Investigations utilizes a myriad of techniques and methods in the 
conduct of its criminal investigations. These include a wide range of visual, elec- 
tronic and physical surveillance, records reviews, mail covers, interviews and grand 
jury investigations. One of the most important elements of our export enforcement 
strategy is our industry outreach program called Operation Gemini. Operation Gem- 
ini is a program where Customs agents solicit the cooperation of exporters, manu- 
facturers and freight forwarders throughout the United States to act as the eyes and 
ears of the Office of Investigations. The Gemini program has a twofold purpose. The 
first purpose is to provide exporters and freight forwarders with information to en- 
sure that their exports comply with the appropriate export regulations. 

Aside from ensuring compliance, the Gemini contacts also afford Customs with 
the ability to gain the lawful cooperation of exporters and to sensitize them to the 
possibility that some of the commodities they export could be sought by individuals 
who seek to divert technology into weapons programs or seek to obtain a commodity 
or munition for an end user that would not be licensed to receive such goods. Infor- 
mation is provided to exporters during Gemini contacts to ensure compliance with 
all the applicable export regulations along with increasing their awareness of the 
potential for illegal activities. Gaining the cooperation of the exporting community 
may be the single most important factor in detecting subjects who pose a threat to 
our national security by dealing in weapons of mass destruction. I will discuss some 
specific investigations which highlight our role in CBW non-proliferation further on 
it this statement. 



233 

Intelligence 

The third prong in our Export Control Strategy is Intelligence Coordination. The 
Customs Service works in close cooperation with the Intelligence Community (IC) 
to glean intelligence data to assist Customs exf)ort investigations. The IC has a vast 
apparatus for the collection and dissemination of intelligence data regarding poten- 
tial persons and entities involved in weapons proliferation overseas. In addition, 
they have information on commodities that are being sought by proliferators from 
sources here and abroad. Historically, intelligence information has provided us with 
areas to explore for criminal investigations. In addition, the data derived from the 
IC forms the basis of our NBC threat assessments. 

International Cooperation 

The fourth prong of our enforcement strategy is International Cooperation and 
Training. The U.S. Customs Service possesses a wealth of talent and information 
in the export enforcement field. Many-countries have little to no export controls, 
laws or regulations. Although many of these countries have been willing to assist 
in U.S. export investigations and have always cooperated, with our Customs At- 
taches, they have not had the ability to investigate export violations. Customs lends 
its expertise through hands-on training, lectures, seminars and other training 
schools to countries around the world. The newly independent states of the former 
Soviet Union have been particularly receptive to U.S. efforts to develop export con- 
trols and enforcement programs. Customs officers have participated in training pro- 
grams for 30 countries in the past two years. 

The international cooperation of customs services and police agencies to thwart 
weapons proliferation is the cornerstone of these training programs. As recently as 
September of this year, the Strategic Investigations Division co-hosted (along with 
the German Customs Service) a Seminar on Nuclear Smuggling in Garmisch, Ger- 
many. The seminar was attended by over 100 participants representing 32 coun- 
tries, all exchanging information on methodologies for detecting the smuggling of ra- 
dioactive materials. In 1995 alone, Customs provided export control and enforce- 
ment training assistance in Kazakstan, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Belarus, 
Poland, Krygystan, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic. 

This four pronged enforcement strategy enables Customs to detect export viola- 
tions and pursue violators with vigor, throughout the globe. In addition, the Cus- 
toms Service has over twenty five Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements (CMAA) 
with countries and other customs services which serve as a conduit for information 
exchange and investigative assistance. 

Chemical and Biological Agent Controls 

I would now like to address specifically how the Customs Service controls and en- 
forces the restrictions on exports of chemical precursors and biological pathogens. 
I think it is important to note that the United States no longer manufactures chemi- 
cal or biological warfare agents. Inasmuch as their manufacture is prohibited, ex- 
port of actual agents is non-existent. However, the materials used to manufacture 
chemical and biological agents are readily available from United States manufactur- 
ers such as chemical makers and supply houses and biological collection and type 
culture companies. In addition, the equipment needed to manufacture chemical and 
biological warfare (CBW) agents is also available from L^S. companies. Let me reit- 
erate that many of these components have legitimate uses. Without biological patho- 
gens and cultures we could not manufacture vaccines or test antibiotics. Many of 
the chemicals used for CW irritants and agents have lawful uses like cosmetics and 
agricultural products. 

There is an international control regime whose member countries carefully control 
CBW precursors and pathogens. The Australia Group (AG) was formed to provide 
a control regime for CBW. The AG currently has 29 member nations. The AG con- 
trols the exports of some 54 precursors which are used in warfare agent production. 
In the past two years, the AG has instituted controls on fermenting equipment and 
other apparatus which is used in CBW production. The Customs Service has played 
an active role in the enforcement working group of the Australia Group. We have 
lent our expertise to discussions on the enforcement of CBW controls. Much of the 
work of the AG has been incorporated into the language of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention which will come under review 
by the Senate, hopefully this year. 

Case Histories 

I would now like to discuss a couple of examples of the types of investigations the 
Customs Service conducts in the CBW arena. Many of these cases developed from 



234 

various sources or impetus, would like to cite one or two cases whose origins where 
developed from a variety of sources. I know that the Subcommittee is particularly 
interested in the AUM Shinrikyo Cult. The Customs Service has three cases that 
involve the Aum Shinrikyo Cult of which the Subcommittee is well aware, two in 
San Jose and one case in New Haven, CT. 

One of the San Jose cases resulted in the seizure of 400 gas masks which were 
purchased by the AUM cult and destined for Japan. This shipment was scheduled 
to be exported on March 22, 1995. However the shipment was recalled from the 
freight forwarder on March 20, 1995, when the broker heard of the Sarin gas attack 
on the Tokyo subway. I have with me today, one of the gas masks that were subse- 
quently surrendered to the Customs Service by the broker. As you can see, these 
masks are Israeli military surplus and have Hebrew markings on the boxes. The 
Customs investigation into this shipment is continuing in New York where the gas 
masks were originally purchased by a member of the AUM cult. 

The San Jose Customs office also conducted an investigation into the AUM cult's 
attempt to acquire a sophisticated laser from a Northern California manufacturer. 
On March 3, 1995, an AUM sect member attempted to purchase a custom welding 
and cutting laser from this company. The value of the laser was estimated at 
$400,4000. The sect member who was negotiating for the laser with the California 
company did not possess the technical expertise to answer specific inquiries from 
the laser company. The AUM member initiated a teleconference between the Cali- 
fornia company and an individual identified as Mr. Murai, who was supposedly the 
AUM sect's lead engineer. Our investigation has learned that Mr. Murai has been 
identified as Hideo Murai, the AUM Cult's Minister of Science and Technology. De- 
spite additional information received from Murai, the company was unable to iden- 
tify the exact application that the laser was needed for by the AUM sect. The sect 
members never contacted the California company again about the laser. On April 
23, 1995, Murai was murdered outside the AUM headquarters in Tokyo. Murai's as- 
sailant was identified as an individual associated with Japanese organized crime. 
The exact motive for Murai's assassination has not been established. 

In 1993, AUM representatives approached a Middlefield, Connecticut, company 
far the purpose of purchasing an interferometer. The Company manufactures 
interferometers, which are sophisticated devices used to make critical measure- 
ments of polished surfaces by means of a laser. This technology has nuclear applica- 
tions. The International Sales Administrator for the company advised the U.S. Cus- 
toms Service that the company planned to demonstrate the system to the AUM rep- 
resentatives, but the AUM representatives failed to bring the material they wanted 
measured by the interferometer. There were no sales by the company to the AUM 
cult. 

As I discussed previously, another one of the techniques Customs agents utilize 
in thwarting the export of CBW precursors and components is the conduct of under- 
cover investigations. Specially trained Customs agents acting in undercover capac- 
ities, pose as weapons dealers or exporters capable of circumventing export controls. 
This technique has been extremely successful in identifying suspects who are seek- 
ing CBW components and other munitions for exports to countries such as Iran and 
Iraq. With the appropriate business acumen. Customs undercover agents provide 
suspects with the opportunity to obtain CBW components, while the materials are 
safely under the control of the U.S. Government. In all instances when such a tech- 
nique is used. Customs agents are extremely careful to provide the means or oppor- 
tunity for obtaining the illegal material, however, they are always cautious that the 
suspect has the intent to acquire the goods prior to Customs providing the oppor- 
tunity. 

Manfred Felber Case 

One such example of a successful undercover operation is the Manfred Felber 
case. In February 1994, the Customs Resident Agent in Charge in Portland, Oregon, 
initiated an investigation on Manfred Felber, an Austrian national who was sus- 
pected of procuring chemical warfare equipment on behalf of the Iranian Govern- 
ment. Felber had approached a confidential informant in Oregon, asking that the 
informant assist him in obtaining 90 chemical agent monitors (CAM). The inform- 
ant, who was not knowledgeable of what the monitors were, asked his control agents 
to obtain information for what the CAMs were used. 

Customs agents explained that chemical agent monitors were used as a safeguard 
in the manufacture of chemical warfare material. It was decided that Customs 
agents would pose as arms dealers capable of obtaining the CAMs. Felber was ap- 
proached and explained to the undercover agents that he would need false end user 
certificates to conceal the true destination for the CAMs which was Iran. Felber also 



235 

requested that the undercover agents assist him in obtaining other munitions des- 
tined for Iran. 

During the undercover negotiations, which were recorded by the undercover 
agents, Felber provided valuable intelligence concerning his participation in the 
international trafTicking of munitions and chemical weapons. Felber told the under- 
cover agents that he would be able to provide partial payment for the munitions and 
CAMs in heroin. Felber claimed that he would have to return to Iran to arrange 
for the shipment of heroin. It is suspected that the heroin payment would have been 
arranged by officials of the Iranian Government. Fraudulent shipping papers were 
prepared and funds were transferred to a U.S. bank at Eugene, Oregon. Felber indi- 
cated that the funds were provided by the Government of Iran and that they had 
passed through banks in Germany, Austria, and Hong Kong. 

Due to the significance of Felber as an international arms trafficker, it was de- 
cided not to permit Felber to depart the country and that payment would be in U.S. 
Currency. On March 15, 1994, Felber was arrested in Oregon, and charged with vio- 
lating the Arms Export Control Act and the Money Laundering Control Act. At the 
time of his arrest, $305,000 was seized from Felber's bank account. On March 18, 
1994, another $300,000 was seized from another bank account belonging to Felber. 
Felber subsequently pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced to four years 
imprisonment. 

Yun/Caplan Case 

I would like to discuss another investigation which utilized an undercover oper- 
ation to detect CBW violations. In 1988, Juwhan Yun, a naturalized U.S. citizen 
(formerly Korean) was doing business as President of Komex international in New- 
ark, New Jersey. Komex was an exporting company involved in the weapons ship- 
ments and did most of its business with South Korea. Yun made inquiries of a New 
York company about purchasing ammunition for South Korea. A former Customs 
Agent who worked at this company reported Yun to Customs investigators as there 
were suspicions that Yun was procuring weapons for an end-user other than the Re- 
public of South Korea. 

A Customs undercover Special Agent contacted Yun under the guise of an arms 
broker. From June 1988 until Yun's arrest in January 1989, the Customs agent pos- 
ing as an arms dealer, negotiated with Yun for purchase of TOW missiles. Stinger 
missiles, classified U.S. missile technology, radar systems, and other defense articles 
and munitions. In all of the dealings with Yun, he failed to obtain a valid export 
license issued by the United States Department of State and thereby violated the 
Arms Export Control Act. 

A court-ordered wiretap of Yun's phone and fax machine was conducted in 1988. 
In November 1988, a fax from a co-conspirator in London named Charles Caplan 
was received which requested Yun to procure from his American supplier (which 
was the Customs undercover front company), a large quantity of Sarin nerve gas. 
In an overt act to further the conspiracy, Yun traveled to London to meet Caplan 
and his associates, and opened a bank account at the Korea First Bank under a fic- 
titious name. Yun eventually wire-transferred funds to the undercover front com- 
pany, and returned to the U.S. with specific instructions for procuring the CW 
agent. Yun asked the undercover agent for 500 MK 94 Gas Bombs and 500 MK116 
"Weteye" bombs, filled with liquid Sarin. Both of these bombs were designed to be 
dropped from an aircraft and are capable of disbursing a large volume of nerve gas 
over a large area. 

Yun suggested to the Customs undercover agent that he mislabel the Sarin bombs 
as "crankshafts" on the export documents, and to procure a false export license. Yun 
agreed to pay $100,000 to the undercover agent to obtain the falsely documented 
license. Yun explained to the undercover agent that he should provide a false end 
user for the "crankshafts" and stated that they were destined for Mozambique or 
Pakistan rather than the intended destination of Iran. 

On January 12, 1989, Yun was arrested in Newark. Yun was tried in the District 
of New Jersey and convicted of conspiring to export nerve gas but acquitted of at- 
tempting to export the bombs. (No bombs ever left the United States.) Yun was sen- 
tenced in September 1989 to 30 months in prison. Charles Caplan was indicted by 
a Federal Grand Jury and Caplan is currently an outstanding fugitive. 

The descriptions of these cases are brief. They do not reflect the months upon 
months of investigative activity that is required to bring an export case to a success- 
ful conclusion. These cases are staffing intensive. Monitoring of electronic surveil- 
lance takes hundreds of staff hours. Development of undercover operations and cov- 
ert identities requires extensive development to ensure that the true nature of the 
operations are not apparent. The cost of these operations is also extremely high. 
Many times these cases are so costly and so staffing intensive that they cannot be 



236 

conducted. This is not to say that we permit violators or violations to go unchecked. 
But, the success of undercover operations has always been the fact that they detect 
violations that would not have been detected under normal scrutiny. These oper- 
ations reveal intelligence about the underground operations that exist within the 
United States and abroad, that law enforcement could not normally penetrate. 

I hope this information sufficiently illustrates the important role that Customs 
plays in thwarting the proliferation of nuclear materials and chemical and biological 
warfare agents and terrorist organizations. I would gladly welcome your questions 
at this time. 

Senator NuNN. Thank you, Ms. Fenchel. We appreciate the im- 
portant role that Customs plays and we know how difficult these 
cases are, and particularly when you get into the dual-use tech- 
nology area. 

Our next witness is John O'Neill, Chief, Counterterrorism Sec- 
tion of the Federal Bureau of Investigations. Mr. O'Neill? 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN P. O'NEILL, SUPERVISORY SPECIAL 
AGENT, CHIEF, COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION, FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Mr. O'Neill. Thank you. Senator, and I thank all the members 
of the Committee for giving me the opportunity to address you 
today on the threat caused by the proliferation of nuclear, biologi- 
cal, and chemical weapons. I would also like to tell you about the 
measures which have been taken by the Federal Bureau of Inves- 
tigations to detect, prevent, and respond to the use of nuclear, bio- 
logical, and chemical weapons in the United States. 

As we have heard here yesterday and today, special weapons pro- 
liferation concerns the spread of weapons of mass destruction and 
their delivery systems. The FBI is the primary agency for foreign 
counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations within the 
United States. 

The FBI has developed and coordinates a special weapons pro- 
liferation program in order to prevent malevolent use and/or pro- 
liferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the Unit- 
ed States. The program relies on proactive domestic programs, for- 
eign counterintelligence investigations in the United States, crimi- 
nal investigations, counterterrorism investigations, close coordina- 
tion with the intelligence community, and international coopera- 
tion. 

As we have seen in our recent investigations, the ramifications 
of a terrorist act committed in the United States are great. The po- 
tential for the loss of life and damaging psychological effects from 
a terrorist attack in the United States involving a nuclear, biologi- 
cal, or chemical weapon are even greater. Simply put, we cannot 
afford one such attack. 

Fortunately, to date, our investigations in the United States re- 
veal no intelligence that rogue nations using terrorism, inter- 
national terrorist groups, or domestic groups are planning to use 
these deadly weapons. We remain vigilant, however, to the possibil- 
ity of nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism by pursuing intel- 
ligence and counter-terrorism programs that are well coordinated 
and well exercised. 

Our first goal is to prevent such an incident from occurring. Sec- 
ondly, we must ensure we have the capabilities to respond swiftly 
and decisively should an attack occur. 



237 

I would like to speak first about the threat of nuclear terrorism. 
Within the past few years, there have been hundreds of reports of 
international smuggling and trafficking incidents involving nuclear 
materials around the world. The FBI has been involved in numer- 
ous assessments of threats of nuclear-related threats and smug- 
gling investigations and nuclear material trafficking investigations 
around the world, working with the Customs Service and the intel- 
ligence community. In evaluating these threats, to date, there are 
no known instances where nuclear weapons or weapons-grade ma- 
terials have actually existed or been purchased in the United 
States. However, the FBI continues to investigate vigorously all al- 
legations relating to nuclear threats within our jurisdiction. 

One of our most recent successful initiatives in the area was the 
FBI-sponsored International Law Enforcement Conference on Nu- 
clear Smuggling, held from April 18 through 20 of this year at the 
FBI Academy at Quantico. Among the 150 participants were law 
enforcement representatives from 23 countries, including the Rus- 
sian Federation and the newly independent states. 

This conference displayed unparalleled cooperation between law 
enforcement and intelligence entities and culminated in an invalu- 
able exchange. The exchange included the examination of the inter- 
national criminal problem of nuclear smuggling and trafficking and 
its counterintelligence and terrorism implications. 

With regard to nuclear terrorism, it is acknowledged that the 
production of a nuclear weapon would entail considerable technical 
experience, expertise and funding, thereby lessening the likelihood 
of an incident at this time. 

The ability of terrorists to obtain and employ chemical and bio- 
logical agents, however, is no longer subject to speculation. The 
sarin gas attack in Japan earlier this year, allegedly carried out by 
the Aum Shinrikyo sect, crossed the threshold with the use of a 
nerve agent to attack a civilian population. 

In responding to the March 20, 1995, attack in the Tokyo subway 
system, the FBI opened a criminal investigation based upon a vio- 
lation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2331, which author- 
izes FBI extraterritorial investigations. As a result, we dispatched 
FBI agents to Japan. We have extraterritorial jurisdiction in this 
matter because two American citizens were victims of the sarin at- 
tack. Thankfully, both of them survived their injuries. The FBI is 
unable to confirm any additional investigations of the Aum 
Shinrikyo sect, if any, at this time because it would be classified 
information. 

Despite the fact that conventional methods of attack are the 
proven choice of terrorist organizations to date, the use of chemical 
and biological weapons or agents can no longer be ruled out. As the 
sarin gas attack in Tokyo demonstrated, other groups may be in- 
spired to employ chemical and biological weapons for future terror- 
ist attacks due to the worldwide attention the Japanese attacks re- 
ceived. 

Low production costs, ease of concealment and lethality make 
some CB agents possible terrorist weapons. Due to the relative 
ease with which CB weapons could be acquired or constructed by 
a terrorist or terrorist group, the FBI remains vigilant to that pos- 



238 

sibility through our active investigations and close coordination 
with the intelhgence community. 

In consideration of the magnitude and potential catastrophic con- 
sequences of the use of such a weapon, the FBI aggressively pur- 
sues countermeasures programs and the readiness to respond to 
and mitigate the consequences of such an attack. 

However, the only documented actual chemical-biological attack 
in the United States involved the use of a biological agent which 
occurred in Oregon in 1984, when two members of a sect produced 
and disbursed salmonella bacteria in restaurants in order to affect 
the outcome of a local election. Seven-hundred-and-fifteen persons 
were affected. Fortunately, there were no fatalities. 

The FBI recently concluded a case involving subjects who have 
manufactured ricin, which is a deadly poison derived from castor 
bean seeds. This extremely toxic poison is easily prepared and all 
of the materials necessary to produce it, as well as the instructions 
on its production, were acquired from publicly-available sources. 

The four individuals investigated for producing the ricin es- 
poused extreme anti-government, anti-tax ideals and advocated the 
violent overthrow of the U.S. Government. They had specifically 
targeted a deputy U.S. Marshal who had previously served papers 
on one of them for a tax violation, as the victim to be poisoned with 
ricin. To carry out the poisoning, the subjects mixed the ricin with 
a solvent which would allow its absorption into the blood stream. 
They conspired to smear the ricin mixture on doorknobs or on car 
steering wheels in order to poison their victim. 

The FBI intervened in time to prevent this attack. This case is 
the first biological weapons investigation brought to trial and suc- 
cessfully prosecuted under the Biological Weapons Antiterrorism 
Act of 1989. On February 28 of this year, two of the defendants in 
the case were found guilty, having been named as principals in the 
ricin poisoning conspiracy. Two additional subjects involved were 
just convicted on October 25 for a violation of Title 18, United 
States Code, Section 175, naming them as co-conspirators in this 
act. 

There is a valid concern over the relative ease with which bio- 
logical materials and chemical precursors can be obtained. For ex- 
ample, in May of 1995, an individual is alleged to have acquired 
three vials of Yersina Pestis, the organism which causes bubonic 
plague, from a biological material supply company. The material 
was recovered, unopened, by law enforcement officials, and the in- 
dividual was arrested and charged with fraud. 

On June 27, the individual was indicted by a Federal grand jury 
on three counts of fraud by wire for opening an account by phone, 
faxing a letterhead memorandum with a fraudulent Environmental 
Protection Agency number thereon, and ordering the three vials of 
bacteria. Those vials had been shipped by Federal Express delivery 
service. 

To date, these are the only cases involving the potential use of 
biological agents that the FBI has investigated where prosecution 
has been sought. On recent occasions, the FBI has responded to 
communicated threats of nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorist 
attacks. These responses include the initiation of our threat credi- 
bility assessments in accordance with the guidelines set forth in 



239 

our operational, nuclear, biological, and chemical incident contin- 
gency plans. 

The threat credibility assessment process, entailing coordination 
with the other entities in the U.S. Government to examine avail- 
able information on the threat and determine its viability from a 
technical, operational, and behavioral standpoint, is very critical. 
To date, all of these alleged threats have been determined to be 
hoaxes. 

As the lead Federal agency in responding to acts of terrorist or 
criminal-related nuclear-biological-chemical incidents in the United 
States, the FBI has taken many actions in order to deal with this 
emerging threat. 

For example, we have developed and maintained a crisis man- 
agement plan to respond to a domestic nuclear-biological-chemical 
terrorist threat or incident, to include procedures for assessing 
threat credibility, operational Federal law enforcement response, 
notifying pertinent agencies, and deploying the necessary technical 
resources to assist FBI field operations and local authorities in in- 
vestigating, containing, and minimizing the consequences of the 
threat. 

Operational plans for responding to a CB terrorist threat or inci- 
dent are delineated in the FBI's chemical-biological incident contin- 
gency plan, and for a nuclear or radiological threat or incident, in 
our nuclear incident response plan. These plans, which have been 
in effect since the 1980s, are continually updated and revised, most 
recently in June of this year. 

The contingency plans have been constructed to provide a blue- 
print for Federal law enforcement crisis response to nuclear, bio- 
logical, and chemical threats or incidents. These plans outline and 
clarify the operational procedures that we will follow if faced with 
this threat or incident. 

The plans are also designed to marshall the appropriate Federal 
tactical, technical, scientific, and medical support to bolster the 
FBI's investigative and crisis management abilities and to augment 
local and State resources in addressing the threat inherent in one 
of these incidents. The contingency plans emphasizes coordination 
between all participants and these plans are particularly concerned 
with the bridge between the law enforcement crisis management 
activities and the management of the consequences of the crisis. 

The first priority of all these plans is the public safety and the 
preservation of life. In a terrorist or criminal-related incident, the 
FBI will assume the lead investigative and crisis management role, 
in association with local law enforcement authorities, to success- 
fully resolve the incident. 

Based on the specific details of the incident, law enforcement re- 
sponsibilities will be resolved or no longer a priority and the Fed- 
eral Emergency Management Agency will subsequently assume 
consequence management responsibilities for the incident. The 
FBI's nuclear, biological, and chemical incident contingency plans 
clarify and address this issue and provide guidance regarding the 
Federal management transition from the FBI to FEMA in this con- 
text. 

Earlier this year, the FBI headquarters tasked all of its 56 do- 
mestic field offices to conduct a chemical-biological terrorism exer- 



240 

cise in each of their regions in accordance with the guidehnes set 
forth in our contingency plan. This includes coordination and par- 
ticipation by other public safety agencies who would be involved in 
an incident of this magnitude. This includes first responders, re- 
gional offices of supporting Federal agencies, and State emergency 
management agencies who would be involved in the consequence 
management of such an incident. Each of our 56 field offices has 
taken action in response to this tasking and are in the process of 
planning and conducting CB exercises at the local level. 

Through vigilance in our investigations and the active coopera- 
tive exchanges with the intelligence community, we remain alert 
for terrorist intentions to acquire or employ weapons of mass de- 
struction. We continue to improve our capabilities to respond to 
threats of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons through active 
coordination with supporting Federal agencies. We continue to de- 
velop, plan, and deliver NBC-related training for our personnel. We 
continue the analysis of exercises conducted to date, which have 
been devoted to crisis management of nuclear, biological, and 
chemical threats and continue to develop new exercises. 

In conclusion, the FBI continues to be vigilant in both its intel- 
ligence collection and analysis to prevent an NBC incident and in 
our plans for a response should an NBC incident occur in the Unit- 
ed States. 

[Prepared Statement of Mr. O'Neilll 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. O'NEILL 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address your Subcornmittee on 
the threat caused by the proUferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) 
weapons. I'd also like to tell you about the measures which have been taken by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations to detect, prevent, and respond to the use of NBC 
in the United States. 

As you know, special weapons proliferation concerns the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. The FBI is the primary agency 
for foreign counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations within the Unit- 
ed States. The FBI has developed and coordinates a special weapons proliferation 
program in order to prevent the malevolent use and/or proliferation of WMD, includ- 
ing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the United States. The program re- 
lies on proactive domestic programs, foreign counterintelligence investigations in the 
United States, criminal investigations, counterterrorism investigations, close coordi- 
nation with the intelligence community, and international cooperation. 

As we have seen in our recent investigations, the ramifications of a terrorist act 
committed in the United States are great. The potential for the loss of life and dam- 
aging psychological effects from a terrorist attack in the United States involving 
NBC are even greater. Simply put, we cannot afford one such attack. Fortunately, 
to date, our investigations in the United States reveal no intelligence that rogue na- 
tions using terrorism, international terrorist groups, or domestic groups are plan- 
ning to use these deadly weapons. We remain vigilant, however, to the possibility 
of NBC terrorism, by pursuing intelligence and countermeasures programs that are 
well coordinated and well exercised. Our first goal is to prevent such an incident 
from occurring. Second, we must ensure we have the capabilities to respond swiftly 
and decisively should an attack occur. 

I'd like to speak about the threat of nuclear terrorism first. 

Within the past few years, there have been hundreds of reports of international 
smuggling and trafficking incidents involving nuclear material. The FBI has been 
involved in numerous nuclear smuggling investigations. In evaluating this threat 
date, there are no known instances where such nuclear weapons or weapons-grade 
nuclear materials have actually existed or been purchased in the United States. 
However, the FBI continues to investigate vigorously all allegations related to nu- 
clear threats within our jurisdiction. 

One of our most recent successful initiatives in the area was the FBI-sponsored 
International Law Enforcement Conference on Nuclear Smuggling, held from April 



241 

18 to April 20. 1995, at the FBI Academy. Among the 150 participants were law 
enforcement representatives from 23 countries, including the Russian Federation 
and the newly independent states. This conference displayed unparalleled coopera- 
tion between law enforcement and intelligence entities and culminated in an invalu- 
able exchange, where participants examined the international criminal problem of 
""Clear smuggling and its counterintelligence and terrorism implications. 

With regard to nuclear terrorism, it is acknowledged that the production of a nu- 
clear weapon would entail considerable technical expertise and funding thereby 
lessening the likelihood of such an incident at this time. 

The ability of terrorists to obtain and employ C/B agents, however is no longer 
subject to speculation. The sarin gas attacks in Japan earlier this year allegedly 
carried out by the Aum Shinrikyo, crossed the threshold with the use of a nerve 
agent to attack a civilian population. In response to the March 20, 1995 attack in 
the I okyo subway system, the FBI opened a criminal investigation based upon a 
violation of Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2331, which authorizes FBI extraterritorial 
investigation. As a result, we dispatched FBI agents to Japan We have 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in this matter because two American citizens were vic- 
tims of the sarin gas attack. Thankfully, both of them survived their injuries The 
''.^^ 1^. unable to confirm any additional investigations, if any, as this would be clas- 
sified information. 

Despite the fact that conventional methods of attack are the proven choice of ter- 
rorist organizations to date, the use of a C/B weapon or agent can no longer be ruled 
out, as the sarin gas attack in Tokyo demonstrated. Other groups may be inspired 
to employ C/B weapons for future terrorist attacks due to the worldwide attention 
the Japanese attacks received. 

Low production cost, ease of concealment, and lethality make some C/B agents 
possible terrorist weapons. Due to the relative ease with which C/B weapon could 
be acquired or constructed by a terrorist or terrorist group, the FBI remains vigilant 
to that possibility through our active investigations and close coordination with the 
intelligence community. In consideration of the magnitude and potential cata- 
strophic consequences of the release of such a weapon, the FBI aggressively pursues 
countermeasures programs and the readiness to respond to and mitigate the con- 
sequences of, such an attack. 

However, the only documented C/B attack in the United States involves the use 
ot a biological agent, which occurred in Oregon in 1984, when two members of a 
sect produced and disbursed salmonella bacteria in restaurants in order to affect the 
outcome of a local election. Seven-hundred-and-fifteen persons were affected- fortu- 
nately, there were no fatalities. 

The FBI recently concluded a case involving subjects who had manufactured ricin 
which is a deadly poison derived from castor bean seeds. This extremely toxic poison 
IS easily prepared, and all of the materials necessary to produce it, as well as the 
instructions on its production, were acquired from publicly available sources The 
four individuals investigated for producing the ricin espoused extreme anti-govern- 
ment, anti-tax ideals, and advocated the violent overthrow of the government For 
the ricin poisoning, they had specifically targeted a deputy U.S. Marshal who had 
previously served papers on one of them for tax violations. To carry out the poison- 
mg, the subjects mixed the ricin with a solvent which would allow its absorption 
into the b oodstream. They conspired to smear the ricin mixture on doorknobs or 
steering wheels in order to poison their victim. 

The FBI intervened in time to prevent the attack. This case is the first biological 
weapons investigation brought to trial and successfully prosecuted under the Bio- 
logical Weapons Antiterrorism Act of 1989. On February 28, 1995, two of the de- 
fendants in the case were found guilty under Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 175 and 
Z, naming them principals in the ricin poisoning conspiracy. Two additional subjects 
involved were just convicted on October 25, 1995, for violation of Title 18, U.S Code 
bection 175 and 371, naming them co-conspirators. 

There is a valid concern over the relative ease with which biological materials and 
chemical precursors can be obtained. For example, in May 1995, an individual is al- 
leged to have acquired three vials of Yersina Pestis, the organism which causes bu- 
bonic plague, from a bio-medical supply company. The material was recovered un- 
opened, by law enforcement officials, and the individual was arrested and charged 
with fraud. On June 27, 1995, the individual was indicted by a Federal grand jury 
on three counts of fraud by wire for opening an account by phone, faxing a letter- 
head memo with an fraudulent Environmental Protection Agency number and or- 
dering the three vials, which had been shipped via Federal Express 
,u ? .u^^^^'^u^ ^^^ ^^^ °"'y ^^^^^ involving the potential use of biological agents 
that the FBI has investigated where prosecution has been sought. On recent occa- 
sions, the t BI has responded to communicated threats of NBC terrorist attacks- to 



242 

include the initiation of threat credibility assessments in accordance with guidelines 
set forth in our operational NBC contingency plans. The threat credibility assess- 
ment process entails coordination with other entities in the U.S. Government to ex- 
amine available information on the threat and determine its viability from a tech- 
nical, operational, and behavioral standpoint. To date, all of these alleged threats 
have been determined to be hoaxes. 

As the lead law enforcement agency in responding to acts of NBC terrorism or 
criminal-related NBC incidents in the United States, the FBI has taken many ac- 
tions in order to deal with this emerging threat. For example, we have developed 
and maintain crisis management plans to respond to a domestic NBC terrorist 
threat or incident, to include procedures for assessing threat credibility, operational 
Federal law enforcement response, notifying pertinent agencies, and deploying the 
necessary technical resources to assist FBI field operations and local authorities in 
investigating, containing, and minimizing the consequences of the threat. 

Operational plans for response to a C/B terrorist threat or incident are delineated 
in the FBI's C^ incident contingency plan; and, for a nuclear or radiological threat 
or incident, the nuclear incident response plan. These plans, which have been in ef- 
fect since the late 1980's, are continually updated and revised, most recently, in 
June, 1995. The contingency plans have been constructed to provide a blueprint for 
a Federal law enforcement crisis management response to an NBC incident. These 
plans outline and clarify the operational procedures that we will follow if faced with 
an NBC threat or incident. 

The plans are also designed to marshall the appropriate Federal tactical, tech- 
nical, scientific, and medical support to bolster the FBI's investigative and crisis 
management abilities and to augment local and State resources in addressing the 
threat inherent in an NBC incident. The contingency plans emphasize coordination 
between all participants and are particularly concerned with the bridge between the 
law enforcement crisis management activities and the management of the con- 
sequences of the crisis. 

The first priority of the plans are public safety and the preservation of life. In 
a terrorist or criminal-related NBC incident, the FBI will assume the lead investiga- 
tive and crisis management role, in association with local law enforcement authori- 
ties, to successfully resolve the incident. 

Based on the specific details of an incident, law enforcement responsibilities will 
be resolved or no longer a priority, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) will subsequently assume consequence management responsibilities for the 
incident. The FBI's NBC incident contingency plans clarify and address this issue 
and provides guidance regarding the Federal management transition from the FBI 
to FEMA in this context. 

Earlier this year, FBI headquarters tasked the 56 domestic FBI field offices to 
conduct C/B terrorism exercise in each of their regions in accordance with the guide- 
lines set forth in the C/B incident contingency plan. This includes coordination and 
participation by other public safety agencies who would be involved in a C/B inci- 
dent; including first responders, regional offices of supporting Federal agencies, and 
State emergency management agencies who would be involved in the consequence 
management of such an incident. Each of the 56 field offices has taken action in 
response to this tasking and are in the process of planning and conducting C/B exer- 
cises. 

Through vigilance in our investigations and active cooperative exchanges with the 
intelligence community, we remain alert for terrorist intentions to acquire or employ 
weapons of mass destruction. We continue to improve our capabilities to respond to 
threats of NBC through active coordination with supporting Federal agencies. We 
continue to develop, plan, and deliver NBC-related training for our personnel. We 
continue the analysis of exercises conducted to date, which have been devoted to cri- 
sis management of NBC threats and continue to develop new exercises. 

In conclusion, the FBI continues to be vigilant both in its intelligence collection/ 
analysis to prevent an NBC incident, and in our plans for a response should an 
NBC incident occur in the United States. 

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. O'Neill. 

Next is Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special 
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict of the Department of De- 
fense. 

Mr. Holmes, I know you have to leave at about 12:40. Dr. Young, 
you are next and we will hear your testimony before we get into 
questions, but I would ask the members of the panel if they have 



243 

questions for Mr. Holmes, I think we should start with those since 
he has notified us in advance that he has to leave. After we com- 
plete the testimony, we will start with your questions, and I would 
hope, given the time, that you could both summarize in 8 to 10 
minutes, if you could. 

TESTIMONY OF H. ALLEN HOLMES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CON- 
FLICT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. Holmes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will summarize the 
highlights of my statement. 

You have heard testimony on the low cost, easy availability of 
the components, relatively low technical skills required, and the 
difficulty in detecting chemical and biological weapons. A dedicated 
effort by a terrorist organization could possibly lead to the cata- 
strophic scenario depicted by many efforts. There is no denying 
that the threat is real and that the Department of Defense and all 
Federal agencies are treating chemical and biological weapons use 
as a very serious possibility. 

But it should be kept in perspective. We should note that the 
Aum Shinrikyo attack was the most sophisticated attempt by a 
large, well-organized group employing a battery of quahfied sci- 
entists, utilizing advanced technical equipment and facility infra- 
structure and supported by considerable financial assets. Despite 
these highly-favorable factors, the effectiveness of Aum Shinrikyo's 
attack was less than might have been predicted. 

What the Tokyo attacks of March 1995 and the Matsumoto at- 
tack of June 1994 do demonstrate, however, is that a radical group 
bent on employing chemical or biological agents can recruit the 
type of scientific expertise required, acquire materials necessary to 
conduct such a campaign, and attempt to stage the event. As ter- 
rorists learn from past mistakes and gain experience in the weap- 
ons, the next attack could have far worse consequences. 

The tougher issue in many respects is the psychological problem 
of public fear resulting from the use of a chemical or biological 
agent. The fear generated by such an attack may pose more dif- 
ficult problems even than the physical threat itself The public 
must be made aware that chemical and biological agents have limi- 
tations and their effectiveness can be mitigated by several meth- 
ods. 

These agents present difficult challenges, but the Federal Gov- 
ernment is working hard to deter, prevent, and minimize their ef- 
fects and provide effective consequence management. We believe 
that with proper planning, coordination, focused research and de- 
velopment, and intelligence support, and the active participation of 
State and local authorities, our Government can respond to this 
threat. 

DoD's combatting terrorism program is part of a coordinated U.S. 
Government interagency team response. Several members of our 
tearn are here today. No single Federal agency possesses the au- 
thorities, response mechanisms, and capabilities to effectively deter 
and resolve terrorist incidents. The U.S. Government program is 
based on the lead agency concept, with the Department of State ex- 
ercising lead agency responsibility overseas and the Department of 



244 

Justice exercising lead agency responsibility for domestic incidents. 
The Department of Defense provides a significant supporting role 
to whichever lead agency is involved. 

We in DoD divide combatting terrorism into two components, 
antiterrorism and counterterrorism. Antiterrorism means the de- 
fensive measures employed to protect personnel and facilities 
against a terrorist incident. Conversely, counterterrorism refers to 
our offensive capabilities. 

It is DoD policy to protect its people, family members, facilities, 
and equipment from terrorist acts. Toward that end, we routinely 
budget for security at military installations and DoD independent 
schools. 

To highlight antiterrorism awareness and importance, my office 
sponsors an annual DoD Worldwide Antiterrorism Conference, 
which serves as a forum for exchange of ideas among DoD and 
other U.S. Government specialists. We also have an awards pro- 
gram. We established it a couple of years ago to recognize those 
who work quietly behind the scenes to protect DoD personnel, in- 
stallations, and their families. 

The second part of the Department's combatting terrorism pro- 
gram is counterterrorism. This includes DoD's support for U.S. pol- 
icy to deter, defeat, and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks 
against U.S. interests wherever they may occur. DoD supports the 
initiatives of the lead agencies in carrying out U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. For example, our office supports the State 
Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism in consultations with 
foreign governments, the deployment of emergency support teams 
at the request of an American ambassador to assist the host gov- 
ernment, and the Department of Justice in the extradition or ren- 
dition of terrorist suspects. 

DoD also largely funds the technical support working group re- 
sponsible for the research and development of counterterrorism 
technologies as U.S. DoD counterterrorism response capabilities 
are routinely exercised from the tactical to the national level. DoD 
special mission units frequently train and exercise with foreign 
counterterrorism units. 

Domestically, DoD forces serve in a support capacity to law en- 
forcement agencies, providing technical and operational support 
upon request. Whether supporting lead agency efforts or receiving 
assistance which enhances tactical capabilities from other Govern- 
ment agencies, DoD is an integral part of a well-organized and 
functional U.S. counterterrorism community. 

Looking specifically at how we would manage a terrorist incident 
involving either a chemical or biological weapon, it is important to 
note that the interagency group combatting terrorism separates the 
two threats. Should a chemical or biological threat occur, DoD can 
respond with special mission units, response teams to provide spe- 
cialized laboratory assistance and help with consequence manage- 
ment tailored to meet the individual incident. 

Looking at steps we are currently taking, DoD is conducting a se- 
ries of senior-level interagency tabletop exercises focused on weap- 
ons of mass destruction. The next two exercises will deal in large 
measure with biological weapons in a domestic scenario, aimed to- 
ward security preparations for the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. 



245 

The interagency CT community is also refmmg its procedures to 
include consequence management in weapons of mass destruction 
incident resolution. The inclusion of FEMA and the Public Health 
Service in the crisis and consequence management of terrorist 
weapons of mass destruction events is a critical and important new 
step by the interagency community. 

Another program is the technical support working group, which 
provides fast track research and development of counterterrorism 
equipment. This group is currently looking at six projects aimed 
specifically at enhancing response capability for a chemical or bio- 
logical incident. Recently, we began a review of many other projects 
to ascertain whether accelerating any of these with additional 
funding could bring equipment on line more quickly for use by our 
response units. A key area where DoD is making progress in fight- 
ing chemical and biological weapons is in detection technology. 

Mr. Chairman, we are confident of our ability to respond quickly 
to terrorist acts. There remain many technical challenges in re- 
sponding to the use of chemical and biological weapons, and I as- 
sure you that the interagency counterterrorism community is work- 
ing hard each day to solve those challenges. We are committed to 
working closely with you and with the State and local authorities 
to see that the American people are protected against the menace 
of international terrorism wherever and whenever it may arise. 
Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Holmes follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. HOLMES 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for this opportunity to discuss with you the Depart- 
ment of Defense's (DoD) role in Combatting Terrorism and how it addresses the 
threat of chemical and biological weapons used by terrorists. Among my duties as 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict), 
I serve as the Principal Staff Assistant and civilian advisor to the Secretary of De- 
fense for policy and planning related to combatting terrorism. These hearings pro- 
vide a positive step in educating the public on the nature of the threat and how 
the U.S. Government will respond. I would like to organize my remarks in the fol- 
lowing manner: first, to address the reality of the threat; second, to give a general 
overview of DoD's Combatting Terrorism program; and finally to discuss the specific 
measures DoD is taking toward countering the potential use of chemical and biologi- 
cal weapons by terrorists. 

You have heard testimony on the low cost, easy availability of components, rel- 
atively low technical skills requirement, and difficulty in detecting chemical and bio- 
logical weapons. A dedicated effort by a terrorist organization could possibly lead 
to the "catastrophic scenario" depicted by many experts. There is no denying that 
the threat is "real" and that DoD, and all Federal agencies, must treat chemical and 
biological weapons use as a very serious possibility. But it should be kept in per- 
spective. We need to note that the Aum Shinrikyo attack was a most sophisticated 
attempt by a large, well organized group employing a battery of qualified scientists, 
utilizing advanced technical equipment and facility infrastructure, and supported by 
considerable financial assets. Despite these highly favorable factors, the effective- 
ness of Aum Shinrikyo's attack was less than might have been predicted, what the 
Tokyo attacks of March 1995 and the Matsumoto attack of June 1994 do dem- 
onstrate, however, is that a radical group bent on employing chemical or biological 
agents can recruit the type of scientific expertise required, acquire materials nec- 
essary to conduct such a campaign, and attempt to stage the event. As terrorists 
learn from past mistakes and gain experience in the weapons, the next attack could 
have far worse consequences. 

The ability to create mass casualties by using chemical and biological weapons de- 
pends on many factors. Finding the right agent, weaponizing the agent, delivering 
the agent in an effective manner, and waiting for the optimal metrological condi- 



246 

tions would be a challenge to any terrorist group. We just need to keep in perspec- 
tive the reality of recent and potential events. 

The tougher issue involved was the psychological problem of public fear resulting 
from the use of a chemical agent. The fear generated by such an attack may pose 
far more difficult problems than the physical threat itself. The public must be made 
aware that chemical and biological agents have many limitations and their effective- 
ness can be mitigated by several methods. These agents present difficult challenges, 
but the U.S. Government is working hard to deter, prevent, and/or minimize the ef- 
fects and provide effective consequence management. We believe with proper plan- 
ning, coordination, focused research and development, and intelligence support, the 
U.S. Government can respond to this threat. 

DoD's Combatting Terrorism program is part of a coordinated U.S. Government 
interagency team response. No single federal agency possesses the authorities, re- 
sponse mechanisms and capabilities to effectively deter and resolve terrorist inci- 
dents. The U.S. Government program is based on a "lead agency" concept with the 
Department of State exercising lead agency responsibility overseas and the Depart- 
ment of Justice exercising lead agency responsibility for domestic incidents. The De- 
partment of Defense provides a significant supporting role to the lead federal agen- 
cy. 

Overseas, working with the State Department, DoD plays a vital role from initial 
planning through implementation of a wide range of overseas activities to include 
military to military cooperation, assistance, training, and joint exercises. Under the 
lead of the Department of Justice-and the FBI, DoD works closely with its domestic 
counterparts, not only to provide cooperation or assistance permitted under law but 
also to ensure that DoD personnel and facilities are protected against any possible 
terrorist threat. 

The Department of Defense is mandated by law, executive order, and Presidential 
Directive to have an effective Combatting Terrorism Program. In November 1988, 
the Secretary of Defense designated the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict [OASD(SO/LIC)] as the office re- 
sponsible for DoD policy and oversight on combatting terrorism. Since its inception, 
S0/1.IC has represented DoD as a key member of the U.S. Government's inter- 
agency counterterrorism effort. We routinely meet with our colleagues from the 
other federal agencies (several of whom are represented on this panel) to discuss, 
plan, and coordinate the U.S. Government response to terrorism. This interagency 
combatting terrorism team has been in existence since the mid-1980s. 

We, in DoD, divide Combatting Terrorism into two components. Antiterrorism 
(AT) and Counterterrorism (CT). Antiterrorism means the defensive measures em- 
ployed to protect personnel and facilities against a terrorist incident. Conversely, 
counterterrorism refers to our offensive capabilities. 

It is DoD policy to protect its personnel, their family members, facilities, and 
equipment from terrorist acts. Toward that end, DoD routinely budgets for security 
at military installations and DoD Dependent schools. To assist in the AT effort, 
OASD(SO/LIC) published DoDD 0-2000.12 (DoD Combatting Terrorism Program) in 
August 1990. This directive assigns specific responsibilities to various DoD elements 
for briefing personnel on any known or suspected terrorist threats and informs them 
of security measures to be taken. It also directs prompt dissemination of intelligence 
information (to those charged with security responsibilities) on terrorist threats, in- 
cluding specific threats against DoD personnel and their family members. 

Additionally, OASD(SO/LIC) published DoD 0-2000. 12-H (Protection of DoD Per- 
sonnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence) in Feb- 
ruary 1993, a handbook that serves as a comprehensive reference book for all DoD 
components on antiterrorism awareness, education, and training activities. 

To highlight AT awareness and importance, OASD(SO/LIC) sponsors an annual 
DoD Worldwide Antiterrorism Conference which serves as a forum for DoD and 
other U.S. Government antiterrorism specialists from throughout the United States 
and abroad to identify key issues and to reach consensus on possible solutions. The 
ASD(SO/LIC) also established an awards program in 1993 to recognize and praise 
those who work quietly behind the scenes to protect DoD personnel and installa- 
tions; sensitize U.S. Military and their families to the nature and dangers of terror- 
ism; and deter and prevent terrorist acts. 

DoD also provides antiterrorism training. In this regard DoD complements the 
Department of State's program for Antiterrorism Training Assistance by providing 
training to foreign military counterparts which may take the form of small unit ex- 
changes or participation in joint training and exercises. A detailed accounting of the 
training that is provided to foreign governments is discussed in the DoD portion of 
the classified State Department's Annual Antiterrorism Report to the Congress. 



247 

This report is mandated under provisions of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and 
Antiterrorism Act of 1986. 

DoD also works routinely with the Department of State in distributing travel 
advisories for DoD members and families. DoD follows the U.S. Government policy 
on "no double standard" regarding availability of threat information. This dictates 
that American Government officials cannot benefit from information which might 
equally apply to the public but is not available to the public. 

The second part of the Defense Department's Combatting Terrorism program is 
Counter-terrorism. This includes Defense Department support for U.S. policy to 
deter defeat and respond vigorously to all terrorists attacks against U.S. interests 
wherever they may occur. DoD supports the initiatives of the lead agencies in carry- 
ing out U.S. counterterrorism policy. For example, our office supports the State De- 
partment's Coordinator for Counter Terrorism in consultations with foreign govern- 
ments the deployment of Emergency Support Teams at the request of an American 
Ambassador to assist the host government, and the Department of Justice in the 
extradition or rendition of terrorist suspects. DoD also largely funds the Technical 
Support Working Group responsible for the research and development of CT tech- 
nologies. 

While it is DoD's policy not to discuss the capabilities, designations, missions and 
locations of DoD counterterrorism special units in a public forum, I would like how- 
ever, to briefly outline how DoD responds to a terrorist incident. During such an 
incident, the ASD(SO/LIC) has two primary roles. He is the Secretary's principal ci- 
vilian advisor. He also serves as the Secretary's representative to the interagency 
crisis coordinating body, which will handle the counterterrorism response. The Joint 
Staff provides a representative as well. The ASD(SO/LIC) provides policy advice 
while the Joint Staff representative provides operational comment and advice. 

U.S./DoD counterterrorism response capabilities are routinely exercised from the 
tactical to the national level. DoD special mission units frequently train and exer- 
cise with foreign CT units. Domestically, DoD forces serve in a support capacity to 
law enforcement agencies, providing technical and operational support upon request, 
whether supporting lead agency efforts or receiving assistance which enhances tac- 
tical capabilities from other government agencies, DoD is an integral part of a well 
organized and functional U.S. counterterrorism community. 

Looking specifically at how we would manage a terrorist incident involving either 
a chemical or biological weapon, it is important to note that the interagency combat- 
ting terrorism community separated the two threats. The interagency community 
recognized long ago that while chemical and biological agents may have some com- 
mon points, the production means, delivery vehicle, countermeasures, and expertise 
were based on completely different criteria. Clearly, in any effort to resolve a terror- 
ist incident, we would want to rely on expertise most familiar with the specific 
threat. Therefore to eliminate confusion and to focus our efforts, we elected to treat 
them as separate and distinct threats. Should a chemical or biological threat occur, 
DoD can respond with special mission units, response teams, provide specialized 
laboratories, and assist with consequence management assets tailored to meet the 
individual Incident. 

Finally, looking at what steps we are currently taking to handle chemical and bio- 
logical incidents-and prevent the proliferation of such weapons, there are a number 
of efforts that should be highlighted. Within the combatting terrorism program, DoD 
is conducting a series of senior level interagency tabletop exercises focused on weap- 
ons of mass destruction. The next two exercises will deal in large measure with bio- 
logical weapons in a domestic scenario aimed toward security preparations for the 
1996 Atlanta Olympics. DoD is refining the process through which it will provide 
military assistance to civil authorities to encompass procedures specifically designed 
to handle weapons of mass destruction in a domestic scenario. The interagency CT 
community is also refining its procedures to include consequence management in 
weapons of mass destruction incident resolution. The inclusion of FEMA and Public 
Health Service in the crisis and consequence management of terrorist WMD events 
is a critical and important new step by the interagency community. 

Another program within the interagency CT community is the Technical Support 
Working Group (TSWG) which provides fast-track research and development of CT 
equipment. The TSWG is currently engaged in six projects aimed specifically at en- 
hancing response capability for a chemical or biological incident. Recently, we began 
a review of all TSWG projects to ascertain if accelerating any of these projects with 
additional funding could bring equipment on-line more quickly for use by our re- 
sponse units. 

A key area where DoD is making progress in fighting chemical and biological 
weapons is in detection technology. There are systems currently fielded or in pro- 
duction for conventional military missions which may support counterterrorism ef- 



248 

forts as well. For example, there is currently a system which can detect surface 
chemical contamination and another which can detect and provide an alarm if the 
air is contaminated. Other systems are under development for chemical detection 
within a specific setting. For example the aircraft interior detector is designed to 
detect, identify, and warn of low levels of nerve or blister agents in vapor form. Such 
a system could also be used in subway stations. Similar capabilities are being devel- 
oped for biological agents. There are also integration systems designed to link point 
detectors as a network so that contamination occurring at multiple sites can be de- 
tected at a central location. The Marine Corps is looking at software packages de- 
signed to incorporate detection and meteorological information to track the dispersal 
of chemical contaminations. This system is being looked at for possible use at the 
1996 Atlanta Olympics. DoD is also investigating new technology for individual pro- 
tection (new suits and accessories) as well as decontaminates, post-exposure medica- 
tions, and vaccines. 

We are working closely with other nations on a bilateral and multilateral basis 
to halt and/or prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. U.S. Gov- 
ernment Policy is directed toward stemming chemical and biological weapons pro- 
liferation. We have identified key chemical precursors, biological pathogens, and nu- 
clear materials used in development of these weapons, and are using those precur- 
sors to establish databases to monitor, deter, and if necessary take action against 
those states or groups involved in chemical or biological weapons development. The 
President has issued three recent Decision Directives (PDD) on nonproliferation, nu- 
clear safety, and counterterrorism designed to increase U.S. Government efforts to- 
ward preventing proliferation. 

There are several treaties dealing with chemical and biological weapons, in addi- 
tion to the multilateral efforts to control products which are specifically needed to 
build such programs or the missiles that might deliver them. Within the interagency 
CT community, we have agreements with friendly nations to jointly develop equip- 
ment for combatting terrorism. Some of these efforts are aimed at the chemical and 
biological threat. Additionally, the interagency community is making every effort to 
enlist the aid of our allies and other nations to coordinate response capabilities for 
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. 

Mr. Chairman, we are confident of our ability to respond quickly to terrorist acts. 
There remain many technical challenges in responding to the use of chemical and 
biological weapons and I assure you that the interagency CT community is working 
hard each day to solve those challenges. We are committed to working closely with 
you and with State and local authorities to see that the American people are pro- 
tected against the menace of international terrorism wherever and whenever it may 
arise. 

I am ready for your questions. 

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Holmes. 
Dr. Young? 

TESTIMONY OF DR. FRANK E. YOUNG, M.D., Ph.D., DIRECTOR, 
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, PUBLIC HEALTH 
SERVICE 

Dr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As a physician who has worked in this field for over 20 years, 
I want to personally thank you and the Members of your Commit- 
tee for the leadership in holding this important hearing to bring at- 
tention to the need to prepare better for the potential use of weap- 
ons of mass destruction by terrorism. These cowardly acts of terror- 
ism affect not only our citizens but those around the world. 

To facilitate your investigation, I would like to make eight quick 
points to summarize the portions of my testimony that may be rel- 
evant from a medical standpoint. 

First, there are two major ways to minimize the impact of terror- 
ism with weapons of mass destruction — prevention through the in- 
telligence that you have heard described, including law enforce- 
ment, and disarmament conventions, and through preparation to 
ensure that a rapid response can be mounted to save lives and re- 
duce human suffering. Regardless of the type of perpetrator, state- 



249 

sponsored or independent, regardless of the means used, the con- 
sequences are the same. We need to be prepared for those con- 
sequences. 

Second, those consequences are primarily health and medical, 
and environmental. Those are the two issues that we need to face. 

Third, if I could have the first graphic put up (chart 1),^ the at- 
tack can occur with or without warning. The attack in Tokyo, the 
one in the Trade Center, and the attack at Oklahoma City were 
without warning. The excellent interaction that we have had, as 
Mr. O'Neill described, between crisis and consequence manage- 
ment, brings together the ability of our teams to focus on terrorism 
threats. This chart illustrates the decision tree that we go through. 

Fourth, FEMA is responsible for coordinating the Federal con- 
sequence management, through the Federal response plan as 
shown in the next graphic (chart 2). The portion in red that is 
shown there, health and medical services, is the portion that is the 
responsibility of the Department of Health and Human Services. 
Whether it be natural disasters or a terrorist attack, the same ap- 
proach is used. Our lead partners are the Departments of Defense, 
Veterans Affairs, Agriculture, Transportation, and the Environ- 
mental Protection Agency, just to mention a few. 

We are also supported by the private sector, which participates 
through the National Disaster Medical System. I am pleased to 
point out that we had three teams that responded to Hurricane 
Marilyn. There were teams from Georgia, Ohio, Boston, and others. 
There are over 5,000 individuals that can be called to duty, medical 
minute men and women that can respond and can go forth to serve 
those victimized by catastrophic natural disasters. 

Fifth, the people who respond first to catastrophic disasters are 
our police, fire fighters, and emergency medical personnel. Daily, 
they risk their lives to protect us. They have vastly different risks 
in responding to bombs and to earthquakes as compared to biologi- 
cal and chemical weapons. 

For example, though bombs and earthquakes can produce mas- 
sive destruction, the medical responders are primarily dealing with 
injuries resulting from trauma. Who can forget the firemen carry- 
ing young children out of the bomb site at Oklahoma City? Medi- 
cally, though, we are prepared to deal with this type of trauma and 
it is a relatively simple task compared to others. 

Chemical weapons are more difficult to identify immediately. 
They can kill the first responders unless there is continuous and 
appropriate training, the appropriate safety equipment, and 
prompt identification of the chemical agent. As you know from your 
investigation, it took many hours for the Japanese physicians to 
identify the agent that was involved, and only intravenous fluid 
support was used until that time. In general, health and medical 
professionals are far less equipped to deal with the response to 
chemical agents. 

Biological agents are usually not detected until symptoms appear 
and the disease has spread outside the area of the original attack 
zone. First responders are at high risk. Fortunately, the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention and the Food and Drug Admin- 



' The charts referred to appears at the end of Dr Young's prepared statement. 



250 

istration have good networks with the private sector, the depart- 
ments of health, industry, and consumer groups, to lead to early 
detection. Rapid diagnosis, determination of antibiotic suscepti- 
bility, establishment of disease surveillance, and obtaining suffi- 
cient supplies of antibiotics are essential ingredients to curtailing 
any outbreak. 

Sixth, the major points of the response medically are shown on 
the next two charts (charts 15 and 16). I will just go through a few 
of them. The threat assessment and the consultation with the af- 
fected jurisdictions are key. Rapid identification of the agent is es- 
sential. The clinical medical support through health professionals, 
laboratory support, and the use of the National Disaster Medical 
System for patient evacuation and in-hospital care, as well as phar- 
maceutical capabilities are critical for our successful response. 

Seventh, the overall strategy is shown in the final graphic (chart 
7). The rapid development of threat assessment, emergency con- 
sultation, deployment of a rapid technical assistance team for 
chemical and biological terrorism, and additional support as re- 
quired are the major features of the plan. 

Finally, I would like to share with you some of the principles 
that we gleaned in our discussions recently with State and local of- 
ficials. We have met with individuals from the Washington Metro- 
politan Council of Governments, the City of Boston, the Office of 
the Governor of Massachusettes and the State of California. We 
have involved our Disaster Medical Assistance Team leaders from 
San Diego and Atlanta in gleaning these principles as well. 

We learned that public information is essential to avoid public 
panic. A readily-accessible joint information center, at local, State, 
and Federal levels, is key. 

Second, awareness and training must be continuous. The fire 
fighters and other first responders emphasized that there is turn- 
over in jobs and turnover in personnel. Thus, the training must be 
continuous and medical supplies must be there. 

The concept of metro strike teams would be similar to the locally 
developed National Disaster Medical Assistance Teams. These 
metro strike teams would be on-site rapidly. There must be appro- 
priate supplies and equipment for these teams. 

It is important that communication capability and capacity are 
taken into account so that we can communicate in the early hours 
after an incident. 

And finally, the local responder must be able to be supported in 
an integrated fashion between Federal, State, and local govern- 
ments. 

The risks are enormous when we consider the potential — and I 
emphasize potential — horrific consequences of a terrorist use of 
weapons of mass destruction. In conclusion, we must be better pre- 
pared and must better prepare our dedicated men and women who, 
as emergency responders, place their lives on the line as they rush 
into harm's way to protect the citizens of our great country. To do- 
otherwise is unconscionable. 

This concludes my formal comments. I tried to summarize them 
briefly for you. I would be happy to answer any questions I can, 
sir. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Young follows:] 



251 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. YOUNG 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here 
to discuss the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to provide 
a public health perspective to your deliberations. As a physician who has addressed 
these issues in the laboratory, as a government official managing the public health 
response to terrorism due to chemical poisonings from cyanide, and as the leader 
of health and medical consequence response in the Federal Response Plan (FRF) 
under the coordination of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), I 
have been forced to wrestle with this problem from both a technical and a policy 
basis. 

Your emphasis on these issues coincides with a Presidential decision to focus on 
terrorism because of the increasing terrorist capability and demonstrated use of 
weapons of mass destruction. In fact much of the action of the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) is based on the Administration's policies in re- 
sponse to terrorism. It is important to note that there are significant differences 
among the non-lethal consequences of nuclear, biologic and chemical weapons of 
mass destruction, and we must be prepared for them. 

Background ., ^ 

Chemical weapons of mass destruction, such as mustard, phosgene and chlorine," 
were first used in World War I, and again in isolated conflicts in the 1960's, 1970's, 
and 1980's. The Tokyo subway attack in 1995 and the information described re- 
cently in the press about the potential use of these agents in the Middle East during 
the Gulf War serve as grim reminders of the recent use of biologic and chemical 
agents as weapons of terrorism. 

Biologic agents, like chemical agents, have been addressed in arms control con- 
ventions. However, unlike chemical and nuclear agents, the capability to combine 
biologic agents makes these agents extremely difficult to detect and monitor. Addi- 
tionally, infectious organisms can multiply and spread to individuals outside the 
original site of attack and can be engineered to be resistant to multiple antibiotics. 
An attack with weapons of mass destruction could occur with or without a known 
threat as shown in this chart (chart 1). When a threat occurs, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) leads the integrated Federal crisis management activities. In 
the case of weapons use without a prior threat, we would be faced with immediate 
public health consequences. 

Crisis and Consequence Management 

The Administration established policies to address both foreign and domestic ter- 
rorism. My remarks today will focus on the domestic issues only. 

The Federal management of domestic crises is the responsibility of the FBI and 
has been addressed by Mr. O'Neil. FEMA and the other domestic departments and 
agencies work closely to support the FBI through their crisis management plan. 

Specifically, HHS provides technical assistance in threat assessment and emer- 
gency consultation. The individuals who provide this assistance must be accessible 
for consultation within an hour of the reauest. HHS will also rapidly deploy individ- 
uals to supplement the FBI by on-site technical assistance. These experts would also 
be prepared to deal with consequence management if the need occurred. It is impor- 
tant to note that training and exercises are required to ensure roles are clearly 
known and the transition from crisis to consequence management occurs smoothly. 

FEMA provides overall coordination for consequence management. The FRP, 
signed by 26 departments and agencies, established primary responsibilities for 12 
Emergency Support Functions (ESF) as shown in this chart (chart 2). When the re- 
sources of the local and State governments are exhausted, and the President ap- 
proves a Governor's request for a Federal Disaster Declaration, FEMA activates the 
FRP and tasks the primary departments and agencies to provide essential services 
through formal mission assignments. 

HHS is responsible for ESF #8 — the health, medical and health related social 
services support. There are 16 functions included within ESF #8 as illustrated in 
this chart (chart 3). I have just returned from the Virgin Islands where I led the 
ESF #8 response to Hurricane Marilyn. Our efforts included the provision of patient 
care, health support to FEMA managed centers, sanitation, assurance of safe food, 
potable water, disease surveillance, vector control, environmental health and mor- 
tuary services. This was a coordinated health response that included key support 
from the Operating Divisions of HHS, and the Departments of Defense (DoD) and 
Veterans Affairs (DVA). 

An essential element in the response to both man-made and natural catastrophic 
disasters is the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). This system is made up 
of four departments and agencies, with HHS as the lead, and includes DVA, DoD 



252 

and FEMA. The NDMS has three major components: patient care, patient evacu- 
ation and patient in-hospital care. Patient care is provided by Disaster Medical As- 
sistance Teams (DMATs). Currently, there are 60 DMATs in existence, as shown in 
charts 4 and 5 by State membership and deployment. Of these, 21 are level 1 teams 
that can mobilize within six hours, with supplies and equipment for 72 hours of op- 
eration. These level 1 teams are self-sufficient with tents, food and water purifi- 
cation equipment. During Hurricane Marilyn, the DMAT teams provided most of the 
health care for 2.5 weeks in the aftermath of the storm on St. Thomas, and supple- 
mented care on St. Croix and St. Johns. DVA and DoD personnel also contributed 
significant support to the islanders during this time. Other major NDMS responses 
since 1989 are shown in chart 6. 

Two types of disasters can occur without warning earthquakes and terrorism. In 
both instances there must be an immediate response, since the number of lives lost 
will, in large measure, be directly impacted by the rapidity of the immediate re- 
sponse capabilities. Weapons of mass destruction cause death, injury and environ- 
mental destruction. Because loss of life is the paramount concern, the immediate 
and initial focus on the impact of terrorism must be on the health and medical con- 
sequences and the capacity of the first responders to save lives. 

Immediately after the Tokyo subway attack, the Coordinating Sub Group of the 
National Security Council tasked the Public Health Service to develop a plan of op- 
eration for the health and medical consequences of chemical and biologic terrorism. 
To begin to plan to meet these needs, in FY 1995, the Secretary of HHS allocated 
funds for the initial planning document. The Office of Emergency Preparedness 
(OEP), as the lead office in HHS, serves as chair and FEMA as the co-chair of the 
interagency committee to develop the immediate health and medical response to ter- 
rorism with biologic and chemical agents. Key departments and agencies involved 
include DoD, DVA, Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Agri- 
culture, FBI, Department of Transportation, and the General Services Administra- 
tion. The committee developed a draft interim plan that integrated the immediate 
health and medical responses of the Federal agencies in support of States and local 
governments (charts 7-10). A few key components of the plan deserve additional 
emphasis, including: 

• Needs assessment for gaps in response capability; 

• Planning, training and exercises are essential to prepare first responders; 

• Metro strike teams trained and ready to cope with biologic and chemical 
agents are essential to support the first responders. These special NDMS 
teams in high risk metropolitan areas would be able to respond within 30 to 
90 minutes (charts 11-13); 

• Communication equipment and expertise is likely to be among the weakest 
links in the response. In the aftermath of the New York Trade Center and 
Oklahoma City bombings, there was an absence of communications capacity 
for about 3 hours. Effective communications will be essential in response to 
terrorism. 

• Administration policy requires a review of the adequacy of NDMS. While the 
level 1 DMATs are appropriately placed for natural disasters (chart 14), there 
are deficiencies with respect to terrorism in large metropolitan areas. 

Presidential Actions and Associated HHS Budget Request 

The President requested that HHS support crisis management through technical 
assistance and development of a rapid deployment team, and consequence manage- 
ment, through the development of plans, identification of shortfalls in plans, and ac- 
tions to remedy those shortfalls. Because HHS is the lead Federal department in 
the immediate aftermath of attack, specific attention was directed to the adequacy 
of NDMS to respond effectively and deficiencies in stockpiles of medicines. 

In response to these additional responsibilities, the President amended the FY 
1996 Budget to provide an additional $9 million to begin to plan for the health and 
medical consequences of domestic terrorism. This funding request was offset by de- 
creases elsewhere in HHS, and was thus, budget neutral. Key elements of this re- 
quest include: 

• Initiating and coordinating integrated planning and evaluation activities with 
Federal, State and local authorities; 

• Training health professionals, emergency responders and emergency man- 
agers, at the Federal, State and local levels, to augment the skills of person- 
nel involved in medical response, early detection, surveillance, inspection, 
sample transportation and laboratory detection. 

• Providing medical response coordination through additional medical, scientific 
and logistic personnel stationed in OEP and HHS regions who would provide 



253 

technical assistance, procure required antidotes and antibiotics, and establish 
the medical support unit to coordinate the emergency response (charts 15 and 
16). 

• Enhancing warning and detection systems to reduce the severe consequences 
of these destructive agents through rapid medical diagnosis. 

• Providing increased capability to identify organisms and identify chemical 
agents in order to quickly identify and provide the appropriate medical treat- 
ment to minimize the morbidity and mortality from a chemical/biological 
agent. 

• Enhance medical and epidemiologic public health activities to be prepared to 
deal with the public health consequences of a terrorist attack. 

• Building and activating four metropolitan strike teams who would be spe- 
cially trained to meet the needs of patients in high risk communities with 
health problems related to weapons of mass destruction. 

Public Health Concerns 

The primary public health concerns include but are not limited to: public health 
advisories; agent identification; hazard identification; hazard reduction; environ- 
mental decontamination; clinical medical support; pharmacy support; worker safety; 
and mortuary support. In the event of a chemical attack with a highly lethal agent, 
immediate therapy is essential. It is important to emphasize that the attack in 
Japan was not with a highly lethal concentration of sarin and that only those in 
the immediate vicinity of the release were killed. Thus the threat to health and 
safety of both the first responders and many of the victims was relatively low. How- 
ever, even in the case of relatively small number of people killed, as in the case of 
the cyanide tampering of Tylenol in the U.S., there was public panic that demanded 
prompt response. First responders have informed us that proper equipment and 
training is essential to ensure a prompt response and that currently, some metro- 
politan areas are unprepared. These courageous fire fighters, police, and emergency 
medical support personnel risk their lives to protect us. It is just wrong to ask them 
to respond without proper preparation. 

With a biologic agent, there is an incubation period followed by a sudden onset 
of symptoms. The rapid identification of the agent is necessary to save lives through 
antimicrobial therapy as the organism can spread to individuals outside the original 
site of attack. Since public anxiety can be expected, accurate public health 
advisories, an appropriate supply of medicine and the capacity to respond medically 
are among the most essential activities. 

At this time, there is no coordinated public health infrastructure to deal with the 
medical consequences of terrorism. The budget request would provide the resources 
to begin to address the following deficiencies: 

• Lack of integration at the Federal, State and local levels, of various dis- 
ciplines required to respond to this type of threat; 

• Inadequate number of trained and experienced responders at all levels; 

• Medical response not placed in high risk metropolitan areas, such as Wash- 
ington, D.C.; 

• Inadequate infrastructure to respond to the increasing number of emer- 
gencies, including an insufficient secure communications facility; and 

• Significant gaps in early warning and detection systems, identification of 
chemical and biologic agents, surveillance, decontamination procedures, and 
worker safety — both in high risk areas and in Federal facilities. If funds are 
not appropriated to fulfill the President's request, the Federal/State/local co- 
ordinated response would be compromised. 

HHS Plan of Action 

The threat of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction is real. While the first 
line of defense is good intelligence and effective crisis management, the Nation must 
be prepared for the unthinkable health and medical consequences. Since it is likely 
that both local and State resources would be overwhelmed in the aftermath of a ter- 
rorist attack with weapons of mass destruction, an integrated Federal, State and 
local response is required. Key ingredients of the plan include, but are not limited 
to the following: 

• Coordinated planning of the integrated Federal family of health and medical 
responders with State and local first responders. It is not acceptable to ex- 
change business cards for the first time at the site of a disaster. 

• Identification and development of training and exercise materials. 



254 

• Formation of integrated teams of first responders with emphasis on pre hos- 
pital care including: triage of patients, decontamination of patients, treatment 
of patients, and as appropriate, patient evacuation. 

• Pre-development of public health advisories and repositories of information 
that are readily available during crises. 

• Augmentation of the infrastructure at the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, the Food and Drug Administration and the National Institutes of 
Health to rapidly identify chemical and biologic agents. 

• Augmentation of the Federal first responder capability to ensure technical as- 
sistance and rapid deployment of NDMS. 

• Ensure sufficient supplies of medicines and vaccines to meet potential needs. 

This is an important and large mission. To do less would be a disservice to the 
American people. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening remarks. I would be happy to answer 
any questions that you and the Subcommittee members may have. 



255 



u 



!/5 

H 
H 



1/3 

o 

H 
PQ 







u 


CZ3 




1/3 


;3 




o 
z 






!Z3 











H 




< 




» 


u 


P< 


(73 


K 


U) 


H 


o 


O 


z 


Z 





256 



en 

G 
O 

I 
S 

§• 

a 

C 
<u 

OX) 

I 











< 


y 




o~ 


o 


& 


=J 


< 












UJ 


« r 




O O O 1 


3 00 



m o a: 5 
c z z P 



O O Q tf) H 
OT O O O O 
3 




O t O < X C 



3^ « ^ z < 
Q O O (u « 

a o o o u. o 



O O 111 X o _ 



<2S 
u a 



O O X O -I I- _ 

aoxOQOQ 
3 a o a o o < 






257 




258 



/ 



1 


►J 






































' 







rt 












































s 












































f-l 


O 


O 


CM 


o 


e- 


o 


r* 


m 


n 


o 


(N 


**> 


in 


r- 


•"* 


•H 


o 


m 


o 


1^ 


^J 


















































-H 








■* 


























rH 




o 










































2 












































>t 












































.-) 






















































«H 




rH 


*H 








r-1 


rH 


<N 














t^ 


s 










































'^ 


O X 










































fe 


5S 




























.-« 














8 


s^" 










































O 


o 










































H 










































J 












































^ 
ti 


S8 
















■-I 












-^ 














Q 


§^ 










































s 


w 




















































































B 


-.S 












































Sg 










U1 








w 










CN 


-^ 










rH 


>« 


a 










































W 






















































































^ 












































<: 


g8 
































t-t 










u 


Q J 










































^^ 


•H Eb 










































o 


ac 










































5-" 










































^J 


.J 












































M 




































tH 








Ed 










































t-i 










































t/5 


^ 










































^ 


w 










f-« 














r^ 
















W 


■< 


Z 










































^ 


M 










































Q 


2 










































d 














n 


•H 


tH 




iH 


»H 


^ 










rH 




CN| 


< 


§ 




















































































P 


S 




























rH 












rH 


< 


§ 










































Z 
























































































« 












































Si 

"1 


O 




o 




CO 






o 

00 
CI 








ON 


rH 

CM 




o 
m 


in 


s 


in 




VC 
CO 
CM 




























o 










« 

c 


































*J 


£ 








-^ 


































4J 


g" 






-^ 


^ 








< 










« 
















0) 






o 





>■ 















-( — 
















OS —- 


■o 









u 


a> 


o 








ID 




c m 


o 


O 


a 




o 


m 


>1 


D O 


T3^ 


c 


-H 




a 


m 








« 


<J 


« 


Ȥ 


■o 


51 


o € 




-H 


Si 


>: 


-C € 


c S 


to 


ti 


01 


o 


u 


X 




« 


§ 


n 


c 


« 


-^ a 


-H 





o 


o 3 


<d - 


CJ> 


D 


in 




CI 


111 




^ 


c 


o 


«M « 


u 


^4 • 


o> 


-^ 


c 


« 0) 


D 


« 0) 


•H « 


-^ 







JH 


►:) 


z 






n 


£X 


« 


N 


-( ♦J 


o 


VI H 


M 4-> 


« 


-^ 


-< 4J 


4-» 


Q 4J 


>.E ;- 


JZ 


O 


m 


*j 










« 


01 


j< 


<-4 


^ 


r^ 


o 





3 


rH 


T3 


C 


O 


ss; 


o 


0) 


CO 


u 


s 


3 






fH 


rH 


u 


U 


«) Ov 


O 


>-t ^ 


• r^ 


to 


^^ 


C 'T 


0) 


« <N 


--^ 









HI 


HI 


^^^ 




< 

=■ .J 


< 


< 


< 


O ^ 


O 


6. — 


O — 


X 


M 


M ^-' 


txi 


X -- 


Xtl- 


X 


X 


Z 


z 


2 


2 



259 







d 






















=T= 


I 




































^ 


rn 


<N 


uil O 


o 


ol ol o 


•* 


o| cn] o||^^ 




:^ 


















































r^ 














o 
































z 
































>< 
































>J 
































M 




•H 






















•H 




i 


o >< 
2 "^ 


t-t 




r-i 












^ 








^ 




o 


O 






























H 
























' 






.-rH 


































88 

O 


rH 
























<N 




1 


W 




























































E^^ 


"S 


















•-• 




»-i 








>i 


o 






























w 

^ 
































H 

¥8 






























u 


O •-) 






























^^ 
































Q 
































>H 


























~"^ 




^> 


^ 






























































« 


z 
u 


























-^ 




































M 






























^ 


z 






















«-) 




in 






»H 






























2 


























^™~ 




i 


Q 

3 




»H 


<N 












fH 












g 
1 


i 


























CI 




« 


























~— _ 








r- 


in 

CM 


in 


in 
rn 


in 




o 

Ol 


00 


1^ 


<N 


O 

o 


































in 














































« 


■o 


4 
C 












■g 


1 














--^ 


c 


.H 












2 






u 










c 


« 

















f- 












.-1 


















< 


S§ 


§ 




c§ 


> a 










4J 












2 — 


*J 

-H 

O — 


o 


«l 
01 

U IN 

o — 


c w 

c 

O IN 
0. — 


1 


♦J 

3 
O 

m 


c 
e CM 


O 01 

0) CM 


0) 
> 


-H 

2 


o 
o 

at 

— * 





260 







261 



o 




262 






sis 

O _ 

o .= m 
.— ^ *««« 





♦d 




c 




« 




E 




0) 


< 


o 




_ 5 


o 


-^^- (jj 




o 


o 


c 


1- 


0) 


m 


3 

a 


o 


0) 
(0 













o 



UJ 

u. 



Q. 
UJ 

o 



Q < _ "J 

2 0. < m o 
LU > Li. Q 



< U. Q 
" O Q Q 



o 

< < 

L4^ 



< 



cc. ± 
O Li. X z 



CO 

o 


c 

0) 




E 


^ 


o 


E 


a 

CQ 


k. 
o 


■^^ to 


L- 




a 


(A 


H 


(0 


ffl 


k. 


<3 


ol 





9 <iy 






O a UJ o 






Q UJ U. Q 






UU 




Q. 




2 


UJ 




c 


Q 

X 
Q. 


^ < 

< u. o < w 


MHSA 
S Regi( 


ooQQa:i<x 
<<ou.xzwx 



L4A 



263 






< 

LU 

I- 



LLI 

> 

o 

-J 

Q. 
LU 

D 

9 

Q. 
< 

QQ 
O 



CO 

O 
Q. 



IX) 



CO 



0) 

o 



0) 
CO 



(0 



Q. 



0) 

3 







V) 






c 






^^ 






£ 






o 






k_ 




(0 

c 

(0 


(0 
0) 






0) 




c 


cc 




,^ 






o 
o 

H 


"<5 
o 




(0 


■D 




c 


0) 




o 


^ 




+J 






(D 


> 


0) 

Q 




E 


S 


o 


< 


<N 


CO 


CO 


1 


1 


 



CM 



< 
CO 



(0 
0) 



(0 

3 
O 

o 

0) 



£ £ 

QQ 



C 
<1> 

£ 

(0 
0) 

<0 

(0 

< 

"5) 
_o 

o 
£ 

a 

LU 



0} 
O 

(0 

o 

c 



(0 
U 

0) 



(0 



Q -S 



c 

o 
(0 



(C 

o 

E 

o 

o 

«+- 
0) 

3 



a> ^ 



(0 



o 

0) 



CN 



0) 


1 


0) 


^mm. 


CC 


Q 


_ 


O 


(D 




o 


CC 




S 


0) 


< 
CO 


> 


D 


£ 


0) 


< 


0) 

c 


 


o 


CO 

 





D 


Q 



0) 

a 

X 

m 

0) 
(0 



(0 



(0 

o 
£ 

0) 



(0 






c 
u 



o 
o 



264 



u 














^ 












J2 

o 

(0 

(i> 






c 

 ■■M 

c 






w 

0) 
M 
(0 
OQ 

(0 






*^' 




00 


a. 
O 






'5) 

c 






Q 


P 








1 


To 






LU 




E 


c 


. 








D 
LU 


o 

a. 

(0 

Q 


c^ 


(0 


C 

*-• 




(0 

H 

+-• 

(0 

 


"35 

c 

(U 

CO 


< 

Q. 
LU 




, ,•• 




4-» 

c 

+-• 

o 
o 

LU 

"<5 
o 

c 
o 


> 
o 

Q. 

X 

UJ 

c 

E 
c 
o 

> 
c 

LU 

(0 

3 


E 

z 

(D 

3 

(0 

c 
o 


(0 

• MM 

(0 

o 

Q. 

(0 

c 
o 

(0 

o 

H- 

mmm 

<-• 
C 
0) 

2 


C 
0) 

E 

Q. 
O 

> 
0) 

Q 

o 
(5 

0) 
(0 




1 

O 
LU 


o 



+-• 

C 
< 

O 

V) 

c 

0} 

o 
CO 


an (Remote iVIeteriologica 
diction) 


>- 

o 

c 


< 

c 
o 

^-» 

o 
o 

Q. 

"(5 


• MM 

(0 

o 

0) 

Q. 

CO 

O) 

c 
o 

♦-• 

C 

o 

"<5 

*■> 
c 

(U 

E 
c 
o 


1 

iu 
O 
Q 

h. 

0) 

c 

LU 

o 


75 

 ■M 

o 

a 

CO 

c 

• MM 

o 

c 
o 

^ 

75 
o 


1- 
>< 


O 

•a 


(0 


(0 

o 
'5) 


CC 

•u 


Q 

a: 


To 
o 

E 
o 

o 




c 
o 




o 


E 
< 


(0 
N 
(0 

X 


o 
o 


o 
o 


UJ 

0) 


^ <0 


E 

c 
o 


> 
c 

LU 


E 


o 
'■5 

(0 


C/) 


00 


75 

> 


CM 


0) 


4-» 


T— 


r- I 


'> 




(0 

Q. 


t- 


 


1 


(C 


1 


"D 





I 


1 


c 


1 


0) 


1 


3 




2 




LU 


O 






LU 




Q 





265 



u 



CD 

DC 
O 



0) 

O 

yj 



o 

I 



o 

Ul 

o 




I 




266 



u 
u 




CO 

C 

o 

p> 
S 

I 

CO 

"5 
o 
o 



<0 

£ 
"c5 
■8 

ll 
CO r: 



§5 
E.2 

E "c5 

J? o 



.a 

(0 



0) 

Q> 
O 

c 



CO <o 

c5 ^ 
S£ 

CO cp 

o cj S 



CO 

s 

c 

s 

o 

t 

p 

c? 

CQ 

"O 
Q) 

c 
.2 

'5 
o 

a 



CO 

s 

"c5 

c 

.a 

£ 

CQ 

8 

CQ 

■o 



I 

O 

t 
1 

.o 

« 

c 



267 



u 



o 



g 



CO 

O 

s 

LU 



O 
O 

o 
o 

CO 




§.2 

^ o 

s  



I 

s 



o 

0) 
Q) 
O 

c 

CO 

c 
o 
o 



E 



Q 



2e 

2 .12 ? 
c c c 

S <B «o 

E .a a 

111 

q> o >^ 



c 
Q 



o 

c: 

a 

"3 

c: 
o 
o 

I 

i2 



.■I 

o 

.£ 

§ 






:3 
o 
•o 

8 

Q) 



5J 



I 



Q) 

o 

"O 

c: 
CO 

E 

cb 

(1> Q) 

is ? 

CtS Q> 
.O CO 

9- Q 

§•§• 






a o 



c-g 



■a p 
5 c^ 



'*^^i;4!a:i;i:^aisj^ 



268 



u 



C/5 

H 



> 

CO 
CO 

Pi 




269 



cji 



o 

H 
U 

H 



CO 

C 
O 






u 

o 

u 
u 

y 

H 



CO 

•c 

< 



- s 





fl 




© 

C8 


a> 


•4^ 




s 


-4^ 


o 




U 


Ui 


e 


H 


U 



In 
(4M 



S 
On 



0Q 
U 

H 

"a 



a 



c 

T3 



C 
<J1 



S 
^© 

'4irf 



*5jd 

s 



c 

a> 

a> 

C) 

c« 

N 
«5 

S 
0) 

a 



^o 

;^ 

-a 

u 

03 

N 

K 
s 

-3 

a 









© 

c 

a 

s 
© 

In 

*>! 
c 



© 
a 
a 

C/3 



03 

c: 



u 
u 

CD 

u 



270 



>^ 

;^ 

9 

o 



09 



o 
a 
a 
s 



S € 



a 

Cm 
O 

On 



78 



03 



■4^ 

o 

a 

a 

s 


fi 




1 




■4^ 

c 
0^ 






u 


a 

a 

s 




a 
*3 


s 

o 
•p« 

•*^ 


^ 


> 


73 




(2^ 




© 




•4^ 


s 


o 


C 

.32 


-4^ 

c 


o 

C8 




O 




c 


s 


H^ 


IIh 




S 


a 




1 


1 


1 


US 


3 




1 


1 


1 


Oh 


ffi 


C« 


> 



271 

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Dr. Young. 

I am going to defer to Senator Cohen to ask Mr. Holmes ques- 
tions at this point and then we will come back with questions for 
the panel. 

Senator Cohen. Just a couple of quick questions, Senator Nunn. 

On page 3, Mr. Holmes, you indicate that it a DoD policy direc- 
tive requires you to inform other personnel through "prompt dis- 
semination of intelligence information on terrorist threats." As I 
read that, it looks like dissemination of information to DoD person- 
nel. Does it go beyond that? As I understand it, in the wake of the 
attack in March, DIA was among the first to gather information 
about Aum's activities and I am wondering what kind of circulation 
you provided to other intelligence agencies beyond DIA. How does 
it get beyond DoD? 

Mr. Holmes. That information is piped almost immediately into 
the intelligence community network and it is available to every- 
body. In fact, we met literally within hours after the news of the 
Aum Shinrikyo attack. Our NSC group met together, and John 
O'Neill was there 

Senator COHEN. So, basically, the dissemination goes beyond 
simply DoD? 

Mr. Holmes. Yes. 

Senator COHEN. It goes through the intelligence community? 

Mr. Holmes. Information goes throughout the intelligence com- 
munity. 

Senator COHEN. Second, on page four of your testimony, you indi- 
cate that "DoD counterterrorism response capabilities are routinely 
exercised from the tactical to the national level" and you "fre- 
quently train and exercise with foreign CT units." One of the con- 
sequences of posse comitatus is exactly that the DoD should have 
an assisting role but not the primary role within the U.S. You have 
joint activities with other Federal agencies, but there is no mention 
made about State and local agencies. Have you had joint activities 
at the local level? 

Mr. Holmes. Yes, we have. I cannot think of any particular exer- 
cises at this point, but when we do conduct these joint exercises in 
communities, the local law enforcement authorities are involved, at 
a minimum, in allowing us to set up the maneuver area. 

Senator COHEN. I think we need to have perhaps some more de- 
tailed briefing in terms of what type of activities that the Depart- 
ment plans in its exercises with local law enforcement and State 
agencies, as well. 

Mr. Holmes. I would be glad to respond to that. 

Senator Nunn. Let me also yield to Senator Glenn for questions 
to Mr. Holmes. 

Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just was wondering, I do not believe I heard you mention, and 
this would come under the control of DoD, what NSA does in this. 
NSA has some absolutely mind-boggling capabilities as far as pick- 
ing up information and preventing some of these things from ever 
happening. I know they feed information that goes out to the CIA 
and so on; it is all a cooperative effort. There have been budget 
cuts out there and so on that I just find are unconscionable almost 
with the job that they could be doing. 



272 

Are they tasked to look into this particular area? If not, why not? 
Are budget cuts affecting their ability to do this? Did you leave 
them out of your testimony inadvertently as an important player, 
or 

Mr. Holmes. No, NSA is a critical player, obviously, and their 
intelligence gathering and warning capabilities are definitely 
cranked into what we do as a community. That exists and it is con- 
tinuing. 

Senator Glenn. Are the budget cuts they are facing cutting back 
on their ability to do some of these jobs? 

Mr. Holmes. I could not give you an informed answer to that, 
Senator, but I would be glad to take the question and submit it in 
writing. 

Senator Glenn. If you could provide that for us, I think 

Mr. Holmes. Yes. 

Senator GLENN. I think some of the cutbacks in those areas are 
very — we think the Cold War is over so all of our problems have 
been solved, and we have just changed directions in some of our 
problem areas is all we have done. Thank you. 

Senator NuNN. Mr. Holmes, let me ask one or two and then we 
will get you out here in a couple of minutes. Have there been 
changes in the way the Department of Defense conducts its busi- 
ness since the Aum Shinrikyo attack? 

Mr. Holmes. I hope I would not surprise you by saying that a 
lot of what we have been talking about today, we have been work- 
ing on for about a year and a half, particularly regarding weapons 
of mass destruction and with a special focus on chemical and bio- 
logical threat, dating to about 6 months before Aum Shinrikyo. 

That attack, however, did confirm that we were on the right 
track and stimulated us to redouble our efforts in certain areas, for 
example, to focus more of our research and development for 
counterterrorism technologies on the threat. There is a new Marine 
Corps response unit that is being organized by the Department of 
the Navy, that will be operational probably this coming summer, 
and will be available to operate in a contaminated environment. 
The unit would participate in the consequence management area of 
an attack. It will be an asset available to DoD as a whole and to 
the interagency. 

These are two specific examples of where we have focused our ef- 
fort more intensively since Aum Shinrikyo. 

Senator NuNN. The antiterrorism bill as passed the Senate and 
is pending in the House, and I understand that there is consider- 
able reluctance to pass it over there; there are a lot of different fea- 
tures of it. What features of that bill are essential, if any, for the 
Department of Defense in addressing your role to biological re- 
sponse as well as chemical response for an attack in the United 
States? 

Mr. Holmes. I would like to give you a more considered answer 
in writing on that, but certainly to the extent that we are able to 
operate and support civilian law enforcement in taking care of a 
chemical and biological incident, that will be helpful. 

But even today, we feel that we do have the authority to provide 
expert support to law enforcement. The only thing that is missing 
today would be the authority to lift posse comitatus limitations 



273 

which do prevent active military from arrests, searches, seizures, 
those kinds of